Lapse plans decided which federal cyber work kept running
In the 2018 to 2019 shutdown, plans written in advance kept federal cyber operations and the vulnerability database running while most NIST sites went dark. Agencies and the organizations relying on them needed to know where that line fell.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
In the 2018 to 2019 shutdown, plans written in advance kept federal cyber operations and the vulnerability database running while most NIST sites went dark. Agencies and the organizations relying on them needed to know where that line fell.
- The week The week that opened 2019 fell in the second week of a partial federal government shutdown.
- The legal test that sorted the work The DHS plan began with the Antideficiency Act.
- The people who stayed The DHS plan’s summary table counted 245,405 employees on board across the department as of November 10, 2018, and 212,699 exempt or excepted.
- The services that continued and stopped The US-CERT site kept publishing during the lapse.
- The contracts that paused Where federal IT and security work is performed by contractors, the lapse reaches it through funding.
- The authorities tied to funding deadlines Some federal cyber authorities are not permanent.
- The strongest objections One objection is that lapses are brief and that elaborate planning for them is wasted effort.
- How it applies by type of organization A federal agency should read its own lapse plan as a cybersecurity document.
- With hindsight The lapse ended on January 25, 2019.
The week
The week that opened 2019 fell in the second week of a partial federal government shutdown. According to the Congressional Budget Office, it had started on December 22, 2018, when appropriations lapsed for part of the government, and it would end on January 25, 2019. CBO later called it a five-week partial shutdown.
Agencies without appropriations were operating under lapse plans written in advance. The Department of Homeland Security’s plan, dated December 17, 2018, set out which of its functions could continue. It cited the Antideficiency Act, which bars obligations without an appropriation and restricts voluntary services except in emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. It said that, to qualify under that exception, the risk had to be real, not hypothetical or speculative, and imminent enough that delay was not permissible.
For the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the plan counted 3,531 employees on board as of November 10, 2018. It estimated that 2,008 would be retained during a lapse as exempt or excepted. Non-exempt staff would need four business hours to wind down their other work. Across DHS, the plan counted 245,405 employees on board and 212,699 exempt or excepted. Employees who were neither would be furloughed. The Commerce plan said that, across that department, 836 employees would remain on duty for a time to carry out an orderly shutdown.
The Department of Commerce’s plan, approved by the Office of Management and Budget and dated December 17, 2018, covered the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Its summary counted 3,378 NIST employees on board and 484 to be retained under its exception categories. Among the activities it listed as continuing was the operation of the national timing and synchronization infrastructure and the National Vulnerability Database. It also excepted the Commerce Department’s chief information security officer, the managers of its round-the-clock cybersecurity monitoring and a digital forensic analyst. At NIST, it excepted staff to maintain physical security and access control systems.
The effects were visible online that week. An Internet Archive capture of NIST’s home page from January 2, 2019 shows a notice that, because of the lapse, almost all NIST-affiliated websites would be unavailable until further notice. It said sites for programs using non-appropriated funds, naming its laboratory accreditation and public safety communications research programs, and sites excepted from the shutdown such as the National Vulnerability Database, would remain available and updated. The page also linked to NIST notices on contract performance and grantee performance during a lapse.
DHS had planned differently for its own website: its lapse plan said the public site would remain accessible but would not be maintained or updated. The US-CERT site, run by CISA’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, kept publishing. On January 3, 2019 it posted a notice encouraging users to apply Adobe security updates for Acrobat and Reader. Its announcements section still led with the December 20, 2018 announcement on Chinese government malicious cyber activity, which said the actors were exploiting trust relationships between IT service providers and their customers.
A government shutdown is usually discussed as a budget fight with economic side effects. The CBO’s later estimate of lost output, and the hardship for unpaid federal workers, dominate that account. For technology and security leaders in public agencies, the 2018 to 2019 lapse showed something more specific. It showed, service by service, which parts of the federal cybersecurity apparatus the government had decided were essential, and which it had decided could stop.
Our argument is that lapse plans, written months before any shutdown, decided which federal cyber work kept running. Those plans applied a legal test built for protecting life and property. Cyber operations that fit the test continued. Work that did not, including much of the standards and guidance that agencies and private organizations rely on, paused. Agencies that depended on federal cyber services, and agencies writing their own continuity plans, needed to know where that line fell.
We take four parts in turn, after a short account of the legal mechanism: the people who stayed, the services that continued and stopped, the contracts that paused, and the authorities whose life depended on funding deadlines. A sixth section tests the argument against the strongest objections. The last looks at how it applies to federal agencies, to state and local governments, and to the banks and health systems that use federal cyber services.
The sector is government because the lapse plans and their effects were federal. Private organizations appear where they depend on federal services. Agencies should confirm their own legal obligations during a lapse with their counsel and budget office.
The legal test that sorted the work
No money, no obligation
The DHS plan began with the Antideficiency Act. It said federal officials may not incur obligations, including contracts or grants, or perform activities without a currently available appropriation unless authorized by law. It said the act restricts voluntary or personal services beyond authorized levels, except for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. Only activities that were exempt or excepted could continue.
The Commerce plan described the same framework. It cited the Attorney General’s 1981 opinion, as updated by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1995. It listed the categories of excepted functions: those with another source of funding, those Congress expressly authorized to continue, those necessary to prevent an imminent and significant threat to life or property, those necessary to the President’s constitutional duties, and activities needed briefly for an orderly shutdown.
Exempt, excepted and non-exempt
The DHS plan used three categories, drawn from Office of Personnel Management guidance. Exempt employees and activities were funded by appropriations that had not lapsed, such as carryover balances or permanent appropriations. Excepted ones were funded by lapsed appropriations but could continue because the law allowed the work to go on, such as emergency work protecting life or property. Non-exempt employees fit neither category and were furloughed.
The distinction matters for security programs. A cyber function paid from a fund that does not lapse continues without any need to justify it. A function paid from annual appropriations continues only if it meets an exception. Two security teams doing similar work in the same agency can therefore have different fates in a lapse, depending on which account pays them.
The imminence requirement
The DHS plan set out how strict the life and property exception was. There had to be a reasonable likelihood that delay would compromise safety or property to a significant degree. The risk had to be real, not hypothetical or speculative, and imminent enough that delay was not permissible. The work had to be limited to what the component head determined was needed to avoid imminent danger.
That test fits incident response well. An active intrusion into a federal network threatens government property now. It fits preventive work poorly. A guidance document, a training program or a planned architecture review protects property too, but against risks that are not imminent in the plan’s sense. Under the test, one kind of cyber work is clearly excepted, and the other clearly is not.
Other routes to continue
The DHS plan described routes besides the life and property exception. Some functions are expressly authorized by law to continue, and some are necessarily implied by a law that must continue. It noted that Congress gives some agencies express authority to contract or borrow despite a lapse, but said that category did not then apply to DHS functions. Components that believed a function qualified were to notify the general counsel.
For security leaders, these routes are worth knowing because they are narrow. A cyber function that cannot fit one of them, and does not meet the imminence test, will stop. Knowing that in advance lets an agency fund such work differently, schedule it away from likely lapse dates, or accept the pause deliberately. Any of those is a better outcome than discovering the gap on the first morning of a lapse, when the people who could fix it may already be furloughed.
Support functions at the minimum
The DHS plan added that administrative, research or other support functions related to an excepted activity should continue only to the extent essential to keep that activity effective, and at a minimum level. For a security operations center, that means the analysts continue. Whether the engineers who maintain its tools, or the staff who manage its contracts, continue depends on whether the center would stop working without them during the lapse.
Physical security counts too
The Commerce plan’s list of NIST excepted positions shows that the test reached physical systems as well as networks. It excepted an IT specialist in Gaithersburg and an electronics technician in Boulder to maintain the physical security and access control systems, including adding people to the system so they could enter buildings. Badge systems are IT systems. A lapse plan that excepts the guards but not the people who keep the badge readers working leaves the guards with doors they cannot manage.
Who decides
The DHS plan put the judgment with component leaders. It said an activity could qualify under the life and property exception only to the extent the component head determined that imminent danger would result from stopping or reducing it. Proposals to continue activities outside the plan’s guidelines were to go immediately to the Office of the General Counsel. For travel, the plan gave the director of CISA, among others, authority to approve domestic travel for excepted activities, in consultation with counsel and the chief financial officer.
That structure puts security judgments in the hands of people who may not be security specialists, advised by lawyers applying a funding statute. A component head deciding whether a monitoring function, a vulnerability scan or a patch deployment meets the imminence test needs a clear account of the risk from the security team. If that account was not written before the lapse, it has to be written in the first hours of one.
Payments and purchases
The plan also limited spending. It said DHS personnel could make a payment during a lapse only when failing to pay would result in an imminent threat to life or property, apart from specified activities. It said accounting centers would not run funds availability checks during the lapse, so components had to keep clear records for processing later.
For security operations, that limit bites on renewals. A software license, a threat intelligence subscription or a certificate that expires during a lapse can be renewed only if the payment meets the test. An agency that tracks renewal dates against the fiscal calendar can renew critical items before a lapse is likely. One that does not may find a tool switching off in the middle of one.
Why plans written in advance matter
Both plans were dated December 17, 2018, and the lapse began on December 22. The Commerce plan said that OMB Circular A-11 required each agency to maintain a plan and submit it to OMB when first prepared or revised. It also said the department’s plan would be reviewed and updated at least every two years. When the lapse came, agencies applied decisions already made. Any cyber function not identified as excepted in the plan had no clear path to continue.
The people who stayed
The numbers in the plans
The DHS plan’s summary table counted 245,405 employees on board across the department as of November 10, 2018, and 212,699 exempt or excepted. Much of that retention was in law enforcement and security components. CISA’s ratio was lower: 2,008 retained of 3,531 on board. NIST’s, under the Commerce plan, was lower still: 484 retained of 3,378.
Those ratios reflect the legal test. CISA ran operational cyber defense and critical infrastructure protection, much of which fit the imminence requirement. NIST’s work was mostly measurement, research and standards. Its excepted staff kept running services such as timekeeping and the vulnerability database, and the security of its facilities.
Cyber roles that were excepted
The Commerce plan shows how cyber roles were justified at the department level. It excepted the department’s chief information security officer, describing the role as giving strategic and tactical cybersecurity guidance and serving as liaison to DHS and OMB. It excepted the program manager for enterprise security operations, who oversaw department-wide monitoring, alerting and response. It excepted an operations manager overseeing round-the-clock cybersecurity monitoring, and a digital forensic analyst supporting excepted senior officials.
The pattern is consistent. Roles that watch and respond were excepted. Their justification tied them to protecting systems that excepted staff still used. The DHS plan, for its part, listed planning, acquisition and procurement, and oversight, audit and assessment not essential to the lapse among the maintenance and support activities that would not continue.
Working without pay
Excepted employees worked without pay during the lapse. The DHS plan said excepted employees would not be paid during the lapse, and would be paid once Congress passed and the President signed a new appropriation or continuing resolution. CBO later noted that federal workers who faced delayed compensation were among those most directly harmed. For a security operations team, that meant analysts on night shifts with no paycheck, for a period nobody could predict at the start.
That is a retention risk as well as a hardship. A lapse that drags on gives an excepted analyst with outside options a reason to use them. The continuity plan can keep a role filled on paper. It cannot keep a person in the role.
Four hours to wind down
CISA’s plan gave non-exempt staff four business hours to complete an orderly cessation of their other activities. The Commerce plan said non-excepted personnel should report for a few hours on the first business day after a lapse to perform short administrative tasks, such as setting an out-of-office message.
Four hours is not much time for security handoffs. A furloughed engineer may be in the middle of a change, holding the only working knowledge of an investigation, or responsible for a scheduled task that will now not run. A lapse checklist for security staff would cover open changes, scheduled jobs, credentials only they hold, and the excepted colleague who takes each item. Writing that checklist before a lapse is cheaper than discovering its gaps during one.
Devices off limits
The DHS plan was strict about furloughed staff and their equipment. It said non-exempt employees could use their DHS devices only to receive and acknowledge furlough notices and to monitor status updates, and that they were not on standby duty. It warned that other use could violate the Antideficiency Act, which carries criminal penalties.
That rule closes off an informal safety net. A furloughed security engineer cannot log in informally to help an excepted colleague, however urgent the problem. Any expertise the excepted team may need has to be either among the excepted staff or written down in advance.
Furloughed knowledge
Furlough also takes knowledge offline. An excepted analyst who needs to ask the engineer who built a detection rule, or the architect who knows why a firewall rule exists, may find that person furloughed and barred from working. Plans that except the operators but not the people who understand the systems leave operations running on what the operators already know.
The services that continued and stopped
Operational alerts kept flowing
The US-CERT site kept publishing during the lapse. On January 3, 2019 it posted a notice about Adobe security updates. Its home page also still carried a December 28, 2018 tip on securing new internet-connected devices and the December 20, 2018 announcement on Chinese malicious cyber activity against IT service providers. For the many organizations that watched those feeds, the operational signal continued.
Alerts from a reduced team
Alerts continuing does not mean the full service continued. CISA’s plan estimated that it would retain 2,008 of its 3,531 employees. The other functions of the agency’s staff, including those not tied to imminent threats, paused. For an organization receiving CISA’s products, the visible feed looked normal. Less visible work, such as follow-up engagements, assessments and partnership activities, depended on whether the people doing it were excepted. A sharing partner could not assume that silence meant nothing was wrong, or that a request for help would get the usual response.
The vulnerability database stayed up
The National Vulnerability Database was specifically named. The Commerce plan listed its operation among the activities that would continue. NIST’s home page notice said excepted sites such as the NVD would stay available and updated. Banks, health systems and agencies whose scanning and patching tools draw on vulnerability data had one less dependency to worry about.
Time as security infrastructure
The Commerce plan listed one service alongside the vulnerability database that security teams seldom think about: the national timing and synchronization infrastructure. Accurate time underpins much of security operations. Log correlation across systems depends on it. Certificate validity checks depend on it. Many authentication protocols reject requests when clocks drift too far apart. Keeping that service running during a lapse was a security decision as much as a scientific one.
Standards and guidance went dark
Almost everything else at NIST was a different story. The home page notice said almost all NIST-affiliated websites would be unavailable until further notice. That reach covered the institute’s sites generally. The notice named only programs using non-appropriated funds, and excepted services such as the NVD, as exceptions.
For security teams, that meant reduced access to the institute’s publications during the lapse. An organization in the middle of a control assessment, or a contractor checking a requirement, might find the source document unavailable online. Copies held elsewhere still worked. The authoritative site did not.
Public sites without managers
Agencies handled their public sites differently. The DHS plan said the department’s public website would remain accessible but would not be maintained or updated. NIST took almost all of its sites offline instead, keeping only those for programs using non-appropriated funds and excepted services such as the NVD. Each choice carries a risk: a site that stays up without managers can show stale information, and a site that goes dark removes a reference others rely on.
A website that is not actively managed is a security question as much as a communications one. Certificates expire on schedule. Content that needs correcting stays wrong. Monitoring for defacement or compromise depends on who is still watching. Where a network stays up to support exempt functions, as the DHS plan provided for its own, the people who watch it need to be among the excepted staff.
What sorting by service reveals
Put together, the lapse sorted federal cyber services into three groups. Real-time operational services, such as alerts and the vulnerability database, continued because they fit the imminence test or were named in the plan. Reference services, such as standards publications, largely stopped. Public-facing sites stayed up in some cases but without active management. Any organization that relied on federal cyber services could map its dependencies onto those three groups.
The contracts that paused
Stop-work orders
Where federal IT and security work is performed by contractors, the lapse reaches it through funding. The Antideficiency Act bars new obligations during a lapse. The Commerce plan’s orderly shutdown section for NIST listed contracting officers whose task was to issue stop-work orders and suspension notices to contractors, electronically, so that contractors would not keep incurring costs after the shutdown began.
A contract funded by an appropriation that has lapsed, and not otherwise excepted, stops. Contract staff go home, often without pay, and the work they were doing waits. Some contracts are funded in advance or by other sources and continue. Whether a given security service continues depends on that funding detail, which few people outside the contracting office know.
Where contractors carry operations
When a security operations center, a help desk or a network operations function is staffed largely by contractors, the lapse plan for federal staff does not settle whether it keeps running. An agency could except its federal security leads and still lose most of the analysts who do the work, if their contract funding lapses. The continuity question has to be asked of the contract as well as the position.
The cost to contractors
The CBO report described the private side of the lapse. It said private-sector entities that lost business were among those most directly affected, and that some would never recoup that income. Security contractors whose work stopped were among them. A contractor that loses five weeks of revenue may lose staff too, and the agency may find, when funding resumes, that the cleared analysts it relied on have moved on.
What contracts can say
Agencies cannot contract around the Antideficiency Act. They can make lapse effects predictable. A security services contract can identify which functions the agency would seek to continue in a lapse, how the contractor would be notified of a stop-work order, how quickly staff must return after funding resumes, and how access and accounts will be preserved or restored. The contracting officer and the security lead should agree those terms before award, not during a lapse.
Restarting is work too
Stopped contracts have to restart. Contractor staff may have moved to other work. Access accounts may have been suspended. Tools and licenses may need renewal. Projects lose their place. The DHS plan required components, at the end of a lapse, to process the backlog of transactions not entered into financial systems. The security equivalent is a backlog of deferred patching, reviews and project work that has to be absorbed once the lapse ends.
The authorities tied to funding deadlines
Authorities with sunset dates
Some federal cyber authorities are not permanent. They expire on a set date unless Congress extends them. In 2018 that was a background fact. By 2025 and 2026, as the hindsight section describes, several were being extended in the same laws that ended or averted lapses, with expiry dates matched to funding deadlines.
That coupling matters for any organization that relies on those authorities. Two of them, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 and the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, are named for what they support: sharing cyber threat information, and state and local cyber work. An authority that expires with a continuing resolution is only as stable as the funding process.
Why sunsets and lapses compound
A lapse and a sunset are different events with similar effects. A lapse stops funded work. A sunset removes legal authority or protection. When both fall on the same date, an organization can lose funding and legal cover together. Grant-funded state cyber staff, for example, depend on both the program’s authorization and the appropriation that pays for awards. Planning for one without the other leaves half the risk unaddressed.
Sharing needs a counterpart
Information sharing has a second dependency besides its legal framework: people on both sides. A bank or health system that shares indicators with a federal agency expects someone to receive them, analyze them and respond. During a lapse, that depends on whether the receiving staff are excepted. The 2018 to 2019 experience showed alerts flowing outward. It said less about how quickly inbound reports were handled, and organizations should not assume the answer.
A calendar of dates that matter
The practical response is a calendar. It lists the end date of the current appropriation or continuing resolution, the expiry dates of each authority the organization relies on, and the renewal dates of critical security contracts and licenses. Where those dates cluster, the organization can act early: renew before the deadline, prepare contingency arrangements, and brief leadership on what would stop. A calendar like that takes an afternoon to build and needs updating each time Congress acts.
Planning for an authority gap
An organization cannot prevent a sunset. It can plan for one. A sharing program can document which of its activities depend on statutory protections and decide in advance how it would continue or pause them if an authority lapsed. A state or local government receiving grant funds can plan for timing gaps in new awards. These are legal questions, and organizations should work through them with counsel.
The strongest objections
Shutdowns are short, so planning is wasted
One objection is that lapses are brief and that elaborate planning for them is wasted effort. The 2018 to 2019 lapse lasted five weeks by CBO’s count. Brief or not, each lapse applies plans that were written in advance, and the plans decide what runs. Reviewing them costs little next to finding out mid-lapse that a critical function was never excepted.
The economic cost was small
Another objection uses CBO’s own figures. CBO estimated that about $3 billion of output would never be recovered, about 0.02 percent of projected annual GDP for 2019. On that measure the lapse was a rounding error. Aggregate figures, though, say little about a specific function. A security operations center that loses half its analysts for five weeks is not 0.02 percent less effective. The harm from a lapse falls on particular services at particular moments, which is why the service-level view matters.
Excepted operations are enough
A third objection is that the imminence test excepts exactly the right work: active defense. Preventive work can wait a few weeks. For a short lapse, that may be right. For a long one, deferred patching, delayed reviews and lost contractor capacity accumulate. The test answers whether work can continue during a lapse. It does not answer what the backlog costs afterward.
Private organizations are unaffected
A fourth objection is that a federal shutdown is the federal government’s problem. The sorting of services shows otherwise. Banks, health systems and state agencies that relied on federal guidance, sharing programs or grants were affected by what stopped. The vulnerability database and alerts continued in 2018 to 2019 because they were named and excepted. That was a choice in a plan, not a guarantee.
Except more roles and the problem goes away
A fifth objection is that agencies could simply except more security roles. The legal test limits that. The DHS plan required that the risk be real and imminent, and that excepted work be limited to what the component head determined was needed. An agency that excepted its whole security program would have to justify each role under that standard. The test is a legal constraint, not a planning preference.
Where the argument is weaker
The argument is weakest for agencies with funding that does not lapse, such as fee-funded programs. The NIST notice itself said sites for programs using non-appropriated funds would remain available. For those programs, lapse planning is a smaller concern.
How it applies by type of organization
Federal agencies
A federal agency should read its own lapse plan as a cybersecurity document. The review is concrete. It should list which security roles are excepted and on what justification, and whether the contractors who staff the security operations center are funded in a way that survives a lapse. It should name who manages public websites and certificates during a lapse. It should estimate the backlog the agency will face when the lapse ends, and assign someone to clear it.
The Commerce plan said it would be reviewed and updated at least every two years, and could be modified when funding sources or program activities changed. An agency can align its security review with that cycle, so that each revision of the lapse plan is checked against the current security program, including new tools, new contracts and new monitoring duties.
Agencies whose security operations centers are run largely by contractors face the hardest version of the question. Their federal leads may be excepted while the contract staff who watch the screens are not funded. The fix is a deliberate decision before the lapse, made with the contracting officer, on how that contract is funded and what it would continue to deliver.
The review belongs to the chief information security officer and the budget office together. The plan is written by people who know funding rules. The security consequences are known by people who run the systems. Both need to be in the room before the next lapse, because once it starts the plan is what governs.
A lapse exercise
A tabletop exercise is a cheap way to test a lapse plan. The scenario is simple: appropriations lapse tonight, and a significant intrusion is detected on the third day. The exercise asks who is on duty, which contractors are still working, which tools have licenses that expire in the next month, who can approve an emergency purchase, and how the agency reaches furloughed experts it is not allowed to call back. The answers show where the plan and the security program disagree.
Measures for the next lapse
An agency can track a few measures over time: the share of security roles with a documented lapse status, the share of security contracts with lapse terms, the number of renewals that fall within likely lapse windows, and the backlog days needed to recover after the last lapse. None requires a lapse to measure. Each shows whether the next one will be easier than the last.
State and local governments
State and local agencies are not subject to federal lapses directly. They depend on federal services, grants and guidance. A state security office that relies on federal alerts, on federal standards for its controls, or on federal grant funds for staff should know which of those would continue during a lapse. Where grant-funded staff are involved, the timing of awards matters as much as their size.
The 2025 law described in the hindsight section shows a further link. It provided for reimbursing states that used their own funds to continue federal programs during a lapse. A state that keeps a federally supported program running during a lapse is making a financial bet on that kind of provision. Its finance office and its security office should understand the bet before they make it.
Banks and health systems
Private organizations rely on federal cyber services in less visible ways: vulnerability data feeding scanners, federal publications cited in control frameworks, alerts feeding threat intelligence, and the legal protections that make information sharing possible. Each is a dependency. A short inventory of those dependencies, marked by whether each continued in 2018 to 2019 and why, gives a security leader a realistic view of what would be available in a future lapse.
For a bank or health system, the response is mostly redundancy. Commercial vulnerability and threat intelligence sources can back up federal feeds. Local copies of the federal standards cited in policies keep them available when the authoritative site is not. Legal advice on information sharing should cover what happens if the statutory framework lapses. This does not imply federal services are unreliable. It recognizes that their continuity during a lapse is decided by a plan the organization does not write.
With hindsight
The lapse ended on January 25, 2019. CBO estimated in January 2019 that the five-week partial shutdown had delayed about $18 billion in federal discretionary spending and suspended some federal services. It said federal workers who faced delayed compensation, and businesses that lost income, bore the most direct effects. It also noted indirect effects, such as businesses unable to obtain federal permits and certifications, which it could not quantify. It estimated that about $3 billion of lost output would never be recovered. It put the reduction in the level of real GDP at $3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2018 and $8 billion in the first quarter of 2019, or 0.2 percent of that quarter’s output. CBO said all of its estimated effects, and their timing, were subject to considerable uncertainty.
Later lapses tied federal cyber authorities directly to funding deadlines. A continuing appropriations law signed on November 12, 2025 treated its funding as beginning on October 1, 2025, and made its personnel funds available for back pay to employees under the lapse pay provision of federal law. It barred reductions in force from its enactment through its end date, January 30, 2026, with exceptions for voluntary separations, court orders and actions needed for an orderly shutdown during a lapse. It moved to that same date the September 30, 2025 expiry dates of three cyber authorities, which had passed as the lapse began: the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, the National Cybersecurity Protection System authorization in the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, and the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program. It also provided for reimbursing states and other grantees that had furloughed employees or used their own funds to continue federal programs during a lapse, and for paying the furloughed employees at their standard rate.
A consolidated appropriations law signed on February 3, 2026 covered a lapse that began on or about January 31, 2026, and made funds available to pay employees for it. It extended the same three authorities to September 30, 2026. Both laws also ratified obligations incurred to maintain the essential level of activity to protect life and property. That is the same test that had sorted federal cyber work in the 2018 to 2019 lapse, restated in the laws that ended later ones.
On September 2, 2026, a continuing appropriations law for fiscal 2027, funding the government until December 11, 2026, extended the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act and the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act authorization to December 11, 2026. Its extensions did not include the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program. As checked on November 14, 2026, no later public law published on govinfo had changed either date, so both authorities were set to expire on December 11, 2026 unless Congress extended them again.
What held up was the core lesson of the 2018 to 2019 lapse: plans written in advance decided which cyber work continued. What changed was the scale of what depended on funding deadlines. By 2026, the federal cyber information sharing law was expiring on the same calendar as continuing resolutions.
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