# Checklist: a federal agency’s post-quantum migration under EO 14412, OMB M-26-15 and NIST IR 8547

Fourteen steps for agency CIOs and CISOs: naming the migration lead, building the cryptographic inventory, ranking systems by risk, submitting the plan, and meeting the 2030 and 2031 deadlines for high value assets and high impact systems, with NIST’s 2030 and 2035 algorithm dates.

Checklist · Cross-sector · Platforms & Architecture. Published November 14, 2026. Last reviewed November 14, 2026.

## Three documents, one schedule

Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks, was signed on June 22, 2026 and published on June 25, 2026 (91 FR 38483) [1]. OMB Memorandum M-26-15, Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, dated June 24, 2026, implements it and the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act [2]. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, final in October 2026, sets when NIST will deprecate and disallow quantum-vulnerable algorithms and says that window does not change the earlier federal deadlines [3]. The order leaves national security systems out of the inventory review it directs and gives them a separate NSA reporting track, and the memorandum does not apply to them [1] [2].

## Using the steps

The steps follow the memorandum’s order: governance, inventory, prioritization, the plan, then the migration deadlines and the work that supports them. Each cites the section of the order, the memorandum or the NIST report it rests on. Deadlines stated as a number of days from a document’s date are given that way, as the documents state them. Where a step is our suggestion, it says so. The owner shown under each step is a typical role; where the memorandum’s Appendix B suggests a role, the step says so, and that list of roles is a sample, not a requirement (the plan contents in the same appendix are required) [2]. This checklist explains federal policy as published; it is not legal advice.

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## The checklist

1. **Confirm which systems are in scope, setting aside national security systems, which follow their own process.** (Agency CIO) M-26-15 says it does not apply to national security systems [2]. Section 4(b)(i) of the order excludes them from the inventory review, and section 5(c) gives the NSA Director a separate reporting duty for agencies that run them [1].
2. **Name the PQC migration lead, reporting to the CIO, and send the name and contact details to OMB and the National Cyber Director.** (Agency head) Section 4(a) of the order required each agency head to do this within 30 days of the date of the order; section 2(h) defines the lead as reporting to the CIO and overseeing cryptographic inventory, the prioritized migration plan and cross-agency coordination [1].
3. **Set up or update the governance structure for the migration, with roles written down for leaders in the front office and in components.** (Deputy secretary with the CIO and CISO) Section 3.C.1 of M-26-15 requires agencies to establish or update an internal governance structure and says roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined. Appendix B gives sample roles, including the CIO and CISO as accountable for prioritization, risk acceptance and resources [2].
4. **Review the inventory of high value assets and high impact systems, and build an automated cryptographic inventory feeding a cryptographic bill of materials.** (PQC technical lead) Section 4(b)(i) of the order directs the review of high value assets and high impact systems [1]. Section 3.C.5 of M-26-15 says agencies should use automation where feasible, and Appendix A section 6 describes inventory through software composition analysis, code testing and network scanning feeding a central cryptographic bill of materials [2]. Appendix B suggests the PQC technical lead oversees inventory [2].
5. **Flag every use of the quantum-vulnerable algorithms the memorandum lists, and treat any other asymmetric algorithm as vulnerable unless it is known to be quantum-resistant.** (PQC technical lead) Appendix A section 2 of M-26-15 lists elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, MQV, ECDSA, Diffie-Hellman, RSA signatures and key establishment, and DSA, and encourages agencies to treat as quantum-vulnerable any asymmetric algorithm not definitively known to be quantum-resistant [2].
6. **Rank systems for migration, putting high impact systems, high value assets and other highly sensitive or especially exposed systems first.** (CISO) Section 3.C.2 of M-26-15 requires that priority and says agencies should include logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, and systems with data expected to remain mission-sensitive in 2030 [2].
7. **Submit the PQC Migration Plan to OMB and ONCD within the memorandum’s deadline, with every section Appendix B requires.** (PQC migration lead, approved by the CIO) Sections 3.B and 3.D of M-26-15 require the plan no later than 120 days from the date of the memorandum, sent to PQC@omb.eop.gov and aligned with NIST IR 8547. Appendix B lists the minimum contents: prioritization with justification, timelines for the migration phases and for TLS 1.3, inventory methods and tools, a cryptographic agility plan, third-party coordination, funding and staffing estimates, a risk strategy and governance roles [2].
8. **Move high value assets and high impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030, and to post-quantum digital signatures by December 31, 2031.** (Application and system owners) Section 4(b)(ii) and (iii) of the order set those two dates [1]. M-26-15 phases 3 and 4 apply them to high value assets, high impact systems, systems with highly sensitive data and especially exposed systems, and Action One sets the objective of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by December 31, 2030 [2].
9. **Support TLS 1.3 or a successor version across the agency by January 2, 2030.** (Network engineering lead) Appendix A section 4 of M-26-15, citing Executive Order 14306, requires TLS 1.3 support as soon as practicable but not later than January 2, 2030 [2]. NIST IR 8547 section 4 repeats the requirement [3].
10. **List systems that cannot support post-quantum or hybrid cryptography for replacement or decommissioning, and build PQC into planned cloud moves, software releases and hardware refreshes.** (Enterprise architect) Section 3.C.3 of M-26-15 requires both [2]. NIST IR 8547 section 4 also says such systems should be identified and prioritized for replacement or decommissioning [3].
11. **Put PQC requirements into acquisitions for the product categories CISA lists, and agree PQC responsibilities with FedRAMP-authorized cloud providers.** (Program office or requirement owner, with acquisition) Section 3.C.4 of M-26-15 says agencies should reference CISA’s product categories publication and include PQC integration in requirements, and should engage FedRAMP-authorized providers on the shared responsibility model [2]. Appendix B suggests the program office ensures vendor requirements include PQC readiness [2].
12. **Design for cryptographic agility, and decide case by case whether a hybrid classical and post-quantum scheme is worth its complexity.** (Security architect) Appendix A sections 3 and 5 of M-26-15 describe hybrid key exchange and signatures as an option based on the agency’s own risk assessment, and set out agility practices such as configuration-driven algorithm choice and agile key management [2]. NIST IR 8547 section 3.2 discusses hybrid techniques [3].
13. **Plan the remaining systems against NIST’s schedule: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and 112-bit symmetric standards disallowed in 2030.** (CISO) NIST IR 8547 section 4 says NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow it under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035, and that this window does not alter the earlier deadlines under the order and M-26-15; section 4.1.3 covers the 112-bit symmetric standards [3]. M-26-15 phase 5 aims to complete remaining migrations by 2035 [2].
14. **Put the migration’s funding and staffing needs into the annual budget request.** (Chief Financial Officer with the CIO and CISO) Appendix B of M-26-15 suggests the CFO works with the CIO, CISO and migration program manager to represent PQC resource needs in the annual budget request, and the plan must include a funding and personnel estimate [2].

## Sources

1. The President, Federal Register (via GovInfo). Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (91 FR 38483, June 25, 2026). <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-25/html/2026-12909.htm> Checked November 14, 2026.
2. Office of Management and Budget. OMB Memorandum M-26-15, Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (June 24, 2026). <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/M-26-15-Execution-of-the-Migration-to-Post-Quantum-Cryptography.pdf> Checked November 14, 2026.
3. National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (October 2026). <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf> Checked November 14, 2026.

Published: November 14, 2026
Canonical URL: <https://insights.moraph.com/checklist-federal-agency-post-quantum-migration-eo-14412-m-26-15>
Publisher: Moraph Insights
