Citibank’s 2015 CFPB order tied monitoring fees to delivery and let it review telemarketers without notice

In orders announced July 21, 2015, federal regulators found Citibank charged for credit monitoring cardholders did not fully receive; the Bureau also found a telemarketing vendor knew which calls would be checked. The bank settled without admitting or denying the findings.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

In orders announced July 21, 2015, federal regulators found Citibank charged for credit monitoring cardholders did not fully receive; the Bureau also found a telemarketing vendor knew which calls would be checked. The bank settled without admitting or denying the findings.

  1. The week On July 21, 2015, two federal regulators announced coordinated actions over add-on products sold with Citibank credit cards.
  2. Fulfillment: fees charged for services not delivered Credit monitoring depends on access to credit reports.
  3. The sales floor: how products were sold, retained and collected on The OCC order made a parallel finding.
  4. Oversight: what the orders found and required The CFPB order made the same finding about two different failures.
  5. Governance and remedy: who answered for the product line The CFPB order’s most immediate requirement was a stop.
  6. How the orders reached different institutions The orders applied only to their respondents.
  7. Objections, and what the record shows The orders addressed the bank’s own functions.
  8. Checks an operations or vendor risk leader could run These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of the 2015 orders or current guidance.
  9. With hindsight The CFPB order set its own term.

The week

On July 21, 2015, two federal regulators announced coordinated actions over add-on products sold with Citibank credit cards. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau acted against Citibank, N.A., its subsidiary Department Stores National Bank and its nonbank subsidiary Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. (USA). [1] [2] The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency took separate action against the two banks. [3]

Both actions were settlements. The Bureau’s document says the respondents agreed to it without admitting or denying any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law, except those establishing jurisdiction. [1] The Comptroller’s document says the Comptroller finds, and the bank neither admits nor denies, the findings it lists. [4]

The Bureau’s document is File No. 2015-CFPB-0015, with a filing stamp of July 21, 2015. [1] It recites stipulations dated July 14 through July 16, 2015. [1] The Comptroller’s document recites a stipulation dated July 20, 2015. [4]

The Bureau’s announcement described the scale. It put relief to eligible consumers at an estimated $700 million, with roughly 7 million accounts affected by the add-on practices. [2] It said a subsidiary also charged expedited payment fees to nearly 1.8 million accounts during collection calls. [2] The respondents would pay the Bureau a $35 million civil money penalty. [2]

The Comptroller announced its own $35 million penalty, payable to the U.S. Treasury. [3] It said restitution paid under its action would also satisfy identical obligations to the same customers under the Bureau’s. [3]

The products fell into three groups. Five debt protection products promised to cancel a payment or balance, or defer a due date, after events such as job loss, disability or hospitalization. [1] Credit monitoring products offered alerts and credit reports. [1] A wallet protection product notified card issuers if a member reported cards lost or stolen. [1]

The Bureau found four kinds of violations. Three concerned the add-ons: deceptive marketing, sales and retention; telemarketing that broke the Telemarketing Sales Rule; and unfair billing and administration of credit monitoring. [1] The fourth concerned deceptive collection practices on delinquent store card accounts. [1]

The monitoring finding is the anchor of this piece. The Bureau found that cardholders were charged the full fee for monitoring products when they were not receiving all of the purchased monitoring or credit report benefits. [1] It said the necessary authorization was sometimes delayed or never obtained, and that credit reporting companies sometimes could not match a cardholder’s identification. [1]

The Comptroller found the same pattern for two identity protection products. Its findings say that from 2000 to February 2013, the bank, through its vendors, charged customers the full fee when they were not receiving the full monitoring or report retrieval services. [4]

The Bureau also found that employees of one telemarketing service provider knew in advance which calls the bank’s quality assurance provider would review in full. [1] It found the bank’s compliance monitoring, vendor management and quality assurance functions failed to prevent, identify or correct that conduct. [1]

Both regulators required new vendor management policies and new compliance structures. [1] [4] The Bureau also stopped the respondents from selling add-on products by telephone or at the point of sale until its regional director did not object to a compliance plan. [1]

For a bank’s operations, vendor management and compliance leaders, the week’s documents described how a product could be sold, serviced and charged for by others while its failures stayed with the bank. The rest of this piece is about that chain.

The Citibank add-on orders of July 2015 are remembered for their size. The CFPB’s release put the relief at an estimated $700 million. [2] For a head of card operations, a vendor risk manager or a chief compliance officer, the orders’ findings matter more than the totals. They describe a product line sold to the bank’s cardholders, serviced in part by vendors, and billed for months or years without the bank’s controls catching that customers were not receiving what they paid for. [1]

Our argument is that the orders turned a familiar idea, that a bank stays responsible for its vendors, into a specific operating requirement. The CFPB order required a plan to ensure customers are billed for credit monitoring only when they receive all of the purchased benefits. [1] It required vendor contracts that let the bank review telemarketing vendors without notice. [1] In our reading, those two terms answer the two failures the orders found: billing that ran ahead of delivery, and oversight the vendor could predict.

That framing places the work with operations and vendor management as much as with compliance. It also explains why the orders still matter, as federal banking agencies revisit their third-party risk guidance in 2026. [7]

We take the orders in four parts:

  1. Fulfillment: how fees were charged for services that were not delivered.
  2. The sales floor: how products were sold, retained and collected on.
  3. Oversight: what the orders found about monitoring, and what they required.
  4. Governance and remedy: how the orders changed who answered for the product line.

The parts do not overlap. The first is about delivery after the sale, the second about the sale itself, the third about the controls watching both and the fourth about accountability and repair. After them we look at how the orders reached different institutions, take the objections in order and end with checks an operations or vendor risk leader could run.

Fulfillment: fees charged for services not delivered

A service that needed the customer’s permission

Credit monitoring depends on access to credit reports. The CFPB order explained that the Fair Credit Reporting Act required a permissible purpose for third parties to obtain cardholders’ credit information to provide monitoring and report retrieval. [1] One such purpose is the consumer’s written instructions. [1]

So, the order found, before the bank or its service providers could access reports for two of the products, they had to obtain sufficient written authorization and personal verification information from each cardholder. [1] The CFPB’s release put it more plainly. Consumers generally must authorize access to their credit information before the monitoring can be performed. [2]

That made each enrollment a two-step process. Step one was the sale, which started the fee. Step two was the authorization, which made the service possible. The orders found the two steps were not tied together. [1] [4]

Where the chain broke

The CFPB order described several breaks. In some cases time passed before a cardholder’s authorization was obtained, or it was never obtained. [1] In others, the cardholder authorized, but a credit reporting company could not process it because it could not match the cardholder’s identification with its own records. [1]

In those circumstances, the order found, cardholders were billed the full fee even when they were not receiving all of the purchased benefits. [1] It found this ran from at least 2000 to approximately September 2012 for one product, and from at least 2002 to approximately February 2013 for another. [1]

For the bank’s own monitoring product and a related service, the order found a different cause. A third-party vendor performed the servicing, and service delivery errors prevented benefits from being activated and fulfilled. [1] Cardholders were again billed the full fee while not receiving some or all of the benefits. [1]

A defined status for the gap

Both orders gave the gap a name. The CFPB order defined “Unfulfilled” as the status of a person billed for a credit monitoring product who, at a given time, did not receive full monitoring or report retrieval services. [1] The reason did not matter. [1] The OCC order used “Unprocessable” for a customer billed for an identity protection product but not receiving its full advertised benefits. [4]

In our reading, those definitions describe a data field that did not exist in the bank’s systems. If the billing system had known which customers were in that status, the fee could have been held. The orders treated the absence of that link as the failure.

Who held the evidence

Vendors held much of the relevant information. For two products, the CFPB order said the third parties marketed and sold the products and performed the servicing and billing under agreements with the bank. [1] For another, a third-party vendor performed the servicing. [1]

The authorization paperwork, the credit bureau responses and the activation status sat with vendors and bureaus. The fee sat on the bank’s card statement. In our reading, the bank could close the gap only by requiring the vendor to report fulfillment status back to it, account by account, and by checking that report against billing.

What the orders required

The CFPB order required a compliance plan with a specific term. It had to include a plan for ensuring that customers are billed for credit monitoring products only when they receive all of the purchased monitoring or report retrieval benefits. [1] If the bank did not submit such a plan, its action plan had to address billing for current customers instead. [1]

The OCC order required full reimbursement for eligible customers who were in “Unprocessable” status at any point in their enrollment. [4] Reimbursement included the product fees paid during that period and any over-limit fees and finance charges. [4] [3]

The CFPB release said the bank had already completed reimbursement for the credit monitoring billing. [2] It said consumers eligible for a refund did not have to take any action to get it. [2]

A hypothetical reconciliation

Consider, as an illustration, what the CFPB order’s billing term would mean for a card issuer today. Each night, the monitoring vendor sends a file listing every enrolled account and its status: active, awaiting authorization, unable to match at a credit bureau, or closed. The issuer’s billing system reads the file before the next statement cycle.

Accounts not in an active status are held from the fee, flagged for outreach and counted. A weekly report shows how many enrolled accounts are not receiving the service, for how long, and why. The vendor’s contract requires the file, sets its accuracy standard and gives the issuer audit rights over the data behind it.

Nothing in that design is exotic. It is a match between two files, owned by someone, with an exception queue. The orders suggest that its absence, over years, produced the injury they describe. [1] [4]

The scale of the gap

The CFPB order estimated the injury from the credit monitoring billing at approximately 2,159,000 cardholder accounts. [1] The release put the related relief at approximately $196 million to roughly 2.2 million accounts. [2] The release said the billing practices ran from at least 2000 through 2013. [2]

In our reading, the duration matters more than the totals. A billing gap that the release dates from at least 2000 through 2013 is not a single error. It points to a reconciliation that was never built.

The sales floor: how products were sold, retained and collected on

Telemarketing run by a subsidiary and its vendors

According to the CFPB order, the nonbank subsidiary and its service providers operated all telemarketing channels for the add-on products. [1] They did so on behalf of the two banks. [1] The OCC order described the bank’s telesales agents and its vendors. [4]

The CFPB order found that, from at least 2003 to August 2012, cardholders were enrolled in debt protection products during telemarketing calls in which costs, terms or benefits were misrepresented or omitted. [1] Its examples included telling cardholders they could avoid a fee by paying in full by the due date, when the fee was avoided only with a zero balance at the end of the billing cycle. [1]

It also found that certain scripts claimed a blanket “free” 30-day trial for one product, although members who did not cancel were charged for those first 30 days. [1] And it found some cardholders who disclosed information showing they would be ineligible for benefits were not told so. [1]

Monitoring products on the phone

For the bank’s identity monitoring product, the CFPB order found misrepresentations on telemarketing calls from at least January 2009 to October 2012. [1] The product was described as providing fraud alerts at the transaction level, when it alerted only to changes in credit files. [1] Its score was described as coming from all three major credit reporting companies, when another vendor generated it from their files. [1]

The order listed the price: generally $1 for the first month and $12.95 a month after. [1] It found the calls omitted that cost and that billing would continue until cancellation, when some cardholders believed they could enroll for 30 days for $1. [1]

Billing authorization on the call

The CFPB order found that from at least January 2009 to October 2012, the subsidiary used leading questions to obtain billing authorization. [1] It found enrollments made without any billing authorization, or by treating ambiguous answers as permission. [1] The order concluded that this violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule’s prohibition on submitting billing information without express informed consent. [1]

The OCC order made a parallel finding. It said telesales agents failed to obtain consumers’ informed and affirmative consent before enrolling them in debt cancellation products. [4]

The vendor that knew which calls would be checked

A more specific finding concerned one telemarketing service provider. The CFPB order found that, from at least January 2009 to October 2012, a number of its employees intentionally and systematically misrepresented product terms on outbound calls to cardholders in certain states. [1]

It found they did so by knowing, before calls were placed, which calls the bank’s third-party quality assurance provider would later review in their entirety. [1] For calls they knew would not be fully reviewed, the order found, the provider encouraged agents to create their own scripts and use them when they were known to contain material misrepresentations. [1] It found the provider’s management failed to correct misrepresentations it knew about. [1]

In our reading, that finding describes a control designed to be seen. Quality assurance that the monitored party can predict measures behavior on the calls it knows are monitored. Nothing in it reaches the rest.

Online claims

The online channel had its own finding. The CFPB order found that a product website claimed daily monitoring with “Access to 3-in-1 credit reports, credit scores and monitoring from the 3 leading credit bureaus at no additional cost.” [1] It found the scores were generated not by the three companies but by the bank’s third-party vendor, using their files as an input. [1]

In our reading, that finding turned on a supplier detail a customer could not easily check. The marketing team described the product; the vendor built it. The claim was accurate only if someone compared the copy with the vendor’s actual process.

Point of sale

Some add-ons were sold at retail checkouts. The CFPB order found that, from at least 2008 to August 2012 for one product, consumers applying for store cards were enrolled in debt protection through pin-pad screens. [1] It found the offer came before the credit application was complete, conflating the two, and that ambiguous text could be read as acknowledging receipt of literature. [1]

The OCC order found the point-of-sale process failed to make clear that the protection product was separate from the card, and lacked controls to ensure informed consent. [4] In our reading, that put screen design inside the compliance perimeter. The sequence of screens was itself a disclosure.

Retention calls

The CFPB order also covered customers who called to cancel. It found that from at least January 2009 to October 2012, retention practices included offering a streamlined version of the monitoring product at a reduced price while falsely stating benefits would not change. [1] It also found misrepresentations about the product’s identity theft expense reimbursement benefit. [1]

Collections

The fourth finding concerned the store card subsidiary. Its service provider handled collections on accounts 90 days or less delinquent, and the subsidiary handled later stages. [1] Both generally charged a $14.95 fee to post a telephone payment from a checking account on the same day. [1]

The CFPB order found that from at least January 2009 to March 2013, in numerous instances, the fee’s purpose was not disclosed, and the service provider called it a “processing” fee. [1] It found no-cost alternatives were not disclosed, and that same-day posting was almost never in the cardholder’s financial interest. [1] The release put relief at about $23.8 million to almost 1.8 million accounts. [2]

Oversight: what the orders found and required

The same sentence, twice

The CFPB order made the same finding about two different failures. It found the bank’s compliance monitoring, vendor management and quality assurance functions failed to prevent, identify or correct the telemarketing vendor’s conduct. [1] It found those functions failed to prevent, identify or correct in a timely manner the billing for services not fully provided. [1]

In our reading, the repetition is the point of the order. Three functions existed. They did not catch two failures in two different parts of the product life cycle. The order’s remedies rebuilt each function around the specific failures it missed.

Vendor management before the contract

The CFPB order required a written vendor management policy for add-on products. [1] Before signing with any service provider, the bank had to analyze the provider’s ability, including its operational and technical capacity, to perform each function in compliance with the law. [1] The functions listed ran from marketing and sale through servicing, billing, fulfillment and administration. [1]

The OCC order required a similar pre-contract analysis of each vendor’s ability to perform in compliance with consumer protection laws and bank policies. [4] In our reading, both orders named fulfillment as a diligence subject, and the CFPB order added operational and technical capacity. A vendor that could sell a product but could not show it delivered it would fail that analysis.

What the contracts had to say

For new and renewed contracts, the CFPB order required written terms setting out each party’s responsibilities. [1] They had to include the provider’s duty to maintain adequate internal controls, including the operational and technical capacity to perform effectively. [1] They had to include the provider’s duty to train its staff on federal consumer financial law and the bank’s policies. [1]

They also had to give the bank the authority to conduct periodic onsite reviews of the provider’s controls, performance and information systems. [1] For providers performing telemarketing of add-ons, that authority had to permit reviews without notice. [1] And the bank needed a right to terminate if the provider materially failed to comply. [1]

The OCC order required similar terms, adding the vendor’s duty to provide periodic reports confirming compliance with its contractual responsibilities. [4] In our reading, that report is the natural home for fulfillment data. A vendor confirming compliance would need to show which customers were receiving the service.

Training that reached the vendor’s staff

The CFPB order’s contract terms included the provider’s duty to train all its employees and agents involved in the products on federal consumer financial law and the bank’s policies. [1] The vendor policy also required written procedures for training provider staff who sell or retain products by telephone, and those who monitor such calls. [1]

In our reading, that brought the vendor’s workforce inside the bank’s training program. The people monitoring calls needed training as much as the people making them, because a monitor who could not recognize a violation would not report one.

Reviews the vendor cannot predict

The CFPB order required periodic onsite review of each provider’s controls, performance and information systems, “with and without prior notice.” [1] In our reading, that requirement answers the telemarketing finding directly. A review program the vendor can foresee can be managed around, as the order found had happened. [1]

The same logic applied to call monitoring. The UDAAP policy the order required called for recording all add-on sales calls in their entirety, where the law allowed, and keeping recordings for at least 25 months. [1] It also covered retention calls where the customer stayed enrolled. [1] With every call recorded, in our reading, the selection of calls to review could no longer be known in advance by the people being reviewed.

Independent monitoring and escalation

The UDAAP policy also required independent call monitoring by qualified personnel trained to identify violations. [1] The monitoring unit had to report findings at least monthly to a specified executive risk manager independent of the business that sold the products. [1] Violations by the bank’s own staff and by service providers had to reach that same independent manager in a timely manner. [1]

The policy had to include an annual written analysis of any changes to how add-on products were governed, sold, billed or fulfilled, and of any new add-on products, with an assessment of their risks. [1] It also had to give risk management, internal audit and compliance the authority and status to review products and see deficiencies remedied. [1]

Internal audit as a second line of evidence

The CFPB order required internal audit to assess compliance with the vendor and UDAAP policies periodically. [1] The first assessment was due within 120 days of the Bureau’s non-objection to the compliance plan, with later ones at least annually. [1] Findings had to go in writing to the compliance committee and the regional director. [1] Audit procedures had to expand their sampling when exceptions suggesting violations were found. [1]

The OCC order set a similar internal audit cycle for the vendor management policy, with findings to the audit committee and the examiner-in-charge. [4] In our reading, the orders made audit findings a regular report to the regulator as well as an internal record.

Governance and remedy: who answered for the product line

A pause on selling

The CFPB order’s most immediate requirement was a stop. The respondents had to discontinue marketing and selling all add-on products by telephone or at the point of sale, and telephone retention, until the regional director did not object to a compliance plan. [1] The plan had to cover marketing, sale, servicing, billing, fulfillment and administration. [1]

In our reading, that pause reversed the burden for restarting. The business could not resume the channel because it believed it had fixed it. It had to show a plan the regulator would accept first.

Board committees

The CFPB order required the board to appoint a compliance committee of at least three directors, a majority of whom could not be employees or officers of the bank or its affiliates. [1] The committee had to meet at least monthly and keep minutes. [1] The OCC order also required a compliance committee. [4]

Within 120 days, the bank had to submit an action plan with timelines for every requirement. [1] The committee had to send the board quarterly progress reports, which the board forwarded to the regulator. [1]

Restitution

The CFPB release described the relief by category. [2] It said approximately $479 million would go to about 4.8 million accounts for deceptive marketing or retention practices. [2] It said approximately $196 million would go to roughly 2.2 million accounts charged for monitoring products while services were not fully performed. [2]

The OCC order required a reimbursement plan within 60 days, with methods for identifying eligible customers and calculating each payment. [4] It required internal audit to review reimbursement after completion and report to the examiner-in-charge and the board. [4]

Two regulators, one remediation

The two actions were coordinated. The Comptroller said restitution paid under its order would also satisfy identical obligations to the same customers under the Bureau’s. [3] The CFPB order defined the Comptroller’s order as one of its terms. [1]

In our reading, coordination reduced duplicate payments but not duplicate oversight. The bank answered to a regional director at the Bureau and an examiner-in-charge at the Comptroller’s office, each with its own plans, reports and deadlines. [1] [4] A compliance office managing both needed one schedule that met each regulator’s terms.

Refunds without claims

The CFPB release said eligible consumers did not have to take any action to receive refunds. [2] The Comptroller’s order required the reimbursement plan to describe how the bank would compile the list of eligible customers and calculate each payment. [4] It also required procedures for locating customers whose contact information had changed. [4]

Where reimbursement was credited to a card account, the plan had to describe how updated balances would be reported to the credit reporting agencies the bank had furnished. [4] For accounts sold to unaffiliated third parties, it had to describe how the bank would ask those parties to report updated balances. [4]

In our reading, remediation was itself a data project. The bank had to reconstruct who was harmed from records that, by the orders’ account, had not tracked the harm when it happened. [1] [4] The quality of the original data set the cost of the repair.

Records and duration

The CFPB order required the respondents to create, for at least five years, records of each consumer’s enrollment in monitoring and other add-on products. [1] It said the order would terminate five years from its effective date, subject to extension if the Bureau brought an action alleging a violation. [1]

The CFPB release said this was the tenth action the Bureau had taken against companies for illegal practices in the marketing or administration of add-on products. [2]

How the orders reached different institutions

Large card issuers

The orders applied only to their respondents. In our reading, their remedies still described what a large issuer could expect if examiners found similar gaps: fulfillment reconciliation, unannounced vendor reviews, full call recording and an independent escalation line. [1] [4]

Banks with retail card partners

The point-of-sale findings reached store card programs, where the bank’s product is sold at a retailer’s checkout. [1] [4] The CFPB order found the bank failed to ensure in-store retail associates consistently provided the products’ terms before the pin-pad enrollment ended. [1] In our reading, partner agreements needed to give the bank control of screen content and sequence, and evidence of what customers saw.

Credit unions and community banks

A smaller institution that offers add-on products through a vendor would face the same structure in miniature. The CFPB order’s requirement for pre-contract diligence on a vendor’s operational and technical capacity is a useful template whatever the institution’s size. [1] Smaller institutions should confirm with counsel and their own regulator which rules and supervisory expectations apply to them.

Debt collection operations

The fee finding reached collections. A collection script that offered a paid option without stating its purpose or the free alternatives was found deceptive. [1] In our reading, collections scripts deserve the same review as sales scripts, because the customer is under pressure.

Vendors and subsidiaries

The CFPB order named a nonbank subsidiary as a respondent and found that it violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule as a telemarketer. [1] In our reading, the order shows that putting a function in a subsidiary or a vendor does not move it outside the reach of consumer protection law. It moves where the evidence lives.

Outsourced call centers

A call center that sells or retains products for a bank would meet these terms from the other side of the contract. Under the CFPB order’s template, it would owe the bank adequate internal controls, staff training and access to its systems. [1] It would accept onsite reviews without notice and a termination right for material failure. [1]

In our reading, a provider that wants bank work should expect to show those capacities during diligence, before the contract is signed. The order required the bank to analyze the provider’s operational and technical capacity first. [1] A provider that cannot produce call recordings, quality results and training records on request will struggle to pass that analysis.

Compliance and audit teams

The orders gave compliance and audit specific outputs: monthly monitoring reports to an independent risk manager, periodic audit assessments with written findings, and expanded sampling when exceptions appear. [1] In our reading, those outputs are a useful benchmark for any institution’s second and third lines, whether or not it sells add-ons.

Product managers

The add-on business combined marketing, credit reporting access, servicing, billing and collections. The orders found failures in each. [1] [4] In our reading, a product manager for any bundled service needs a map of each step, who performs it and how the bank learns that it happened.

Objections, and what the record shows

“The vendors did it”

The orders addressed the bank’s own functions. The CFPB order found the bank’s compliance monitoring, vendor management and quality assurance failed. [1] The OCC order found the bank, through its vendors, billed customers. [4] The bank neither admitted nor denied the findings. [1] [4] In our reading, the responsibility the orders assigned was the bank’s.

“Customers could have completed the authorization”

The OCC order noted that customers were given the materials needed to submit authorization. [4] The CFPB order found the resulting injury was not reasonably avoidable by consumers. [1] In our reading, the answer turns on the billing design. A fee that starts before the service can start puts the cost of incomplete paperwork on the customer.

“These were legacy products”

The conduct ended years before the orders. The CFPB order dated the monitoring billing to at least 2000 through about February 2013. [1] The order still required forward-looking controls for any future add-on sales. [1] In our reading, regulators treated the age of the conduct as a reason for restitution, not a reason to skip controls.

“Recording every call is too costly”

The CFPB order required recording entire sales and retention calls where the law allowed, and keeping the recordings at least 25 months. [1] That has a storage and review cost. In our reading, the alternative the order found, sampled review that the vendor could predict, had a higher one. [1] Full recording does not mean full review. It means any call can be reviewed, which changes how every call is made.

“The fees were small”

Individual fees were modest. The CFPB order said the monitoring product generally cost $12.95 a month after a $1 first month. [1] Across accounts and years, the release put relief for the monitoring billing alone at approximately $196 million. [2] In our reading, small recurring fees are where reconciliation matters most, because no single customer has a strong reason to notice.

“Quality assurance was in place”

It was. The CFPB order’s finding was that a third-party quality assurance provider reviewed calls, and that the telemarketing provider knew which ones. [1] In our reading, the existence of a control was never the question. Its design was.

Checks an operations or vendor risk leader could run

These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of the 2015 orders or current guidance. Institutions should confirm their obligations with counsel and their regulators.

  • Fee-to-delivery reconciliation: for every recurring fee tied to a service a vendor performs, compare who is billed with who is receiving the service.
  • Activation status feeds: require vendors to report fulfillment status by account, and act on accounts in a pending or failed state.
  • Unpredictable review: make sure vendor reviews and call sampling cannot be foreseen by the people being reviewed.
  • Full recording: where the law allows, record entire sales and retention calls and keep recordings long enough to support a later review.
  • Independent escalation: route vendor violations to a risk manager outside the business that sells the product.
  • Screen review: treat point-of-sale and online enrollment screens as disclosures, and test their sequence as well as their wording.
  • Collections scripts: review fee offers in collection calls for purpose, cost and free alternatives.
  • Exit terms: confirm each vendor contract gives a right to terminate for material noncompliance.

The 2015 orders found a bank billing for services others failed to deliver, and oversight others could foresee. [1] [4] The checks above follow that line: tie every fee to evidence of delivery, and make every review one the reviewed party cannot plan around.

With hindsight

The CFPB order set its own term. It said it would terminate five years from its effective date, or five years from the most recent date the Bureau began an action alleging a violation of it. [1] As checked on November 16, 2026, the Bureau’s enforcement action page for the matter lists its status as “Expired/Terminated/Dismissed.” [5] The page says it was last modified August 8, 2023. [5]

The page lists the filing date as July 21, 2015, the forum as an administrative proceeding and the product as credit cards. [5] It links the consent order and the three stipulations. [5]

The broader expectation the orders applied did not end with them. On June 9, 2023, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC and the OCC published final interagency guidance on third-party relationships, final as of June 6, 2023. [6] It replaced each agency’s existing general guidance on the topic. [6]

The 2023 guidance said a banking organization’s use of third parties does not diminish its responsibility to meet legal requirements to the same extent as if the activities were performed in-house. [6] It said “a contract often establishes the banking organization’s right to audit and provides for remediation when issues are identified.” [6] It described ongoing monitoring appropriate to each relationship’s risk. [6]

In our reading, the guidance stated in general terms what the 2015 orders had required of one bank in specific terms. Pre-contract diligence, defined responsibilities, audit rights and termination rights all appear in both. [1] [6] The orders’ more pointed terms, such as reviews without notice and fee-to-delivery reconciliation, remain examples rather than general requirements.

The 2015 order also looked forward in its own terms. It said the Bureau may use the practices it described in future enforcement actions against the respondents and their affiliates, including to establish a pattern or practice of violations. [1]

The 2023 guidance also described critical activities. It said they may include activities that could cause significant risk if the third party fails, have significant customer impacts, or significantly affect the organization’s financial condition or operations. [6] Among examples of documentation and internal reporting the agencies said they had observed, it listed a current inventory of all third-party relationships. [6]

The guidance is changing again. On September 15, 2026, the OCC, the Board, the FDIC and the NCUA proposed new third-party risk management guidance. [7] The proposal would discuss aligning third-party risk management with the reasonably assessed risk of each relationship, and tailoring practices to the organization’s size and risk profile. [7]

The agencies said they plan to rescind and replace existing guidance on third-party risk management. [7] The proposal set a comment deadline of November 16, 2026. [7] As checked on November 16, 2026, it remains a proposal. [7]

What held up from 2015 is the allocation of responsibility. The 2023 guidance keeps it with the bank, and the 2026 proposal would change how the bank tailors its oversight. [6] [7] What the orders added, and what no general guidance has fully replaced, is specificity about the controls that failed.

In our view, the lasting point for operations leaders is the billing gap. A fee that can start before the service starts needs a reconciliation, and that reconciliation is an operating control, not a compliance document.

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  • CFPB
  • OCC
  • add-on products
  • vendor management
  • credit cards
  • UDAAP