FDA’s 2015 duodenoscope actions faulted makers’ reporting and offered extra steps not all hospitals could take
FDA’s August 12, 2015 warning letters faulted all three duodenoscope makers’ reporting, citing Olympus and Hoya for infection reports not filed within 30 days. Its August 4 notice offered hospitals extra reprocessing steps that, FDA said, not all facilities could implement.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
FDA’s August 12, 2015 warning letters faulted all three duodenoscope makers’ reporting, citing Olympus and Hoya for infection reports not filed within 30 days. Its August 4 notice offered hospitals extra reprocessing steps that, FDA said, not all facilities could implement.
- The week The letter to Olympus Corporation of the Americas concerned medical device reporting.
- The bench: manual cleaning as the step that decides the outcome The safety communication explained the design problem.
- The supplements: four extra measures and their costs FDA listed the costs.
- The reporting chain: how an infection signal was meant to travel The facility’s deadlines are set in the rule.
- The fleet: models, instructions and notices Those are manufacturer findings.
- How the actions reached different facilities A large system with a high ERCP volume, an in-house microbiology laboratory and a sterile processing department may have the resources FDA mentioned for culturing or sterilization. [1] Its challenge is coordination across sites: the same model scopes, the same instructions and the same reporting route at every hospital.
- The objections, and what the record shows The letters support part of this objection.
- Checks an operations or quality leader could run These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of FDA’s 2015 communication or the reporting rule.
- With hindsight FDA’s next steps came quickly.
The week
On August 12, 2015, the Food and Drug Administration issued warning letters to the three companies whose duodenoscope operations it had inspected that spring: Olympus, Fujifilm and Hoya, through its Pentax Life Care Division. [2] [3] [4] Duodenoscopes are the side-viewing endoscopes used in endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography, or ERCP. [1] The letters followed inspections in March, April and May 2015 at the companies’ facilities in Japan and the United States. [2] [3] [4]
The letter to Olympus Corporation of the Americas concerned medical device reporting. It said the TJF Type Q-180V duodenovideoscope was misbranded because the firm failed to furnish information required under 21 CFR Part 803. [2] Its first cited deviation was a failure to report within 30 calendar days information that reasonably suggested a device may have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury. [2]
The letter gave an example. A complaint referenced 16 patients who contracted a Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection after an endoscopic procedure with the firm’s devices, some with abscesses. [2] It said the firm submitted one report for all the patients and failed to submit an initial report for each event. [2] It said the firm became aware of the event on May 16, 2012, and that FDA received the reports in 2015. [2] The letter also cited the firm’s written reporting procedure as inadequate. [2]
The letter to Hoya Corporation’s Pentax Life Care Division found the devices adulterated under the Quality System regulation and misbranded under the reporting rules. [4] It said validation studies supporting ethylene oxide sterilization and high-level disinfection instructions for one model were run on different model endoscopes, without documenting why the results applied. [4] It said the firm failed to submit initial reports for each patient who developed a “Carbapenem Resistance Enterobacteriaceae infection” after a procedure with its duodenoscopes. [4] Its importer had reported those events instead. [4]
The letter to Fujifilm Medical Systems U.S.A. listed nine items. [3] The first said the firm’s 2014 reprocessing validation for the ED-530XT duodenoscope did not evaluate the effects of reprocessing on an O-ring. [3] Others concerned corrective and preventive action, complaint handling and process controls. [3] The ninth said the firm had not reported to FDA two corrections it made in 2014, including a customer letter on processor compatibility. [3]
Each letter recorded that the firm had responded to the inspection findings. FDA said the adequacy of Olympus’s response could not be determined, because it lacked documentation of the corrective actions. [2] It concluded that some of Hoya’s responses were not adequate, noting that corrective actions had not been completed. [4] The letters are FDA’s findings and requests for correction, not court judgments. Each asked the firm to reply in writing within fifteen business days. [2] [3] [4]
The letters followed a related notice to hospitals. On August 4, 2015, FDA issued a safety communication on supplemental measures to enhance duodenoscope reprocessing. [1] It was addressed to gastroenterologists, endoscopy nurses, reprocessing staff, infection control practitioners and personnel conducting endoscope culturing. [1]
The communication listed four supplemental measures that, it said, emerged from an agency-led expert panel meeting earlier that year: microbiological culturing, ethylene oxide sterilization, a liquid chemical sterilant processing system and repeat high-level disinfection. FDA had convened an advisory committee panel on duodenoscope reprocessing on May 14 and 15, 2015. [1] Facilities could take one or more of them in addition to following manufacturers’ instructions. [1]
It was candid about limits. FDA said not all facilities could implement the measures. They “require specific resources, training, and expertise,” it said. [1] It said it was aware of persistent bacterial contamination even after strict adherence to manufacturer reprocessing instructions. [1] It recommended that facilities establish a comprehensive quality control program for reprocessing duodenoscopes. [1]
The duodenoscope actions of August 2015 are remembered as device safety actions. For a health system’s operations, quality and compliance leaders, they read as a workforce and process document. The safety communication described reprocessing as a detailed, multistep process. It said meticulous adherence to the instructions is labor intensive and prone to human error. [1] The warning letters described failures in how information moved from patients to manufacturers to FDA. [2] [4]
Our argument is that the August 2015 actions put the remaining risk of a hard-to-clean device on the people and processes inside hospitals. FDA asked facilities to consider supplemental measures that, by its own account, cost staff time, training, equipment and scope availability. [1] On August 12, it told manufacturers that their own reporting and validation had fallen short. [2] [3] [4] In our reading, until device design changed, the hospital’s reprocessing unit and its reporting chain were the controls that remained.
That framing places the work across several leaders. Reprocessing sits with sterile processing or endoscopy managers. Adverse event reporting can sit with risk management, separate from the people who handle the scopes. The August 2015 actions linked those functions. [1]
We take the facility’s side of the problem in four parts:
- The bench: the manual cleaning step and the staff who perform it.
- The supplements: the four extra measures and what each cost in capacity.
- The reporting chain: how infection signals were meant to travel from a facility to the manufacturer and FDA.
- The fleet: the scope models a facility owns, and the instructions and notices attached to each.
The parts do not overlap. The first is people, the second process add-ons, the third information flow and the fourth equipment. After them we look at how the actions reached different kinds of facilities, take the objections in order and end with checks an operations or quality leader could run.
The bench: manual cleaning as the step that decides the outcome
What FDA said about the elevator
The safety communication explained the design problem. Duodenoscopes contain “many small working parts,” and cleaning the elevator mechanism is of particular concern. [1] Its moving parts contain microscopic, hard-to-reach crevices. [1] If not thoroughly cleaned and disinfected, tissue, fluid and bacteria from one patient may remain and expose later patients to infection. [1]
FDA’s instructions for that step were specific. It asked staff to clean the elevator mechanism and its recesses by hand, even when using an automated endoscope reprocessor. [1] It asked them to raise and lower the elevator throughout manual cleaning so both sides could be brushed. [1]
The workforce requirements inside the guidance
The communication set out three expectations of the people doing the work. Staff should have the manufacturer’s instructions readily available. [1] They should understand the importance of their role. [1] They should maintain proficiency in the reprocessing tasks. [1]
In our reading, each expectation maps to an operational control. Ready access to instructions means current, model-specific instructions at the sink, not in a binder elsewhere. Understanding the role means training that explains consequences as well as steps. Proficiency means periodic assessment of competence, recorded. FDA’s recommended quality control program asked for written procedures for monitoring training and adherence. [1]
Human factors
The advisory panel’s discussion, as FDA summarized it, stressed that manual cleaning before disinfection or sterilization is critical. [5] The panel recommended strengthening competency training for reprocessing staff and incorporating human factors testing when developing reprocessing instructions. [5] The first of those is a facility task. The second is a manufacturer task. In our reading, the split shows the shared ownership of the bench: the facility trains, the manufacturer writes instructions a trained person can follow.
Automation does not remove the manual step
Automated endoscope reprocessors wash and disinfect scopes between uses. FDA described them as devices designed to expose outside surfaces and interior channels to chemical solutions. [1] The communication was explicit that automation does not replace the hand step. It asked staff to clean the elevator mechanism by hand “even when using AER.” [1] For repeat disinfection, it said automated cycles do not eliminate the need for meticulous manual cleaning first. [1]
That matters for staffing models. A unit that buys reprocessors to save labor still needs trained people at the sink for the step FDA identified as critical. In our reading, automation shifted labor rather than removing it, and a capacity plan that assumed otherwise would understate the staff needed.
Labor intensity as a capacity input
FDA described meticulous adherence to reprocessing instructions as labor intensive and prone to human error. [1] That description is a staffing statement. A reprocessing unit’s throughput depends on how long a complete, compliant cycle takes and how many trained staff are on each shift.
Health system operations teams plan procedure rooms, physicians and anesthesia. Reprocessing time can be treated as a fixed overhead. The August 2015 communication, in our reading, made it a variable that could limit procedure volume if staffing or competence fell short.
Turnover and new staff
Proficiency is a property of people, and people change. A reprocessing unit that loses an experienced technician loses knowledge of model-specific steps that may not be written down in full. FDA’s call for staff to “maintain proficiency” implies, in our reading, that proficiency is checked again over time, not established once at hiring. [1]
A practical consequence is an onboarding plan for reprocessing roles that covers each scope model in service, supervised practice and a recorded sign-off before independent work. Another is a refresher schedule tied to changes: a new scope model, a revised instruction or a new reprocessor. Those are our suggestions. FDA’s communication asked for written procedures for monitoring training and adherence, and left the design to the facility. [1]
Where reprocessing reports in the organization
The communication was addressed to several groups at once: gastroenterologists, gastrointestinal surgeons, endoscopy nurses, reprocessing staff and infection control practitioners. [1] In a hospital those groups report to different leaders. Reprocessing may report to perioperative services, to a central sterile department or to the endoscopy unit.
In our reading, the breadth of the audience was a signal that no single department owned the risk. A facility that names one accountable leader for duodenoscope reprocessing, with authority over training, supplies and the quality program, gives the communication’s recommendations an owner. Without one, each group can assume another is responsible.
Documentation at the bench
The quality control program FDA recommended included documentation of equipment tests, processes and quality monitors used during reprocessing. [1] That record serves two purposes. It lets the facility show that each cycle followed the instructions. It also lets the facility trace which scope was used on which patient after which cycle, which matters if an infection cluster appears.
A facility whose reprocessing records are on paper, or in a system separate from the procedure record, will find that tracing slower. The communication did not prescribe a system. [1] It did make the record part of the expected program.
The supplements: four extra measures and their costs
Microbiological culturing
The first supplemental measure was culturing: sampling a scope’s channels and distal end after reprocessing to detect contamination. [1] FDA pointed to the interim surveillance protocol the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released in March 2015. [1] One option in that protocol was to culture after every reprocessing cycle and quarantine the scope until results were known. [1] Another was to culture at intervals the facility chose, such as weekly, monthly or after a set number of procedures. [1]
FDA listed the costs. Culturing is resource-intensive and adds the cost of testing and staff time to collect and process samples. [1] Some facilities had outsourced culturing to environmental or contract laboratories. [1] Culture results take time, and a scope cultured after every cycle is unavailable until results return. [1] FDA said facilities should assess their supply and clinical demand for duodenoscopes before implementing it. [1]
FDA also noted a measurement limit. The false positive rate, false negative rate and limits of detection for the CDC interim method had not been established. [1] It still said persistent contamination as defined in the protocol should lead to action, such as taking the scope out of circulation. [1]
Ethylene oxide sterilization
The second measure was ethylene oxide gas sterilization after cleaning and high-level disinfection. [1] FDA said sterilization, where possible and practical, gives a greater margin of safety. [1] It listed the trade-offs: the process is costly and may not be available to all facilities, may affect the scope’s materials, and may be toxic to staff and patients if residue remains. [1] It again said facilities should assess scope supply and demand. [1]
Liquid chemical sterilant systems
The third measure was a liquid chemical sterilant processing system. [1] FDA explained that because the process rinses with highly purified but not sterile water, the device does not remain completely free of viable microbes. [1] It asked facilities to use only systems FDA had cleared for endoscopes, including duodenoscopes, and to follow the system maker’s instructions. [1]
Repeat high-level disinfection
The fourth measure was a second high-level disinfection cycle, by hand or in an automated reprocessor. [1] FDA said repeat disinfection does not remove the need for meticulous manual cleaning first. [1] It asked facilities to check that the scope model and disinfectant were compatible with the reprocessor, according to the reprocessor maker’s labeling. [1]
Sterilization and staff safety
One of the measures carried a risk to the workforce itself. FDA said ethylene oxide may be toxic to reprocessing personnel, and to patients if residue remains on the device. [1] It asked users to follow the duodenoscope maker’s instructions on gas concentration, temperature, exposure time and humidity. [1]
A facility adding that step would therefore bring occupational safety into the decision. In our reading, employee health and environmental safety staff belong in the review alongside infection prevention, because the measure that lowers one risk raises another for the people doing the work.
What the supplements shared
All four measures added time, equipment, supplies or staff. For two of them, culturing and ethylene oxide sterilization, FDA told facilities to assess their scope supply and clinical demand. [1] None replaced manual cleaning. [1] FDA framed them as options to evaluate against the facility’s expertise, training and resources. [1]
In our reading, that framing turned the choice into an operations decision. A facility could not adopt culturing with quarantine without either more scopes or fewer procedures. It could not adopt sterilization without access to a sterilizer and acceptance of material and toxicity risks. Each choice had a capacity price, and FDA said so. [1]
Who decides which measures to adopt
FDA presented the supplemental measures as options to evaluate. [1] That evaluation has clinical, operational and financial parts. Infection prevention can judge the risk reduction. Reprocessing and endoscopy managers can judge the workflow. Finance and supply chain can judge the cost of extra scopes, sterilizer access or laboratory services.
In our reading, a facility benefits from making the decision once, in a forum that includes all of them, and writing down the result and the reasons. A recorded decision has two uses. It shows regulators and accreditors that the facility considered FDA’s options. It also gives the facility a baseline to revisit when new data arrive, as they did repeatedly after 2015.
Outsourced laboratories as a supplier relationship
FDA noted that some facilities had outsourced culturing to environmental or contract laboratories, citing lack of on-site experience, uncertainty in interpreting results and workflow. [1] An outsourced laboratory becomes part of the facility’s safety process. Its turnaround time sets how long a quarantined scope is out of use.
A facility using one would need agreed sampling methods, turnaround commitments and a route for positive results to reach the people who pull scopes from service. Those are contract terms. In our reading, they deserve the same attention as the clinical protocol.
A hypothetical capacity calculation
Consider a hypothetical community hospital that performs ERCP on several days a week with a small set of duodenoscopes. If it cultures after every cycle and quarantines each scope until results return, some scopes will be unavailable on the next procedure day. [1] It must then buy or lease more scopes, reschedule procedures, or culture at intervals instead.
Each path has a different owner. Buying scopes is a capital decision. Rescheduling is a scheduling and access decision. Choosing interval culturing is a clinical quality decision about accepted risk. FDA’s communication gave the options and their costs. [1] It left the allocation to the facility.
The reporting chain: how an infection signal was meant to travel
The facility’s duty
FDA’s communication reminded readers that device manufacturers and user facilities must comply with the medical device reporting regulations. [1] Under those rules, a device user facility includes a hospital, ambulatory surgical facility, nursing home, outpatient diagnostic facility or outpatient treatment facility that is not a physician’s office. [6]
The facility’s deadlines are set in the rule. A death that a device may have caused or contributed to must be reported to FDA, and to the manufacturer if known, “no more than 10 work days” after the facility becomes aware. [6] A serious injury must be reported to the manufacturer within the same period, or to FDA if the manufacturer is unknown. [6] A facility becomes aware when its medical personnel obtain information about a reportable event. [6]
The manufacturer’s duty, as the letters described it
Manufacturers had their own clock: no later than 30 calendar days after becoming aware of information reasonably suggesting a device may have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury. [2] The Olympus letter cited a failure to submit an initial report for each patient event, and reports received in 2015 for an event the firm became aware of in 2012. [2] The Hoya letter cited a failure to submit initial reports for each patient with such an infection, which its importer had reported instead. [4]
The Hoya letter also described how information was supposed to move inside a global firm. It said the reporting procedure failed to describe how other regions, including firms outside the United States, would make sure the U.S. importer received the information it needed. [4] In our reading, that finding concerns the same problem a hospital system faces: an event known in one place that has to reach the place that reports it.
Where the chain could break inside a hospital
A duodenoscope-associated infection may not look like a device event when it is first seen. It may appear as a cluster in infection prevention data, as a culture result in the laboratory or as a complication noted by a physician. The reporting rule starts the clock when medical personnel obtain information that reasonably suggests a reportable event. [6]
That design asks a hospital to connect three functions: infection prevention, which sees clusters; reprocessing, which knows which scope was used and how it was cleaned; and risk management, which files reports. In our reading, the August 2015 letters showed what a broken chain looked like on the manufacturer’s side. A facility could check its own chain against the same standard.
A hypothetical cluster
A hypothetical hospital shows how the chain could work. Infection prevention notices two patients with the same resistant organism within a short period. Both had ERCP. The reprocessing log shows the same duodenoscope was used for both, after cycles recorded as complete.
At that point, several steps follow from the documents. The scope can be taken out of circulation, as FDA said persistent contamination should prompt. [1] The facility can assess whether the information reasonably suggests a device may have caused or contributed to a serious injury, which would start its reporting clock. [6] And the manufacturer, once told, would have its own reporting duty. [2]
Each step depends on records linking patient, procedure, scope and cycle. If those records are in separate systems that do not talk to each other, the link may take days to establish. The rule’s clock runs from when medical personnel obtain the information. [6] In our reading, slow linkage risks a late report even when everyone acts in good faith.
Information coming back from manufacturers
The Fujifilm letter showed the return path. It cited a technical service communication, effective April 30, 2014, telling customers to prepare a syringe of sterile water in case a suction button became lodged during ERCP. [3] It cited an April 11, 2014 customer letter saying a scope model was not operationally compatible with a particular processor. [3] FDA said the firm had not reported those corrections to the agency in writing. [3]
For a hospital, those are notices that changed how a scope should be used. In our reading, a facility needed a way to receive, route and act on manufacturer communications whether or not FDA had been told of them. Customer letters that land with purchasing or biomedical engineering may not reach the reprocessing unit or the endoscopy suite unless someone routes them.
The electronic reporting change
Two letters noted that the electronic medical device reporting rule, published February 13, 2014, would take effect for manufacturers and importers on August 14, 2015. [2] [4] That change concerned how manufacturers file. It did not change the facility’s duty. It did mark the same weeks as a shift in how the manufacturer side of the chain would operate.
The fleet: models, instructions and notices
Validated instructions by model
The Hoya letter said validation studies for one model’s sterilization and disinfection instructions had been run on different model endoscopes without documenting why the results applied. [4] It said labeling listed gas mixtures for ethylene oxide sterilization that differed from the mixture used in validation. [4] The Fujifilm letter said a 2014 reprocessing validation for the ED-530XT did not evaluate the effects of reprocessing on an O-ring and relied on one full sterilization cycle. [3]
Those are manufacturer findings. Their consequence for a facility is that instructions for use are model-specific, and the evidence behind them can change. A facility that follows instructions faithfully still depends on their validity. FDA’s August 4 communication said the agency would alert users when updated and validated reprocessing instructions became available. [1]
Instructions as controlled documents
If instructions can change when a manufacturer revalidates them, a facility needs to know which version its staff are using. FDA said it would alert users when updated and validated instructions became available. [1] An alert is useful only if the old version is withdrawn from the workstation and the new one is trained on.
In our reading, that is document control of the kind quality teams already apply to clinical protocols. Each instruction set would carry a version and an effective date, a named owner would replace it when a new one arrives, and staff would sign that they have read the change. The communication did not require this. It did recommend a quality control program with written procedures and documentation, which is where such a control would live. [1]
The same discipline applies to the facility’s own procedures. A unit that adds a supplemental measure, such as repeat disinfection, changes its process. The change, the date and the training given are part of the record that shows the facility followed its own program.
Knowing which scope is which
To act on model-specific instructions and notices, a facility needs an inventory: each scope’s model, serial number, service history and the version of instructions in use. A notice that applies to one model, or one model paired with one processor, is useful only if the facility knows where those scopes are. [3]
A biomedical engineering team may keep the equipment inventory, while an endoscopy unit tracks its own scopes. In our reading, the August 2015 documents made the scope inventory a safety record, linked to reprocessing logs and to the reporting chain.
Matching scopes to processors
The Fujifilm letter cited a 2014 customer letter saying one scope model was not operationally compatible with a particular video processor, with a possibility of improper image display. [3] FDA’s finding concerned the firm’s failure to report that correction. [3] For a facility, it shows that a scope’s safe use can depend on the equipment it is paired with.
In our reading, that makes the pairing of scopes, processors and reprocessors a configuration item. A facility that records which combinations are in use can act quickly on a compatibility notice. One that does not must search room by room.
Service and repair as part of the fleet
The Fujifilm letter said service reports from repair facilities fell within the firm’s own definition of complaint information, yet several had not been investigated as complaints. [3] That is a manufacturer finding. It also shows that repair and service events carry safety information. A facility that sends scopes for repair receives reports that may describe damage relevant to reprocessing. Routing those to the reprocessing unit closes another loop.
Procurement questions
The letters carried a standard warning: federal agencies may be advised of warning letters so they can take them into account when awarding contracts. [2] [3] [4] Hospitals are not bound by that sentence. In our reading, it signals that a vendor’s regulatory record is a procurement input. A facility buying or leasing scopes could ask about open warning letters, validated instructions for the specific models offered, and how the vendor notifies customers of corrections.
Loaner and repaired scopes
Scopes sent for repair are sometimes replaced temporarily by loaners. A loaner may be a different model, with different reprocessing instructions. In our reading, a facility’s inventory and instruction controls need to cover loaners from the day they arrive, and repaired scopes when they return with changed parts. FDA’s emphasis on following the manufacturer’s instructions for the device in hand applies to them equally. [1]
Retiring a model
A facility that decides to replace a model faces a transition period with mixed fleets. During that period, staff must follow two sets of instructions and the inventory must show which scopes remain. A planned retirement date, and a record of when the last scope of the old model left service, keep that period bounded.
How the actions reached different facilities
Academic and large health systems
A large system with a high ERCP volume, an in-house microbiology laboratory and a sterile processing department may have the resources FDA mentioned for culturing or sterilization. [1] Its challenge is coordination across sites: the same model scopes, the same instructions and the same reporting route at every hospital.
Systems with central reprocessing
A health system may reprocess scopes for several sites in one central department. That model can concentrate expertise and equipment, which helps with measures such as culturing or sterilization that FDA said require resources and expertise. [1] It also adds transport time and a handoff between sites. In our reading, the traceability chain must then cover the journey, so a scope used at one hospital can be linked to the cycle run at another.
Community hospitals
A smaller hospital with fewer scopes and no on-site culturing capacity faces the capacity calculation more sharply. FDA acknowledged that not all facilities could implement the measures. [1] For such a hospital, the priority the communication set was strict adherence to manufacturer instructions, staff proficiency and a quality control program. [1]
Ambulatory surgery centers and outpatient facilities
An ambulatory surgical facility, outpatient diagnostic facility or outpatient treatment facility is a device user facility under the reporting rule, unless it is a physician’s office. [6] An outpatient site that performs ERCP therefore carries the same reporting duty as a hospital. Its reprocessing staff may be fewer, and its access to sterilization or culturing more limited.
Public hospitals
The reporting rule covers a hospital whether it is licensed by a federal, state, municipal or local authority. [6] The safety communication made no distinction by ownership. [1] In our reading, the difference for a public hospital lies in procurement: public purchasers follow their own contracting rules, which can make adding scopes or sterilization capacity slower to arrange.
Patients and referring physicians
The August 4 communication included recommendations for patients. It encouraged them to discuss the benefits and risks of procedures using duodenoscopes with their physician, and said: “For most patients, the benefits of ERCP outweigh the risks of infection.” [1] It told them what symptoms after the procedure should prompt a call, including fever or chills. [1]
For a facility, those recommendations imply a patient communication task. Consent discussions and discharge instructions are where they land. In our reading, aligning those materials with the communication is a low-cost step that also helps detect infections after discharge, which feeds the reporting chain.
The objections, and what the record shows
“This is a manufacturer problem, not a hospital problem”
The letters support part of this objection. They cite manufacturers for reporting failures, inadequate procedures and validation gaps. [2] [3] [4] But FDA also said it was aware of persistent contamination even when facilities followed instructions strictly. [1] Until designs changed, the facility’s processes were the controls available. Treating the problem as the manufacturer’s alone would not have protected the next patient.
“The supplemental measures were optional”
They were. FDA said facilities could take one or more of them and should evaluate whether they had the expertise, training and resources. [1] The communication also recommended things that were not framed as optional in the same way: strict adherence to instructions, manual cleaning of the elevator and a comprehensive quality control program. [1] A facility that adopted no supplemental measure still had those to show.
“Culturing data are unreliable”
FDA itself said the method’s false positive and false negative rates and limits of detection had not been established. [1] It still said persistent contamination should prompt action. [1] The objection is a reason to treat culturing as one signal among several, not a reason to ignore positive results.
“Reporting duties are clear already”
The rules were clear. [6] The letters showed that clear rules did not guarantee timely reports on the manufacturer side. [2] [4] In our reading, the same risk exists inside a hospital, where the information needed for a report is spread across departments. Clarity of the rule is not the same as a working process.
“New designs will solve it, so process investment is wasted”
This is the strongest objection with hindsight, because FDA did later recommend a transition to new designs. [5] But that recommendation came in 2019, and FDA framed it as a transition to begin, not an overnight replacement. [5] Facilities kept reprocessing reusable scopes in the meantime. The bench controls, traceability and reporting routes built after 2015 also apply to other complex reusable devices. In our reading, the investment was not tied to one scope model.
“The cost falls on facilities that did nothing wrong”
That is fair as a description. The letters found failings at manufacturers, while the supplemental measures and their costs fell on facilities. [1] [2] [3] [4] The communication did not shift those costs. A facility’s practical levers were procurement terms, its choice among the measures and its own reporting, which could add to the evidence FDA used.
Checks an operations or quality leader could run
These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of FDA’s 2015 communication or the reporting rule. Facilities should confirm reporting questions with their regulatory and legal advisers.
- Instructions at the point of use: confirm that each reprocessing station has the current, model-specific instructions for every scope model in service.
- Competence records: keep dated competency assessments for each reprocessing technician, including the manual cleaning of the elevator mechanism.
- Capacity plan: model reprocessing time and scope availability alongside procedure schedules, including any quarantine for culturing.
- Traceability: make it possible to link each patient procedure to the scope used and that scope’s last reprocessing cycle.
- Reporting route: document how an infection cluster seen by infection prevention reaches the person who decides whether a device report is due.
- Manufacturer notices: route customer letters, technical service communications and recall notices to reprocessing and endoscopy staff, with a record of action taken.
- Scope inventory: keep each scope’s model, serial number, service history and instruction version in one place.
- Vendor questions: at purchase or lease, ask about open regulatory actions, validation for the specific model and the vendor’s customer notification process.
The August 2015 actions asked hospitals to manage a device whose risk could not be removed by following instructions alone. [1] The checks above follow that line: make the bench reliable, make capacity visible and make sure what one department sees reaches the department that must report it.
With hindsight
FDA’s next steps came quickly. On October 5, 2015, it ordered each U.S. duodenoscope manufacturer, Olympus, Fujifilm and Pentax, to conduct postmarket surveillance studies under section 522. [5] The studies were to examine how the devices are reprocessed in real-world settings and the resulting contamination rates. [5]
Design changes followed. On January 15, 2016, FDA cleared an Olympus TJF-Q180V duodenoscope with design modifications intended to reduce infection risk. [5] On September 20, 2017, it cleared a Pentax model with a disposable cap that FDA said would improve access for cleaning. [5]
The culturing question moved toward standard methods. On February 26, 2018, FDA, CDC and the American Society for Microbiology released voluntary standardized protocols for duodenoscope surveillance sampling and culturing. [5] FDA described them as an update to the CDC interim protocol of March 2015. [5]
The surveillance studies became an enforcement issue of their own. On March 9, 2018, FDA issued warning letters to all three manufacturers for failing to provide sufficient data to address the section 522 study requirements. [5] FDA said all three responded with plans for meeting study milestones. [5] On December 10, 2018, it reported interim results showing higher than expected contamination rates after reprocessing. [5]
The decisive change came in 2019. On August 29, 2019, FDA recommended that hospitals and endoscopy facilities begin transitioning to duodenoscopes with innovative designs that facilitate or eliminate the need for reprocessing. [5] The same communication said the three manufacturers were withdrawing fixed endcap duodenoscopes from the market. [5] It warned that adenosine triphosphate test strips should not be used to assess duodenoscope cleaning, since FDA had not evaluated them for that purpose. [5]
On April 5, 2022, FDA issued a safety communication supporting the transition to fully disposable duodenoscopes and those with disposable components. [5] It stated that the warning letters issued to the three manufacturers were closed. [5] The archived page for the 2015 Olympus letter also lists a close-out letter dated June 7, 2017. [2]
On June 30, 2022, FDA updated that communication with final results for a newer Fujifilm model. It reported 1.1 percent of samples positive for high concern organisms, compared with 4 to 6 percent for similar older models. [5] As checked on November 16, 2026, FDA’s duodenoscope page says its content is current as of June 30, 2022. [5]
The reporting rules the 2015 communication pointed to remain in force. As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR text of 21 CFR Part 803, up to date as of November 12, 2026, keeps the 10 work day deadline for user facility reports. [6]
What held up from August 2015 is the diagnosis. FDA said then that contamination could persist despite strict adherence to instructions. [1] The surveillance studies it ordered that October reported higher than expected contamination, and its answer by 2019 was a change in design. [5] What did not hold up was the hope that supplemental cleaning steps could close the gap on their own. FDA moved from measures facilities could add to a recommendation that they begin transitioning to new designs. [5]
In our view, a lasting point for health system leaders is about where risk lands while a design flaw persists. In 2015 it landed on reprocessing staff, scope supply and internal reporting. Those functions decided how well a facility managed the risk until better devices arrived.
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