OCR’s 2016 cloud guidance called key-less cloud storage a business associate job and left proof to contracts
OCR’s cloud computing guidance, last reviewed October 6, 2016, said a provider storing encrypted health data without the key is still a business associate. It said the rules required no audit right, so evidence of the provider’s controls depended on what customers negotiated.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
OCR’s cloud computing guidance, last reviewed October 6, 2016, said a provider storing encrypted health data without the key is still a business associate. It said the rules required no audit right, so evidence of the provider’s controls depended on what customers negotiated.
- The week Its core statement came in the introduction.
- Status: a business associate without the key The guidance answered its second question directly.
- Allocation: who does what in a shared system A cloud service splits control.
- Evidence: what a customer may see The guidance asked whether the rules require a provider to give documentation of its security practices, or allow customers to audit them.
- Location and exit: where the data goes and how it leaves Question nine asked whether a covered entity may use a provider that stores data on servers outside the United States.
- How the guidance reached different organizations A health system was a covered entity with a large set of cloud services, some bought centrally and some by departments.
- Objections, in order The strongest case for providers was that unreadable data cannot be misused.
- What a health organization could check today The first check is the one OHSU’s case points to.
- With hindsight The guidance has stayed in place.
The week
An Internet Archive copy captured on October 13, 2016 shows that the HHS Office for Civil Rights had on its website a page titled Guidance on HIPAA & Cloud Computing, last reviewed on October 6, 2016. [1]
The guidance said it was meant to help covered entities, business associates and cloud service providers understand their HIPAA obligations. [1] It focused on cloud resources offered by a provider that is legally separate from the organization considering its services. [1] It pointed readers to NIST Special Publication 800-145 for the types of cloud service. [1]
Its core statement came in the introduction. When a covered entity engages a cloud service provider to create, receive, maintain or transmit electronic protected health information on its behalf, the provider is a business associate. [1] The same is true when a business associate subcontracts with a cloud provider. [1]
The guidance then added its central point. A provider is a business associate even if it processes or stores only encrypted data and lacks an encryption key. [1] It said lacking a key does not exempt a provider from business associate status and obligations. [1]
The page set out eleven questions and answers. They covered whether a covered entity may use the cloud at all, encrypted storage without a key, the conduit exception and endorsements. [1] They also covered use without an agreement, incident reporting, mobile access, retention after the contract ends, storage outside the United States, audit rights and de-identified data. [1]
The answers drew on rules already in force. The 2013 omnibus rule had made business associates directly liable for compliance with certain HIPAA requirements. [2] It had also extended business associate status to subcontractors that handle protected health information for another business associate. [2] That rule took effect on March 26, 2013, with compliance required by September 23, 2013. [2]
The 2013 rule had already addressed storage. It said an entity that maintains protected health information for a covered entity is a business associate and not a conduit, even if it does not actually view the information. [2] The 2016 guidance cited that passage when it treated no-view storage. [1]
The guidance also cited an enforcement case. It said OCR had entered into a resolution agreement with a covered entity that stored the data of over 3,000 individuals on a cloud-based server without an agreement. [1] That case was Oregon Health & Science University. HHS announced it on July 18, 2016, with a settlement payment of $2,700,000 and a three-year corrective action plan. [3]
The OHSU release described findings that went beyond the cloud server. It said OHSU had performed risk analyses in several years, but OCR found they did not cover all of the enterprise’s electronic protected health information. [3] It also said OCR found significant risk of harm to 1,361 of the individuals on the cloud server, given the sensitive nature of their diagnoses. [3]
The guidance did not name any provider. In answer to a question about which providers offer HIPAA-compliant services, it said OCR does not endorse, certify or recommend specific technology or products. [1]
OCR’s cloud guidance of October 2016 answered a status question in writing. A provider that stores encrypted health data without the key is a business associate. [1] It did less to settle a second question: how a customer would know that the provider’s controls worked. [1]
Our argument is that the guidance made the provider’s legal status fixed and left the evidence of its security to negotiation. That split shaped what health organizations had to do, and it is the gap a 2025 proposal sought to close. [1] [5] We take the guidance in four parts:
- Status: who counts as a business associate when the provider cannot read the data.
- Allocation: how duties divide between a provider and its customer when each controls part of the system.
- Evidence: what a customer may demand to see, and what the rules did not require the provider to give.
- Location and exit: where the data may be held, and what happens when the contract ends.
The four parts do not overlap. The first is about who is regulated, the second about who does what, the third about proof and the fourth about place and time. After them we look at how the guidance reached different kinds of organizations, take the objections in order, and end with what a health organization could check today.
This is a reading of public documents, not legal advice. Covered entities and business associates should confirm their obligations with counsel.
Status: a business associate without the key
What the guidance decided
The guidance answered its second question directly. A provider that stores only encrypted data and has no decryption key is a business associate, because it receives and maintains the data for a covered entity or another business associate. [1] An entity that maintains the data is a business associate even if it cannot view it. [1]
The guidance gave this arrangement a name for its own use. It called it no-view services. [1] The name mattered, because it told readers that the arrangement was recognized and regulated, not excluded.
Why encryption did not change the answer
OCR explained why encryption alone could not carry the provider outside the rules. Encryption reduces the risk of unauthorized viewing, but it does not protect integrity or availability. [1] It does not stop data being corrupted by malware. It does not keep data available during an emergency. [1]
The guidance also said encryption does not address administrative safeguards, such as risk analysis, or physical safeguards for the servers that hold the data. [1] The Security Rule covers all three: confidentiality, integrity and availability. A provider holding unreadable data can still lose it, corrupt it or make it unreachable.
In our reading, this is the center of the guidance. The rules protect the data as an asset that must stay accurate and reachable, rather than as a secret alone. A provider that holds the asset has duties toward it whether or not it can read it.
The conduit question
The guidance asked whether a cloud provider could be considered a conduit, like the postal service. Its answer was that, generally, it is not. [1] The conduit exception, it said, is limited to transmission-only services, including temporary storage incident to transmission. [1]
That reading came from the 2013 rule. There, HHS called the conduit exception a narrow one, meant to exclude entities providing courier services. [2] It said the exception is limited to transmission services, digital or hard copy, including temporary storage incident to the transmission. [2]
The guidance drew the line on persistence. A conduit’s access is transient. A provider that stores data for the purpose of storing it has more persistent access, and is a business associate. [1] If a provider both transmits and stores data for a customer, it is a business associate for the transmission as well. [1]
When the provider does not know
The guidance addressed a provider that does not know it holds health data. It recognized that a provider may lack actual or constructive knowledge that a customer is using it for protected health information. [1]
For that case, it pointed to the affirmative defense in 45 CFR 160.410. The defense applies where the provider corrects the non-compliance within 30 days, or a longer period OCR finds appropriate, of when it knew or should have known. [1] It does not apply where the provider was unaware because of its own willful neglect. [1]
Once a provider learns it holds the data, the guidance gave it a choice. It must come into compliance, or securely return the data, or securely destroy it if the customer agrees. [1] After return or destruction it is no longer a business associate. OCR recommended that providers document those actions. [1]
Where the line stops
The guidance set one clear outer limit. A provider that receives and maintains only information de-identified under the Privacy Rule is not a business associate. [1] De-identified information is not protected health information, and the Security Rule does not require safeguards for it. [1]
That gives a health organization two different routes out of business associate obligations for a given dataset. It can de-identify the data to the Privacy Rule standard, or use a service that only transmits. Encryption without the key is not a third route. [1]
The customer’s side of the status question
The status ruling also fixed the customer’s obligation. The guidance said a covered entity that uses a provider to maintain electronic protected health information without a business associate agreement is in violation of the HIPAA Rules. [1] It cited 45 CFR 164.308(b)(1) and 164.502(e). [1]
It then cited the OHSU settlement as an example of OCR acting on that violation. [1] [3] The point for customers was concrete. A team that put data in a cloud service without an agreement had created a compliance failure on the customer’s side, whatever the provider’s view of its own role.
The guidance also said a provider that meets the definition must comply with the applicable rules whether or not it has signed an agreement. [1] Both sides, then, carried obligations that did not depend on the paper. The paper was itself a requirement for the customer.
Chains of subcontractors
The status analysis did not stop at the first provider. The 2013 rule adopted HHS’s proposal that downstream entities handling protected health information for a business associate comply in the same manner as the primary business associate. [2] The guidance applied that to cloud providers used by business associates. [1]
A chain could therefore run from a hospital to a billing vendor, from the vendor to a software platform, and from the platform to an infrastructure provider. Each link that creates, receives, maintains or transmits the data is a business associate of the link above it. [1] [2]
The covered entity signs only the first agreement. It depends on each later link to sign the next one. The 2013 rule made each business associate responsible for its own subcontractor agreements. [2] OCR’s later fact sheet listed failure to enter into such agreements among the grounds of direct liability. [4]
Allocation: who does what in a shared system
The shared-control problem
A cloud service splits control. The customer may control who logs in to an application. The provider controls the hardware, the hypervisor or the storage layer. The Security Rule was written as a set of standards for each regulated entity. [1]
The guidance addressed that split for no-view services. Where only the customer controls who can view the data, some Security Rule requirements may be met for both parties through the actions of one party. [1]
The example OCR gave
OCR used access control as its example. Authentication or unique user identification may be the customer’s responsibility, while encryption may be the provider’s. [1] Which party implements which control may depend on each party’s risk management plan and the agreement. [1]
If the customer implements reasonable and appropriate authentication and agrees that the provider need not add its own, those access control duties would be met for both parties by the customer’s action. [1] That is a significant statement. It treats one control as satisfying two entities’ obligations, so long as the division is agreed.
What stayed with the provider
The guidance did not let the provider hand everything to the customer. Even where the customer authenticates users, the provider may still need internal controls over its own administrative tools. [1] Those tools manage storage, memory, network interfaces and processors. [1]
OCR told providers to consider, in their risk analysis, the risk of a malicious actor gaining access to those tools. [1] It also told them to consider the risk of unpatched or obsolete administrative tools. [1] In our reading, this put the platform layer, which the customer never sees, inside the provider’s own risk analysis.
Writing it down
The guidance asked both parties to confirm in writing how each would address the Security Rule requirements. [1] That could be in the business associate agreement or in other documents. [1]
It then said how OCR would treat a failure. Where the agreement gives the customer control of certain security features and the customer fails to implement them, OCR will consider that factor important and relevant in any investigation. [1] A provider is not responsible for failures attributable solely to the customer, based on the facts of the case. [1]
Why the allocation mattered in an investigation
This passage turned the agreement into evidence. After an incident, the question of which party owned a failed control would be answered first by the written division. [1] An agreement silent on the division would leave that question to reconstruction.
A health system’s security team could read the passage as a design instruction. Each control in a cloud service needs a named owner, recorded before an incident. Controls that both parties assume the other runs are the ones that fail without anyone noticing.
A hypothetical division, written out
A hypothetical regional health system moving its imaging archive to a storage service shows how the division might read. The system keeps the encryption keys and runs user authentication through its own directory. The provider stores the encrypted objects and runs the storage platform.
Under the guidance, the access control duties for viewing the images could be met by the system’s authentication, if the agreement says so. [1] The provider would still owe controls over its administrative tools and its own risk analysis. [1] Backup, availability and return of data would sit in the service level terms. [1]
Written out, the division would name each control, its owner and the evidence the owner keeps. A row with no owner is the finding. The guidance asked for that written confirmation, though not in that format. [1]
Privacy duties in a no-view service
The allocation also reached the Privacy Rule. A no-view provider may not control who views the data, but it must still use and disclose the encrypted information only as its agreement and the Privacy Rule permit. [1] OCR gave an example: the provider may not impermissibly use the data by blocking or terminating the customer’s access. [1]
The agreement must also require the business associate to make information available so the covered entity can meet individuals’ rights of access, amendment and accounting. [1] For a no-view provider, the guidance suggested the agreement say how. A provider might make the data available for amendments while only the customer makes them. [1]
Breach duties in a no-view service
Breach notification followed the same logic. A no-view provider must notify its customer of breaches of unsecured protected health information. [1] If the breached data is encrypted to the HHS standard, the incident falls within the breach safe harbor and the provider need not report it as a breach. [1]
If the data was encrypted below that standard, or the key was also compromised, the provider must report the incident as a breach unless an exception applies. [1] The encryption standard, in that sense, sets the line between a reportable breach and an unreportable one. The key’s custody decides whether the line holds.
Evidence: what a customer may see
The answer to question ten
The guidance asked whether the rules require a provider to give documentation of its security practices, or allow customers to audit them. Its answer was no. [1] The rules require customers to obtain satisfactory assurances, in the form of a business associate agreement, that the provider will safeguard the data. [1]
The guidance added that customers may require additional assurances through the agreement, a service level agreement or other documents. [1] Those could include documentation of safeguards or audits, based on the customer’s own risk analysis. [1]
What that answer left open
The answer placed a legal floor and left everything above it to contract. A covered entity could satisfy the rule with a signed promise. Whether it could see evidence behind the promise depended on its bargaining power and on the provider’s standard terms.
That mattered because the customer still owed its own risk analysis. The guidance said a customer should understand the provider’s environment so it can conduct its own risk analysis and risk management. [1] A risk analysis built on a promise, without evidence, is weaker than one built on tested controls.
The service level agreement as a second contract
The guidance named the service level agreement as a place to address HIPAA concerns. [1] It listed five examples: availability and reliability, backup and recovery, return of data after termination, security responsibility, and limits on use, retention and disclosure. [1]
It tied backup and recovery to ransomware. The service level agreement could address back-up and data recovery as necessary to respond to a ransomware attack or other emergency. [1] In our reading, that placed recovery from ransomware inside a commercial negotiation.
The guidance also warned that the service level agreement must be consistent with the business associate agreement and the rules. [1] Its example was access. The terms must not prevent the customer from accessing its data, in violation of the cited rule sections. [1]
Incident reports by agreement
The evidence question returned in question six. A provider that experiences a security incident must report it to its customer. [1] The Security Rule requires the business associate agreement to require that. [1]
The Security Rule, the guidance said, does not prescribe the level of detail, frequency or format of incident reports. [1] The parties could set those terms, with different levels of detail based on the threat and risk. [1] The agreement could also specify responses to certain incidents and whether patterns of attempted incidents should be reported. [1]
In our reading, this answer made incident evidence another negotiated item. A customer that signed a provider’s standard agreement accepted whatever reporting detail it offered. A customer that negotiated could ask for more. Breach reports, by contrast, kept the content and timing the Breach Notification Rule sets. [1]
Mobile access and the device in the middle
Question seven extended the same structure to devices. Health care providers, other covered entities and business associates may use mobile devices to reach data in a cloud, with appropriate safeguards on the device and in the cloud. [1] Agreements must be in place with any third party providers for the device or the cloud that will have access to the data. [1]
The rules, the guidance said, do not endorse or require specific technology. They require risk analysis and reasonable and appropriate safeguards. [1] That left the evidence for a mobile-to-cloud path in the customer’s own risk analysis, supported by what each provider agreed to disclose.
What a customer could ask for
A health system reading question ten could build a list of what to ask for in the agreement and related documents. The guidance itself named documentation of safeguards and audits as examples. [1] Other items follow from the guidance’s own concerns.
- A written division of each Security Rule control between the parties, as the guidance asked. [1]
- A description of how the provider controls its administrative tools, the risk the guidance named. [1]
- Recovery terms that match the customer’s own contingency plan, including after ransomware. [1]
- Incident reporting detail and timing above the rule’s floor, which the guidance said the parties could set. [1]
- Terms that keep the customer’s access to its data, which the guidance said the agreement must not block. [1]
These are contract choices, not rule requirements. The third part turns on that difference. The guidance made the provider’s status a matter of law and its proof a matter of bargaining. [1]
Who had the bargaining power
Bargaining power was not evenly spread. A large health system could negotiate terms with a provider. A small practice signing a provider’s standard terms would, we expect, have had little room to. The guidance applied the same rules to both. [1]
The result, in our reading, was that the depth of evidence a customer held about its provider tracked its size more than its risk. A small ambulatory practice with sensitive data could hold less evidence than a large system with routine data. The rules did not adjust for that.
Location and exit: where the data goes and how it leaves
Storage outside the United States
Question nine asked whether a covered entity may use a provider that stores data on servers outside the United States. The answer was yes, with a business associate agreement and compliance with the rules. [1]
The guidance noted that the rules contain no requirements specific to data held outside the United States. [1] It said the risks may vary greatly by location, and that overseas storage may increase risks or raise questions of enforceability. [1]
It gave an example. If data is kept in a country with documented increased attempts at hacking or malware, those risks should be considered and addressed with reasonable and appropriate safeguards. [1]
What location meant for the risk analysis
Location became an input to the risk analysis, not a prohibition. The guidance named the Security Rule’s risk analysis and risk management provisions as the place to weigh it. [1]
That left a health organization to find out where its provider held its data, including backups and disaster recovery copies. A provider’s standard documents might not say. The guidance gave no list of acceptable countries, and it did not require disclosure of location. [1]
Retention after the contract ends
Question eight asked whether a provider must keep data after its service ends. The answer was no, generally. [1] The Privacy Rule requires the business associate agreement to require the provider to return or destroy all protected health information at termination, where feasible. [1]
If return or destruction is not feasible, the agreement must extend its protections to the data and limit further uses to the reasons that made return infeasible. [1] The guidance gave an example: other law requiring the provider to retain the data. [1]
Access during the relationship
The exit question connects to access during the relationship. The guidance said the agreement and service level terms must not prevent the customer from accessing its data. [1] It also said a no-view provider may not impermissibly block or terminate the customer’s access. [1]
That speaks to a commercial dispute. A provider in a billing disagreement may be tempted to suspend service. The guidance cited an OCR FAQ on business associates blocking or terminating access. [1] In our reading, the guidance put that tactic outside what a business associate may do with the data.
Planning the exit at the start
The exit terms were the ones a customer could least fix later. Return or destruction at termination, the format of returned data, and the timing of deletion all needed to be in the agreement before the data moved. [1]
A health system that adopted a cloud service in 2016 without exit terms would, we expect, face its hardest negotiation at the point it wanted to leave. The guidance made return or destruction a required term, but it did not set format, timing or cost. [1]
Copies that are easy to miss
The location question reaches copies as well as the primary store. Backups, replicas for disaster recovery and copies used for testing all hold data. The guidance’s answers on location, retention and return applied to protected health information wherever the provider maintained it. [1]
A return-or-destroy clause that covers only the production system would leave the other copies outside its terms. The rule’s requirement is to return or destroy all protected health information at termination, where feasible. [1] Drafting the clause to name each kind of copy is a contract choice that follows from that word, all.
The same is true of location. A provider might hold primary data in one country and recovery copies in another. The guidance’s point about risks varying by location would then apply to each. [1]
How the guidance reached different organizations
Health systems
A health system was a covered entity with a large set of cloud services, some bought centrally and some by departments. The guidance gave it two jobs: find every service holding its data, and put an agreement in place for each. [1]
The OHSU case showed the first job’s difficulty. The release described data of over 3,000 individuals on a cloud-based server without an agreement. [3] It also described risk analyses that did not cover all the enterprise’s data. [3] Finding the services was the precondition for everything else.
Ambulatory networks and physician practices
A smaller provider organization faced the same rules with less bargaining power. It could use any cloud configuration, public, hybrid or private, if it signed an agreement. [1] It was unlikely to secure audit rights in a provider’s standard terms.
For such an organization, the guidance’s list of service level topics was a practical checklist. Availability, backup, return of data, security responsibility and use limits could be checked against the standard terms before signing. [1]
Health plans
Health plans are covered entities and were reached the same way. [1] Plans also use business associates that themselves use cloud providers. The guidance said a provider is a business associate when a business associate subcontracts with it. [1] A plan’s exposure therefore extended through its vendors to their cloud providers.
Business associates that use the cloud
A billing company, claims processor or analytics firm that served covered entities was itself a business associate. When it used a cloud provider, that provider was a subcontractor business associate. [1] [2]
The 2013 rule applied the business associate provisions to such subcontractors, as HHS had proposed. [2] So the billing company needed its own agreement with its provider, and its own risk analysis covering the provider’s environment. [1] [2]
Cloud providers
For providers, the guidance closed a commercial position. Under the guidance, encryption without the key gave a provider no ground to decline a business associate agreement. [1] It also had to address risks to its own administrative tools as part of its risk analysis. [1]
The guidance gave providers something in return. A provider is not responsible for failures attributable solely to its customer. [1] A clear written division of duties protected the provider as much as the customer.
Organizations using de-identified data
Research groups and analytics teams that worked only with data de-identified to the Privacy Rule standard were outside the guidance’s business associate analysis. [1] The guidance made that a precise boundary. In our reading, data that is encrypted, pseudonymized or partly redacted is not de-identified for this purpose unless it meets the Privacy Rule’s process. [1]
Objections, in order
1. Encryption without the key should end the analysis
The strongest case for providers was that unreadable data cannot be misused. OCR’s answer was that the rules protect integrity and availability as well as confidentiality. [1] A provider can lose, corrupt or make unavailable data it cannot read. The objection addresses one of three duties.
2. The rules are flexible, so the status matters less
Status mattered because it brought direct liability. The 2013 rule made business associates directly liable for compliance with certain requirements. [2] OCR’s later fact sheet listed failure to comply with the Security Rule as one of the grounds. [4] The guidance did say the requirements are flexible and scalable for no-view services. [1] Flexibility shaped how the duties applied; it did not remove them.
3. Contracts are the right place for evidence
There is a fair case that evidence belongs in contracts. Organizations differ in risk, and a fixed audit requirement would burden small providers and small customers alike. The guidance chose that route. [1]
The argument still holds, in our reading, because the guidance tied the customer’s own risk analysis to an understanding of the provider’s environment. [1] A customer without evidence had a duty it could not fully perform. The contract route worked for customers with bargaining power and left the rest with promises.
4. The guidance added nothing new
In one sense this is right. The no-view and conduit analysis restated the 2013 rule. [1] [2] The guidance’s additions were the allocation passage, the incident reporting flexibility, the location discussion and the explicit answer on audit rights. [1] Those additions are what an organization would build a cloud program around.
5. OCR could not enforce what the contract left out
That is partly true. OCR’s fact sheet says its enforcement authority over business associates extends only to the listed requirements. [4] In our reading, a provider that refused audit rights broke no rule. [1] But the customer that relied on such a provider still owed its own risk analysis, and the gap would show there. [1]
6. A small practice cannot run this program
A small practice has a fair complaint. It cannot audit a large provider or negotiate its terms. The guidance did not ask it to. [1] It asked for an agreement, a risk analysis and reasonable and appropriate safeguards, scaled to the organization. [1]
What a small practice can do is read the provider’s standard terms against the guidance’s list. Availability, backup, return of data, security responsibility and use limits are visible in standard documents or absent from them. [1] Absence is information the risk analysis can record.
What a health organization could check today
An inventory of services holding the data
The first check is the one OHSU’s case points to. Every cloud service holding electronic protected health information needs to be known and covered by an agreement. [1] [3] That includes services departments bought, services vendors use as subcontractors, and services holding encrypted backups.
A control-by-control division
For each service, a written record of which party runs each Security Rule control follows the guidance directly. [1] Where the customer runs authentication and the provider runs encryption, both should be recorded. [1] Where neither has accepted a control, the gap should be visible.
Evidence the agreement provides
The next check is what evidence each agreement gives. If the agreement gives no documentation or audit right, the customer’s risk analysis should say what it relied on instead. [1] That keeps the risk analysis honest about its basis.
Location, recovery and exit
The service level terms should be read for availability, backup and recovery, return of data at termination, security responsibility and use limits, the five topics the guidance listed. [1] Location of primary and backup copies belongs in the same review, since the guidance made location a risk factor. [1]
Incident reporting terms
Finally, the agreement’s incident reporting terms should be compared with what the customer needs to run its own incident response. The guidance allowed the parties to set detail and frequency. [1] A term that reports only confirmed breaches would leave the customer blind to attempts that the guidance said could be reported. [1]
Reporting to leadership
A short report to the board or compliance committee can follow the four parts. How many services hold the data and how many have agreements. How many have a written division of controls. How many give evidence beyond a promise. How many have exit and location terms settled.
A fifth count is worth adding: incidents reported by providers in the last review period, and how many arrived with enough detail to act on. The guidance let the parties set that detail. [1] The count shows whether the terms they set were enough.
Those five counts come from the organization’s own records. They do not depend on any provider’s cooperation, and they show where the guidance’s gaps fall in that organization’s own portfolio. [1]
With hindsight
The guidance has stayed in place. An Internet Archive copy of HHS’s page captured on November 9, 2026 shows Guidance on HIPAA & Cloud Computing at a new address, with content last reviewed December 23, 2022. [7] The copy still sets out the same eleven questions, including the no-view analysis, the conduit answer and the answer that the rules do not require audit rights. [7]
OCR later set out business associates’ direct liability in a separate fact sheet. The copy of HHS’s page captured on September 19, 2026 shows it as last reviewed on July 16, 2021. [4] It lists ten categories of direct liability, including failure to comply with the Security Rule and failure to provide breach notification to a covered entity or another business associate. [4]
The fact sheet also stated a limit. It said OCR has authority to take enforcement action against business associates only for the requirements and prohibitions it lists. [4] In our reading, that confirmed the guidance’s structure: the provider’s status brought direct duties, while terms beyond those duties lived in the contract. [1] [4]
The evidence question returned in a proposed rule. On January 6, 2025, HHS published a proposal to modify the Security Rule, 90 FR 898. [5] Its abstract cited breaches and cyberattacks, deficiencies OCR had observed in investigations, and changes in how health care is provided. [5]
The proposal would add a written verification requirement for business associates. A regulated entity would obtain written verification from each business associate that it has deployed the required technical safeguards, at least once every 12 months. [5] The verification would include a written analysis of the business associate’s relevant systems by a person with appropriate knowledge and experience. [5]
The proposal would also require a written certification, by a person with authority to act for the business associate, that the analysis had been performed and is accurate. [5] In our reading, this would move the 2016 guidance’s third part, evidence, from a contract choice to a rule requirement. [1] [5]
The proposal cited the 2016 guidance directly. In discussing network maps, it quoted the guidance’s statement that a customer should understand a provider’s cloud environment to conduct its own risk analysis. [5] It also asked for comment on the extent of a cloud provider’s direct management control over applications in cloud environments. [5]
Other parts of the proposal reached the same relationship. It would require a business associate to report activation of its contingency plan to the covered entity or business associate within 24 hours of activation. [5] The guidance had left incident reporting detail to the parties. [1]
As checked on November 16, 2026, the proposal had not become a final rule. The 2026 Unified Agenda entry for RIN 0945-AA22 lists the rulemaking among long-term actions. [6] Its timetable shows the proposal on 01/06/2025 at 90 FR 898 and a final action date of 07/00/2027. [6] That date is the agency’s projection.
What held up from October 2016 was the status analysis. A provider holding encrypted data without the key remained a business associate in the guidance as last reviewed in 2022. [7] The direct liability that status carried was set out in OCR’s later fact sheet. [4]
What did not hold up was the reliance on contracts for evidence. HHS’s own proposal would replace the contract route with an annual written verification. [5] Until a final rule appears, organizations still depend on what their agreements give them. [6]
For health organizations, the lasting work is the record that both routes require. A control-by-control division with each provider, and the evidence behind it, would serve under the 2016 guidance and under the 2025 proposal if finalized. [1] [5]
Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.