DHS’s 2015 cell-site simulator policy required approvals and deletion; a 2023 audit found record gaps
Policy Directive 047-02 of October 19, 2015 required warrants with two exceptions, supervisor approval, deletion after each mission and an auditing program. DHS’s Inspector General reported in 2023 that neither DHS’s nor the Secret Service’s policy required documenting approval or deletion, and found gaps.
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Policy Directive 047-02 of October 19, 2015 required warrants with two exceptions, supervisor approval, deletion after each mission and an auditing program. DHS’s Inspector General reported in 2023 that neither DHS’s nor the Secret Service’s policy required documenting approval or deletion, and found gaps.
- The week The DHS directive described how the devices work.
- The legal gate: a warrant by policy, a court order by statute The directive layered two kinds of legal process.
- The data rule: deletion on a schedule, auditing by program The directive’s data section listed five practices. [1] The operator had to delete all data immediately after a mission.
- The chain of accountability: approvals, contacts and counts The directive did not say approvals had to be written.
- The partners: use on behalf of other agencies Support to another agency splits the work.
- How the policy reached different agencies The DHS testimony named ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations and the Secret Service as the users. [3] Their missions differ.
- Objections, in order True.
- Checks a program or compliance leader could run These checks are our suggestions for any agency policy governing a sensitive technology or data source.
- With hindsight The components wrote their own procedures.
The week
On October 19, 2015, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security issued Policy Directive 047-02, titled Department Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology. [1] It was addressed to the heads of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Secret Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Protective Service. [1] The memorandum directed immediate implementation of a DHS-wide policy. [1]
The directive said it was issued in light of the Department of Justice’s recent legal analysis of the technology. [1] The Justice Department had announced its own policy on September 3, 2015, according to a later House committee staff report. [5] That policy required its components to obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause, with limited exceptions. [4] [5]
The DHS directive described how the devices work. It said cell-site simulators function by transmitting as a cell tower, so that nearby phones identify the simulator as the most attractive tower and transmit identifying signals to it. [1] It said the devices provide only relative signal strength and general direction, do not function as a GPS locator, and must be configured as pen registers that may not collect the contents of any communication. [1] It said they do not provide subscriber account information. [1]
The directive set its scope as use inside the United States in furtherance of criminal investigations. [1] It said affected components may issue additional specific guidance consistent with it. [1]
Its central legal change concerned court authorization. The directive said DHS had in the past appropriately obtained authorization by seeking an order under the Pen Register Statute. [1] As a matter of policy, it said, components must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause, except in two circumstances. The warrant had to be issued under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the state equivalent. [1]
The first exception was exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment, such as the need to protect human life or avert serious injury. [1] The second was exceptional circumstances, where the law does not require a warrant and obtaining one is impracticable, with uses in furtherance of protective duties under 18 U.S.C. 3056 and 3056A as an example. [1] DHS’s testimony and the later Inspector General report tied that example to the Secret Service. [3] [6] In both cases, the directive said use still had to comply with the Pen Register Statute. [1]
The directive set management controls. Each component using the devices had to develop operational policy or procedures. It had to coordinate them with the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Policy, the Privacy Office and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. [1] Within 30 days of the policy’s date, each such component had to designate an executive-level point of contact at headquarters. [1] Deployment required approval by a first-level supervisor, and emergency use required a second-level supervisor. [1]
It set data rules. Immediately after a mission, the operator had to delete all data. [1] When locating a target, data had to be deleted as soon as the target was located. When identifying a target, it had to be deleted as soon as the target was identified, and no less than once every 30 days. [1] Components had to implement an auditing program to ensure deletion. [1]
The directive said it applied to all instances in which components use the devices in support of other federal agencies or state and local law enforcement. [1] It required each field office to report annual records of total deployments, deployments at other agencies’ request and emergency deployments to component headquarters. [1]
On October 21, 2015, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Information Technology held a hearing titled Examining Law Enforcement Use of Cell Phone Tracking Devices. [2] [3] Its stated purpose included examining both the Justice Department’s and DHS’s new policies. [2] Witnesses were a Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General from the Justice Department and DHS’s Assistant Secretary for Threat Prevention and Security Policy. [2]
The DHS prepared testimony said the components using the technology were ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations and the Secret Service. [3] It described the new policy as setting management controls, legal requirements, court application content, data collection and disposal guidelines, and training and oversight. [3] It said the policy brought DHS’s policies under a single document and a uniform standard. [3]
Policy Directive 047-02 is a short document with a clear structure: a legal gate, data rules, management controls and a clause about partners. [1] Read as an internal control design, it also shows a gap worth naming. It set duties that depended on people acting correctly at the moment of use, and it said little about the records that would prove they had.
Our argument is that the directive set approval and deletion duties without requiring a record of each one, and that this choice shaped what auditors could find later. It required supervisory approval before deployment and deletion after each mission. [1] It required an auditing program for deletion. [1] DHS’s Inspector General later reviewed fiscal years 2020 and 2021. It reported that neither DHS’s policy nor the Secret Service’s required personnel to document approval and deletion, and that the components did not always have documented support of either. [6]
That matters beyond law enforcement. Any agency that adopts a policy for a sensitive technology faces the same design question: which duties produce evidence by default, and which rely on recollection. The directive is a useful case because both the policy and the later audit are public. [1] [6]
We take the directive in four parts:
- The legal gate: what authorization the policy required before use.
- The data rule: what had to happen to collected data, and when.
- The chain of accountability: who approved, who answered for compliance and what was reported.
- The partners: how the policy reached use on behalf of other agencies.
The parts do not overlap. The first is legal process, the second data handling, the third internal management and the fourth the boundary with other agencies. After them we look at how the policy reached different kinds of agency, take the objections in order and end with checks a program or compliance leader could run.
The legal gate: a warrant by policy, a court order by statute
Two layers of authorization
The directive layered two kinds of legal process. As policy, it required a search warrant supported by probable cause. [1] As law, it required compliance with the Pen Register Statute, which ordinarily requires judicial authorization before use. [1] It told prosecutors either to obtain a warrant that contained everything a pen register order would require, or to seek a warrant and a pen register order at the same time. [1]
The directive was explicit that the warrant requirement was policy. It said the Department had previously obtained authorization appropriately through pen register orders. [1] The higher standard was a choice the Department made, consistent with the Justice Department’s. [1] [4] A choice made by policy can be enforced by policy, which means by internal controls.
A standard set by policy can move by policy
Because the warrant requirement was a policy choice, it could be changed by the same route. The directive itself contemplated periodic review and component-specific guidance. [1] That flexibility cuts both ways for compliance. It lets an agency raise its standard ahead of the courts, as DHS and the Justice Department did. It also means the standard lives in documents that must be kept current and consistent across components.
For a compliance leader, a policy-based standard needs version control. Each component procedure has to cite the department policy it implements and be revised when that policy changes. The Inspector General later treated the department directive and the two component policies as a set, saying the component policies largely mirror the directive. [6] Mirroring is helpful. It also copies any gap in the original.
Exceptions that kept the statute
Both exceptions dropped the warrant and kept the statute. In exigent circumstances, use still needed court approval consistent with the Pen Register Statute’s emergency provisions. [1] Where emergency pen register authority was needed, the emergency had to be one listed in section 3125, and the prosecutor had to apply for a court order within 48 hours, as the statute requires. [1] The directive’s footnote said that knowingly using a pen register under emergency authorization without applying for an order within 48 hours is a criminal violation. [1]
Exceptional circumstances required approval from executive-level personnel at component headquarters and the relevant U.S. Attorney. [1] The Pen Register Statute still applied. [1]
What the policy said the device collects
The directive was precise about the data. In locating a known device, the simulator initially receives identifying numbers from multiple devices nearby and, once it finds the target, obtains signaling information only for that device. [1] In identifying an unknown device, it obtains signaling information from non-target devices near the target for the limited purpose of distinguishing the target. [1]
The directive said the simulator does not capture emails, texts, contact lists, images or other data on the device, and does not provide subscriber account information. [1] It said the devices must be configured as pen registers under 18 U.S.C. 3127(3). [1] The DHS testimony added that further legal process, such as a subpoena to a provider, is needed to obtain subscriber information. [3]
For a compliance team, that description is a data inventory. It names what is collected, from whom and for what purpose, and it names what is not collected. In our reading, it is the part of the directive that maps directly onto a privacy impact assessment, which is why the later absence of an approved assessment at ICE stood out. [6]
The distinction auditors later tested
The directive used two terms that sound alike. “Exigent circumstances” was a Fourth Amendment concept that could excuse a warrant. [1] An “emergency” under the Pen Register Statute was a narrower list that could excuse a prior court order, if an application followed within 48 hours. [1] A situation could be one and not the other.
That distinction is easy to state and hard to apply at speed. An operator facing an urgent request decides in minutes whether a situation is exigent. Whether it is also a statutory emergency, and whether someone has filed for an order, are separate questions with separate owners. The directive placed the answers with agents, operators and prosecutors working together. [1] It did not say how each answer would be recorded.
Candor to the court
The directive required applications to include sufficient information to ensure courts were aware that the technology may be used. [1] Applications should describe the technique in general terms, say that non-target devices would emit identifiers, and inform the court of possible temporary service disruption. [1] They should also explain how data not associated with the target would be deleted, and state that there would be no affirmative investigative use of non-target data absent further court order. [1]
Those statements turned the data rule into a representation to a court. A deletion practice described in an application is a promise the agency must be able to show it kept. In our reading, the directive linked the legal gate and the data rule more tightly than its section headings suggest.
The data rule: deletion on a schedule, auditing by program
What had to be deleted, and when
The directive’s data section listed five practices. [1] The operator had to delete all data immediately after a mission. Data used to locate a target had to be deleted as soon as the target was located. Data used to identify a target had to be deleted as soon as it was identified and no less than once every 30 days. Before another mission, the operator had to verify the equipment was cleared. And components had to run an auditing program. [1]
A footnote defined a mission’s length only loosely, saying a typical mission may last anywhere from less than one day up to several days. [1] Another defined “collection” and “retention” narrowly, as the technical process of obtaining identifying signals and the period during which they are used to find a target, until deletion. [1]
Non-target data as the privacy core
Those affected by the technology included people who were not suspects. Identifying an unknown device required collecting signals from devices of people nearby who were not under investigation. [1] The directive gave them three protections. Data was deleted on schedule, and the court was told how non-target data would be deleted. There was to be no affirmative investigative use of non-target data absent further court order, except to identify the target. [1]
Each of these is a use restriction backed by a deletion duty. Use restrictions are hard to audit after the fact, because a prohibited use leaves no trace unless the system records access. Deletion is the stronger protection, because data that no longer exists cannot be misused. That makes the deletion record the evidence that matters to the bystanders the policy protects. In our reading, the directive’s structure put the heaviest weight on the duty it did not require anyone to document.
Deletion and the duty to preserve
The directive framed deletion as consistent with existing law, including any duty to preserve exculpatory evidence. [1] Its footnote said it was not likely, given the limited data collected, that exculpatory evidence would be obtained. It added that investigators who know or have reason to believe information is exculpatory or impeaching have a duty to memorialize it. [1]
That clause creates a second record requirement inside the deletion rule. Before deleting, an operator had to consider whether anything should be preserved, and if so, record it. The directive asked for the judgment. It did not prescribe how the judgment would be recorded when the answer was that nothing needed preserving.
How the Justice Department’s rule differed
The Justice Department’s policy set a different schedule for one case. When used to locate a known device, it required deletion as soon as the device was located and no less than once daily. [4] For identifying an unknown device, it required deletion as soon as the target was identified and in any event no less than once every 30 days. [4] It also required an auditing program. [4]
DHS’s directive tied the location case to mission completion and to the target being located, without the once-daily floor. [1] We draw no conclusion about which is better. The point for program leaders is that two departments, writing in September and October 2015 on the same technology, chose different retention triggers. Retention rules are design choices, and each choice implies a different record to prove compliance.
An auditing program defined by example
The directive’s auditing clause was its evidence clause. It said components shall implement an auditing program to ensure data is deleted as described. [1] To the extent feasible, the program would include hardware and software controls. Its example was an equipment sign-in process recording the operator’s badge number and an affirmative statement by the operator of legal authority to collect and view data. [1]
The example describes access control, not deletion evidence. A sign-in log shows who used the equipment and that they asserted authority. It does not by itself show that data was deleted after the mission. The phrase “to the extent feasible” also gave components room to decide how much of the program to automate. [1] In our reading, the directive required an auditing program and left the content of the audit trail open.
Why a deletion record is hard
Deletion is the absence of data. Proving it requires a record created at the moment of deletion, by a system or a person, tied to the mission. Without that record, an auditor can only ask and be told. The directive’s design asked operators to delete and components to audit. [1] Whether each deletion produced its own record was left to component procedures.
The chain of accountability: approvals, contacts and counts
Who approved
The directive required first-level supervisor approval before deployment and second-level approval for emergency use. [1] Use on an aircraft required approval by a Special Agent in Charge or the executive-level point of contact. [1] It required each component to identify which officials would hold approval authority. [1]
The directive did not say approvals had to be written. The later audit reported that the Secret Service said supervisors verbally approved each use. [6] A verbal approval can satisfy a policy that says “approved”. It cannot be checked later without a second source.
Who answered for compliance
Each component had to designate an executive-level headquarters point of contact responsible for implementation and for promoting compliance. [1] Components had to develop operational policy in coordination with the Department’s legal, policy, privacy and civil liberties offices. [1] They had to set training protocols, including privacy and civil liberties training, and operators had to be trained by a qualified component expert. [1]
The House staff report later noted that each affected component was to designate its point of contact by mid-November 2015. [5] The DHS Inspector General later reported that in 2017 the Secret Service and ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations each developed component-specific policies incorporating the directive’s requirements. [6]
What was counted
Each field office had to report annual records to component headquarters: total deployments in the jurisdiction, deployments at the request of other agencies including state and local law enforcement, and deployments in emergency circumstances. [1] A footnote said such records may also be required for ongoing oversight by DHS oversight offices. [1]
Annual counts are useful for oversight at a high level. They show volume and mix. They do not show whether any single deployment met the legal gate or the data rule. The House staff report observed that, unlike the Justice Department’s policy, DHS’s did not require statistics for cases of non-warrant use. [5] In our reading, the counts the directive did require were aggregates, and the evidence that mattered for compliance was at the level of the case.
Component policies as the place for evidence
The directive left procedure to components. [1] That was the natural place for evidence requirements: the forms, systems and fields that turn a duty into a record. The Inspector General reported that ICE’s policy said supervisory approval should be documented if circumstances permit, and required data deletion after each mission. [6] It reported that the Secret Service relied on verbal approvals and sent monthly reminders to operators to delete data. [6]
Both approaches reflect a choice about evidence. “If circumstances permit” makes documentation conditional, so its absence is not by itself a breach. Monthly reminders encourage deletion without recording it. In our reading, neither component policy closed the evidence gap the department directive left open, and the audit found the consequence in both. [6]
Training as a control
The directive treated training as a precondition. Operators had to be trained and authorized by their component, with training administered by a qualified component expert. [1] Each component had to identify training protocols, including privacy and civil liberties training, and provide the policy and training to relevant employees. [1] The DHS testimony said the training included privacy and civil liberties protections. [3]
Training is a preventive control whose evidence is easy to produce: rosters, materials and dates. The Inspector General’s later recommendations leaned on it, with the Secret Service committing to training sessions and the Inspector General asking for training rosters as evidence of closure. [6] In our reading, training was the part of the 2015 design that generated records naturally, and the audit’s remedies built on that.
Improper use and its handling
The directive said allegations of violations of any orders implementing the policy would be referred to the component office that handles misconduct allegations. [1] Its final section said the policy does not create any right or benefit enforceable at law or equity against the United States, and creates no right of review in any proceeding. [1]
Those two clauses define the policy’s enforcement model. Compliance is internal: supervisors, component offices and oversight bodies. Outsiders, including the people whose devices were scanned, gain no enforceable right from the policy itself. That makes the internal record the only route by which anyone outside the operating team can confirm the policy was followed.
Review and change
The directive made periodic review of the policy and training each component’s responsibility, based on guidance from DHS oversight offices. [1] It said significant changes in technology or in information collection, maintenance, use or retention protocols may trigger oversight responsibilities and be reviewed before implementation. [1] Its footnote gave an example: a significant technology change could require an updated or new privacy impact assessment. [1]
That clause pointed at the privacy compliance process that the later audit found ICE had not completed. [6] The directive named the process. The control that would have ensured it ran before use was elsewhere, in DHS privacy policy. [6]
The partners: use on behalf of other agencies
The clause
The directive’s state and local section said the policy applies to all instances in which components use cell-site simulators in support of other federal agencies or state and local law enforcement. [1] A footnote to its emergency pen register provisions said that in non-federal cases the case agent or operator must contact the prosecutor and any other applicable points of contact for the state or local jurisdiction. [1]
The DHS testimony at the October 21 hearing repeated that the policy applies to all instances of support to other agencies. [3] It said the Secret Service uses the technology in joint operations with state and local law enforcement. [3]
Where responsibility blurred
Support to another agency splits the work. The partner agency runs the investigation and seeks court authorization under its own law. The DHS component operates the equipment. The directive said DHS policy applied. [1] It did not say how a DHS operator would confirm, before deploying, that the partner had obtained what DHS policy required.
The Inspector General later reported exactly this gap. It said the components’ policies did not provide sufficiently detailed guidance on complying when other entities, such as local law enforcement, are responsible for obtaining judicial authorizations. [6] It reported that, according to component officials, they relied on other agencies to obtain required court authorizations. [6]
Why the handoff is where control fails
Handoffs between organizations are where assumptions go unchecked. Each side can reasonably believe the other has handled the legal step. The partner assumes the federal operator knows its own policy. The operator assumes the partner has the order its policy requires. Neither assumption leaves a record unless one side is required to create it.
The directive’s clause placed the duty on DHS by saying its policy applied to support missions. [1] A duty without a verification step, in our reading, is a duty each side can believe the other met. The audit later recorded that belief in the officials’ own account of relying on partners. [6]
Grants as a second channel
DHS reached state and local agencies by another route as well. The House staff report found that DHS allowed state and local law enforcement to buy cell-site simulators with grants from FEMA’s preparedness grant programs. [5] It said DHS identified more than $1.8 million in such grants and did not keep a separate accounting, so the total may be higher. [5]
The directive did not address grants. [1] The staff report recorded that FEMA policy made the use of such equipment subject to the prohibitions in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. It also recorded DHS’s statement that it would examine whether grantees’ adoption of baseline policy provisions, including training requirements, should be mandated as a condition of purchase. [5] The staff report recommended that DOJ and DHS make funding or approval of the technology for state and local agencies contingent on those agencies adopting, at a minimum, the departments’ new guidelines. [5] In our reading, the grant channel was a part of the partner relationship that the 2015 directive’s controls did not reach.
What a partner check could hold
A partner check need not be elaborate. Before deployment in support of another agency, a DHS operator could record the requesting agency, the case reference and the legal authority obtained and by whom. The operator could also record whether the situation was treated as exigent or as a statutory emergency. If the latter, the record could show when the 48-hour application was filed and by whom.
These fields mirror the Inspector General’s later recommendations. They asked the components to develop internal controls for compliance with the Pen Register Statute, particularly when assisting other agencies, and to differentiate policy-defined exigent circumstances from statutory emergencies. [6] The fields are our illustration, not text from the directive or the report.
How the policy reached different agencies
The two operating components
The DHS testimony named ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations and the Secret Service as the users. [3] Their missions differ. The testimony described HSI deployments in investigations of narcotics trafficking, human trafficking and kidnapping, and to rescue underage victims of exploitation. [3] It described Secret Service use in protective and investigative missions and joint operations. [3]
DHS’s testimony gave the Secret Service’s protective duties as an example of exceptional circumstances. [3] The partner clause mattered for both. For a component that supports other agencies, the gap between policy and partner process is where its compliance risk concentrates. [6]
Other DHS components
The directive was addressed to six component heads, including CBP, the Coast Guard, TSA and the Federal Protective Service. [1] Its controls applied to any that used the technology. A component without devices in 2015 would still inherit the policy if it acquired them. In our reading, writing the policy department-wide before every component used the technology set the baseline ahead of adoption.
State and local agencies
State and local agencies were outside the directive except when DHS components operated in their support. [1] The House staff report found that state laws varied on what court authorization was required, and that several states had passed laws requiring a warrant or order based on probable cause. [5] It recommended that state and local agencies adopt policies at least equivalent to the federal guidelines. [5]
For a county or city agency, the 2015 federal policies were a template rather than an obligation. A local chief adopting one would face the same design question DHS faced: what record proves each approval and each deletion.
Prosecutors
The directive drew prosecutors into the process. Law enforcement personnel had to consult prosecutors before using a simulator, a duty the directive said extends to state and local prosecutors in operations with them. [1] Its footnote said sample applications with technical information were available from the Justice Department’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. Agents or prosecutors had to contact that section before filing an application that deviated from the samples. [1]
That made the prosecutor a second keeper of evidence. A warrant application, a pen register order or an emergency application is a court record. Where the prosecutor filed, a record existed outside the agency. Where no one filed, as the audit later found in some exigent cases, there was nothing to find in either place. [6]
Agencies outside DHS and the Justice Department
The House staff report looked beyond the two departments. It said the committee wrote to 24 federal agencies, and that the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration both indicated they own cell-site simulators. [5] Neither was bound by the DHS directive or the Justice Department policy.
For agencies like these, the 2015 policies offered a model and no mandate. An agency adopting the technology outside the two departments had to write its own rules, and would face the same choices about authorization, retention and evidence.
Oversight bodies
For inspectors general and legislative committees, the directive offered a standard to audit against. [1] The annual counts gave them a starting point. [1] The absence of case-level records, where it occurred, limited what they could verify. [6]
Objections, in order
“A policy cannot specify every record”
True. A department-wide directive sets principles and leaves procedures to components, which this one did explicitly. [1] The objection supports the argument rather than defeating it. If the directive delegated procedures, the evidence requirements had to be in component procedures. The Inspector General reported that the Secret Service’s policy, like DHS’s, did not require documentation of approval and deletion. [6]
“The audit found warrants were obtained”
It did. The Inspector General reported that for the cases it reviewed, the components obtained required search warrants for uses under normal circumstances. [6] The gaps it reported concerned exigent uses, court orders under the Pen Register Statute, documentation of approval and deletion, and a privacy impact assessment. [6] The legal gate held where it was visible. A warrant is itself a record.
“Deletion happened even if it was not recorded”
The Inspector General reported that, according to ICE, data was deleted but documentation was not completed correctly. [6] That may be so. An auditor cannot confirm it. A control whose performance cannot be shown is, for oversight purposes, a control that may not have run. In our reading, that is the cost of a deletion duty without a deletion record.
“Documentation slows urgent operations”
Exigent use is, by definition, urgent. An operator asked to locate a device where life is at risk should not be filling in forms first. The objection has real force for the moment of decision. It has less force for the record afterwards. The directive already required a second-level supervisor’s approval for emergency use and, where the statute applies, a court application within 48 hours. [1] A record of who approved, at what time, and when the application was filed can be completed after the fact without delaying the operation.
The Secret Service’s later fix shows the scale of the change. The Inspector General reported that it added fields to its investigative reporting system so approvals and deletion are documented. [6] Fields in an existing system are a small burden compared with an audit finding. They also help the operators themselves. A record made at the time protects an operator who followed the policy from a later claim that they did not, which a verbal approval cannot do.
The directive disclaims any enforceable right. [1] A reader could take that as lowering the stakes of documentation. The opposite follows. When outsiders cannot enforce a policy, oversight bodies are the only external check, and they work from records. The Inspector General’s findings on approval and deletion were findings about what could be shown. [6]
“This is a law enforcement problem, not a general one”
The technology is specific. The pattern is general. Any agency policy that relies on a supervisor’s approval and a technician’s cleanup, and asks for an audit program without saying what it records, can produce the same finding. Benefits eligibility systems, data-sharing agreements and access to sensitive records all have the same shape.
Checks a program or compliance leader could run
These checks are our suggestions for any agency policy governing a sensitive technology or data source. They are not requirements of Directive 047-02, and agencies should confirm their obligations with counsel.
- Approval records: does every approval the policy requires produce a dated record, in a system, tied to the case?
- Deletion evidence: does every deletion or disposal duty produce a record at the moment it is performed, and can the record be matched to the mission or case?
- Partner handoffs: where another agency obtains the legal authority, does the policy require confirming and recording that authority before the agency acts?
- Terms that sound alike: where the policy uses two similar concepts, such as exigency and statutory emergency, does the record capture which one applied and why?
- Privacy documentation before use: is the privacy impact assessment approved before deployment, and does procurement check for it?
- Conditional language: does any documentation duty say “if circumstances permit” or similar, and if so, is there a later step that completes the record?
- Policy set alignment: do component procedures cite the department policy version they implement, and are they revised together?
- Funding channels: when the agency funds others to acquire the same capability, does the grant carry the same conditions the agency applies to itself?
The directive answered the legal question well for its time. [1] The checks above address the question it left to components: what each duty would leave behind as proof.
One last test is simple to run. Pick a recent case that used a sensitive capability and give it to an auditor who was not involved. Ask the auditor to reconstruct, from records alone, who approved it, under what authority, what data was collected and when it was destroyed. Where the reconstruction depends on asking the people involved, the policy has a duty without an evidence trail. That is the gap Directive 047-02 left, and it is not specific to cell-site simulators.
With hindsight
The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee published a staff report on December 19, 2016, titled Law Enforcement Use of Cell-Site Simulation Technologies: Privacy Concerns and Recommendations. [5] It said the committee began a bipartisan investigation in April 2015 and received information from 24 federal agencies. [5]
Among its findings, the report said DHS had 124 cell-site simulation devices and spent more than $24 million on the technology in fiscal years 2010 through 2014. [5] It said the Justice Department had 310 devices and spent more than $71 million in the same years. [5] It recommended that Congress pass legislation establishing a nationwide framework for when and how geolocation information can be accessed and used. [5]
In the meantime, it recommended that DOJ and DHS condition federal funding or approval of the technology for state and local agencies on their adopting, at a minimum, the new federal guidelines. [5] It recommended replacing non-disclosure agreements with agreements requiring candor to courts, and that state and local agencies adopt policies equivalent to the federal ones. [5]
The components wrote their own procedures. DHS’s Inspector General reported that the Secret Service issued a cell-site simulator manual dated January 10, 2017, and ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations issued a policy dated August 31, 2017, both incorporating the directive’s requirements. [6]
The Inspector General’s report OIG-23-17, titled Secret Service and ICE Did Not Always Adhere to Statute and Policies Governing Use of Cell-Site Simulators, is dated February 23, 2023 on its cover. [6] It reviewed investigations using the devices in fiscal years 2020 and 2021. [6]
It reported that for the cases reviewed, the components obtained required search warrants. [6] It found that both did not always obtain court orders required by policy and the Pen Register Statute when using the devices in investigations involving exigent circumstances. [6] It gave two reasons. The policies lacked sufficiently detailed guidance on working with external agencies, and the components did not correctly interpret the policies’ requirement for pen register orders or, in emergencies, for applications within 48 hours. [6]
It found the components did not always have documented support of supervisory approval and data deletion, and said neither DHS’s nor the Secret Service’s policy required such documentation. [6] It reported that the Secret Service had added fields to its investigative reporting system to document both. ICE had updated its system for approvals and said it would address deletion documentation in a future policy update. [6]
It also found that ICE did not have an approved privacy impact assessment for the technology during the period reviewed, as DHS privacy policy and the E-Government Act of 2002 require. [6] It said DHS Privacy had approved ICE’s privacy threshold analysis on April 3, 2015, finding the technology privacy sensitive and a new assessment required, and approved ICE’s assessment on January 24, 2022. [6]
The report made six recommendations, and DHS concurred with all six. [6] The Inspector General’s cover memorandum treated recommendations 1 through 5 as open and resolved and recommendation 6, on privacy documentation, as open and unresolved. [6] We have not found, in the sources opened for this article, a later public statement of their status, and make no claim about it.
What held up from October 2015 is the legal gate. The reviewed uses under normal circumstances had warrants. [6] What did not hold up was the evidence layer: approvals and deletions that the directive required but did not require anyone to record, and partner support where the directive’s rule met no procedure. [1] [6] In our view, the lesson for any agency writing a technology policy is to specify, for each duty, the record that proves it ran.
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