DFARS’s 2017 deadline let each defense contractor price its own security, with no required check before award
Defense contractors had to implement NIST SP 800-171 by December 31, 2017. The rule required no certification, had bidders price compliance into offers and left it out of evaluation unless a buyer chose otherwise. In our reading, the market decided how much security to buy.
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Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
Defense contractors had to implement NIST SP 800-171 by December 31, 2017. The rule required no certification, had bidders price compliance into offers and left it out of evaluation unless a buyer chose otherwise. In our reading, the market decided how much security to buy.
- The week Sunday, December 31, 2017, was the last day allowed by a Defense Department contract clause for contractors to implement a federal security standard.
- Price: compliance as an allowable cost in each bid The first part is how the cost of compliance reached the government.
- Proof: a representation, not a certification The second part is what a contractor had to show.
- Selection: compliance outside the competition The third part is whether compliance affected who won.
- Flowdown: the cost and the proof passed down the chain The fourth part is the supply chain.
- How the deadline landed on different contractors The same clause produced different economics for different firms.
- Objections, in order Five objections deserve an answer.
- What a leader could check These checks follow from the four parts.
- With hindsight The economics described above did not last.
The week
Sunday, December 31, 2017, was the last day allowed by a Defense Department contract clause for contractors to implement a federal security standard. The clause was DFARS 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting. In the version dated October 2016, paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A) said the contractor shall implement NIST SP 800-171 as soon as practical, but not later than December 31, 2017.
The clause applied to covered contractor information systems. Those were unclassified systems owned or operated by or for a contractor that processed, stored or transmitted covered defense information. That term meant unclassified controlled technical information or other information listed in the government’s controlled unclassified information registry. It covered such information marked and provided by DoD, or collected, developed or used by the contractor for the contract.
NIST SP 800-171 was titled Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. Revision 1 was dated December 2016, and the copy then on NIST’s site included updates as of November 28, 2017. It organized its security requirements into fourteen families, from access control to system and information integrity. Each family had basic requirements drawn from FIPS 200 and derived requirements drawn from the federal control catalog.
The publication described how an organization should document its position. It said nonfederal organizations should describe in a system security plan how the requirements are met or how they plan to meet them. They should develop plans of action describing how unimplemented requirements will be met. When requested, those documents should be submitted to the responsible agency or contracting officer to demonstrate implementation or planned implementation. Federal agencies could consider them as critical inputs to a risk decision on whether to share controlled information with the organization.
The clause had several other parts. For contracts awarded before October 1, 2017, the contractor had to notify the DoD Chief Information Officer within 30 days of award of any 800-171 requirements not implemented at award. Contractors could ask the contracting officer to vary from a requirement. The DoD CIO would decide whether a requirement was not applicable or whether an alternative was equally effective.
A cloud provider holding covered defense information for the contractor had to meet security requirements equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline. Cyber incidents had to be reported to DoD within 72 hours of discovery. Malicious software had to go to the DoD Cyber Crime Center. Images of affected systems had to be preserved for at least 90 days after the report.
The clause flowed down. Primes had to include it in subcontracts for operationally critical support or involving covered defense information, including subcontracts for commercial items. The prime had to decide whether information passed to a subcontractor kept its identity as covered defense information.
A companion solicitation provision, DFARS 252.204-7008, carried the same date. It said that by submitting an offer, the offeror represented that it would implement the 800-171 requirements not later than December 31, 2017.
The deadline had been set in a final rule published on October 21, 2016. Responding to comments, DoD said the phrase as soon as practical encouraged contractors to begin early while letting them plan their own implementation. It said the rule did not require certification of any kind, and that by signing the contract the contractor agreed to comply with its terms.
Security standards are written in the language of controls. Their consequences arrive in the language of money. The DFARS deadline of December 31, 2017, is a clear case. The clause told defense contractors what to implement. The rule that set it told them who would pay and how anyone would know. Those answers shaped what happened next more than the controls did.
Our argument is that the 2016 rule, and the deadline it set, made security a cost that each contractor priced for itself, with no required check before award. DoD said the rule required no certification. It said the cost of compliance was allowable and should be accounted for in proposal pricing. And it said the clause was not structured to make compliance an evaluation factor in source selection. In our reading, those three choices together left the market to decide how much security contractors bought.
A market with no check before award has a predictable feature. A contractor that spends fully on compliance carries that cost in its price. A contractor that spends less, but represents the same compliance, can bid lower. Unless the buyer can tell them apart, the lower bid wins. The Justice Department would later name exactly that problem, and the Defense Department would later build a system to check before award.
Why read a security clause through an economics lens? Because the clause did not operate in isolation. It sat inside a procurement system that chooses suppliers by comparing offers. Whatever the clause required, the procurement system decided whether meeting it helped or hurt a bidder. A requirement that costs money and earns nothing in competition is a requirement that each bidder will meet to the extent it must, and no further. How far it must depends on who checks, when and with what consequence.
We take the economics in four parts. Together they cover how compliance cost entered a contract and what decided whether it was spent:
- Price: how the cost of compliance entered bids and contracts.
- Proof: what a contractor had to show, to whom and when.
- Selection: whether compliance affected who won the work.
- Flowdown: how the cost and the proof passed down the supply chain.
After the four parts we look at how the deadline landed on different kinds of contractor, take the main objections in order, and list what a leader could check. We describe the rules from their text. Where we say what a rule required of a particular firm, that is our reading, and firms should check with counsel.
Price: compliance as an allowable cost in each bid
The first part is how the cost of compliance reached the government. DoD answered a comment about cost recovery in the 2016 rule. It said it did not develop cost recovery models for compliance with DFARS rules. The cost related to compliance should be considered during proposal preparation, and contractors should follow their own accounting processes.
What DoD said about the size of the cost
DoD did not estimate the cost. The rule said the cost of compliance was unknown, because it depended on the make-up of the information system and the security already in place. For a contractor already meeting the 2013 version of the clause, the changes would be less significant. For a new contractor handling covered defense information, the rule said the cost could be significant.
The rule then said the cost of compliance is allowable and should be accounted for in proposal pricing, in accordance with the entity’s accounting practices. That is the central economic statement. Compliance was a cost of doing business, to be recovered through prices like any other.
How that worked by contract type
Under a cost-reimbursement contract, allowable costs are reimbursed, subject to the cost principles and the contractor’s accounting practices. Security spending that is allowable and properly allocated can flow through to the government. In our reading, cost-type contractors faced less price pressure on security spending, though they still had to justify it.
Under a fixed-price contract, the contractor bears its costs. Whatever it spends on security comes out of the margin it priced in. A fixed-price bidder that priced full compliance and one that priced little both receive the price they bid. The difference shows up in profit, not in a reimbursement claim.
Where a commercial item supplier sells at catalog or market prices, the arithmetic is harder still. A supplier of commercial items that received covered defense information under a subcontract would have to recover security costs in prices it set for the market as a whole, or absorb them.
Indirect costs and allocation
For contractors with indirect cost pools, security spending on shared systems would be spread across contracts through overhead rates. A firm whose network served both defense and commercial work would allocate the cost under its disclosed practices. In our reading, that spread the cost of defense-driven security to commercial customers too, unless the firm segregated the defense environment.
Segregation is itself an economic decision. Building a separate enclave for covered defense information narrows the scope of the controls and their cost. It also adds the cost of running a second environment and the friction of moving work between them. The rule left that design choice to each contractor.
The cost of the plan versus the cost of the controls
800-171 revision 1 gave contractors two kinds of cost. One was the cost of implementing controls. The other was the cost of documenting the position: a system security plan and plans of action. We would expect the second to cost less than the first. A contractor could produce a plan that described unimplemented requirements and a schedule to fix them for less than implementing them would cost.
The publication treated that plan as legitimate. It said organizations should describe how requirements are met or how they plan to meet them, and develop plans of action for unimplemented requirements. In our reading, that left room for a contractor to treat a documented gap as compatible with its representation, depending on how the contract and the contracting officer read the clause. The economic incentive pointed toward documenting gaps rather than closing them, when closing them cost more than the bid could carry.
Who sets the security budget
Inside a contractor, the security budget competes with every other cost. The CISO asks for it. The pricing team and the business unit decide how much of it the bid can carry. When the bid is fixed-price and security is not evaluated, the business case for the CISO’s request rests on avoided loss and contract risk, which are hard to quantify. In our reading, the 2017 framework put the CISO at a disadvantage in that internal argument, because the outside world gave no credit for the spending.
Pricing a gap assessment
A bidder that wanted to price compliance honestly needed a gap assessment: a comparison of its systems against each requirement, with a cost for closing each gap. That assessment had its own cost. For a firm without in-house security staff, it meant buying outside help before knowing whether it would win the contract. In our reading, the cost of finding out what compliance would cost was itself a barrier, and it fell before any revenue.
The cost of an incident under the clause
The clause also attached costs to incidents. A contractor that discovered one had to review its systems for compromise, report within 72 hours, preserve images and packet captures for at least 90 days and give DoD access for forensic analysis on request. Those duties cost staff time and outside help, and they arrive without warning. A bid that priced prevention but not response would understate the expected cost of the contract. In our reading, the response duties were a cost every bidder faced in proportion to its chance of an incident, which weaker security raised.
Recurring costs
Compliance was not a one-time purchase. Monitoring, log review, patching, training, vulnerability scanning and incident response cost money every year. A bid that priced the initial build but not the running cost would understate the true cost. Contractors with multi-year contracts had to price both, and fixed-price contractors carried the risk that running costs rose faster than expected.
Who paid in the end
The government paid for compliance through prices where contractors priced it. Where contractors did not, the cost of weak security fell elsewhere: on the government as owner of the information, and on the contractor if an incident occurred. Information theft does not appear in a contractor’s cost report. The contractor whose systems were breached might bear incident response costs and reputational harm. The loss of the information itself, and whatever an adversary gained from it, fell on the government and the programs it supported. DoD made a version of the same point in the 2016 rule. Answering comments that asked for help for small businesses, it said the cost to the nation in lost intellectual property and lost technological advantage over potential adversaries was much greater than the investment. It added that the value of the information does not diminish when it moves to contractors, prime or sub, large or small. That asymmetry, in our reading, is the root of the economics this article describes.
Proof: a representation, not a certification
The second part is what a contractor had to show. Here the 2016 rule was explicit. In response to comments about oversight and certification, it said no new oversight paradigm was created. Oversight, if deemed necessary, could use existing FAR and DFARS allowances, or an additional requirement could be added to a contract. The rule did not require certification of any kind. By signing the contract, the contractor agreed to comply.
The representation in the offer
The provision at DFARS 252.204-7008 made the point at the offer stage. By submitting an offer, the offeror represented that it would implement the 800-171 requirements not later than December 31, 2017. The representation was a promise about future conduct. Before the deadline, an offeror could truthfully say it would implement. After the deadline, the representation in new offers referred to requirements that should already be in place.
What the contracting officer saw
At award, a contracting officer saw the representation and any variance requests. Variance requests went to the DoD CIO for adjudication, and accepted variances were incorporated into the contract. The contracting officer did not see the system security plan unless he or she asked for it. 800-171 said the plan and plans of action should be submitted when requested. The clause did not require submission.
The notice for older contracts
For contracts awarded before October 1, 2017, the clause required a notice to the DoD CIO within 30 days of award listing requirements not implemented at award. That notice gave DoD some visibility into gaps, but only for those contracts, and only at the start. It was not a recurring report. It did not tell a contracting officer whether a gap had been closed by the deadline.
After award
Once a contract was signed, the contracting officer administered it. The clause gave no schedule for checking security during performance. A contracting officer could ask for the system security plan, as 800-171 contemplated, but the clause did not require it. In our reading, security after award was monitored mainly through incidents and through any program-specific terms a buying office had added. That left a contractor’s security posture invisible for the life of the contract unless something went wrong or someone asked.
Incident reporting as the only regular signal
The clause’s regular signal to DoD was incident reporting. A contractor had to report cyber incidents affecting covered systems or information within 72 hours, preserve images and give DoD access for forensic analysis on request. Those duties produced evidence after something had gone wrong. In our reading, the clause’s design meant the government learned about a contractor’s security chiefly when it failed.
Variances as a priced alternative
The clause offered one formal route to a different answer. A contractor could ask to vary from a requirement, explaining why it did not apply or how an alternative was equally effective. The DoD CIO decided. An accepted variance became part of the contract. That route had a cost: preparing the case and waiting for a decision. But it produced something no plan of action did, a documented government acceptance. In our reading, it was the one mechanism in the 2017 framework that converted a contractor’s security choice into a government-endorsed position.
What an investigator would later look for
The clause and the provision created a paper trail even without a check before award. An offer represented future implementation. A contract contained the clause. A system security plan, if one existed, described the position. Incident reports, if any, showed what happened. An investigator testing whether a representation was true would compare those documents with the systems as they were. The documents a contractor kept, or did not keep, would decide how that comparison went. For that reason we suggest treating the plan as evidence, not paperwork.
Self-assessment without a common method
In our reading, a contractor assessing itself against 800-171 in 2017 chose its own method. The DoD Assessment Methodology, with its scoring and its record in the supplier system, became a contract requirement only with the 2020 interim rule. Two contractors with the same systems could reach different conclusions about whether they met a requirement, and both could represent compliance in good faith. In our reading, the absence of a common method made representations hard to compare even for a buyer who wanted to.
Why proof mattered economically
Proof is what lets a buyer distinguish between sellers. Without it, the buyer pays the same for a secure supplier and an insecure one. A seller that has invested cannot show that investment at award. In our reading, the 2016 rule’s decision to require no certification removed the mechanism by which security spending could earn a return in competition. The only return was avoided loss, which accrued partly to the government, not the contractor.
Selection: compliance outside the competition
The third part is whether compliance affected who won. A comment to the 2016 rule asked whether DoD could require full compliance as a condition of responsiveness, and urged DoD not to exclude offerors on that basis before the deadline. Another asked DoD to say the clause would not be used in evaluation.
What DoD said
DoD said the clause was not structured to facilitate the use of compliance with 800-171 as a factor in evaluation and source selection. The requirements were set as the minimum acceptable level to protect covered defense information. But the rule did not preclude a requiring activity from saying in a solicitation that compliance would be an evaluation factor, and how.
What that meant in competition
So the default was that compliance was a condition of the contract, not a basis for choosing between bidders. A buying office could choose to evaluate it. Absent that choice, two offerors with different security postures would be compared on price and other factors as if their security were equal. Each represented the same thing.
In our reading, that default made security a pass-fail term with no test at the gate. Every offeror passed by representing. The competition then turned on everything else.
The buyer’s option
The option to evaluate security existed. A program office handling sensitive technology could make it a factor, ask for the system security plan and score it. That would have let security earn a return in the competition for that contract. But it required the buying office to have the expertise to evaluate security plans and the time to do so. The 2016 rule left that to each office.
The deadline as a change in what offers meant
The date changed the meaning of the representation. Before December 31, 2017, an offeror represented that it would implement by that date. After it, an offeror’s representation that it would implement by a date already past could only be read as a statement about the present. In our reading, the deadline turned a forward-looking promise into a statement of current fact for every offer submitted after it. Firms that had relied on a plan to close gaps later were, from that point, representing something their plan said was not yet true, unless the contract or a variance said otherwise.
What evaluation would have required
For a buying office that wanted to evaluate security, the work was real. It needed evaluators who could read a system security plan, a rating scheme that distinguished strong from weak plans, and time in the schedule to do it. It also needed to decide how much a better plan was worth against a higher price. In our reading, those costs explain why the default of not evaluating was attractive to buying offices too. The economics of no check applied to buyers as well as sellers.
Signals bidders could send
A bidder that had invested could try to show it. It could describe its security program in its proposal, attach a third-party assessment or offer its system security plan for review. Without an evaluation factor, the buying office had no obligation to credit any of it. The signal cost money to produce and earned nothing in the score. In our reading, that is the condition under which sellers stop sending a signal, and buyers stop being able to tell sellers apart.
Consequences for pricing behavior
If security does not win contracts, a rational bidder spends on it only what the contract and the risk of enforcement require. Enforcement in 2017 rested on the contract terms and existing remedies. In our reading, that set the expected cost of under-investment low, at least until an incident or an investigation. The price of the lowest-cost compliant-on-paper bidder became the price the government paid.
Flowdown: the cost and the proof passed down the chain
The fourth part is the supply chain. Defense programs depend on tiers of subcontractors. The clause followed the information down the tiers.
The flowdown duty
Paragraph (m) required the prime to include the clause in subcontracts for operationally critical support or involving covered defense information, including commercial item subcontracts, without alteration except to identify the parties. The prime had to decide whether information passed down retained its identity as covered defense information, consulting the contracting officer if necessary. Subcontractors had to tell the prime when they sought a variance and give the prime their incident report numbers.
The prime’s decision about scope
That decision about scope had economic weight. If the prime treated a drawing as covered defense information, the subcontractor that received it had to protect it under the clause, at its own cost. If the prime decided it was not covered, the cost disappeared, along with the protection. The prime had an incentive to minimize what it sent down as covered, and the subcontractor had an incentive to receive as little as possible.
Small businesses
Comments to the 2016 rule raised the cost to small businesses. Respondents said smaller suppliers could not afford the investment and skilled staff needed, and asked for alternatives, subsidies or shared services. DoD’s response, as summarized in the rule, did not create a separate standard for small businesses. The requirement applied to any contractor handling covered defense information.
For a small machine shop or engineering firm, the cost of 800-171 compliance could be large relative to its contract value. Its options were to invest, to decline work involving covered information, or to represent compliance it had not achieved. In our reading, the economics did not favor the first option when no one checked.
Proof up the chain
A prime that flowed the clause down had little more proof of its subcontractors’ security than the government had of the prime’s. It received their representation through the subcontract. It could ask for more, such as a system security plan or an assessment. But asking cost money and slowed purchasing. In our reading, each tier faced the same economics as the government at the top: no check before award unless it chose to buy one.
Information that changes hands
Covered information moves. A prime sends drawings to a machine shop, which sends them to a heat-treating vendor, which emails a question back. Each hand-off is a point where information can leave a protected system. The clause covered systems that processed, stored or transmitted covered information, so every tier that touched the information was in scope. In our reading, the economics favored designs that kept covered information in fewer places: shared portals controlled by the prime, rather than copies spread across suppliers’ systems.
What a prime could require
A large prime could require subcontractors to meet terms beyond the clause, such as providing their system security plans or using the prime’s secure portal. It could also offer help. Whether it did depended on its own economics. Requiring more of suppliers raised their prices or narrowed the supplier base. Offering help cost the prime money it might not recover. The clause did not require either.
Where the cost settled
Taken together, the flowdown pushed the cost of security toward the tier that held the information and had the least ability to pass it on. Primes could spread costs across large contracts. Small subcontractors could not. Where the cost could not be passed on, it was either absorbed or avoided. In our reading, the economics of the chain meant that the weakest point in security was likely to be found where the margin was thinnest.
Cloud providers in the chain
The clause put one external check in the chain. Cloud providers holding covered defense information had to meet requirements equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline and comply with the clause’s incident duties. That pushed contractors toward providers that could show equivalence. In our reading, the cloud requirement was the one place where the 2016 rule tied proof to a recognized external baseline.
How the deadline landed on different contractors
The same clause produced different economics for different firms.
Large primes
Large primes were more likely, we think, to have security teams, existing programs and experience with the 2013 version of the clause. The 2016 rule said the changes would be less significant for a contractor already compliant with that version. For such firms, the marginal cost of 800-171 was smaller, and they could spread it across a large contract base. Their larger exposure was in the supply chain: the subcontracts to which the clause flowed down, with little visibility into each.
Mid-tier contractors
Mid-tier firms faced what we see as a hard trade-off. They had enough covered work to need real compliance and enough competitors to feel price pressure. Where their contracts were fixed-price, the choice between investing and documenting gaps carried direct margin consequences.
Small subcontractors
Small subcontractors were likely, as we see it, to face a high cost relative to revenue and little ability to recover it. Their customers were primes, who set prices. They could raise prices only if the prime accepted, and the prime’s own price was set in competition.
Universities and research institutions
Research institutions performing defense work could receive covered information under contracts that included the clause. We would expect open networks and decentralized administration to make 800-171 costly to implement across a whole institution. One response open to them was a separate secure environment for covered work. The economics again pushed toward narrowing scope.
Commercial item suppliers
Suppliers of commercial items were included in flowdown where they handled covered information. Their prices were set for a broad market, so recovering defense-specific security costs was hard. For some, the rational choice was to avoid receiving covered information at all.
Firms with civilian agency work as well
A firm that also worked for civilian agencies faced a different regime there. The DFARS clause applied to Defense contracts. Civilian contracts used FAR clauses, including a basic safeguarding clause, FAR 52.204-21, that the later CMMC rule tied to its first level. For a firm with mixed work, the economic question was whether to build one environment to the higher standard or maintain different environments for different customers.
Distributors and resellers
Distributors and resellers in the defense supply chain handle part numbers, drawings and specifications as they source parts. Where those documents were covered defense information, the distributor was in scope. Where a distributor’s business runs on thin margins and high volume, the cheapest compliance strategy was to avoid holding covered documents, by routing them through the prime’s systems or the manufacturer’s. That choice depended on whether its customers would accept it.
New entrants
A firm entering the defense market for the first time faced the full cost of 800-171, as the 2016 rule acknowledged for new contractors. Incumbents with existing programs faced only the increment. In a competition where security was not evaluated, the new entrant could close that gap by pricing less security. In a competition where it was checked, the entrant had to invest before it could compete. The rules that came later changed which of those paths was open.
IT and cloud service contractors
Contractors running an IT service or system on DoD’s behalf fell under a different paragraph of the clause, (b)(1). Cloud computing services in that position were subject to a separate clause, 252.239-7010, and other such services to security requirements specified elsewhere in the contract. An outside cloud provider that a contractor used for its own covered information had to meet requirements equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline. In each case, compliance had a more defined external reference than 800-171 self-assessment.
Objections, in order
Five objections deserve an answer. We take them in the order they bear on the argument.
1. Contractors had a legal duty, so economics did not decide behavior
Contractors did have a contractual duty, and a false representation carries legal risk. But a duty without a check before award is enforced after the fact, by audit, incident or investigation. The probability and size of that enforcement are part of the economics. In 2017, as the 2016 rule itself said, the rule had created no new oversight paradigm. In our reading, that made the expected cost of falling short low enough for price competition to matter.
2. Allowable cost meant the government paid for compliance, so there was no incentive to skimp
Allowability lets a contractor recover costs it incurs and prices. It does not make a bidder price them. In a fixed-price competition, the bidder that prices less security wins if security is not evaluated. Allowability helped cost-type contractors and did little for fixed-price bidders.
3. Plans of action were a legitimate tool, not a loophole
800-171 treated plans of action as legitimate, and they are. Organizations cannot implement every control at once, and a documented plan is better than an undocumented gap. Our point is economic. When a plan was cheaper than implementation and no one checked progress, the plan could become a substitute rather than a schedule. The later rules described in the hindsight section put a time limit on that.
4. DoD could not have assessed thousands of contractors in 2017
Probably so. The 2020 interim rule said DoD could not scale its own assessment capability to conduct on-site assessments of approximately 220,000 contractors every three years. But the economics of no check still applied. The later answer was a mix of self-assessment scores, government assessments and third-party certification. The 2017 rule did not attempt any of these, which in our reading is why the market decided.
5. The real harm was theft, which no contract term could price
The harm from weak security is the loss of information, which falls largely on the government and the nation, not on the contractor’s books. No contract price captures that. We agree, and it is the reason a check matters. If the harm cannot be priced, the buyer has to verify the precaution directly instead of relying on the seller’s incentives. The later rules did exactly that.
What a leader could check
These checks follow from the four parts. They are our suggestions, not requirements.
- Is the cost of meeting each contract’s security requirements built into bids from a written gap assessment?
- Is the system security plan current, and does each plan of action have an owner, a date and a funded remedy?
- Has the firm decided which information it sends to subcontractors as covered, and recorded why?
- Does the firm know which of its subcontractors handle covered information and what evidence of their security it holds?
- Does the person who signs offers understand what the security representation in them commits the firm to?
The checks need owners. Bid pricing belongs to the capture and pricing team with the CISO. The system security plan belongs to the CISO. Scope decisions on flowdown belong to contracts and program management. Subcontractor evidence belongs to supply chain. The representation belongs to the executive who signs, advised by counsel.
These checks were useful in December 2017 and are more useful now. Each one turns a security obligation into a business record: a cost in the bid, a plan with dates, a decision about scope, evidence from suppliers and an informed signature. A firm that keeps those records can defend its price, its representation and its supply chain. A firm that does not is relying on no one asking.
With hindsight
The economics described above did not last. Over the following years, the Defense Department and the Justice Department changed both the proof and the consequences.
On September 29, 2020, DoD published an interim DFARS rule, effective November 30, 2020, on assessing contractor implementation of cybersecurity requirements. Its background cited a DoD Inspector General report, DODIG-2019-105, which it said indicated that contractors did not consistently implement mandated security requirements for controlled unclassified information. The rule said neither the FAR basic safeguarding clause nor the DFARS clause provided for DoD verification of a contractor’s implementation before contract award. It said contractors self-attested that they would implement 800-171 when they submitted their offer, and that the regulation let them handle controlled unclassified information without having implemented all 110 requirements and without enforceable timelines for closing gaps. It said flowing the clause down did not give DoD sufficient insight into the security posture of companies across the supply chain. It said DoD could not scale its own assessment capability to the size of the industrial base.
The 2020 rule introduced the NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Methodology. A Basic Assessment was a self-assessment by the contractor. Medium and High Assessments were done by the government. Results were recorded in the Supplier Performance Risk System. Contracting officers were to verify that an offeror had a current assessment, not more than three years old, on record before award. In our reading, that was the first check before award, and it turned a representation into a score the buyer could see.
On October 6, 2021, the Justice Department announced its Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative. It said it would use the False Claims Act to pursue cybersecurity-related fraud by government contractors and grant recipients. It named knowingly misrepresenting cybersecurity practices among the conduct it would pursue. One of the benefits it listed was ensuring that companies that follow the rules and invest in meeting cybersecurity requirements are not at a competitive disadvantage. That is the economic problem this article describes, stated by the government.
On October 15, 2024, DoD published the final rule establishing the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program, effective December 16, 2024. It set three levels. Level 2 covered the requirements of NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 required by the DFARS clause, through either a self-assessment or a certification assessment by an accredited third-party organization. The rule said that although the clause’s requirements predated CMMC, a verification requirement for the handling of controlled unclassified information was new with the program.
The rule also limited plans of action. A contractor could reach a conditional status with some requirements unmet only if its score met a threshold and the open items were of low point value. Open items had to be closed within 180 days and verified by a closeout assessment. If they were not, the conditional status would expire. An affirming official had to affirm continuing compliance after each assessment and annually.
On September 10, 2025, DoD published the final DFARS rule putting CMMC into contracts, effective November 10, 2025. It required contracting officers to check the supplier system and not award to an offeror without a current CMMC status at the required level for each relevant information system. It phased the requirement in, and the clause prescription it added printed the dates. Until November 9, 2028, the clause goes into solicitations and contracts where the program office or requiring activity determines that the contractor is required to have a specific CMMC level. On or after November 10, 2028, it goes in where the program office or requiring activity determines that the contractor will use its own information systems to process, store or transmit federal contract information or controlled unclassified information. Awards solely for commercially available off-the-shelf items are excluded throughout.
What held up from our argument is the diagnosis. The 2017 deadline set a standard without a required check, and the later actions each added one. A score before award came in 2020, a Justice Department enforcement initiative against misrepresentation in 2021, and a CMMC status as a condition of award, on contracts that carry the requirement, from November 2025. What we cannot say from the sources is what share of contractors met the 2017 deadline in full. The 2020 rule’s reference to the Inspector General’s finding is the official signal we have.
For a contractor in 2026, the economics have shifted, though not everywhere yet. Until November 9, 2028, as the rule prints the date, the CMMC clause goes into contracts where the program office or requiring activity decides to include it. The second phase of that rollout did not start on schedule. A memorandum from the Department of War Chief Information Officer dated July 13, 2026 suspended the November 2026 CMMC Phase 2 transition. As checked on November 16, 2026, DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, tells contracting officers to work with requiring activities to remove or revise CMMC requirements in new and existing solicitations and contracts in line with that memorandum. The deviation says the memorandum permits CMMC Level 1 (Self) or Level 2 (Self) assessments in all procurement requests and requires baseline compliance with NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 under DFARS 252.204-7012, the clause this article is about. The deviation keeps the two dates in the clause prescription. On those contracts, security affects eligibility for award, plans of action have a time limit, and an affirming official affirms compliance after each assessment and every year. The 2025 rule also said CMMC is not an evaluation factor, so the cost of compliance is still priced into bids. But on those contracts, the bidder that priced less can no longer win by representing the same thing without a current status on record.
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