# CISA BOD 26-04: risk-based vulnerability deadlines for federal agencies, explained

CISA’s directive of June 10, 2026 revokes BOD 22-01 and BOD 19-02. Federal civilian agencies now set each remediation deadline from four facts about the asset and the flaw, from three days with a forensic triage to the next system upgrade.

Explainer · Government · Security & Resilience. Published November 14, 2026. Last reviewed November 14, 2026.

## At a glance

- Issued by CISA on June 10, 2026. It binds Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; national security systems and certain Department of War and intelligence community systems are outside it.
- It revokes BOD 19-02 (April 29, 2019) and BOD 22-01 (November 3, 2021). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog stays, with its inclusion criteria unchanged.
- Four decision points set each deadline: is the asset publicly exposed, is the CVE in the catalog, can exploitation be automated, and does it give partial or total control.
- Deadlines are calendar days: three days with forensic triage, three days, 14 days, 60 days, or fix on the next system upgrade.
- Required actions come in three phases: immediately, within 60 days and within 180 days of issuance.
- Status goes to CISA through the CDM Dashboard; agencies without automated CDM reporting report manually, and asset tags become mandatory in Phase III.

## What the directive replaces, and whom it binds

A Binding Operational Directive is a compulsory direction to federal executive branch departments and agencies, issued under 44 U.S.C. 3552 and 3553. BOD 26-04, *Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk*, was issued on June 10, 2026. It applies to agency assets in any federal information system, including systems run by another entity on an agency’s behalf, and does not cover national security systems or certain Department of War and intelligence community systems [1].

The directive supersedes and revokes BOD 19-02, which set remediation deadlines for internet-accessible systems, and BOD 22-01, which created the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog in 2021. CISA describes the change as focusing patching on the areas of highest risk instead of treating all vulnerabilities and systems equally, and notes that threat actors’ use of AI may further narrow the time between a patch’s release and possible exploitation [1]. CISA’s implementation guidance adds that, with BOD 19-02 revoked, agencies are no longer required to use CVSS scores to prioritize vulnerabilities [2].

## Four facts set the clock

Each deadline comes from four decision points; the remediation table is informed by the Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) system [1]:

- **Publicly exposed:** the asset is reachable by unauthenticated or untrusted entities over a public network, wherever it is hosted. If any of CISA’s or the agency’s methods finds it exposed, the answer is yes.
- **In the KEV:** the CVE has an entry in the catalog.
- **Automatable:** an adversary can automate every step of exploitation.
- **Technical impact:** exploitation gives partial or total control of the asset. An exploit that reliably reveals log-in credentials counts as total control.

CISA publishes answers to the last three for every CVE through services such as its Vulnrichment program; agencies answer the first [1]. Where a CVE outside the catalog has no automatable or impact data yet, CISA treats it as not automatable with total impact until the data arrives [2].

### The remediation table

Table 1 of the directive is published as an image on CISA’s page. Read row by row, it groups as follows [1]:

- **Three days and forensic triage:** a KEV vulnerability with total control on a publicly exposed asset, automatable or not; and a KEV vulnerability with total control on an internal asset when exploitation is automatable.
- **Three days:** exposed, in the KEV, automatable, partial control; and exposed, not in the KEV, automatable, total control.
- **14 days:** exposed, in the KEV, not automatable, partial control; exposed, not in the KEV, automatable, partial control; exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable, total control; and every other KEV vulnerability on an internal asset.
- **60 days:** exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable, partial control; and internal, not in the KEV, automatable.
- **Fix on system upgrade:** internal, not in the KEV, not automatable. The flaw should be remediated the next time the asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild.

The clock starts at whichever comes first: CISA adding the CVE to the catalog, or the agency identifying it on an asset and updating the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard under BOD 23-01. Deadlines move as facts change: taking a system off the internet lengthens its deadline, and a new KEV listing shortens it. Remediation means the vulnerability is eliminated by patching, decommissioning or another action [1]. The timelines are maximums; agencies may set shorter ones, and CISA states that it does not issue waivers for actions required in its directives [2].

## Three phases of required actions

**Phase I, effective immediately.** Agencies review and update vulnerability management policies so that they set a process for remediating KEV entries within CISA’s timeframes, assign roles, define enforcement and tracking, and report to CISA on request. They automate KEV status reporting through the CDM Dashboard, or report manually every two weeks if they have not automated it. They keep Cyber Hygiene scanning running, remove its source addresses from blocklists, and update or attest their publicly exposed IP addresses and domains once a quarter [1].

**Phase II, within 60 days.** Agencies update processes to remediate vulnerabilities from the CVE database, or a service with the same data, as well as the catalog [1].

**Phase III, within 180 days.** Agencies remediate within the Table 1 deadlines and continuously tag every asset reachable from outside the agency network on a routable address. Each tag carries organization and sub-organization, environment (production or development), exposure (public or internal) and asset type (server, application or network device). Agencies without automated CDM reporting send this to CISA every seven days in a machine-readable format, and every asset in the CDM Federal Dashboard must list all of its IP addresses, including private ones [1]. CISA has published the standardized data schema for this tagging [1] [2].

## The forensic triage behind the shortest deadline

Where the table says three days and forensic triage, the agency must finish remediation or mitigation within three days and also check whether the asset was compromised [1]. The implementation guidance sets six steps: scoping, preserving and collecting evidence, critical patching and stabilization, containment, triage analysis, and an escalation decision recorded in a forensic triage report. It gives target hours for each step, from scoping within two hours of a KEV addition to the escalation decision within 48 to 72 hours, and states that only the triage itself is required, not those target times [2].

The order matters to operations teams: the guidance puts acquiring volatile data first and says to collect all required evidence before patching, because patching may jeopardize the availability of artifacts. A confirmed compromise is reported through CISA’s Incident Reporting System. The guidance also asks agencies to plan in advance for high value assets, recording how they will weigh availability against the risk of exploitation [2].

## Cloud services and contractors

The directive does not apply to contractors unless their contract says so, but agencies must review their contracts to decide what changes they need. For systems in third-party environments, the agency keeps an inventory and obtains status updates. For FedRAMP certified services, agencies work through the FedRAMP program office; for other cloud services, directly with the provider [1].

The guidance splits responsibility by service model: the agency keeps full responsibility on premises and for infrastructure as a service; for platforms it oversees security, identity, access, data and audit logging while network security falls to the provider; and for software as a service the provider is responsible for web application security, identity, operations and network protection while the agency remains accountable for access and authentication, data and content, and audit logging. CISA strongly recommends that remediation timelines be part of a service-level agreement or contractual arrangement with the provider. It also states that FedRAMP will require providers to adopt its Vulnerability Detection and Response and Vulnerability Evaluation and Reporting rules by December 7, 2026, to align with the directive [2].

## Dates to plan around

These are the directive’s own deadlines, counted from its issuance on June 10, 2026.

- **June 10, 2026:** issued; Phase I applies at once [1].
- **Within 60 days:** Phase II process updates [1].
- **Within 180 days:** Phase III remediation deadlines and asset tagging [1].
- **December 7, 2026:** FedRAMP’s vulnerability rules mandatory for cloud providers, according to CISA’s guidance [2].
- **Every quarter:** attestation of publicly exposed IP addresses and domains [1].
- **Each fiscal year:** CISA reassesses the Table 1 timelines and reports implementation status to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the OMB Director and the National Cyber Director [1].

The directive binds federal civilian agencies only. Banks, health systems, and state and local governments that use the KEV catalog to set their own priorities are choosing to do so, and the table is a reference for them, not a requirement. Our [data brief on the catalog’s 2026 additions](https://insights.moraph.com/cisa-kev-catalog-2026-additions-and-deadlines) shows how the due dates on new entries changed this year. The guidance page was last updated August 25, 2026, as checked on November 14, 2026 [2].

Moraph’s teams help organizations with work like this: [see our solutions](https://www.moraph.com/solutions).

## Sources

1. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (June 10, 2026), including Table 1: Remediation Timelines. <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk> Checked November 14, 2026.
2. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. BOD 26-04: Implementation Guidance for Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (updated August 25, 2026). <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk> Checked November 14, 2026.

Published: November 14, 2026
Canonical URL: <https://insights.moraph.com/cisa-bod-26-04-risk-based-remediation-explained>
Publisher: Moraph Insights
