GDPR’s 2018 start reached US health systems through what they did toward Europe, not whom they treated

When the GDPR began to apply on May 25, 2018, it reached US health organizations by four routes: three in Article 3 (an EU establishment, services directed at people in the Union, monitoring them there) and contracts. Patient nationality alone was not one of them.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

When the GDPR began to apply on May 25, 2018, it reached US health organizations by four routes: three in Article 3 (an EU establishment, services directed at people in the Union, monitoring them there) and contracts. Patient nationality alone was not one of them.

  1. The week On Friday, May 25, 2018, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation began to apply.
  2. Establishment: a stable arrangement in the Union Article 3(1) applied the regulation to processing in the context of the activities of an establishment in the Union.
  3. Offering services: activity directed at people in the Union Article 3(2)(a) applied to a controller or processor without a Union establishment where processing related to offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union.
  4. Monitoring: tracking behavior that takes place in the Union Article 3(2)(b) applied where processing related to monitoring the behavior of data subjects as far as their behavior took place within the Union.
  5. Contract: obligations that arrive through agreements The fourth route did not depend on Article 3 applying to the US organization.
  6. Why health data raised the stakes on every route Each route carried more weight for health organizations because of Article 9.
  7. What Article 3 did not do Article 3 did not make the regulation apply to every European’s data wherever held.
  8. Who in a US health system had to own the analysis The four routes ran through different parts of an organization, which is why no single function could answer the scope question alone.
  9. How the routes fell on different health organizations Large academic centers could have every route open.
  10. Objections to reading scope by conduct Four objections deserve a reply.
  11. What a health compliance leader could check The four routes translate into checks that remain useful for any data protection regime defined by conduct.
  12. With hindsight The board’s guidance on Article 3 arrived after the regulation began to apply.

The week

On Friday, May 25, 2018, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation began to apply. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 had been adopted on April 27, 2016, and its Article 99 set the date: “It shall apply from 25 May 2018.” The same day, the European Data Protection Board took over from the Article 29 Working Party, the body of national data protection authorities that had operated under the 1995 Data Protection Directive. In Endorsement 1/2018, dated May 25, 2018, the board recorded that the regulation “enters into application today” and that the directive was repealed with effect from the same day.

The endorsement adopted 16 documents the working party had prepared for the new regime. They covered consent, transparency, automated decision-making and profiling, personal data breach notification, data portability, data protection impact assessments, data protection officers, lead supervisory authorities, records of processing, binding corporate rules, adequacy and administrative fines. None addressed Article 3, the provision that decided whether the regulation applied to an organization outside the European Union.

Article 3 set out three bases of territorial scope. Under Article 3(1), the regulation applied to processing “in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union,” whether or not the processing took place there. Under Article 3(2), it applied to a controller or processor not established in the Union that processed personal data of data subjects “who are in the Union.” The processing had to relate to offering them goods or services, paid or not, or to monitoring their behavior as far as it took place within the Union. Article 3(3) covered places where member state law applied by virtue of public international law.

Several other articles mattered to health organizations. Article 4(15) defined “data concerning health” as personal data related to a person’s physical or mental health, including the provision of health care services, which reveal information about health status. Article 9(1) prohibited processing of “data concerning health” and other special categories unless an exception in Article 9(2) applied, such as explicit consent or the provision of health care under Union or member state law. Article 27 required a controller or processor covered by Article 3(2) to designate in writing a representative in the Union. It exempted processing that was occasional, did not include large-scale processing of special categories and was unlikely to result in a risk to individuals. Article 33 required a controller to notify a personal data breach to the supervisory authority “without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours” after becoming aware of it. The exception was a breach unlikely to result in a risk to individuals. Article 37 required a data protection officer where core activities consisted of large-scale processing of special categories.

In the United States, the HIPAA rules applied, under 45 CFR 160.102, to health plans, health care clearinghouses and providers that transmit health information electronically in covered transactions. Where provided, they also applied to business associates. Those rules turned on the kind of entity. Article 3 turned on where an organization was established and what it did toward people in the Union.

A US health system could easily frame its first question about the GDPR in May 2018 in terms of patients: did it treat Europeans. That framing was natural, because HIPAA had trained compliance teams to think about whose information they held and in what role. Article 3 asked something else. It did not ask whose data an organization held. It asked where the organization was established and what it did toward people while they were in the Union.

We read Article 3, and the contracts that follow from it, as four separate routes by which the regulation could reach a US health organization. They do not overlap, and between them they cover the ways a US hospital, physician network, health plan or life sciences company could find GDPR obligations on its desk:

  1. Establishment: an office, clinic, subsidiary or other stable arrangement in the Union, in whose context the processing took place.
  2. Offering services: activity directed at people in the Union, such as an international patient program that markets to them where they live.
  3. Monitoring: tracking the behavior of people while they are in the Union, including remote monitoring of their health status.
  4. Contract: receiving personal data from an organization that is itself subject to the regulation, as a processor or importer, so that obligations arrive by agreement even when Article 3 does not apply directly.

Our argument is that the routes were set by conduct, not by the nationality or residence of patients. A US hospital that treated a visiting European in Boston did not, on that fact alone, become subject to the regulation for that care. A US hospital that ran a second-opinion service marketed in German to patients in Germany might. The practical work in 2018 was to find the conduct, not to count the patients. After the four routes we look at how health data raised the stakes, what Article 3 did not do, and who had to own the analysis. We then turn to different health organizations, the objections, and what a compliance leader can check.

Establishment: a stable arrangement in the Union

Article 3(1) applied the regulation to processing in the context of the activities of an establishment in the Union. The text did not define establishment, and in May 2018 there was no board guidance on Article 3 to consult. Recital 22, which accompanied the article, described establishment as implying the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements, whatever their legal form.

For a US health organization, the obvious cases were clear. A health system that operated a clinic in Ireland, a research institute with a lab in Germany or a health plan with a European service center had an establishment. Processing in the context of those activities was within scope, even if the data sat on servers in the United States. The phrase “regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not” closed the obvious escape.

The harder cases sat at the edges. A US academic medical center might have a liaison office in a European city to support referrals and partnerships. A physician group might employ a single coordinator in Europe to arrange travel for patients. Whether such arrangements were establishments, and whether the processing was carried out in their context, depended on facts. In 2018, organizations had to judge with counsel, without the later board guidance.

Establishment could also arise through acquisition. A US health system that bought or invested in a European clinic, laboratory or digital health company acquired whatever establishment that business had. Due diligence for such a deal needed to ask how the target processed health data, under which legal bases and with which vendors. The buyer’s systems might soon process the same data in the target’s context.

What follows from an establishment

An organization with an establishment was a controller or processor in the Union for the relevant processing. The full regulation applied, including the need for a lawful basis under Article 6, an exception under Article 9 for health data, transparency to individuals, data subject rights and breach notification to the competent authority. The organization also had to decide which supervisory authority led on its cross-border processing, a question the endorsed working party guidelines on lead authorities addressed.

For a US group, the establishment route also raised a structuring question. Did the European entity’s processing stay in its own systems, or did it run through the US parent’s electronic health record, data warehouse or contact center. If the latter, the parent’s systems processed data in the context of a Union establishment. The answer shaped which systems needed GDPR controls as well as which legal entity.

Partners and affiliates that may not be establishments

US health systems also formed looser ties in Europe: clinical affiliations, branding agreements, education partnerships and referral relationships with European hospitals. A European hospital that used a US system’s name under license, or that referred patients to it, was a separate controller with its own obligations. Whether the US system had an establishment through that partner depended on whether the partner acted as the US system’s stable arrangement for its activities or simply as an independent organization with its own patients. The contract between them was the first place to look, and in our reading it should say which party controlled which data.

Records as the first deliverable

Article 30 required records of processing activities, and the board’s endorsement included a working party position paper on derogations from that duty. For an organization with a European establishment, the record was where the analysis became concrete. It listed the purposes, categories of data and recipients for each processing activity. A US health system that could not produce such a record for its European operations could not show where its GDPR scope began and ended.

Offering services: activity directed at people in the Union

Article 3(2)(a) applied to a controller or processor without a Union establishment where processing related to offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union. Payment did not matter. What mattered, in our reading of the text and its recital, was whether the organization directed its offer at people in the Union.

Recital 23 said that the mere accessibility of a website in the Union, an email address or other contact details was insufficient to show that intention. So was the use of a language generally used in the controller’s own country. It pointed instead to factors such as a language or currency generally used in one or more member states, with the possibility of ordering in that language. Mentioning customers or users in the Union was another. Those factors described marketing conduct.

For a US health organization, the clearest example of such conduct was an international patient program. Such programs might publish pages in European languages, list telephone numbers for European callers, partner with European insurers or referral agents, or describe services for patients traveling from particular countries. Each was, in our reading, evidence of an intention to offer services to people in the Union. A single English-language website that happened to be visible in Europe was not.

Article 3(2)(a) applied to processing “related to” the offer. In our reading, that drew a line inside the organization. Processing connected to the international program, such as inquiries, intake forms, scheduling, cost estimates and pre-travel record reviews, related to the offer. Processing of the same patient’s data after arrival, as part of ordinary care in the United States, raised a harder question. Did it still relate to an offer made to someone in the Union, or was it care given to someone in the United States. The text did not answer it, and organizations had to take a view with counsel.

The point for program design was to know where the line might fall. An international program whose intake data flowed into the main electronic health record, with no separate handling, made it hard to say which processing related to the offer. A program that kept intake, estimates and correspondence in a defined system could at least describe its scope.

Estimates, deposits and payment

International programs commonly involve money before care: cost estimates, deposits and payment arrangements. Quoting prices in euros or pounds, accepting payment from European insurers or describing payment options for patients in particular countries were, in our reading, the kinds of factors recital 23 described. The finance and patient access teams that handled those steps were part of the offer, and their systems processed data related to it. A scoping exercise that looked only at clinical systems would miss them.

Second opinions and telehealth

Remote services raised the clearest case. A US hospital offering written second opinions or video consultations to patients who remained in Europe was offering services to data subjects in the Union, and the entire service took place while they were there. In our reading, such a service fell squarely within Article 3(2)(a) if it was directed at people in the Union. It could also bring the representative requirement in Article 27 into play, because that article’s exemption covered only processing that was occasional, did not include large-scale processing of special categories such as health data, and was unlikely to result in a risk.

Monitoring: tracking behavior that takes place in the Union

Article 3(2)(b) applied where processing related to monitoring the behavior of data subjects as far as their behavior took place within the Union. Recital 24 linked monitoring to tracking natural persons on the internet, including the potential subsequent use of profiling techniques to make decisions about them or analyze or predict their preferences, behaviors and attitudes.

Two kinds of health activity fit this route. The first was web tracking. A US health system whose website used analytics or advertising tools that tracked visitors, including visitors in the Union, and built profiles of them, was arguably monitoring behavior there. The second was remote patient monitoring. A device or app that reported a patient’s vital signs, glucose readings or activity to a US provider after the patient returned home to Europe was monitoring that patient’s health while in the Union.

Remote monitoring after discharge

The second case is the one with clinical stakes. A US cardiology program might implant a device in a European patient and follow the patient remotely after the patient flew home. A transplant program might monitor medication adherence through an app. Each data point the program received after the patient’s return described behavior or health status in the Union. In our reading, Article 3(2)(b) was written for continuing observation of that kind, whatever the clinical motive.

The consequence was also operational. Remote monitoring programs depend on vendors: device makers, app developers, data platforms. If the monitoring brought the program within the regulation, its vendors’ processing on its behalf did too, and the contracts needed the terms Article 28 required. A program designed under HIPAA business associate agreements alone might lack them.

Portals and messages after return

A patient who returned to Europe after treatment might keep using the US provider’s patient portal, receive follow-up messages and send questions to clinicians. Each exchange took place while the patient was in the Union. Portal access logs and messaging could amount to tracking in some designs, and follow-up care offered remotely could amount to offering services. In our reading, the organization had to decide on purpose where an episode of care in the United States ended and a continuing relationship with someone in Europe began. It also had to record that decision.

Research apps and remote studies

Research added a variant of the monitoring route. A US sponsor or academic center running a study through a smartphone app or wearable could enroll participants who lived in Europe, or follow participants who moved there. Each reading the app transmitted described the participant’s health or behavior while in the Union. Unlike a site-based trial, where European hospitals collected the data, an app-based study could put the US organization in direct contact with participants. In our reading, that made the monitoring route, and possibly the offering route, more likely to apply directly to the US party.

Web tracking on health sites

Web tracking deserves its own caution. A health system’s marketing team might add tracking tools to its site without considering visitors abroad. If the site offered content directed at Europeans, or if tracking built profiles of visitors that the organization used, the monitoring route could apply to visitors in the Union. Health information inferred from browsing, such as pages viewed on specific conditions, would then be special category data. The safest design, in our reading, was to know which tags ran on which pages and what each collected, wherever the visitor was.

Contract: obligations that arrive through agreements

The fourth route did not depend on Article 3 applying to the US organization. It depended on Article 3 applying to someone else. A European hospital, insurer or research sponsor subject to the regulation could send personal data to a US organization. The European party then had duties about that disclosure, and it would pass them on by contract.

Two kinds of contract followed. Where the US organization processed data on the European party’s behalf, as a processor, Article 28 required a contract with specified terms. They included processing only on documented instructions, confidentiality, security and sub-processors only with authorization. Assistance with data subject rights, deletion or return at the end, and audit rights completed the list. Where the data left the European Economic Area, the European party also needed a basis for the transfer under Chapter V. In 2018 that meant tools such as standard contractual clauses or, for participating companies, the EU-US Privacy Shield.

Research and clinical trials

For academic medical centers and life sciences companies, the contract route was the familiar one. A multinational clinical trial might have European sites that collected data from participants and sent pseudonymized data to a US sponsor or coordinating center. A research consortium might share registry data across the Atlantic. In each case, a European party’s obligations reached the US organization through data sharing agreements, transfer clauses and research protocols.

Whether pseudonymized data remained personal data was a point the regulation addressed directly. Recital 26 said pseudonymized data that could be attributed to a person by using additional information should be considered information on an identifiable person. A US sponsor holding key-coded trial data was, in our reading, holding personal data under the regulation, even if HIPAA treated the same data differently.

Vendors serving European clients

The contract route also reached US companies that served European health organizations: software vendors, transcription services, revenue cycle firms and cloud platforms. Their European clients were controllers. The vendors were processors and, if they received data in the United States, importers. Their obligations came from their contracts, and from Article 3 too if they offered services to the Union or had an establishment there.

Business associate agreements are not processor contracts

US health organizations already had a contract model for vendors: the HIPAA business associate agreement. An organization could assume a business associate agreement would double as an Article 28 contract. The two overlapped in purpose and differed in content. In our reading, Article 28 required terms that HIPAA’s business associate rules did not, such as processing only on documented instructions, including for transfers. Controller authorization for sub-processors and assistance with data protection impact assessments were others.

The reverse also applied. A US organization acting as a processor for a European hospital would sign that hospital’s Article 28 terms, which could differ from its own standard business associate language. The organization needed to know which of its contracts carried which obligations, and its vendor management and security teams needed to apply the stricter set where both applied.

Transfers and their limits in 2018

Transfer tools governed how data could leave Europe, not whether the US recipient was within Article 3. A US organization receiving data under standard contractual clauses took on contractual commitments to the European exporter. Those commitments could include cooperation with European authorities and assistance with individuals’ rights. In our reading, individuals could also rely on some of them, depending on the clauses. For a US hospital or research center, the clauses were a set of promises it had to be able to keep with its existing systems and staff.

Why health data raised the stakes on every route

Each route carried more weight for health organizations because of Article 9. Data concerning health was a special category whose processing was prohibited unless an exception applied. The exceptions included explicit consent and vital interests where consent could not be given. Another covered processing necessary for preventive or occupational medicine, medical diagnosis, health or social care or treatment, or managing health systems. It required a basis in Union or member state law or a contract with a health professional. Public health and scientific research had their own conditions.

Those exceptions were written for European health systems operating under European law. A US hospital relying on them needed to show which applied. For a second-opinion service, explicit consent was the obvious candidate. For remote monitoring, consent or a contract with a health professional might fit. Each choice had consequences for withdrawal, documentation and the information the patient had to receive.

Article 9 also changed the representative and officer duties. Article 27’s exemption from appointing a representative did not apply to processing that included large-scale processing of special categories. Article 37 required a data protection officer where core activities consisted of large-scale processing of special categories. In our reading, a US organization within Article 3(2) whose core activity was a large international patient program could need both. “Large scale” was undefined, and the endorsed guidance on officers offered factors rather than numbers.

Rights requests from people in Europe

An organization within scope also had to answer individuals’ rights requests under the regulation’s terms. Article 15 gave a right of access, Article 17 a right to erasure in defined circumstances and Article 20 a right to data portability. HIPAA also gave patients a right of access, with its own rules. A request from a former international patient could therefore arrive under both regimes, with different scope, deadlines and exceptions.

Erasure raised the sharpest conflict. Medical record retention rules in US states could require a hospital to keep records that a European patient asked it to delete. The regulation’s erasure right had exceptions, including where processing was necessary for compliance with a legal obligation. Whether a US state retention law counted for that purpose was a question for counsel. The practical step was to route such requests to someone who could make that call, rather than to a medical records clerk applying only the HIPAA process.

Breach notification on two clocks

Health organizations also faced two breach regimes. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule set its own timelines for notifying individuals and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Article 33 required notification to the supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of awareness, unless the breach was unlikely to result in a risk. Article 34 required notice to individuals where the breach was likely to result in a high risk. An incident affecting both US patients and data within GDPR scope would run both clocks at once. The board endorsed the working party’s breach notification guidelines on May 25, 2018, so that guidance was available from the first day.

What Article 3 did not do

Article 3 did not make the regulation apply to every European’s data wherever held. Article 3(2) referred to data subjects “who are in the Union,” and to offering services to them or monitoring their behavior there. A European tourist treated in a US emergency department was not, at that moment, in the Union, and the hospital had not offered its emergency services to people in the Union. In our reading, that care was outside Article 3. The patient’s nationality did not change the analysis.

Article 3 also did not turn a US organization into a European one for every purpose. It applied to the processing that met its tests. A health system with a European international program could have GDPR obligations for that program and none for its domestic operations, if it kept the two apart. The scope was activity-based, which meant it could be drawn narrowly by design or widely by accident.

Finally, Article 3 did not displace HIPAA. A US covered entity within GDPR scope for some processing remained subject to HIPAA for its protected health information. The two regimes overlapped without merging. Their definitions, legal bases, rights and breach rules differed, so a single policy written for one did not satisfy the other.

Staff and students traveling in Europe

A US health organization’s own people also travel. Clinicians attend conferences, researchers visit partner sites and students rotate abroad. The organization processes their data while they are in Europe for payroll, travel and supervision. In our reading, that processing did not by itself amount to offering services to people in the Union. The board later took the same view in its territorial guidelines, in an example about a US company reimbursing employees on business trips to France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The employment relationship was not an offer of services to those individuals.

Who in a US health system had to own the analysis

The four routes ran through different parts of an organization, which is why no single function could answer the scope question alone. Establishment questions sat with legal and corporate development, who knew where the organization had entities, offices and staff. Offering questions sat with the international patient program, marketing and patient financial services. Monitoring questions sat with digital health, clinical programs and the web team. Contract questions sat with research administration, procurement and the office that signed data use agreements.

The HIPAA privacy officer was the natural coordinator, because the role already covered patient information. But the HIPAA role was defined by a different statute, and its usual tools, such as notices of privacy practices and business associate agreements, did not map onto the GDPR’s requirements. A privacy officer leading the GDPR analysis needed input from each of the functions above and authority to require it.

The analysis also needed a decision maker. Some routes could be closed by design: an international program could stop marketing in European languages, or a remote monitoring program could decline patients who would return to Europe. Others could only be managed. Choosing between those options was a business decision with clinical and reputational effects, and in our reading it belonged with executive leadership, informed by counsel.

How the routes fell on different health organizations

Academic medical centers

Large academic centers could have every route open. They might run international patient programs, conduct multinational trials, operate overseas affiliates and publish websites with global audiences. Each route needed its own analysis, and the organization needed one owner who could see all of them. The research route was likely familiar ground, because European sites had processed trial data under the 1995 directive before the regulation replaced it.

Community hospitals and physician groups

For a community hospital without international programs, Article 3 was unlikely to apply through the first three routes. The questions were narrower: whether its website tracking reached Europe in a way that amounted to monitoring, and whether any vendor or research partner sent it data under GDPR contracts. Such an organization could document a short analysis and move on. The work was to write down why the regulation did not apply, with dates and owners, so that a later program change triggered a fresh look.

Health plans

US health plans covering members who live or work in Europe, such as expatriate plans, faced the offering route directly if they marketed coverage to people in the Union. Their claims processing for members abroad would then relate to that offer. Plans with European affiliates faced the establishment route. Their vendor chains, from claims processors to pharmacy benefit managers, carried obligations by contract.

Life sciences and digital health companies

Pharmaceutical and device companies could face all four routes at once: European subsidiaries, apps offered to European patients, remote device monitoring and clinical trial data flows. Digital health startups with apps available in European app stores and marketed there could face the offering and monitoring routes from launch. For them, the regulation was not an extension of an existing program. It was a design requirement for the product.

Specialty labs and genetic testing

Laboratories that accepted specimens from abroad faced a specific version of the offering route. A US lab that marketed genetic or specialty testing to clinicians or consumers in Europe, shipped collection kits there and returned results to people there was, in our reading, offering services to people in the Union. Genetic data was itself a special category under Article 9(1). For such labs, the regulation was a condition of the international business line, and the scope analysis belonged in the line’s launch plan.

Objections to reading scope by conduct

Four objections deserve a reply.

The first is that enforcement against a US hospital was unlikely, so the analysis was academic. We take no view on enforcement likelihood, and we do not think the analysis depended on it. A European partner, insurer or research sponsor would ask the question in contract negotiations. A patient could exercise rights. And a US organization that told the public it complied with the regulation needed to know what that meant.

The second is that the conduct test was too uncertain to plan around. Recital 23’s factors were indicative, not a checklist, and in May 2018 there was no board guidance on Article 3. That was true. But uncertainty about the edges did not make the center uncertain. A remote second-opinion service marketed to Europeans in their languages was, in our reading, within the text. An organization could start with the clear cases and document its view of the unclear ones.

The third is that HIPAA compliance should be enough, since HIPAA is a serious regime. HIPAA is serious, but it is different. It allows uses for treatment, payment and health care operations without patient authorization. The GDPR required a lawful basis and an Article 9 exception for each processing purpose, plus rights HIPAA did not grant in the same form, such as erasure in some circumstances. An organization within GDPR scope that relied on HIPAA alone would have gaps.

A fourth objection is that patients who seek care abroad accept the destination’s rules. The regulation did not frame scope around patient choice, however. It framed it around the organization’s conduct toward people in the Union. A patient’s willingness to travel did not change whether a hospital had marketed to them where they lived or monitored them after they went home. Consent could matter as an Article 9 exception for particular processing. It did not decide whether the regulation applied.

What a health compliance leader could check

The four routes translate into checks that remain useful for any data protection regime defined by conduct.

  • List every presence the organization has in the Union, from subsidiaries and clinics to single employees and liaison offices, and record whether processing occurs in their context.
  • Inventory international patient, second-opinion and telehealth programs, noting for each whether it is directed at people in the Union and which systems hold its data.
  • Identify every remote monitoring program and web tracking tool that may collect data from people in the Union, and the vendors that process it.
  • Collect every contract under which the organization receives personal data from a European party, and confirm its processor, transfer and research terms.
  • Map the breach notification duties that would apply if an incident touched any of these routes, with the owner and the deadline for each.

Each check produces a record: a list, an inventory, a contract register or a notification map. Together they show where the regulation reaches the organization and where it does not, which is what a regulator, partner or board will ask.

With hindsight

The board’s guidance on Article 3 arrived after the regulation began to apply. On November 16, 2018, the European Data Protection Board adopted Guidelines 3/2018 on territorial scope for public consultation, and on November 12, 2019, it adopted the final version. The final guidelines listed factors that could indicate an intention to offer goods or services in the Union. They included designating the Union or a member state by name and paying search engines to reach consumers in the Union. Others were dedicated addresses or phone numbers for Union callers and travel instructions from member states. They also included using a language or currency of a member state.

The guidelines addressed the points this article treated as open in 2018. They said that “the fact of processing personal data of an individual in the Union alone is not sufficient” to trigger the regulation for a controller not established there; targeting must also be present. Their list of monitoring activities included “Monitoring or regular reporting on an individual’s health status.” Example 25 described a pharmaceutical company outside the Union, subject to Article 3(2), sponsoring clinical trials at hospitals in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The board said it had to designate a representative in one of those member states. On establishment, the board said the presence of a single employee or agent could be sufficient in some circumstances, if that person acted with a sufficient degree of stability.

On February 14, 2023, the board adopted the final version of Guidelines 05/2021 on the interplay between Article 3 and the transfer rules in Chapter V. It set three cumulative criteria for a transfer: an exporter subject to the regulation, disclosure to another controller or processor, and an importer in a third country. Its Example 1 said that when a third-country company targeting the EU collects data directly from a person in the Union, that is not a transfer, but the company must still apply the regulation. In our reading, for a US hospital’s international program that meant direct intake fell under Article 3, while data received from a European hospital fell under Chapter V as well.

On July 10, 2023, the European Commission adopted an adequacy decision for the EU-US Data Privacy Framework. The Commission said personal data could flow from the EU to US companies participating in the framework without additional safeguards. That helped the contract route for US organizations that participated. It did not change Article 3. A US organization directly within the regulation’s scope still had to comply with it, adequacy or not.

The territorial guidelines also included a mirror image of the visiting patient. Example 10 described a US citizen traveling in Europe who used a news app offered by a US company and directed exclusively at the US market. The board said the collection of that tourist’s data by the US company was not subject to the regulation. Presence in the Union without targeting was not enough, in either direction.

In our reading, the board’s guidance confirmed the conduct-based reading more than it changed it. The routes we described remained the routes. What changed was how much detail an organization could cite when it drew the lines around its own programs.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.

  • GDPR
  • territorial scope
  • health data
  • HIPAA
  • international patients
  • remote monitoring