The CFPB’s Dwolla order, which it called its first data security action, charged security claims, not a breach

The March 2, 2016 consent order, in findings Dwolla neither admitted nor denied, found its claims of encryption, PCI compliance and better-than-industry security untrue, and required a full program with board oversight. The Bureau’s later unfairness guidance came in 2022 and was withdrawn in 2025.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

The March 2, 2016 consent order, in findings Dwolla neither admitted nor denied, found its claims of encryption, PCI compliance and better-than-industry security untrue, and required a full program with board oversight. The Bureau’s later unfairness guidance came in 2022 and was withdrawn in 2025.

  1. The week Dwolla had consented.
  2. The claims: what Dwolla told consumers These were marketing claims, written to win customers.
  3. The gap: what the Bureau found about practice Those dates overlap the period of the claims, which the order dated from January 2011. [2] In our reading, the timing is the case.
  4. The remedy: the program the order required The first requirement was conduct.
  5. The legal basis: deception, and later unfairness The order found Dwolla was a covered person under the Consumer Financial Protection Act. [2] That status gave the Bureau jurisdiction over a company that was neither a bank nor a credit union.
  6. How the order reached different institutions The order named one company.
  7. Objections, in order The penalty was small. [1] The obligations were not: a full program, twice-yearly risk assessments, annual independent audits, board review of every submission and Bureau supervision for the life of the order. [2] The cost of compliance with the order was the larger consequence.
  8. Checks a compliance or security leader could run Collect every public statement about security: website pages, app store text, onboarding screens, sales materials, support macros and contract language.
  9. With hindsight The Dwolla order was the Bureau’s first data security action, by its own description. [1] By its terms, the order would terminate five years from its effective date, or five years from the most recent date the Bureau began an action alleging a violation, with provisions for dismissals. [2] We did not find, in the sources opened for this article, a later Bureau action alleging that Dwolla violated it.

The week

On March 2, 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau announced an action against Dwolla, Inc., an online payment platform based in Des Moines, Iowa. [1] The Bureau said Dwolla had deceived consumers about its data security practices and the safety of its online payment system. [1] It ordered the company to pay a $100,000 civil money penalty and fix its security practices. [1]

The press release called it the Bureau’s first data security action, and said it built on advances made by several other agencies. [1] The consent order, filed on March 2, 2016, as File No. 2016-CFPB-0007, cited sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which prohibit deceptive acts and practices. [2]

Dwolla had consented. The order said the company executed a stipulation dated February 24, 2016, and consented to the order without admitting or denying the findings of fact or conclusions of law, except for facts establishing jurisdiction. [2]

The order described the business. Dwolla launched in Iowa on December 1, 2009, in California on April 5, 2010, and nationally on December 1, 2010. [2] Consumers became members by registering, and could transfer funds from a Dwolla balance or a linked bank account. [2] To open an account they supplied name, address, date of birth, telephone number and Social Security number; to link a bank account, the account and routing numbers. [2]

The order said Dwolla held consumers’ funds in a single pooled account at Veridian Credit Union, an Iowa-chartered federally insured credit union, or at Compass Bank, a federally insured bank. [2] As of May 2015, it said, Dwolla had approximately 653,000 members and had transferred as much as $5,000,000 per day. [2]

Access ran through credentials and software. To transfer funds, the order said, consumers entered a username, a password and a unique four-digit PIN. [2] Members reached their accounts through Dwolla’s website or through applications, on a network the order said was designed and supported by Dwolla or its third-party vendors. [2]

The Bureau’s findings centered on what Dwolla had said. From January 2011 to March 2014, the order found, Dwolla represented to consumers that it employed reasonable and appropriate measures to protect their data. [2] It said Dwolla claimed its practices exceeded industry standards, that all information was securely encrypted and stored, and that it was PCI compliant. [2] The Bureau found that, in fact, Dwolla had not employed reasonable and appropriate measures, had not encrypted all sensitive information at rest, and was not PCI compliant. [2]

The press release summarized what the order required. Dwolla had to stop misrepresenting its data security, adopt comprehensive data security measures and policies including risk assessments and audits, and train employees. [1] It also had to fix security weaknesses in its web and mobile applications and store and transmit consumer data securely. [1] The Bureau cited its authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to act against unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices. [1]

The order did not describe a breach. Its findings concerned the gap between Dwolla’s statements and its practices. [2] The press release said such deception about security and security practices is illegal. [1]

The Dwolla order is easy to read as a small penalty against a small company. Its structure is more useful than its size. The Bureau’s legal claim was deception: Dwolla said things about its security that the Bureau found untrue. [2] The Bureau’s remedy was a security program, with a plan, an accountable person, risk assessments, training, an outside audit and board oversight. [2]

Our argument is that the order made a firm’s security claims the compliance exposure, and its security program the proof. A financial company that describes its controls to customers creates statements that must be backed by evidence. [2] In our reading, Dwolla’s order showed what that evidence was expected to look like, years before later rules and guidance set out similar lists. [2] [5]

We take the order in four parts:

  1. The claims: what Dwolla told consumers about its security.
  2. The gap: what the Bureau found about Dwolla’s actual practices.
  3. The remedy: the program the order required.
  4. The legal basis: why deception was the theory, and what changed when the Bureau later spoke of unfairness.

The parts do not overlap. The first is statements, the second facts, the third obligations and the fourth law. After them we look at how the order reached different kinds of financial institution, take the objections in order and end with checks a compliance or security leader could run.

The claims: what Dwolla told consumers

Safety as a selling point

The order found that Dwolla represented its network and transactions as safe and secure. [2] It quoted the website as saying Dwolla empowers anyone with an internet connection to safely send money to friends or businesses. [2] It said the website described Dwolla transactions as safer than credit cards and less of a liability for consumers and merchants. [2]

These were marketing claims, written to win customers. They were also factual statements about controls. A claim that a payment system is safer than another is a comparison a regulator can test against what the company actually did.

Comparisons to industry standards

The order listed claims that Dwolla’s practices met or exceeded industry standards. Dwolla said its practices exceeded or surpassed industry security standards and set a new precedent for safety and security. [2] It said it stored consumer information in a bank-level hosting and security environment. [2] It said it encrypted data using the same standards required by the federal government. [2]

Each of those phrases invites a question: which standard, measured how, by whom? The order answered for the Bureau. It found that Dwolla’s practices did not surpass or exceed industry standards. [2]

Encryption claims

The most specific claims were about encryption. The order listed statements that all information was securely encrypted and stored, that 100 percent of a user’s information was encrypted, and that Dwolla encrypted all sensitive information on its servers. [2] It listed claims that Dwolla encrypted data in transit and at rest and that its website, apps, connections, back end and APIs used the latest encryption. [2]

Absolute words made these claims easy to disprove. The order found that Dwolla did not encrypt all sensitive consumer information in its possession at rest. [2] A single unencrypted field, in our reading, was enough to make a claim of all or 100 percent false.

The PCI claim

The order described the PCI Security Standards Council as an open global forum that issues data security standards for cardholder data, adopted by some of the largest card networks. [2] It found Dwolla represented that its transactions, servers and data centers complied with those standards. [2] It found they did not. [2]

A compliance claim is a claim about an assessment. Saying a system is compliant with a named standard implies that someone measured it against that standard and found it met. Without that measurement, the claim has no basis, whatever the controls actually are.

Claims at the point of collection

The claims met consumers at the moment Dwolla asked for their most sensitive data. To open an account, consumers submitted name, address, date of birth, telephone number and Social Security number; to link a bank, account and routing numbers. [2] The order found Dwolla stored that information. [2]

A security statement placed beside a form that asks for a Social Security number does a specific job. It answers the customer’s question at the point of decision. That is the moment a claim can sway a customer’s choice, and so the moment it matters that the claim be true.

Where the claims appeared

The order said the statements appeared on Dwolla’s website or in direct communications with consumers. [2] The press release said the same. [1] That breadth matters for a compliance program. Security claims can appear in a support reply, a sales email or a social media post as easily as on a security page.

Who owns a claim

In the order’s account, the claims came from marketing pages and communications with consumers, while the practices came from engineering and operations. [2] A firm that lets marketing describe security without a check from the security function invites exactly this gap. The fix is procedural: a review step for any statement about security, with the security owner signing off on the evidence.

Materiality

The Bureau found the claims material. It said they were likely to affect a consumer’s choice or conduct about whether to become a member of Dwolla’s network. [2] It also found they were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer into believing Dwolla had reasonable and appropriate data security practices when it did not. [2]

For a payment service asking customers for Social Security and bank account numbers, the link between security claims and the decision to sign up is direct. The firm was selling trust, and the claims were the product description.

The gap: what the Bureau found about practice

Policies and a written plan

The order found that from launch until at least September 2012, Dwolla did not adopt or implement reasonable and appropriate data security policies and procedures for consumer information. [2] It found that until at least October 2013, Dwolla had no written data security plan. [2]

Those dates overlap the period of the claims, which the order dated from January 2011. [2] In our reading, the timing is the case. For part of the period in which Dwolla described its security as exceeding industry standards, the Bureau found it had no written plan for that security at all. [2]

Risk assessment

The order found Dwolla failed to conduct adequate, regular risk assessments to identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks and to assess its safeguards. [2] It found Dwolla conducted its first comprehensive risk assessment in mid-2014. [2]

A risk assessment is the step that connects controls to threats. Without one, a firm cannot say which controls matter most, and its claims about security rest on belief rather than analysis.

Training and a phishing test

The order found that until at least December 2012, employees received little to no data security training. [2] It found the first mandatory training was held in mid-2014. [2]

The order described a test. In December 2012, Dwolla hired a third-party auditor for its first penetration test of its website, which included a phishing email sent to employees. [2] The order said nearly half of employees opened the email, and of those, 62 percent clicked the link. [2] Of those who clicked, it said, 25 percent tried to register on the phishing site and gave a username and password. [2] It found Dwolla failed to address the results or educate staff about phishing. [2]

The test itself was a good control. The finding was about what happened next. A test whose results are not acted on can become evidence that the firm knew of a weakness and left it in place.

Encryption in fact

The order found that relevant industry standards require encryption of sensitive data. [2] It found Dwolla had, in numerous instances, stored or transmitted without encryption names, mailing addresses, four-digit PINs, Social Security numbers, bank account information and images of driver’s licenses, Social Security cards and utility bills. [2]

It also found that Dwolla encouraged consumers to email sensitive information in clear text, including Social Security numbers and scans of identity documents, to speed up registration. [2] In our reading, that finding shows how an onboarding shortcut can defeat a security claim. The fastest path for a new customer was the least protected one.

Dates as evidence

The Bureau’s findings were dated: no reasonable policies until at least September 2012, no written plan until at least October 2013, first comprehensive risk assessment and first mandatory training in mid-2014. [2] The claims ran from January 2011 to March 2014. [2] The case turned on comparing those dates.

A firm can only defend a claim period if it can show when each control began. Dated policy approvals, training records, assessment reports and test results are the evidence. A firm that cannot date its controls cannot show its claims were true when made.

The side shop

The order described two software operations. In July 2012, Dwolla hired a software development manager in Iowa who began establishing secure development practices. [2] At the same time, it ran an alternative development operation at Dwollalabs.com, led by a developer with no data security training. [2]

The order found that Dwollalabs development did not follow the security practices Dwolla had set for its main operations. [2] Sensitive consumer data was stored on the site and its apps, and Dwolla did not test their security before releasing them to the public. [2] It named the apps: #Dwolla, MassPay, the Dwolla iOS app and Dwolla for Windows. [2] It found no risk assessments or penetration tests were done on Dwollalabs.com. [2]

This finding deserves close study by any firm with more than one development team. A security program that covers the main platform but not the innovation lab, the pilot or the side project leaves a door open. Customer-facing apps built outside the program still carry the company’s security claims.

Vendors inside the network

The order’s definition of Dwolla’s network included the electronic instrument designed and supported by Dwolla or its third-party vendors. [2] The claims about security therefore covered systems that vendors ran as well as Dwolla’s own.

The remedy addressed that. It required procedures to select and retain service providers capable of maintaining consistent security, and contracts requiring them to keep appropriate safeguards. [2] In our reading, a firm’s security claim is only as true as the weakest vendor system it covers.

The overall finding

The order summarized the failures in five points: no reasonable policies, no measures to identify foreseeable risks, inadequate training, improper encryption and insecure software development, especially at Dwollalabs. [2] In our reading, each point maps to an element the remedy later required. [2]

The remedy: the program the order required

Stop the claims

The first requirement was conduct. The order barred Dwolla from misrepresenting its data security practices, including its storage and encryption practices, PCI compliance and adherence to any relevant data security standard or best practices. [2]

The prohibition reached adherence to any standard. In our reading, that turned every future claim of compliance into a statement the company had to be ready to prove under the order.

Ten program elements

The order required Dwolla to adopt reasonable and appropriate data security measures, and listed ten specific steps. [2] They were:

  1. A written, comprehensive data security plan with administrative, technical and physical safeguards suited to the company’s size, complexity, activities and data.
  2. Reasonable and appropriate data security policies and procedures.
  3. A qualified person designated to coordinate and be accountable for the program.
  4. Data security risk assessments twice a year of each relevant area of operation.
  5. Evaluation and adjustment of the program in light of those assessments and monitoring.
  6. Regular, mandatory training on the company’s policies, safe handling of sensitive information and secure software design, development and testing.
  7. Security patches for vulnerabilities found in any web or mobile application.
  8. Customer identity authentication at registration and before a funds transfer.
  9. Procedures for selecting and retaining capable service providers, with contract terms requiring safeguards.
  10. An annual data security audit by an independent, qualified third party.

Each element came straight from the order’s text. [2] Together they read as a template for a security program at a payments company in 2016.

Patching applications

The order required Dwolla to develop, implement and update security patches for any vulnerabilities found in any web or mobile application. [2] The requirement reached every application, which in our reading included those built at Dwollalabs. [2]

The Bureau’s 2022 circular later treated timely software updates as one of its three examples of practices whose absence it expected to cause unfair harm. [3] The Dwolla order had already written patching into a remedy, for a firm whose violation was deception. [2]

To the extent not already in place

The order required reasonable and appropriate measures to the extent not already in place. [2] That wording recognized that a firm under investigation may have started fixing problems before the order. Its findings described dates when some controls began, such as the first risk assessment and training in mid-2014. [2] The order’s job was to make the program complete and to keep it so under audit.

Authentication as a required control

One element went beyond the findings. The order required Dwolla to develop and maintain an appropriate method of customer identity authentication at registration and before effecting a funds transfer. [2] The findings had not described an authentication failure; the requirement looked forward. [2]

For a payment service, the two moments named are the points of greatest fraud risk: when an account is created and when money leaves it. The order put controls at both. A firm designing its own program can start from the same two points.

The audit cycle

The audit had its own timetable. Within 10 days Dwolla had to identify the auditor and its qualifications to the Bureau’s Enforcement Director for non-objection, and within 30 days to retain it. [2] Within 180 days the auditor had to deliver a written report to the board. [2]

The audit’s purpose was to validate that the risk assessments identified risks to sensitive data and that Dwolla had implemented reasonable mitigations. [2] It also had to review compliance with the order’s security measures. [2] The audit had to be repeated annually. [2]

Twice a year

The order set the risk assessment cadence at twice annually, for each area of relevant operation. [2] The FTC’s current rule asks for periodic additional risk assessments without fixing a frequency, and a written initial assessment with stated criteria. [5] The order’s cadence was a choice for a firm that had gone without assessments for years. [2]

The board’s role

The board had duties of its own. Within 30 days of receiving the audit report, it had to adopt a compliance plan to correct deficiencies and implement recommendations, or explain in writing why a recommendation was not being implemented. [2] It had to submit the report and plan to the Enforcement Director, who could direct revisions. [2]

The board had to review every submission before it went to the Bureau. [2] The order said the board would have ultimate responsibility for proper and sound management and for compliance with federal consumer financial law and the order. [2] It had to require timely reporting by management and timely corrective action. [2]

In our reading, those clauses put security on the board’s agenda by order. The audit report went to the board first. A director could not say the security program was a management detail.

Everyone with a role reads the order

The order had to be delivered within 30 days to each board member and executive officer, and to managers, employees, service providers and agents with responsibilities related to its subject. [2] Each recipient had to sign an acknowledgment within 30 days of delivery. [2] For five years, new board members, executives and staff with related duties had to receive it before assuming their responsibilities. [2]

That requirement turns an enforcement document into a training document. The people who write marketing copy, build apps and manage vendors learn what the company may and may not say. It is a practice any firm could adopt for its own security claims standard without an order.

The order defined related consumer actions as private suits or other agencies’ actions based on substantially the same facts. [2] Dwolla had to notify the Enforcement Director within 30 days of any final judgment, consent order or settlement in such an action, including any redress paid. [2]

Records, reporting and supervision

The order required compliance progress reports, approved by the board, “within 90 days of the Effective Date, and again one year after the Effective Date.” [2] It required Dwolla to keep for at least five years its policies, training materials, risk assessments, advertisements and marketing materials related to data security, and all consumer complaints about data security. [2]

Dwolla also agreed to be subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority for the duration of the order and not to petition to end that supervision. [2] The order said it would terminate five years from its effective date, or five years from the most recent date the Bureau began an action alleging a violation of it. [2]

The penalty

The penalty was $100,000, paid to the Bureau’s Civil Penalty Fund. [1] [2] The order barred Dwolla from seeking a tax benefit or reimbursement, including through insurance, for the penalty. [2] The program costs, the annual audits and the supervision were not part of that figure.

A covered person

The order found Dwolla was a covered person under the Consumer Financial Protection Act. [2] That status gave the Bureau jurisdiction over a company that was neither a bank nor a credit union. In our reading, the pooled-account structure, with funds held at insured institutions, did not take Dwolla outside the Bureau’s reach. [2]

Why deception fit

The Bureau charged deceptive acts or practices. [2] Its findings followed the elements: representations, their falsity, the likelihood of misleading a reasonable consumer and materiality. [2] Dwolla’s statements were specific and public, which made them provable.

Deception has a structural feature: it reaches what a firm says. A firm that made no security claims could not be charged with deceiving consumers about security in this way. In our reading, that is why the order’s first remedy was to stop the claims, and why the program served as proof for any future claims.

The theories not used

The press release cited the Bureau’s authority over unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices. [1] The order itself identified only deceptive acts and practices as the violations. [2] In our reading, the Bureau chose the theory its facts proved most directly. The claims were in writing, and the practices contradicted them.

The limit of a deception theory

A deception theory depends on the claim. It gives a regulator less to work with when a firm stays silent about its security, or speaks only in general terms. That limit is what made the Bureau’s later guidance significant.

The 2022 circular

On August 11, 2022, the Bureau issued Consumer Financial Protection Circular 2022-04. [3] It asked whether entities can violate the prohibition on unfair acts or practices when they have insufficient data protection or information security. [3] Its answer was yes. [3]

The circular said inadequate security for sensitive consumer information can be an unfair practice, and that it can be unfair even without a breach or intrusion. [3] It named three examples of conduct it said would typically meet the first two elements of unfairness: failing to require multi-factor authentication, inadequate password management and failing to apply software updates in a timely way. [3]

In our reading, that moved the Bureau’s stated theory from what a firm says to what it does. Under the circular’s reasoning, a firm with Dwolla’s practices could have faced an unfairness claim even if it had made no security claims at all. [3]

The 2025 withdrawal

On May 12, 2025, the Bureau published a notice withdrawing a long list of guidance documents, applicable that day. [4] Circular 2022-04 was on the list. [4] The notice said the withdrawal was not necessarily final and that the Bureau intended to keep reviewing the guidance. [4] It said the withdrawn guidance should not be enforced or otherwise relied on by the Bureau while the review was ongoing. [4]

The notice also pointed out that other enforcers remain. It said states maintain jurisdiction over many institutions within the Bureau’s purview, that state attorneys general may bring actions under the Dodd-Frank Act, and that the FTC has broad authority over unfair and deceptive practices. [4]

What did not change

The withdrawal reached guidance, not the statute or the Dwolla order. [4] The prohibition on deceptive acts in the Consumer Financial Protection Act that the Dwolla order cited was not part of the withdrawal. [2] [4] In our reading, a firm’s public security claims remain as exposed after 2025 as they were in 2016.

How the order reached different institutions

The order named one company. Its lessons reach institutions that make, check or depend on security claims.

A payments fintech

A fintech that collects bank account numbers and Social Security numbers is in Dwolla’s position. [2] Its marketing and onboarding text are the first places to check. Claims of compliance with a named standard need a current assessment behind them.

A partner bank or credit union

The order said Dwolla held consumer funds in a pooled account at a federally insured credit union or a federally insured bank. [2] The order did not make findings against either institution. For a bank or credit union in a similar partnership, the partner’s security claims and practices are part of its own third-party risk. Due diligence that reads the partner’s security page should also ask for the evidence behind it.

A credit union offering a payment app

A credit union that launches a member payment app makes the same kind of statements Dwolla made, to members who must trust it with account credentials. [2] The app’s store listing, onboarding screens and help pages all carry claims. If the app was built by a vendor or a separate digital team, the Dwollalabs finding applies directly. [2]

A broker-dealer or wealth manager

A broker-dealer or adviser that describes its security in client materials faces the same logic under its own regulators. Statements about encryption, testing or certifications in client agreements, websites and pitch books should be reviewed with the same care as performance claims.

A core or digital banking vendor

A vendor that provides online banking or payment software to banks and credit unions writes security descriptions its clients may repeat to their own customers. Its sales and documentation claims travel further than its own website. The same evidence standard applies, with a wider audience.

A community bank

A community bank that relies on a core provider and an online banking vendor may repeat those vendors’ security claims to customers. A claim the bank makes is the bank’s claim, whoever wrote the original. The bank should know what the vendor’s claim rests on before repeating it.

A nonbank lender under the FTC’s rule

A financial institution under the FTC’s jurisdiction is subject to the Safeguards Rule. [5] Its required elements, as checked on November 16, 2026, include a qualified individual, a written risk assessment, encryption, multi-factor authentication, secure development practices, testing, training, service provider oversight and written reports to the board. [5] The Dwolla order’s list anticipated much of that list, in our reading. [2] [5]

An innovation team inside any institution

The Dwollalabs finding applies to any institution with a lab, a pilot program or a separate digital unit. [2] If that unit ships customer-facing software outside the security program, the institution’s security claims may be false for those products.

Objections, in order

1. A $100,000 penalty shows the risk was small

The penalty was small. [1] The obligations were not: a full program, twice-yearly risk assessments, annual independent audits, board review of every submission and Bureau supervision for the life of the order. [2] The cost of compliance with the order was the larger consequence.

2. Without a breach, no consumer was harmed

The Bureau’s theory did not require harm. It required material misrepresentations likely to mislead. [2] The 2022 circular went further, saying inadequate security can be unfair without a breach. [3] That circular was withdrawn in 2025, but the deception theory was not. [4]

3. Everyone says their security exceeds industry standards

That is the reason the order matters. A common phrase is still a factual claim. The Bureau found Dwolla’s version false and barred similar misrepresentations about adherence to any standard. [2]

4. The 2025 withdrawal ended this line of enforcement

The withdrawal reached guidance documents, including the unfairness circular. [4] It did not withdraw the deception prohibition the Dwolla order used. [2] [4] The notice itself pointed to states and the FTC as continuing enforcers. [4]

5. A startup cannot afford a full program

The order scaled the plan to the company’s size and complexity. [2] What it did not allow was a claim larger than the program. A firm that cannot yet afford a full program can make smaller, accurate claims.

6. Our auditor signed off, so our claims are safe

An audit supports the claims it covers, for the period it covers. The Dwolla order required an annual audit by an independent, qualified person acceptable to the Enforcement Director, with a defined purpose. [2] A firm’s claims should not go beyond what its auditor actually tested, and should change when the audit scope changes.

7. There was no Bureau data security rule to break

There did not need to be. The order relied on the statutory prohibition on deceptive acts and practices, applied to Dwolla’s own statements. [2] The firm’s claims supplied the standard against which its practices were measured.

Checks a compliance or security leader could run

Claims inventory

Collect every public statement about security: website pages, app store text, onboarding screens, sales materials, support macros and contract language. Record the evidence for each.

Review gate

Require the security function to approve any new or changed statement about security before it is published, with the evidence attached to the approval. Audit a sample of published statements against the approvals each year, and withdraw any statement that has no approval on file.

Absolute words

Flag claims that use all, every, 100 percent, never or exceeds industry standards. The Dwolla order showed how one exception defeats an absolute claim. [2]

Compliance claims

For each claim of compliance with a named standard, record the assessment behind it, who performed it and when it expires. Remove claims without a current assessment.

Program boundary

List every team that ships customer-facing software, including labs and pilots, and confirm each is inside the security program’s development, testing and risk assessment scope. [2]

Test follow-through

For each penetration or phishing test, record the findings, the owner of each fix and the date it was closed. The order faulted Dwolla for not acting on its test. [2]

Onboarding channels

Check every way customers can send identity documents. Close any channel that sends sensitive data unencrypted, such as plain email. [2]

Vendor claims

Where your security statements describe systems that vendors run, obtain the vendor’s evidence for those statements and record its date. Repeat the request when the contract renews.

Patch tracking

Track known vulnerabilities in every customer-facing web and mobile application to a dated fix, including apps built by labs, pilots or vendors. [2]

Complaint log

Keep consumer complaints about data security, and the responses, in one place for at least five years. The order required Dwolla to keep them. [2]

Acknowledgments

Have staff who write customer-facing security statements, build customer apps or manage vendors acknowledge the firm’s security claims standard in writing, as the order required for its own text. [2]

Board reporting

Report the program’s risk assessments, test results and open findings to the board in writing at least annually. The order required board review; the FTC’s current rule requires a written report to the board. [2] [5]

With hindsight

The Dwolla order was the Bureau’s first data security action, by its own description. [1] By its terms, the order would terminate five years from its effective date, or five years from the most recent date the Bureau began an action alleging a violation, with provisions for dismissals. [2] We did not find, in the sources opened for this article, a later Bureau action alleging that Dwolla violated it.

The Bureau’s stated theory widened in 2022. Circular 2022-04, issued August 11, 2022, said insufficient data protection or security for sensitive consumer information can violate the prohibition on unfair practices. [3] It said this can be so even without a breach. [3] It pointed to the Bureau’s July 22, 2019 complaint against Equifax as an earlier allegation of unfairness based on inadequate security. [3]

The circular named three practices. It said that failing to require multi-factor authentication for employees, or to offer it to consumers, made it unlikely an entity could justify the harm. [3] It said the same of inadequate password management and of failing to update software in a timely way, including not keeping asset inventories of software dependencies. [3]

In 2025 the Bureau stepped back from that guidance. Its notice published May 12, 2025, withdrew many guidance documents, applicable that day, and Circular 2022-04 was among them. [4] The notice said the Bureau had determined the withdrawn guidance should not be enforced or otherwise relied on by the Bureau while its review continued, and that the withdrawal was not necessarily final. [4] As checked on November 16, 2026, the Bureau’s web page for the circular remains online; we rely on the Federal Register notice for its status. [3] [4]

The FTC’s rule moved the other way for firms under its jurisdiction. As checked on November 16, 2026, 16 CFR 314.4 requires a qualified individual, a written risk assessment, encryption of customer information in transit and at rest, multi-factor authentication and secure development practices. [5] It requires annual penetration testing absent continuous monitoring, vulnerability assessments at least every six months, staff training, service provider oversight and a written incident response plan. [5] The section cites amendments at 86 FR 70307 on December 9, 2021, and 88 FR 77508 on November 13, 2023. [5]

The rule’s scope is the reason it matters to nonbank firms. Part 314 says it applies to the handling of customer information by all financial institutions over which the FTC has jurisdiction. [5] It also requires the qualified individual to report in writing, regularly and at least annually, to the board of directors or equivalent governing body. [5]

What held up from March 2016 is the anatomy of the remedy. The order’s qualified person, risk assessments, training, secure development, service provider contracts and independent review appear, in our reading, in the FTC’s current list of required elements. [2] [5] What did not hold up is any expectation that the Bureau’s security theory would only grow. Its unfairness guidance came and, as of the 2025 notice, went. [3] [4]

In our view, the safest reading for a financial firm is the one the Dwolla order already made plain: do not claim more security than you can prove. That rule needed no circular, and the 2025 withdrawal did not touch the statute behind it. [2] [4]

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  • CFPB
  • Dwolla
  • data security
  • UDAAP
  • Safeguards Rule
  • fintech