# Checklist: the duties around a ransomware payment decision, from sanctions risk to suspicious activity reports and CIRCIA

Twelve steps for the people who decide whether a ransom is paid: OFAC’s sanctions risk and reporting advice, FinCEN’s suspicious activity report guidance for financial institutions, CIRCIA’s 24-hour payment report once a final rule takes effect, and a state ban on public-entity payments as an example.

Checklist · Cross-sector · Security & Resilience. Published November 14, 2026. Last reviewed November 14, 2026.

## Four sources, different weights

The sources behind these steps carry different legal weight. OFAC’s Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (September 21, 2021) is explanatory and does not have the force of law, but the sanctions it describes do, and OFAC says civil liability is strict [1]. FinCEN Advisory FIN-2021-A004 (November 8, 2021) reminds financial institutions of their existing suspicious activity report duties and asks for specific SAR entries [2]. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 requires covered entities to report ransom payments to CISA within 24 hours, but that duty takes effect only on the dates a final rule sets (6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(7)) [3]. As checked on November 14, 2026, CISA says it continues to work on the final rule and that reports are not required until it takes effect [4]. State laws differ; North Carolina’s G.S. 143-800 is used here as one example of a ban on public-entity payments [5].

## How to use the list

The steps run from preparation, through the decision, to the reports that follow a payment. Each names the source and the part of it the step rests on; the OFAC advisory has no numbered sections, so its headings are named. The U.S. government strongly discourages paying ransoms [1]; this checklist does not recommend paying or refusing. Where a step is our suggestion, it says so. The owner shown under each step is a typical role, not one the sources name, unless the step says a source names it. This checklist explains public guidance and law; it is not legal advice, and counsel should be involved in any payment decision.

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## The checklist

1. **Before any incident, decide who has authority to approve or refuse a ransom payment and who must be consulted.** (Board or chief executive, with the general counsel) Our suggestion. OFAC’s advisory says the U.S. government strongly discourages paying ransom or extortion demands and recommends focusing on defensive and resilience measures [1], so the decision needs a named owner before it arises.
2. **Report the attack to CISA, the local FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center or the local Secret Service office as soon as possible, and report attacks and payments to Treasury’s Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection.** (CISO with the general counsel) Under the heading on contacting government agencies, OFAC strongly encourages victims to report to those agencies as soon as possible and to report attacks and payments to OCCIP [1]. Under the heading on cooperation, OFAC says a self-initiated, complete report made as soon as possible after discovery is a voluntary self-disclosure and a significant mitigating factor if a sanctions nexus is found [1].
3. **Screen the threat actor, the payment addresses and every intermediary against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals list and the comprehensively embargoed jurisdictions.** (Sanctions compliance with the incident response firm) OFAC’s advisory, under the heading on facilitating payments, says U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with SDNs, other blocked persons and embargoed jurisdictions, and that civil penalties are based on strict liability, even without knowledge [1]. Screening each party this way is our suggestion for checking that.
4. **If there is any reason to suspect a sanctions nexus, contact OFAC, and expect a license request to be reviewed with a presumption of denial.** (General counsel) OFAC asks victims to contact it if there is any reason to suspect a sanctions nexus, and its licensing policy says license applications involving ransomware payments are reviewed case by case with a presumption of denial [1].
5. **Keep evidence of the security measures in place before the attack and of the organization’s cooperation with law enforcement.** (CISO) OFAC says meaningful steps to reduce extortion risk, such as offline backups, incident response plans, training, updated anti-malware software and authentication protocols, are a significant mitigating factor, as is full and ongoing cooperation, including giving law enforcement technical details, the ransom demand and payment instructions as soon as possible [1].
6. **Check the firms that would handle a payment: incident response companies, cyber insurers and money services businesses.** (General counsel with procurement) FinCEN’s advisory says some incident response firms and insurers facilitate payments, and that depending on the facts this could be money transmission, which requires registration with FinCEN as a money services business and brings SAR obligations [2]. OFAC says such companies’ sanctions compliance programs should account for ransomware risk [1].
7. **If the organization is a financial institution, decide whether a SAR is required, including for a ransom it paid as a victim and for attempted payments.** (BSA officer) FinCEN’s advisory reminds institutions that a SAR is required for suspicious transactions of $5,000 or more ($2,000 for money services businesses, with one exception), that this can include ransom payments made by institutions that are victims, and that it covers attempted and successful transactions [2].
8. **Treat ransomware-related suspicious transactions as needing immediate attention: call FinCEN first, then file the SAR with the advisory’s key term and the cyber fields, and keep the SAR and supporting documents for five years.** (BSA officer) FinCEN’s advisory says it and law enforcement treat these as situations requiring immediate attention, points institutions to FinCEN’s Financial Institution Hotline before filing, asks for the key term CYBER-FIN-2021-A004 in SAR field 2 and the narrative, field 42 and 42z with the keyword ransomware, and cyber indicators in fields 44(a)-(j), (z), and restates the five-year retention requirement [2].
9. **Work out whether the organization will be a CIRCIA covered entity, and prepare to report any ransom payment to CISA within 24 hours once the final rule takes effect.** (General counsel with the CISO) 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2) requires a covered entity that makes a ransom payment to report it to CISA within 24 hours, even if the attack is not a covered cyber incident; (a)(3) requires supplemental reports, (a)(4) data preservation, and (a)(5)(A) allows one report when a payment precedes the 72-hour incident report. Section 681b(a)(7) says paragraphs (1) through (4) take effect on the dates the final rule sets, and (a)(5)(A) works through procedures that rule will set [3]. Preparing now is our suggestion.
10. **Until the CIRCIA final rule takes effect, consider sharing cyber incident information with CISA voluntarily.** (CISO) CISA’s CIRCIA page says reporting under CIRCIA is not required until the final rule goes into effect and encourages organizations to share cyber incident information voluntarily before then [4].
11. **For a state agency or local government, check state law before any contact with the attacker; in North Carolina, payment and communication are barred and the state IT department must be consulted.** (Agency counsel with the CIO) G.S. 143-800(a) bars North Carolina state agencies and local government entities from paying or otherwise communicating with an entity that has encrypted data and offered to decrypt it for a ransom, and 143-800(b) requires them to consult the Department of Information Technology under G.S. 143B-1379 [5]. Other states’ laws differ; this is one example.
12. **Record the decision, the facts it rested on, the screening results and every report made, with dates and times.** (General counsel) Our suggestion. The record shows the reporting and cooperation OFAC weighs as mitigating factors [1], supports a financial institution’s SAR and its five-year retention [2], and supports the preservation duty in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(4) once in effect [3].

## Sources

1. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (September 21, 2021). <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline> Checked November 14, 2026.
2. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FIN-2021-A004, Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments (November 8, 2021). <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2021-11-08/FinCEN%20Ransomware%20Advisory_FINAL_508_.pdf> Checked November 14, 2026.
3. United States Code (via GovInfo). 6 U.S.C. 681b, Required reporting of certain cyber incidents (2024 edition). <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title6/html/USCODE-2024-title6-chap1-subchapXVIII-partD-sec681b.htm> Checked November 14, 2026.
4. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) (rulemaking status, checked November 14, 2026). <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia> Checked November 14, 2026.
5. North Carolina General Assembly. N.C. Gen. Stat. 143-800, State entities and ransomware payments (checked November 14, 2026). <https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_143/GS_143-800.html> Checked November 14, 2026.

Published: November 14, 2026
Canonical URL: <https://insights.moraph.com/checklist-ransomware-payment-decision-sanctions-sar-circia>
Publisher: Moraph Insights
