# Checklist: meeting CISA BOD 26-04 remediation and reporting duties

Thirteen steps for a federal civilian agency’s CIO, CISO and vulnerability team, from the policy update CISA required at once to the asset tagging and remediation timelines due within 180 days of June 10, 2026, each tied to the directive or CISA’s guidance.

Checklist · Government · Security & Resilience. Published November 14, 2026. Last reviewed November 14, 2026.

## Who this is for

Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies bound by Binding Operational Directive 26-04, issued by CISA on June 10, 2026. It revokes BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 and sets remediation deadlines from four facts about each vulnerability and asset: public exposure, whether the CVE is in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, whether exploitation is automatable, and its technical impact [1]. It does not apply to national security systems or to certain Department of War and Intelligence Community systems [1]. What the directive asks for is set out in our [explainer](https://insights.moraph.com/cisa-bod-26-04-risk-based-remediation-explained).

## Three phases, in order

The directive has three phases: actions effective on issuance, process updates within 60 days, and remediation timelines and asset tagging within 180 days [1]. The steps follow that order and end with the FISMA metric that will show how the agency is doing. Each names the required action or the part of CISA’s Implementation Guidance (last updated August 25, 2026, as checked on November 14, 2026) it rests on [2]; where a step is our suggestion, it says so. The owner shown is the role that usually holds the work; the directive leaves roles to each agency’s policy.

## The checklist

1. **List every system in scope, including those hosted by cloud providers or other agencies, and record who reports on each.** (CISO with system owners) The directive covers agency assets in any federal information system, including one operated by another entity on the agency’s behalf. For systems in third-party environments, FedRAMP ones included, the agency must keep an inventory, obtain status updates and ensure compliance through collaborative continuous monitoring [1]. Recording who reports on each system is our suggestion.
2. **Review and update the vulnerability management policy to the directive and retire internal references to BOD 19-02, BOD 22-01 and CVSS-based deadlines.** (CISO policy staff) Required action 1, effective immediately: review and, as appropriate, update the policy and procedures; the policy must at least set a process for remediating KEV entries within CISA’s timelines, assign roles, define the actions needed for a prompt response, and set internal validation, enforcement, tracking and reporting; CISA may ask for a copy [1]. The directive revokes BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01, and the guidance notes CVSS is no longer required for prioritization [1] [2]. Clearing out the old references is our suggestion.
3. **Automate KEV status reporting through the CDM Dashboard, and run bi-weekly manual reports until that is done.** (CDM program lead) Phase I requires agencies to monitor KEV catalog updates and report KEV status automatically through the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Dashboard; agencies that have not fully automated must report manually every two weeks [1].
4. **Keep CISA Cyber Hygiene scanning running, unblock its source addresses, and diary the quarterly attestation of public IP addresses and domains.** (Network security and SOC) Phase I: continue Cyber Hygiene scanning, remove its source IP addresses from blocklists, and once a quarter (or when CISA asks) update or attest publicly exposed IP addresses and agency-owned domains through the scope change process, listing additions and removals since the previous quarter [1]. CISA publishes the source addresses in the Methodology section of Cyber Hygiene reports [2].
5. **Extend the vulnerability process to every CVE the agency finds, using the CVE database alongside the KEV catalog.** (Vulnerability management lead) Phase II, within 60 days of issuance: update processes to support remediation based on the CVE database (or a service with the same data) and the KEV catalog [1]. The guidance adds that agencies should track and prioritize all vulnerabilities, with longer timelines acceptable for those outside the KEV catalog [2].
6. **Build the four decision points into the scanning and ticketing tools, pulling KEV status, automatability and technical impact from CISA’s Vulnrichment data.** (Vulnerability management engineering) CISA publishes KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact for every CVE ID through the Vulnrichment Program; agencies answer asset exposure themselves, following CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance [1]. Where automatability and impact are missing for a CVE outside the KEV catalog, CISA treats them as “no” and “total” until metadata arrives [2].
7. **Tag every asset reachable from outside the network with agency and sub-agency, environment, exposure and asset type, using CISA’s published schema.** (Asset management and CDM lead) Phase III, within 180 days: continuously identify and tag externally reachable assets with those four tags, and make sure every asset in the CDM Federal Dashboard carries all its IP addresses, private ones included; agencies without full CDM automation report this every seven days in a CISA-approved machine-readable format [1]. CISA has published the BOD 26-04 Standardized Data Schema [1].
8. **Start each remediation clock at the earlier of the KEV addition or the asset’s appearance in the CDM dashboard, and recalculate it when the facts change.** (Vulnerability management lead) Appendix A: timelines run in calendar days from whichever comes first, CISA adding the CVE to the KEV catalog or the agency identifying it on an asset and updating the CDM dashboard under BOD 23-01. Taking an asset off the internet lengthens the timeline; a new KEV listing shortens it [1]. The guidance says to remediate by the KEV entry’s due date as set by the table, and allows agencies to set shorter timelines [2].
9. **Write the forensic triage plan for the cases Table 1 marks “&amp; forensic triage”, with explicit risk decisions for high value assets agreed in advance.** (Incident response lead with HVA owners) Table 1 marks three of its sixteen combinations this way, all of them KEV-listed with total control. Where it does, the agency must remediate or mitigate within three days and carry out a forensic triage that follows the Implementation Guidance [1]. The guidance sets six steps, from scoping to an escalation decision, with target times (scoping within two hours, escalation within 48 to 72 hours) that it labels recommended, not required; it says agencies should plan how HVAs will be handled [2].
10. **Agree the contents of the forensic triage report and who decides to escalate to full incident response.** (SOC manager) The guidance asks for a report covering the timeline, actions taken, technical findings, containment and next steps; where compromise is confirmed, the agency reports through the CISA Incident Reporting System and coordinates with CISA, following the Federal Incident Notification Guidelines [2]. The guidance says to use the report to decide whether to escalate; naming who decides is our suggestion.
11. **Review contracts with the Contracting Officer and agree how each cloud provider will report vulnerability status.** (CISO with Contracting Officers) The directive does not bind contractors unless the contract says so, but agencies must review all contracts for needed changes; for FedRAMP offerings they work through the FedRAMP PMO, and for others directly with the provider, with deviations documented [1]. The guidance says commercial providers report status to the customer agency, which then reports, and that FedRAMP will require its Vulnerability Detection and Response and Vulnerability Evaluation and Reporting rules by December 7, 2026 [2].
12. **Send any case the agency cannot meet to CyberDirectives@cisa.dhs.gov early, with the mitigation planned.** (CISO) The guidance states that CISA does not issue waivers or exceptions for directive actions, and asks agencies to raise special use cases at that address so CISA can suggest mitigations and an estimated timeframe [2].
13. **Check the CDM-reported mean time to remediate KEVs before each FISMA submission, and track it monthly against the directive’s timelines.** (CIO’s FISMA reporting lead) The fiscal year 2026 and 2027 CIO FISMA metrics include CDM-reported mean time to remediate KEVs in days (CIO-FY26-0121.cdm), and agencies must correct any pre-populated data before the deadline [3]. The monthly tracking is our suggestion.

## Sources

1. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (June 10, 2026). <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk> Checked November 14, 2026.
2. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. BOD 26-04: Implementation Guidance for Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (updated August 25, 2026). <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk> Checked November 14, 2026.
3. OMB, CISA and the CISO Council FISMA Metrics Subcommittee. FY 2026 and FY 2027 CIO FISMA Metrics, Version 1.1 (September 1, 2026). <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-09/fy26-fy27-fisma-cio-metrics-508.pdf> Checked November 14, 2026.

Published: November 14, 2026
Canonical URL: <https://insights.moraph.com/checklist-cisa-bod-26-04-remediation-reporting>
Publisher: Moraph Insights
