The FTC’s 2015 guide drew ten lessons from settled cases; its 2021 Safeguards Rule required similar controls
On June 30, 2015, the FTC published Start with Security, ten lessons drawn from alleged facts in its data security settlements. A 2018 appeals ruling demanded specific orders, and the 2021 Safeguards Rule set specific controls for financial institutions under FTC jurisdiction.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On June 30, 2015, the FTC published Start with Security, ten lessons drawn from alleged facts in its data security settlements. A 2018 appeals ruling demanded specific orders, and the 2021 Safeguards Rule set specific controls for financial institutions under FTC jurisdiction.
- The week The guide was explicit about its source material.
- The data: what a company holds, stores and discards The guide’s first lesson was to start with security by limiting data.
- The access: who can reach the data, and how they prove it The second lesson was to control access sensibly.
- The systems: how networks and software are built and kept current The fifth lesson was to segment networks and monitor activity.
- The others: service providers The eighth lesson was about vendors.
- How the guide reached different sectors For mortgage lenders, finance companies and other nonbank financial institutions under the FTC’s jurisdiction, the guide described the enforcer’s view of security before the 2021 rule existed.
- Objections, and where the argument stops The strongest objection is that the guide described allegations, not findings.
- Checks for security leaders These are our own suggestions, not requirements of the guide or any rule, except where a rule is cited.
- With hindsight The FTC kept Start with Security online.
The week
On June 30, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission announced a business education initiative called “Start With Security.” [1] The release said the initiative included new guidance for businesses drawing on lessons from the more than 50 data security cases the FTC had brought. [1] It also announced a series of conferences, the first set for September 9 in San Francisco and the second for November 5 in Austin, Texas. [1]
The guidance was a publication titled Start with Security: A Guide for Business, dated June 2015. [2] The release said it “lays out ten key steps to effective data security, drawn from the alleged facts in the FTC’s data security cases.” [1] It said the document included references to the cases and plain-language explanations of the security principles involved. [1] The FTC also introduced a single website consolidating its data security information for businesses. [1]
The guide listed its ten lessons on its first page. [2] The first five were: start with security; control access to data sensibly; and require secure passwords and authentication. [2] They continued: store sensitive personal information securely and protect it during transmission; and segment your network and monitor who is trying to get in and out. [2] The rest were: secure remote access; apply sound security practices when developing new products; make sure service providers implement reasonable security measures; keep security current and address vulnerabilities; and secure paper, physical media and devices. [2]
The guide was explicit about its source material. It said its lessons came from “the more than 50 law enforcement actions the FTC has announced so far.” [2] It said: “These are settlements – no findings have been made by a court – and the specifics of the orders apply just to those companies.” [2] It said learning about alleged lapses could help a company improve its practices. [2]
Each lesson cited cases by company name and described what the FTC had alleged. [2] The guide named, among others, Twitter, Guidance Software, Reed Elsevier, Lookout Services, Superior Mortgage Corporation and ValueClick. [2] It also named Fandango, Credit Karma, DSW, Dave & Buster’s, Lifelock, HTC America, TRENDnet, GMR Transcription, Upromise, TJX, Rite Aid and CVS Caremark. [2] For each, it described the alleged lapse and how the risk could have been reduced. [2]
The guide placed itself alongside earlier FTC advice. The release said it built on publications such as Protecting Personal Information, guidance for mobile app developers and guidance on the Internet of Things. [1] The guide restated principles from Protecting Personal Information: know what personal information you have, keep only what you need, protect what you keep, dispose of what you no longer need and plan for incidents. [2]
The release said the conferences would be aimed at small and medium-sized businesses in various industries. [1] The first event would be hosted and co-sponsored by the University of California Hastings College of the Law, and the second co-sponsored by the University of Texas Robert C. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. [1] The September event, the release said, would cover security by design, common vulnerabilities, secure development strategies and vulnerability response for start-ups and developers. [1]
Start with Security is remembered as a plain-language business guide. For a security or compliance leader at a bank, health system or public agency, it was something more specific. It was the FTC’s own summary of what its settled cases implied a company should do. And it said, in its own words, that those cases were settlements without court findings, built on alleged facts. [2]
That combination is the subject of this piece. The guide turned allegations into a practical checklist of ten lessons. [2] On June 6, 2018, a federal appeals court vacated an FTC data security order that required a “reasonably designed” program without a meaningful standard for what that meant. [3] On December 9, 2021, the FTC published amendments to its Safeguards Rule, for financial institutions under its jurisdiction, with specific requirements: access controls, encryption, multi-factor authentication, secure development, monitoring and service provider oversight. [4]
Our argument is that the 2015 guide was the bridge between an enforcement record and a written standard. In our reading, it showed which controls the FTC treated as basic, years before any of them became a stated rule for the institutions it regulates. For organizations outside the FTC’s rules, it remained a readable account of what an enforcer had alleged in cases where data was lost.
The guide’s framing deserves care. Each example is an allegation in a complaint that the company settled. [2] Reading it well means separating three things: what the FTC alleged, what the company agreed to in its order, and what the guide drew from both. The guide itself gave only the first and third. [2] In our reading, that makes it a guide to the enforcer’s expectations, not a record of proven facts about any company.
We group the ten lessons into four parts, each covering what the guide asked a company to control:
- The data: what a company holds, how it is stored and moved, and how it is discarded.
- The access: who and what can reach the data, and how they prove who they are.
- The systems: how networks and software are built, watched and kept current.
- The others: service providers that handle data on the company’s behalf.
The four parts cover all ten lessons without overlap. Lessons one, four and ten concern the data; two, three and six concern access; five, seven and nine concern systems; and eight concerns service providers. [2] After the four parts we look at how the guide reached different sectors, take the objections, and end with checks a security leader could run.
The data: what a company holds, stores and discards
Collect and keep less
The guide’s first lesson was to start with security by limiting data. It said that collecting and maintaining information “just because” was no longer a sound business strategy. [2] It put the principle simply: no one can steal what you don’t have. [2]
It gave examples from cases. In RockYou, the FTC’s complaint charged that the company collected users’ email passwords at registration and stored them in clear text. [2] In BJ’s Wholesale Club, according to the complaint as the guide described it, the company kept customers’ card data for up to 30 days, long past the completed sale. [2] The FTC said holding it without a legitimate business need created an unreasonable risk. [2] In Accretive, the FTC alleged the company used real people’s personal information in employee training and failed to remove it from employees’ computers afterward. [2]
Real data in training and development
The guide also warned against using personal information where it is not needed. It said Accretive used real people’s data in training sessions. [2] It said foru International gave sensitive consumer data to service providers developing applications. [2] It said both risks could have been avoided with fictitious data for training or development. [2]
In our reading, this lesson reaches every organization that builds or tests software. Test environments, analytics sandboxes and vendor development projects hold copies of production data unless someone decides otherwise. Those copies can be less protected than the original. A rule that development and training use synthetic or masked data removes a whole class of exposure.
Protect it in storage and transit
The fourth lesson covered encryption. The guide said to use strong cryptography during storage and transmission, and that the method would depend on the business. [2] It named options such as TLS/SSL, data-at-rest encryption or an iterative cryptographic hash. [2] It said any method is only as good as the people who implement it. [2]
The cases showed where encryption had stopped short. In Superior Mortgage Corporation, the FTC alleged that data was encrypted between the browser and the server, but a service provider then decrypted it and emailed it in clear text to offices. [2] In ValueClick, the complaint charged the company used a non-standard, proprietary encryption method that the guide described as a simple alphabetic substitution system. [2] In Fandango and Credit Karma, the FTC alleged the companies turned off SSL certificate validation in their mobile apps. [2]
Configuration as a control
The Fandango and Credit Karma cases show a specific failure. The guide said the companies used SSL encryption in their apps but turned off SSL certificate validation without other compensating measures. [2] It said this made the apps vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. [2] It said following the iOS and Android developer guidelines, which warn against turning off validation, would have prevented the problem. [2]
In our reading, this is the most direct lesson for banks and health systems with mobile apps. Encryption that is present but misconfigured can look compliant in a document and fail in practice. A review of an app’s security needs to test its behavior, including whether it rejects invalid certificates, as well as confirming that encryption is listed in its design.
Secure paper, media and devices
The tenth lesson covered the physical side. The guide said that according to FTC complaints in Rite Aid and CVS Caremark, the companies threw sensitive personal information such as prescriptions into dumpsters. [2] In Goal Financial, it said, the FTC alleged that an employee sold surplus hard drives containing the sensitive information of approximately 34,000 customers in clear text. [2] It recommended shredding, burning or pulverizing documents and wiping devices not in use. [2]
Data on the move
The tenth lesson also covered data outside the office. In Accretive, the guide said, the FTC alleged that an employee left a laptop with more than 600 files, containing 20 million pieces of information related to 23,000 patients, in a car that was stolen. [2] The CBR Systems case, it said, concerned alleged unencrypted backup tapes, a laptop and an external drive taken from an employee’s car. [2] The guide advised tracked shipping, limiting when staff carry sensitive data and keeping it out of sight and locked when they must. [2]
Both examples involved health or medical information, as the guide described them. [2] In our reading, they show why encryption of portable devices and media became a baseline expectation in health care. A lost device is an incident; a lost encrypted device is far easier to contain.
Payment devices
The guide also described a closed staff investigation from 2007 into PIN entry devices vulnerable to tampering. [2] It said staff closed that investigation given the novelty of the attack at the time and other factors. [2] It said attacks on point-of-sale devices were by 2015 common and well known, and that businesses should take reasonable steps to protect such devices. [2] In our reading, the passage shows the FTC’s view that the bar for “reasonable” rises as an attack becomes known.
What the data part asks of an organization
The data lessons rest on an inventory. A company cannot limit what it collects, encrypt what it stores or dispose of what it no longer needs without knowing what it has and where. In our reading, the guide’s data lessons were the most transferable to regulated sectors. Banks, health systems and agencies hold large amounts of sensitive data and face their own retention and disposal rules.
The 2021 Safeguards Rule later made several of these points requirements for covered institutions. It required institutions to protect by encryption all customer information they hold or transmit, both at rest and in transit over external networks. [4] Where encryption is infeasible, it allowed effective alternative compensating controls reviewed and approved by the institution’s Qualified Individual. [4] It required procedures for secure disposal of customer information “no later than two years after the last date the information is used” to serve the customer, with stated exceptions. [4] It also required periodic review of data retention. [4]
The access: who can reach the data, and how they prove it
Need to know and administrative access
The second lesson was to control access sensibly. The guide said employees should have access only on a need-to-know basis. [2] In Goal Financial, the FTC alleged the company failed to restrict employee access, and that a group of employees transferred more than 7,000 consumer files to third parties without authorization. [2] In Twitter, it alleged that almost all employees had administrative control over the system. [2]
The guide said administrative access should be limited to the employees whose job requires it. [2] In our reading, this lesson anticipated what became a standard concern about privileged accounts. A compromise of any credential with administrative rights becomes a compromise of the whole system.
Passwords and authentication
The third lesson was about authentication. The guide cited Twitter for allowing common dictionary words as administrative passwords and passwords reused from other accounts. [2] It cited Guidance Software and Reed Elsevier for storing credentials insecurely. [2] It cited Lookout Services, Twitter and Reed Elsevier for not disabling credentials after repeated failed login attempts. [2] And it cited Lookout Services for an authentication bypass through a predictable resource location flaw. [2]
The guide’s language on stronger authentication was measured. It said businesses “may want to consider other protections – two-factor authentication, for example.” [2] It did not describe two-factor authentication as required. [2]
Reused passwords and guessing
Two of the authentication failures the guide described are about attackers using passwords from elsewhere. It said the Twitter complaint concerned passwords employees were already using for other accounts, which left the system open to attackers trying passwords stolen from other services. [2] It said the Lookout Services, Twitter and Reed Elsevier cases involved failing to suspend credentials after repeated failed attempts. [2]
In our reading, these two lessons work together. Lockout limits guessing. Unique passwords limit the value of credentials stolen elsewhere. Neither protects against a password that is both unique and stolen, which is why the guide pointed toward additional protections such as two-factor authentication. [2]
Remote access
The sixth lesson covered remote access. The guide said network security is only as strong as the weakest computer with remote access to it. [2] In Premier Capital Lending, it said, the company allegedly activated a remote login account for a business client without first assessing that client’s security. [2] In Settlement One, the complaint said the business let clients without basic protections access consumer reports through its portal. [2] In Dave & Buster’s, the FTC charged the company failed to adequately restrict third-party access to its network. [2]
Vendor and client credentials
Two of the remote access cases involved credentials given to outside parties. In Premier Capital Lending and Settlement One, the alleged failure was granting access to clients without checking their security. [2] In our reading, any organization that lets brokers, referring clinicians, partner agencies or vendors log in faces the same question. Their accounts are part of its attack surface, and their computers’ security becomes its concern.
The guide’s answer was to assess before granting access and to limit what outsiders can reach. [2] Its Dave & Buster’s example suggested restricting connections to specified IP addresses or granting temporary, limited access. [2]
What the access part asks of an organization
Access lessons depend on knowing who has access to what. For a bank or health system, that means an entitlement inventory covering employees, contractors, vendors and remote connections. In our reading, the guide’s remote access cases are especially relevant to institutions whose clients, partners or vendors connect to their systems.
The 2021 Safeguards Rule turned the measured language into a requirement for covered institutions. It required access controls that authenticate users and limit them to the customer information they need for their duties. [4] It required multi-factor authentication “for any individual accessing any information system,” unless the Qualified Individual approves in writing reasonably equivalent or more secure access controls. [4] In our reading, the distance between the guide’s “may want to consider” and the rule’s requirement is the clearest measure of how the standard moved.
The systems: how networks and software are built and kept current
Segmentation and monitoring
The fifth lesson was to segment networks and monitor activity. In DSW, the FTC alleged the company did not sufficiently limit computers in one in-store network from connecting to others and to corporate networks. [2] In Dave & Buster’s, it alleged the company did not use an intrusion detection system or monitor system logs. [2] The FTC said something similar happened in Cardsystem Solutions, where, as the guide described it, hackers installed programs that sent stored data outside the network every four days. [2]
Secure development
The seventh lesson concerned building products. The guide cited MTS, HTC America and TRENDnet for failing to train employees in secure coding. [2] It cited HTC America, Fandango and Credit Karma for failing to follow platform security guidelines. [2] It cited TRENDnet and Snapchat for privacy and security features that did not work as advertised. [2] And it said that in more than a dozen FTC cases, businesses failed to test applications for well-known vulnerabilities, citing Guess? for SQL injection. [2]
Keeping security current
The ninth lesson was about vulnerability management. The guide said security is “an ongoing process.” [2] In TJX, the FTC alleged the company did not update its anti-virus software. [2] In HTC America, it charged the company had no process for receiving and addressing vulnerability reports. [2] The guide said that, depending on network complexity, a company may need to prioritize patches by severity, but should have a reasonable process to update and patch. [2]
A channel for vulnerability reports
The guide gave a detailed example of a lost warning. In Fandango, it said, the company relied on its general customer service system to handle warnings about security risks. [2] According to the complaint, a researcher’s report was categorized as a password reset request, answered automatically and marked resolved. [2] The guide said Fandango did not learn of the vulnerability until FTC staff contacted it. [2]
The guide’s advice was to have an effective process to receive and address such reports. [2] It suggested a clearly publicized channel, such as a dedicated email address, that flags reports for security staff. [2] In our reading, this is a low-cost control that organizations in any sector can check in an afternoon: send a test report and see where it goes.
Features that must work as described
The guide also addressed security and privacy features. In TRENDnet, it said, the FTC charged the company failed to test whether a setting to make a camera feed private actually did so. [2] In Snapchat, it said, the company advertised that messages would disappear, but the FTC said it failed to ensure that claim was accurate. [2] The guide’s advice was to verify that such features work as advertised. [2]
For banks and health systems, the parallel is any security or privacy feature offered to customers or patients: account alerts, data sharing settings, consent choices, session timeouts. In our reading, a feature described to users is a promise, and the guide’s cases show what happened when, as alleged, a promise was not tested.
Incident response
The guide restated an earlier FTC principle: create a plan to respond to security incidents. [2] It did not set out what the plan should contain. The 2021 Safeguards Rule did, for covered institutions. It required a written incident response plan addressing goals, internal processes, roles and decision authority, communications, remediation, documentation and post-incident review. [4] In our reading, the move from “create a plan” to a list of required contents mirrors the path of the other lessons.
What the systems part asks of an organization
Systems lessons ask for process, not single tools. Segmentation needs an architecture. Monitoring needs someone reading the logs. Patching needs an inventory of software and a way to rank fixes. A vulnerability report needs a channel and an owner. In our reading, the guide’s cases show failures of process more than of technology: tools absent, unused or turned off.
The 2021 Safeguards Rule wrote similar expectations into requirements. It required secure development practices for in-house applications and procedures to evaluate externally developed ones. [4] It required change management procedures and controls to monitor and log the activity of authorized users. [4] It required regular testing: continuous monitoring or, absent effective continuous monitoring, annual penetration testing and vulnerability assessments at least every six months. [4]
The others: service providers
Put it in writing
The eighth lesson was about vendors. The guide said to be candid about security expectations, select providers able to meet them and monitor that they do. [2] Its first sub-lesson was to put requirements in contracts. [2] In GMR Transcription, the FTC alleged the company hired service providers to transcribe sensitive audio files without requiring reasonable security, and that files containing health-related information were exposed on the internet. [2]
Verify compliance
The second sub-lesson was verification. The guide said security cannot be a “take our word for it” thing. [2] In Upromise, the FTC alleged the company hired a provider to build a browser toolbar and failed to verify that it was implemented consistently with the company’s policies and contract terms. [2] According to the FTC, the toolbar collected sensitive information, including financial account numbers, and transmitted it in clear text. [2]
Vendors across the other lessons
Service providers appear throughout the guide, as well as in lesson eight. In Superior Mortgage, it was the provider that decrypted and emailed data. [2] In foru International, the company gave sensitive data to providers developing applications. [2] In Dave & Buster’s, an intruder allegedly came in through a third party’s access. [2] In our reading, the guide treated vendor risk as a thread running through every other control.
Contract terms that match the lessons
The guide’s vendor lessons can be read against its other nine. In our reading, a contract that puts “appropriate security standards” in writing, as the guide advised, can name the specific controls the other lessons describe. [2] Those include encryption across the full data path, limits on administrative access, multi-factor authentication for remote access, a channel for vulnerability reports, timely patching and secure disposal at the end of the relationship.
Each of these has a test that can be written into the contract as evidence: a report, a configuration export, an attestation or a right to audit. In our reading, contract terms tied to evidence answer the guide’s point that security cannot be a matter of taking the vendor’s word for it. [2]
Assessing vendors by risk
The guide did not say how often to check vendors, or how deeply. It left both to the company’s judgment about the data involved. The 2021 rule required periodic assessment based on the risk each presents. [4] The rule’s comment summary recorded concerns that periodic assessment would be costly, and that smaller institutions would struggle to monitor larger service providers. [4] In our reading, the risk-based wording answers part of that concern. A small institution can focus its checks on the vendors that hold the most sensitive data.
What the vendor part asks of an organization
For a bank, health system or agency, vendor oversight already has its own rules and guidance. The guide added examples of how vendor failures looked in practice, as alleged. [2] In our reading, its two sub-lessons, contract and verify, describe the minimum of any vendor program: terms that state security requirements, and evidence that the vendor meets them.
The 2021 Safeguards Rule required covered institutions to oversee service providers by selecting capable ones, requiring safeguards by contract and periodically assessing them based on risk. [4] It also allowed the Qualified Individual to be employed by a service provider, with the institution retaining responsibility for compliance. [4]
How the guide reached different sectors
Nonbank financial institutions
For mortgage lenders, finance companies and other nonbank financial institutions under the FTC’s jurisdiction, the guide described the enforcer’s view of security before the 2021 rule existed. Several cases it cited involved financial firms: Superior Mortgage, Goal Financial, Premier Capital Lending and Settlement One. [2] The 2021 rule later expanded the definition of financial institution to include “finders” that bring together buyers and sellers. [4]
Banks and credit unions
The 2021 rule applies to financial institutions over which the FTC has jurisdiction. [4] Its comment summary recorded commenters who compared parts of it with guidelines issued through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, for example on encrypting data at rest. [4] In our reading, the guide still mattered to banks and credit unions in two ways. Their nonbank affiliates and vendors could fall under the FTC. And the guide’s cases described failures, such as weak vendor oversight and unencrypted transfers, that any institution could check itself against. In our reading, its value for banks was as a set of alleged failure modes, not as a rule.
Health systems and health data firms
Several cases the guide cited involved health information: GMR Transcription, Accretive, Rite Aid and CVS Caremark. [2] In our reading, the guide showed that the FTC’s security cases reached health data held by firms in the health sector. Transcription firms and pharmacies were among the firms named. [2] LabMD, a medical laboratory subject to HIPAA, later became the case in which an appeals court vacated an FTC order. [3]
Public agencies
The guide was written for businesses. [2] Its lessons still apply to the contractors that agencies use, and map onto controls agencies already have. In our reading, an agency’s use of the guide was as a vendor screening tool: a short list of failures to ask contractors about.
Vendors to regulated institutions
The guide’s widest reach may have been to companies that serve regulated institutions. A transcription firm, billing company, software developer or data processor may have no sector regulator of its own. The FTC’s cases described in the guide included firms of exactly these kinds, as alleged. [2] In our reading, a bank, health system or agency could use the guide as a short list of questions for such vendors, grounded in failures an enforcer had acted on.
Consumer report resellers and data firms
Two of the guide’s remote access cases concerned access to consumer reports. [2] In Premier Capital Lending and Settlement One, the alleged failures let unauthorized parties obtain consumer information through clients’ credentials or portals. [2] In our reading, these cases are relevant to any firm that resells or redistributes sensitive data. Its security includes the security of everyone it lets in.
Small and medium-sized businesses
The release said the conferences would be aimed at small and medium-sized businesses. [1] The 2021 rule later exempted financial institutions holding information on fewer than 5,000 consumers from certain requirements, including a written risk assessment, an incident response plan and annual board reporting. [4] In our reading, the FTC’s approach recognized that small firms needed simpler paths, in both its 2015 education and its 2021 rule.
Objections, and where the argument stops
“Settlements are not law”
The strongest objection is that the guide described allegations, not findings. The guide said so itself. [2] The Eleventh Circuit later vacated the FTC’s order against LabMD as unenforceable. [3] It held that the order did not enjoin a specific act or practice and instead mandated a complete overhaul of LabMD’s program. [3] It said the order contained no meaningful standard of what a “reasonably designed” program was. [3]
We accept the objection and build on it. The court said that the FTC may prescribe rules defining unfair practices “with specificity.” [3] The 2021 Safeguards Rule, for its covered institutions, stated specific controls. [4] In our reading, the path from the 2015 guide to the 2021 rule moved the standard from alleged facts to written requirements. Before that, a company could read the guide but could not treat it as a rule.
“The guide was too basic to matter”
A second objection is that its lessons were obvious. The guide itself said most of the alleged practices “involve basic, fundamental security missteps.” [2] That is why it repays reading. In our reading, the cases show organizations failing at basics, not at advanced defenses. A checklist of basics that an enforcer has acted on is useful precisely because the basics are where failures were alleged.
“The rule came from elsewhere”
A third objection is that the 2021 rule did not cite the guide. That is correct as far as we can see from the rule’s text. [4] We do not claim the guide caused the rule. We claim only that the controls the guide described in 2015 resemble controls the rule required in 2021. The rule also drew dissents from two Commissioners. [4]
“Lessons from 2015 are dated”
A fourth objection is that threats changed after 2015. They did. The guide itself said threats may transform over time while the fundamentals remain constant. [2] In our reading, the cases it described, such as unchecked vendors, unencrypted transfers, weak administrative passwords and unread logs, are failures of fundamentals. Organizations can still test themselves against each one.
“The cases were about consumer companies, not institutions”
A fifth objection is that the guide’s cases involved retailers, apps and device makers, so banks, health systems and agencies have little to learn. The guide’s list is broader than that. It included mortgage and lending firms, a company whose employee’s laptop held information on 23,000 patients, a transcription business and pharmacies, as alleged. [2] And the failures it described, such as reused passwords, unchecked vendor access and unencrypted transfers, are not specific to any industry. In our reading, the sector of the company matters less than the control that was alleged to be missing.
Where the argument stops
We do not assess any company named in the guide, and we name only companies whose cases the FTC settled, as the guide describes them. The guide describes them through the FTC’s allegations, in settlements without court findings. [2] We do not say what any sector’s regulator requires beyond the FTC rules cited. Organizations should take their own legal advice on which rules apply to them.
We also do not claim the guide was complete. It said its lessons distilled the facts of the cases, and it pointed readers to the FTC’s Business Center for an up-to-date listing of cases and other free resources. [2] A program built only from its ten lessons would leave out areas the cases did not reach. In our reading, the guide is best used as a floor, a list of failures an enforcer has acted on, beneath whatever framework an organization’s own regulator or board requires.
Checks for security leaders
These are our own suggestions, not requirements of the guide or any rule, except where a rule is cited.
On data
- Keep an inventory of sensitive data, where it lives and why it is kept.
- Check that encryption covers the full path, including after a provider receives the data.
- Set disposal dates and confirm devices and paper are destroyed or wiped.
On access
- Review who holds administrative rights and why.
- Require multi-factor authentication for access to systems holding sensitive data; covered institutions under the Safeguards Rule must, subject to its written-approval exception. [4]
- Assess the security of any client or vendor before granting remote access.
For boards and executives
- Ask which of the guide’s ten lessons management has tested in the past year, and with what evidence.
- Ask which vendors hold the most sensitive data and when each was last assessed.
On systems and vendors
- Confirm someone reviews logs and alerts, and that vulnerability reports have an owner.
- Test applications for well-known vulnerabilities before release.
- Write security requirements into vendor contracts and verify them with evidence, not assurances.
With hindsight
The FTC kept Start with Security online. As checked on November 16, 2026, the guide and the June 30, 2015 release remain on the FTC’s website. [1] [2]
In our reading, a 2018 decision showed the limits of the order-by-order approach the guide summarized. On June 6, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided LabMD, Inc. v. FTC. [3] The FTC had alleged that LabMD’s data security program was inadequate and an unfair practice, and the Commission had issued a cease and desist order. [3] The court assumed, without deciding, that LabMD’s alleged negligent failure to maintain a reasonable program was an unfair practice. [3] It then held the order unenforceable and vacated it. [3]
The court gave its reasons. It said the order contained no prohibitions and did not instruct LabMD to stop any specific act or practice. [3] It said the order required a data security program “reasonably designed” to the Commission’s satisfaction, without a meaningful standard for what that meant. [3] It noted that the FTC can act through rulemaking, prescribing rules that define unfair practices with specificity, as well as through case-by-case litigation. [3]
The FTC’s next major step on security standards was through rulemaking. On December 9, 2021, it published amendments to its Safeguards Rule, which applies to financial institutions over which it has jurisdiction under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. [4] The FTC said the amendments added provisions giving more guidance on specific aspects of an information security program, such as access controls, authentication and encryption. [4] They also required periodic reports to boards of directors or governing bodies. [4] The rule was issued with Commissioners Phillips and Wilson dissenting. [4]
The rule also exempted institutions holding information on fewer than 5,000 consumers from certain requirements, including its written risk assessment, incident response plan and board reporting. [4] It required a single “Qualified Individual” to oversee the program, who could be employed by a service provider, with the institution keeping responsibility. [4]
The rule took effect on January 10, 2022, but the provisions listed in its section 314.5 had a later applicability date. [4] On November 23, 2022, the FTC delayed that date from December 9, 2022 to June 9, 2023. [5] It cited a reported shortage of qualified personnel and supply chain issues that could delay equipment, made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic. [5]
The FTC amended the rule again on November 13, 2023. [6] It required financial institutions to report to the Commission any notification event in which unencrypted customer information involving 500 or more consumers is acquired without authorization. [6] The amendments took effect on May 13, 2024. [6]
What held up from 2015 is the content of the guide’s ten lessons. The rule’s requirements for access controls, encryption, multi-factor authentication, secure development, monitoring, disposal and service provider oversight track topics the guide had covered with case examples. [2] [4] What changed is their status. For covered institutions, they moved from lessons drawn from allegations to requirements written in a rule, after a court held one such order, which required a “reasonably designed” program without a meaningful standard, unenforceable. [3] [4]
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