Florence’s waivers were narrow; the hospital’s own records carried the rest

HHS declared Hurricane Florence emergencies on September 11 and 12, 2018. The waivers that followed were fixed by statute in place, time and scope. Privacy Rule permissions and records the preparedness rule required carried the rest.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

HHS declared Hurricane Florence emergencies on September 11 and 12, 2018. The waivers that followed were fixed by statute in place, time and scope. Privacy Rule permissions and records the preparedness rule required carried the rest.

  1. The week On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, as Hurricane Florence moved toward the eastern seaboard, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar declared public health emergencies in North Carolina and South Carolina.
  2. The boundary of relief: place, time and scope The flexibilities HHS described rest on section 1135 of the Social Security Act.
  3. Permissions that never needed a waiver OCR’s guidance made a point that is easy to miss in an emergency: even without a waiver, the Privacy Rule allows patient information to be shared to assist in disaster relief and to help patients receive care.
  4. Records the hospital needed before the storm In September 2016, CMS published a final rule setting national emergency preparedness requirements for Medicare and Medicaid participating providers and suppliers.
  5. Patients outside the hospital The fourth part is the one HHS emphasized in both Florence releases.
  6. Federal help and what it assumed The HHS releases describe federal resources that arrived around hospitals rather than inside them: medical teams from the National Disaster Medical System, Commissioned Corps officers, a national ambulance contract activated to evacuate hospitals and nursing homes if needed, and Federal Medical Stations staged for displaced people with special health needs, including chronic conditions, limited mobility or common mental health issues.
  7. A hazard with no declaration: the cyber outage The 2016 rule’s list of hazards included interruptions in communications, including cyber-attacks.
  8. Who does the work The four parts have different owners inside a health system, and the lens of this article is the workforce that carries them.
  9. The record of the event itself A declared emergency produces its own records requirement.
  10. Where waivers and records meet The four parts connect at specific points, and the connections are where hospitals can fail without noticing.
  11. Objections One objection is that we understate the waivers.
  12. After the storm: when relief ends The end of relief deserves as much planning as its start.
  13. How it differs across providers Hospitals hold the privacy waiver, which applies only to hospitals that have instituted a disaster protocol.
  14. With hindsight The preparedness rule was loosened on paper after Florence.

The week

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, as Hurricane Florence moved toward the eastern seaboard, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar declared public health emergencies in North Carolina and South Carolina. HHS said the declarations followed the President’s emergency declarations for the two states and gave beneficiaries of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and their health care providers and suppliers, greater flexibility in meeting emergency health needs. The Secretary acted under the Public Health Service Act and the Social Security Act, and HHS said the actions and flexibilities were retroactive to September 7, 2018 in North Carolina and September 8, 2018 in South Carolina.

The same release described the department’s preparations. HHS said it had pre-positioned about 230 medical personnel from the National Disaster Medical System, with caches of medical equipment, in North Carolina and Maryland, and had activated the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps’ Rapid Deployment Force. Its Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, known as ASPR, had coordinated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency to activate a national contract that made additional ambulances available to evacuate hospitals and nursing homes if needed. ASPR and CMS had given North Carolina and South Carolina health officials information on the number of Medicare beneficiaries in the potentially affected areas who relied on dialysis or on special medical equipment at home, and on the type of equipment, such as oxygen concentrators.

On Wednesday, September 12, the Secretary declared a public health emergency in Virginia, again following a presidential emergency declaration, with flexibilities retroactive to September 8. HHS said it had worked with FEMA to pre-position about 400 medical and public health personnel, with about 150 more on alert, that about 300 ambulances were standing ready and that two 250-bed Federal Medical Stations were staged to care for displaced people with special health needs. It said the Secretary’s Operations Center was activated around the clock and that the Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention had activated their emergency operations centers.

On Thursday, September 13, in a release that said Florence was making landfall, the HHS Office for Civil Rights issued guidance on equal access to emergency services and on sharing medical information. It listed practices emergency officials should consider, as circumstances and resources allowed, to serve people with limited English proficiency, people who are deaf or hard of hearing, people with disabilities and members of diverse faith communities. It also explained the privacy side of the declarations, in a passage aimed at hospitals: the Secretary had waived sanctions and penalties under certain provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule for covered hospitals, but only in the emergency area and period, only for hospitals that had instituted a disaster protocol and for up to 72 hours from the time a hospital implemented that protocol. It said that even without a waiver, the Privacy Rule allowed patient information to be shared to assist in disaster relief and to help patients receive the care they need. It pointed readers to OCR’s decision tool on HIPAA disclosures for emergency preparedness.

A public health emergency declaration sounds like the moment rules give way. For hospitals in Florence’s path, the declarations of September 11 and 12, 2018 did open flexibilities under federal health programs. But the relief they made possible was bounded by statute in place, time and scope, and the privacy waiver in particular was narrow. In our assessment, what carried a hospital through the storm was what it had prepared in advance under rules that did not relax at all.

Our argument is that Florence showed four separate things a hospital’s technology and operations leaders need to manage in a declared emergency, and that only one of them is the waiver. First, the boundary of relief: where, when and to whom a waiver applies, which the statute fixes. Second, the permissions that never needed a waiver: what the HIPAA Privacy Rule already allowed in a disaster, and the civil rights duties that continued. Third, the records the hospital had to have before the storm: the tracking, documentation and communication systems the Medicare emergency preparedness rule required. Fourth, the patients outside the hospital: people at home who depend on powered equipment or dialysis, whom federal data helped states find. The four do not overlap, and between them they cover what a hospital relies on when a declaration is made.

We take each in turn, then test the argument and look at what it means for different kinds of providers. Hospitals should take advice from counsel on how waivers and the HIPAA rules apply to them in any particular emergency. Nothing here is legal advice.

The boundary of relief: place, time and scope

What the statute lets the Secretary waive

The flexibilities HHS described rest on section 1135 of the Social Security Act. The statute lets the Secretary temporarily waive or modify certain requirements of Medicare, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program for health care items and services furnished in an emergency area during an emergency period. The list is specific. It covers conditions of participation and other certification requirements; program participation requirements; pre-approval requirements; licensing requirements for professionals licensed in another state; certain actions under the emergency treatment law for transfers and alternative screening locations; sanctions under the physician self-referral law; deadlines and timetables, which may only be modified, not waived; certain payment limits for out-of-network care for enrollees in what the 2017 text of the code calls Medicare+Choice plans; and sanctions and penalties for noncompliance with three HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions.

In our reading, everything else stays in force. The statute’s list does not include the HIPAA Security Rule, state law or the hospital’s contracts with its vendors, and we read nothing in it as suspending the hospital’s duty to keep records, to protect them or to bill accurately. It modifies specific federal program requirements so that care can continue, and nothing more.

Where and when

The statute defines the emergency area and emergency period as the place and time in which there exists both an emergency or disaster declared by the President under the National Emergencies Act or the Stafford Act, and a public health emergency declared by the Secretary. That is why the HHS releases said the Secretary’s declarations followed the President’s emergency declarations for each state. Both were needed.

A waiver can be made retroactive to the beginning of the emergency period, at the Secretary’s discretion, which is how the Florence flexibilities reached back to September 7 and 8. It ends when either declaration ends or, subject to extension, 60 days after it is first published. The statute also requires the Secretary to certify to Congress, at least two days before exercising the authority for an emergency area, which provisions will be waived, for which providers, in which area and for what period.

The narrowest piece: the privacy waiver

The HIPAA part of section 1135 is the narrowest. It covers sanctions and penalties for noncompliance with three provisions: the requirements in section 164.510 of the Privacy Rule to obtain a patient’s agreement to speak with family members or friends and to honor a request to opt out of the facility directory; the requirement in section 164.520 to distribute a notice of privacy practices; and the patient’s rights under section 164.522 to request privacy restrictions and confidential communications. The statute says a waiver of these provisions applies only if the actions are taken without discriminating among individuals on the basis of their source of payment or ability to pay, and is limited to a 72-hour period beginning when a hospital implements a disaster protocol. After that, the waiver is withdrawn and the provider must comply for any patient still in its care.

The OCR guidance of September 13 restated those limits directly: only the emergency area and period, only hospitals with a disaster protocol, up to 72 hours from implementing it unless the declaration ended first. For a hospital’s privacy office, that means the waiver is a short bridge, not a suspension. Its start is set by an internal event, the hospital’s activation of its protocol, which the hospital has to be able to show happened and when.

What this part asks of a hospital

A hospital that wants to rely on any waiver has to know, at the time, which declarations cover it, which provisions are waived and from when, and when its own 72-hour privacy window began. In our view, the emergency operations center should keep a running log of those facts during an event, with the time the disaster protocol was activated recorded as a fixed entry. The waiver protects only conduct that fits within it, and the log is what shows that it did.

Permissions that never needed a waiver

What the Privacy Rule already allows

OCR’s guidance made a point that is easy to miss in an emergency: even without a waiver, the Privacy Rule allows patient information to be shared to assist in disaster relief and to help patients receive care. It said the rule permits covered entities to share information for treatment, for public health activities and to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to health or safety, and allows sharing with family, friends and others involved in a patient’s care in emergencies.

The rule’s text supports that reading in detail. Section 164.510(b) lets a covered entity use or disclose information to notify, or help notify, a family member, personal representative or other person responsible for a patient’s care of the patient’s location, general condition or death. If the patient is not present, or cannot agree or object because of incapacity or an emergency, the covered entity may use professional judgment to decide whether a disclosure is in the patient’s best interests and disclose only what is directly relevant. And section 164.510(b)(4) allows disclosure to a public or private entity authorized by law or by its charter to assist in disaster relief, for the purpose of coordinating notification, applying the usual agreement requirements only to the extent professional judgment finds they do not interfere with responding to the emergency.

Read together, those provisions cover the disclosures a hospital needs in an evacuation: telling families where a patient went and how they are, and working with relief organizations to reunite people. They do not depend on a declaration or a 72-hour window. A hospital whose staff know them can act on the first hour of an emergency without waiting for Washington.

Civil rights duties that continued

The other half of OCR’s guidance concerned obligations that did not relax. It asked emergency responders and officials to consider qualified interpreters for people with limited English proficiency and for people who are deaf or hard of hearing; emergency messaging in the languages prevalent in the area and in multiple formats, such as audio, large print and captioning; accessible websites for disaster information; transportation that accounts for mobility impairments and assistive devices; accessible shelters; and keeping people with their service animals, medical equipment, caregivers and medication.

Several of those items are technology questions for a hospital. Emergency messages and patient instructions sent by text, phone or portal have to work for patients who need another language or format. A disaster information page has to be accessible. The systems that send mass notifications have to hold the language and contact preferences that make that possible, which means those preferences have to be recorded before the emergency.

Records the hospital needed before the storm

The preparedness rule and its deadline

In September 2016, CMS published a final rule setting national emergency preparedness requirements for Medicare and Medicaid participating providers and suppliers. It took effect on November 15, 2016, and providers had to implement it by November 15, 2017. Florence arrived after that implementation date. The rule required an all-hazards approach, and its preamble listed among the hazards care-related emergencies, equipment and power failures, loss of all or part of a facility, interruptions in the supply of essentials such as water and food, and interruptions in communications, including cyber-attacks.

For hospitals, the rule added a condition of participation, section 482.15, requiring an emergency preparedness program with an emergency plan based on a documented risk assessment, policies and procedures, a communication plan and a training and testing program, plus requirements for emergency and standby power. As published in 2016, the plan, the policies and procedures and the communication plan each had to be reviewed and updated at least annually.

Tracking people

Among the required policies and procedures was a system to track the location of on-duty staff and sheltered patients in the hospital’s care during an emergency. If staff or patients were relocated, the hospital had to document the specific name and location of the receiving facility or other location. That is a records requirement with direct technology consequences: a tracking system that works when the hospital’s usual network, power or electronic health record is degraded, and that can follow a patient to another facility.

Keeping the medical record available

The policies also had to provide a system of medical documentation that preserves patient information, protects its confidentiality, and secures and maintains the availability of records. The three verbs in that sentence map onto the three things a hospital’s records team must solve in a storm: keeping information from being lost, keeping it private while it moves with patients, and keeping it reachable when systems are down. Downtime procedures, offline copies of critical data and the ability to send a summary record with an evacuated patient are the practical forms that requirement takes.

Communicating with the outside

The communication plan had to include names and contact information for staff, entities providing services under arrangement, patients’ physicians, other hospitals and volunteers, and contact information for emergency preparedness officials; primary and alternate means of communicating; and a method for sharing information and medical documentation with other providers to maintain continuity of care. It also had to include a means, in the event of an evacuation, to release patient information as permitted under section 164.510(b)(1)(ii) of the Privacy Rule, a means of providing information about the general condition and location of patients as permitted under section 164.510(b)(4), and a means of providing information about the hospital’s occupancy, needs and ability to help to the authority having jurisdiction.

The cross-references matter. The preparedness rule did not tell hospitals to wait for a waiver before releasing information in an evacuation. It told them to have a means of making the disclosures the Privacy Rule already permitted. The privacy waiver of section 1135 sits on top of that, for a short window, for three specific provisions.

The waiver role written into the plan

Finally, the rule required the hospital’s policies and procedures to address its role under a waiver declared by the Secretary under section 1135, in providing care and treatment at an alternate care site identified by emergency management officials. The preparedness rule thus expected hospitals to plan for the waiver in advance: to know what they would do at an alternate site and how, before a declaration made it possible.

Patients outside the hospital

The fourth part is the one HHS emphasized in both Florence releases. ASPR and CMS gave state health officials in North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia information on the number of Medicare beneficiaries in the potentially affected areas who relied on dialysis or on special medical equipment at home, and on the type of equipment, such as oxygen concentrators. HHS said the information helped health and emergency management agencies respond, particularly after extended power outages.

Those patients are not in the hospital, but they are the hospital’s problem when the power goes out. A patient whose oxygen concentrator stops, or whose dialysis center closes, arrives at the emergency department. As HHS described it, the federal data went to state health officials, and it described counts and equipment types for planning. A hospital’s own records of the patients it serves who depend on powered equipment, or who receive dialysis, are a separate and complementary source, and they are only useful if they are current and reachable during an outage.

This part has a privacy dimension too. Sharing information about at-risk patients with public health authorities and emergency managers is a disclosure that has to fit a Privacy Rule permission, such as the public health and serious threat provisions OCR mentioned. A hospital that plans this sharing in advance, with its public health partners and its privacy office, can do it quickly in an emergency without improvising its legal basis.

The data also has to survive the emergency. A list of patients on home oxygen or dialysis that lives only in a system that loses power or connectivity in the storm is no help when the outage it was meant for arrives. The same downtime planning that protects the medical record should cover these lists: a current copy that care managers can reach from outside the affected area, refreshed on a schedule, with access limited to the people who need it.

Finally, these patients need to hear from someone. Outreach before a storm, to confirm backup power, supplies and a plan to reach treatment, is a communication task that draws on the same contact and language preferences the civil rights guidance relies on. A health system that can reach its at-risk patients in their own language before landfall reduces the number who arrive at the emergency department in crisis afterward.

Federal help and what it assumed

The HHS releases describe federal resources that arrived around hospitals rather than inside them: medical teams from the National Disaster Medical System, Commissioned Corps officers, a national ambulance contract activated to evacuate hospitals and nursing homes if needed, and Federal Medical Stations staged for displaced people with special health needs, including chronic conditions, limited mobility or common mental health issues. HHS said the FDA was prepared to help manufacturers in the storm’s path if needed, and named potential flooding as one of the greatest concerns for manufacturing facilities.

Each of those resources assumes something about the hospitals it serves. An ambulance contract for evacuation assumes the hospital can say which patients need to move, in what order and to where, and can send their information with them. A Federal Medical Station caring for displaced people assumes that someone can tell its staff about the people who arrive, including their medications and equipment. Federal teams supporting a hospital assume they can be integrated into its staffing, with access to the records they need and no more.

The preparedness rule anticipated the last of those. As published in 2016, it required hospital policies and procedures to address the use of volunteers and other emergency staffing strategies, including the process and role for integrating state and federally designated health care professionals to address surge needs. That is an access management question as much as a staffing one: who grants temporary access to clinical systems, at what level, and who removes it when the teams leave.

A hazard with no declaration: the cyber outage

The 2016 rule’s list of hazards included interruptions in communications, including cyber-attacks. That inclusion matters for technology leaders, because a cyber outage triggers the same operational needs as a storm while none of the declaration-based relief applies unless declarations are made.

Section 1135 waivers depend on an emergency area and period, which the statute defines by the existence of both a presidential emergency or disaster declaration and a public health emergency declared by the Secretary. A ransomware attack on a single hospital produces neither on its own. The hospital in that situation has no waiver to rely on. It has the Privacy Rule’s ordinary permissions, its preparedness plan and its records.

The comparison sharpens the argument. Every element of the third part, the tracking system, the documentation system that keeps records available, the communication plan with its contact lists and alternate means, and the arrangements to transfer patients to other hospitals, is exactly what a hospital needs when its own systems are encrypted by an attacker. The difference is that the tracking and documentation systems may themselves be the systems that are down. A plan that assumes the electronic health record will be available during an emergency is a plan for storms, not for cyber-attacks, and the all-hazards approach the rule’s preamble described took in both.

For that reason, we think a hospital should test its preparedness plan against a scenario in which its clinical systems are unavailable for an extended period, with no declaration and no waiver. The required exercises can accommodate it: the additional annual exercise may be a tabletop built on a narrated, clinically relevant emergency scenario, and a cyber scenario tests the records part of the plan harder than a storm does.

Who does the work

The four parts have different owners inside a health system, and the lens of this article is the workforce that carries them.

  • The boundary of relief belongs to the emergency operations center, with legal and compliance support, which tracks declarations and waivers and records when the disaster protocol was activated.
  • The standing permissions belong to the privacy office, which has to turn section 164.510 into short guidance that front-line staff can use, and to the civil rights and patient access functions responsible for language and disability access.
  • The records belong to the clinical informatics, health information management and IT teams that run tracking, documentation and downtime systems, and to the emergency management team that owns the communication plan.
  • The patients outside the hospital belong to care management and population health teams, working with public health partners.

The preparedness rule’s training requirements reach all of them. As published in 2016, the rule required initial training for all new and existing staff, individuals providing services under arrangement and volunteers, consistent with their expected roles, and documentation of that training. Training that covers the four parts by role, rather than a single general briefing, is how a hospital makes sure each owner knows what is theirs when a declaration arrives.

The record of the event itself

A declared emergency produces its own records requirement. The preparedness rule required hospitals to analyze their response to emergency events, maintain documentation and revise the plan as needed. For Florence, that meant an after-action record of what the hospital did, what worked and what failed.

That record has uses beyond improving the plan. Waivers modify program requirements for specific places, times and providers, and a hospital that relied on one may later need to show that its conduct fell within it. Disclosures made under the Privacy Rule’s disaster permissions may later be questioned by a patient or family. In each case, the evidence is the log and records the hospital kept at the time. A hospital that writes its after-action review from memory long after the event has a weaker record than one whose emergency operations center kept a timed log throughout.

In our assessment, the after-action record should also capture every place where staff improvised because the plan did not cover a situation, since those are the gaps the next revision should close. Florence’s pattern of declarations, issued on different days with different retroactive dates for neighboring states, is the kind of detail an after-action review can turn into a standing procedure.

Where waivers and records meet

The four parts connect at specific points, and the connections are where hospitals can fail without noticing.

  • The 72-hour privacy window begins when the hospital implements its disaster protocol. The emergency operations log, a record from the third part, is what shows when that happened.
  • An evacuation requires the hospital to tell families where patients went. The permission comes from section 164.510(b), the second part. The means comes from the preparedness rule’s communication plan, the third part. The waiver is not needed.
  • The alternate care site role depends on a section 1135 waiver, the first part, but the plan for it was required in advance by the preparedness rule, the third part.
  • Patients at home who depend on power appear at the hospital when the grid fails. Federal data reached state planners, the fourth part; the hospital’s own patient records, the third part, are what let it plan for its share of them.

In each case, the waiver is the smallest piece. The records and permissions the hospital had before the storm carry the larger share of the work.

Objections

Waivers are what make disaster care possible

One objection is that we understate the waivers. For some needs they are decisive: licensing flexibility for professionals from other states, relief from transfer requirements under the emergency treatment law in a declared emergency, and the alternate care site role all depend on section 1135. We agree, and that is why the boundary of relief is the first part of our argument. Our point is that the waivers are specific and bounded, and that a hospital that confuses them with a general suspension of rules will make disclosures and decisions it cannot later support.

Staff cannot check a statute during a hurricane

A second objection is that front-line staff in a storm cannot weigh Privacy Rule provisions. We agree, and for that reason the work has to be done in advance. The preparedness rule required training on emergency policies and procedures. A hospital that trains staff on three things, what they may tell families, what they may share with relief organizations and who to ask about anything else, gives them what they need without asking them to read regulations under pressure.

Federal data on home-equipment patients makes hospital records redundant

A third objection is that federal data on Medicare beneficiaries with powered equipment covers the fourth part. As HHS described it, the data went to state health officials and described numbers and equipment types in affected areas. As HHS described it, it counted Medicare beneficiaries only, and it went to state officials rather than to hospitals. A hospital’s records cover a different population with different detail. The two are complements.

Paper downtime procedures are enough

A fourth objection is that paper downtime forms handle an outage. They handle the hospital’s internal work for a while. They do not track a patient to another facility, notify a family across the state or send a summary record with an evacuee. The preparedness rule asked for a documentation system that preserves information and keeps it available, and for a tracking system that follows people when they move, which paper can support but cannot carry alone over distance.

Retroactive dates make timing irrelevant

A fifth objection is that retroactive waivers, like Florence’s, mean a hospital need not track timing closely, because relief reaches back anyway. Retroactivity helps, but only for the waivers the Secretary makes retroactive and only to the dates chosen, which for Florence differed by state. The privacy waiver has its own clock, 72 hours from the hospital’s activation of its disaster protocol, which retroactivity does not extend. And the end of a waiver is not retroactive at all: when the period ends, the requirements apply again, and the statute says the provider must comply with the privacy provisions for any patient still in its care.

After the storm: when relief ends

The end of relief deserves as much planning as its start. Under the statute, a waiver or modification ends when the presidential declaration or the public health emergency ends or, subject to extensions of up to 60 days at a time, 60 days after it is first published. For the privacy provisions, the 72-hour limit ends relief sooner still.

Ending relief is an operational event. Patients admitted during the emergency may not have received the notice of privacy practices, may not have been offered the chance to opt out of the facility directory and may have had information shared with family under the waiver rather than under the ordinary rules. When the waiver ends, the statute requires the hospital to comply with those provisions for any patient still in its care. A hospital needs a way to find those patients and complete what was deferred: deliver the notice, offer the directory choice and record any restrictions they request.

The same applies to staffing and access. Temporary access granted to federal teams, volunteers or staff from other facilities has to be removed when they leave, and the access logs reviewed. Workarounds adopted during the emergency, such as shared accounts at a field site or paper records later scanned into the electronic record, have to be closed and reconciled. A hospital that plans the return to normal operations alongside the emergency response avoids carrying emergency-era risks into ordinary time.

How it differs across providers

Hospitals

Hospitals hold the privacy waiver, which applies only to hospitals that have instituted a disaster protocol. They also carry tracking and communication duties for patients they receive and send during evacuations. For them, the four parts all apply in full.

Nursing homes and other providers

The preparedness rule applied to a wide range of Medicare and Medicaid participating providers and suppliers beyond hospitals, and the OCR release pointed readers to CMS’s preparedness rule page for long-term care facilities. The section 1135 privacy waiver, by contrast, applies to hospitals. A nursing home evacuating residents relies on the Privacy Rule’s standing permissions, such as those in section 164.510, and on its own preparedness plan, which in our reading makes the second and third parts carry the whole load.

Health systems with sites in several states

Systems that also run clinics, home health agencies or dialysis services have a further task: matching each kind of site to the rules that apply to it. The preparedness rule set requirements by provider type, and the privacy waiver applies only to hospitals, so a single storm can find a system’s hospital working under a waiver while its clinic down the road, in the same declared area, works under the ordinary rules.

A system with hospitals in more than one state faces declarations that may cover some sites and not others, start on different dates and end at different times. Florence produced exactly that pattern: declarations for North Carolina and South Carolina on September 11, retroactive to different dates, and for Virginia on September 12. A system’s emergency operations center needs to track declarations site by site, because the boundary of relief is drawn by state and date, not by organization.

What we would ask a health system leader today

  • Does our emergency operations log record, as fixed entries, which declarations cover each site, which waivers apply from when, and when each hospital activated its disaster protocol?
  • Do front-line staff know what the Privacy Rule lets them tell families and relief organizations without any waiver?
  • Can our patient tracking and medical documentation systems follow a patient to another facility when our network or record system is down?
  • Do our mass notification systems hold language and format preferences, and are our disaster information pages accessible?
  • Do we know which of our patients depend on powered equipment or dialysis at home, and have we agreed with public health partners how we would share that in an emergency?

With hindsight

The preparedness rule was loosened on paper after Florence. Today’s text of section 482.15, as amended on September 30, 2019 at 84 FR 51817, requires hospitals to review and update the emergency plan, the policies and procedures, the communication plan and the training and testing program at least every 2 years, rather than at least annually as in 2016. Training on emergency procedures is required at least every 2 years, with additional training when the policies and procedures are significantly updated. Testing is now stated as at least twice a year: an annual full-scale community-based exercise, or a facility-based functional exercise when a community exercise is not accessible, plus an additional annual exercise that may be a drill or a tabletop. A hospital that activates its emergency plan for an actual emergency is exempt from its next required full-scale or functional exercise. The core records Florence relied on remain: the tracking of staff and patients, the medical documentation system, the communication plan with its Privacy Rule cross-references and the role under a section 1135 waiver at an alternate care site.

The Privacy Rule’s disaster provisions in section 164.510(b), including notification of family and disclosure to disaster relief organizations, read today as they did in 2018. The eCFR’s amendment history for the section ends with a rule published on January 25, 2013.

Federal relief from HIPAA enforcement was later used at national scale. During the COVID-19 public health emergency, OCR used a different tool, notifications of enforcement discretion. On April 13, 2023, OCR announced in the Federal Register that four such notifications would expire when the COVID-19 public health emergency expired, which it said was scheduled for 11:59 p.m. on May 11, 2023. After that, it said, the notifications would no longer provide a basis for OCR to exercise enforcement discretion in imposing penalties for HIPAA violations, though OCR would continue to apply them to violations during the period each was in effect. It gave covered health care providers a 90-calendar-day transition period to come into compliance for telehealth provided through non-public facing remote communication technologies.

That notice made the same point Florence did, at national scale. Relief from HIPAA enforcement is tied to a declaration and ends with it, and the organization has to be ready to comply again on a known date. The 90-day transition period, which the notice said would expire at 11:59 p.m. on August 9, 2023, gave providers that had relied on the telehealth flexibility time to bring their platforms back inside the rules.

What held up from Florence is the division of labor among the four parts. Waivers did what the statute allows, for the places and times it allows. The permissions in the Privacy Rule and the records the preparedness rule required did the rest. What did not hold up is the annual rhythm of preparedness reviews, which CMS relaxed in 2019, though hospitals still had to run two exercises each year. In our reading, that change makes the records themselves more important, since fewer formal reviews mean fewer scheduled chances to find that a contact list or tracking procedure has gone stale.

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  • Hurricane Florence
  • section 1135 waivers
  • HIPAA
  • emergency preparedness
  • public health emergency
  • CMS