Libra’s design left the hard compliance work to the banks at its edges

At the July 2019 Libra hearings, Facebook’s testimony placed the reserve in bank deposits and custodians and customer checks at regulated on- and off-ramps. For banks, the lasting question was which of those obligations would land on them.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

At the July 2019 Libra hearings, Facebook’s testimony placed the reserve in bank deposits and custodians and customer checks at regulated on- and off-ramps. For banks, the lasting question was which of those obligations would land on them.

  1. The week On July 16 and 17, 2019, both congressional committees responsible for banking held hearings on Libra, the digital currency Facebook had proposed.
  2. The reserve: deposits someone else holds The testimony’s answer to the stability question was the reserve.
  3. The ramps: where customers would be checked The testimony’s answer to the illicit finance question was the ramps.
  4. The data: a wall someone has to maintain The Senate hearing’s title named data privacy, and the testimony addressed it with a structural answer.
  5. The supervisor: one regulator for the network, many for its edges The testimony’s answer to the oversight question was Switzerland for the association and FinCEN registration for the association and Calibra.
  6. Objections Five objections deserve answers.
  7. What a bank should ask of any stablecoin it touches The four places translate into four sets of questions a bank can ask of any stablecoin arrangement, whether it is holding reserves, providing custody, serving a ramp or offering conversion directly.
  8. With hindsight On January 31, 2022, Silvergate Capital Corporation, the holding company for Silvergate Bank, acquired intellectual property and technology assets for running a blockchain-based payment network from a group of sellers that its Form 8-K listed as the Libra Association, a Swiss association, and its Diem subsidiaries.

The week

On July 16 and 17, 2019, both congressional committees responsible for banking held hearings on Libra, the digital currency Facebook had proposed. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs met on Tuesday, July 16, for a hearing titled “Examining Facebook’s Proposed Digital Currency and Data Privacy Considerations.” The House Committee on Financial Services met on Wednesday, July 17, for “Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and the American Financial System.” At the Senate hearing the only witness was Facebook’s head of Calibra, the subsidiary building a digital wallet for Libra. In the House he testified first, and a second panel of five witnesses followed.

Opening the Senate hearing, the committee’s chairman set out a list of concerns that, he said, were in no way limited to: how the payment system would work and be managed, and how Libra, the Libra Association, Calibra and Facebook would interact; what consumer protections would apply; how individuals’ data and privacy would be protected; how the Libra ecosystem would interact with the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money-laundering rules; and how Libra could threaten financial stability. He cited the Treasury Secretary’s statement the previous day that Treasury had “very serious concerns that Libra could be misused by money launderers and terrorist financiers.”

The written testimony described the design. Libra would be “fully backed on a one-to-one basis through the Libra Reserve, which will hold a basket of currencies in safe assets such as cash bank deposits and highly liquid, short-term Government securities,” including the U.S. dollar, the British pound, the euro and the Japanese yen. The reserve’s assets would be held by a geographically distributed network of regulated custodians with investment-grade credit ratings. The Libra Association, which would govern the network and administer the reserve, was headquartered in Geneva; the testimony said it expected to be supervised by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority and intended to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network as a money services business. According to the written answers to the committee, an initial group of 28 organizations was working on the association’s charter.

On illicit finance, the testimony said Calibra was registered with FinCEN as a money services business, had filed for state money transmitter licenses, and would comply with the Bank Secrecy Act. It described the network’s approach as a digital network “that features regulated on- and off-ramps with proper know-your-customer (KYC) practices,” combined with the ability of law enforcement and regulators to analyze on-chain activity. On data, it said Calibra would not share individual customer data with the Libra Association and, except in limited circumstances such as preventing fraud or criminal activity, complying with the law, or when users chose, would not share customers’ account information or financial data with Facebook.

At both hearings the witness repeated a commitment, recorded in the Senate transcript as: “Facebook will not offer the Libra digital currency until we have fully addressed regulators’ concerns and received appropriate approvals.” In the House, the committee’s chairwoman noted that she and colleagues had written to Facebook earlier in July asking it to cease implementation until regulators and Congress could examine the issues, and said the committee would discuss a draft bill, the Keep Big Tech Out of Finance Act, which would prevent large platform utilities like Facebook from becoming financial institutions and block them from creating their own currencies. On May 9, 2019, FinCEN had issued guidance, FIN-2019-G001, on how its regulations apply to business models involving convertible virtual currencies.

Much of the questioning at the Libra hearings was about the company itself: privacy, monetary sovereignty and its own track record. Read for design rather than politics, the testimony described something more specific. Libra’s promises on safety and on financial crime would be kept largely by regulated institutions at its edges. Banks would hold the reserve’s cash. Custodians would hold its securities. Regulated wallets and exchanges, the on- and off-ramps, would identify customers. The network itself, as described, would not.

Our argument is that, for banks and their compliance officers, the lasting lesson of July 2019 was where a stablecoin’s obligations land. A payment network that is not a bank can still depend on banks for every control that makes it trustworthy. The banks that provide those services carry their own obligations for the activity that passes through them, whether or not the network’s sponsors name them. We break this into four places where Libra’s design put the work, and then the objections:

  • The reserve: the bank deposits and custodied securities that would make one Libra worth what it claimed.
  • The ramps: the points where money entered and left the network, where customer identification was meant to happen.
  • The data: the separation between payment data and a social network, and who would enforce it.
  • The supervisor: which regulator would oversee the network as a whole, and what that left for the regulators of the institutions around it.
  • Objections: the strongest arguments against reading the hearings this way.

The four places are distinct because each describes a different service a regulated firm would provide: holding value, admitting and releasing users, handling their information, and answering to a supervisor. Between them they cover the questions the Senate chairman listed, from consumer protection to anti-money-laundering rules to stability.

The reserve: deposits someone else holds

The testimony’s answer to the stability question was the reserve. Each Libra would be backed one to one by a basket of assets, held as cash bank deposits and highly liquid short-term government securities, across four currencies. In the House hearing, asked about the private banknotes of nineteenth-century wildcat banks, the witness said the reserve would be a one-for-one reserve, and that the wildcat banks’ problems arose from fractional reserves.

Whose balance sheet

A reserve held in “cash bank deposits” is a set of deposit accounts at banks. Those banks would hold large balances belonging to a single customer, the reserve, whose own users could ask to redeem at any time through the network’s participants. For a bank, that profile raises familiar questions: concentration of deposits in one client, the stability of those deposits under stress, and the liquidity the bank would need to hold against them. A run on the stablecoin could become a withdrawal from the banks holding its reserve.

The testimony did not name the banks or custodians, and it did not have to; the reserve had not been set up. But a bank considering such a relationship would need to answer those questions in its own risk management, under its own supervisor, regardless of how the stablecoin’s sponsors described the reserve. The promise of a one-to-one reserve was only as good as the deposit and custody arrangements that carried it out.

Redemption as an operating load

A one-to-one reserve is a promise that holders can turn the coin back into money. Redemption is where that promise meets a bank’s operations. If redemptions run through the reserve’s deposit accounts, the banks holding them must be able to move large sums on short notice, possibly outside normal business hours if the network runs continuously and the issuer wants to honor redemptions promptly. A bank that has not planned for that load may find its payment operations, liquidity desk and fraud controls tested at the same time.

We think a bank should model the redemption scenario before accepting reserve deposits: how much could be withdrawn in a day, through which payment rails, at what hours, and with what checks. The answer shapes liquidity and staffing alike, because large unexpected outflows draw on the same people who handle the bank’s other urgent payments. The testimony did not describe the redemption process in that detail, and in July 2019 it did not need to. A bank planning to hold reserve deposits would need to.

Custody and transparency

The testimony said the reserve’s assets would be held by a geographically distributed network of regulated custodians with investment-grade credit ratings. It added that the association was expected to regularly publish unaudited information on the reserve’s composition. For custodian banks, that design would mean holding securities for a client whose holders were the public at large, and whose credibility depended in part on what the custodians could confirm. The question of what a custodian would attest to, how often and to whom, was not settled in the hearings. We think it is the question a custodian should settle before taking such a mandate, because the stablecoin’s public reporting may lean on the custodian’s records.

Being named as a reserve bank

A reserve whose credibility rests on its banks invites the question of whether those banks will be named. Publishing the list would let holders judge the reserve’s quality. It would also tie each bank’s name to the stablecoin’s fortunes, for better or worse. A bank would want to decide in advance whether it accepts being named, what the issuer may say about it, and how it will respond to public questions about the reserve, because those questions would come to the bank as well as the issuer. We think the terms of any public reference to the bank belong in the deposit or custody agreement, not in a later negotiation under pressure.

A basket, not a dollar

The basket design mattered for banks in a second way. A Libra would not have a fixed value in any single currency. A U.S. bank whose customer paid in or cashed out Libra would be dealing in an asset whose dollar value moved with exchange rates. That affects how the bank would describe the product to customers, how it would account for balances, and which consumer rules would apply. We do not need to resolve those questions here. The point is that the reserve’s design reached into the operations of every bank that touched the coin.

The ramps: where customers would be checked

The testimony’s answer to the illicit finance question was the ramps. Libra would be a network “that features regulated on- and off-ramps with proper know-your-customer (KYC) practices,” combined with law enforcement’s ability to analyze activity on the blockchain. In the House, asked whether there was any technical way to stop someone offering Libra for trade anonymously on the dark web, the witness answered that “all of the on- and off-ramps are properly KYC’d.”

What a ramp is

An on-ramp is the point where conventional money becomes the digital currency: a wallet provider that accepts a card payment or bank transfer, an exchange, or a bank offering the service directly. An off-ramp is the reverse. In Libra’s design, identification would happen at those points. Between them, users could transfer Libra to each other on the network. The testimony was clear that Calibra, as one wallet, would comply with the Bank Secrecy Act and run customer identification. It did not say that every holder of Libra would pass through a regulated wallet for every transfer.

That leaves banks in two roles. A bank could be a ramp itself, offering conversion to and from Libra, in which case it would run customer identification and monitoring on that activity as it would on any other. Or a bank could serve a ramp, holding accounts for a wallet provider or exchange, in which case its obligations would attach to that customer relationship: understanding the ramp’s business, its controls and the risks of the flows passing through it.

Volume and thresholds

Ramp-based controls also depend on how much activity passes through each ramp. A wallet with a small number of customers and modest flows can review unusual activity by hand. A wallet attached to a platform with a very large user base would need automated monitoring, tuned for a payment type with its own patterns, and the staff to review what the automation flags. A bank serving such a ramp would want to know that the ramp’s monitoring scaled with its growth, and would want its own thresholds for when the ramp’s activity required enhanced review at the bank. We think those thresholds should be set before the relationship starts, in terms of volume, customer count and the share of flows linked to addresses the ramp cannot identify, so that growth triggers a review rather than slipping past one.

Self-custody and the gap between ramps

A House member pressed the witness on what would happen once a large fraction of Libra moved into self-custody and flowed among self-custody holders. The witness said the association would enable tools so that law enforcement and wallets could understand where movements were happening. The member asked whether the system would then be absolutely dependent on every wallet being in a regulatory regime that could be trusted. We read the exchange as identifying the gap in a ramp-based model: activity between the ramps is visible on the ledger, but the identities behind it are known only when value enters or leaves through a regulated point.

For a bank serving a ramp, that gap is a risk it would inherit. Funds arriving at the off-ramp could have passed through many unidentified hands since they left the on-ramp. The bank’s monitoring of the ramp’s account would see the aggregate flows, not the chain behind them. We think a bank in that position would need to understand what analysis the ramp performed on the ledger history of the funds it accepted, and to set limits on the activity it was prepared to support without that analysis.

Sanctions at the ramp

The testimony said the Calibra wallet would be governed by rules administered or enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, along with FinCEN and the FTC. Sanctions compliance follows the same ramp logic as customer identification. A regulated ramp can screen its customers and their transactions against sanctions lists. Value moving between unidentified holders on the network is harder to screen, because the parties are known only by their addresses. A bank serving a ramp would want to know how the ramp screens its customers and also the network addresses its customers transact with, and what it does when a payment arrives from an address linked to a sanctioned party.

The same question applies in reverse. A bank that receives a wire from a ramp to pay out a customer’s redemption is relying on the ramp’s screening of how that value reached the customer. If the ramp’s screening stops at its own customer, the bank’s screening of the wire may be the last check, and it sees only the last step.

The customer at the ramp

Ramps are also where customers meet the system, and therefore where consumer protection questions land. The Senate chairman’s list included what consumer protections would apply and the implications for consumers of financial loss from fraud or the project’s failure. In a ramp-based design, a customer who loses money to a scam on the network, or who sends value to the wrong address, would turn first to the wallet or bank they used to get in. Whether that firm had any obligation to help, and under which rules, depended on how the product was structured and which laws applied to it.

A bank offering conversion directly would face those questions with its own customers, and its complaint handling, error resolution and disclosure processes would need to reflect the answers. A bank serving a ramp would face them indirectly, through complaints that reach it because the customer’s bank account was the source of the funds. We think banks would want clear disclosures, agreed with any ramp partner, about what the bank can and cannot do when something goes wrong on the network.

Guidance already in force

The ramps were not operating in a vacuum. FinCEN’s May 2019 guidance, FIN-2019-G001, addressed how its regulations apply to business models involving convertible virtual currencies, and the testimony anticipated registration of both Calibra and the association as money services businesses. A bank serving such a business would apply its existing expectations for money services business customers. The novelty was scale. A network linked to a very large social platform could bring a volume of ramp activity that a bank’s existing program for money services businesses was not sized for.

The data: a wall someone has to maintain

The Senate hearing’s title named data privacy, and the testimony addressed it with a structural answer. Calibra was a regulated subsidiary, created in part to separate social and financial data. Except in limited circumstances, it would not share customers’ account information or financial data with Facebook, and it would not share individual customer data with the Libra Association, in the written testimony’s words, “no matter how it might be collected.”

Why separation is an operating control

A promise to keep data separate is a policy. Keeping it separate is an operating control: access rights, system boundaries, logging, and an audit that shows the boundaries hold. The testimony described the policy. The hearings could not test the control, because the system did not exist. For the regulators of the institutions involved, the useful question would be what evidence of separation would be produced, how often, and to whom.

The exceptions matter too. Sharing to prevent fraud or criminal activity, to comply with law, and when users choose are each reasonable. Each is also a path through the wall. A data separation regime is only as strong as the controls on its exceptions: who can invoke them, what records are kept, and who reviews the use.

One of the testimony’s exceptions was sharing when users choose. Choice is a meaningful protection only if the choice is clear, specific and easy to reverse. A wallet embedded in a large platform could present that choice in different ways, some clearer than others. For regulators and for banks partnering with such a wallet, the design of the consent screens, the defaults and the records of what each user chose would be part of the evidence that the wall held. We think a bank partner would want to see those designs before launch, because its customers’ data could pass through them.

Where banks come in

Banks would sit on the other side of the data question. A bank serving as a ramp or holding a wallet provider’s accounts would receive data about its own customers’ transactions with the network, and might share data back for compliance purposes. Its own privacy obligations would apply to that data whatever the network’s sponsors promised about theirs. We think banks would also want to know, before entering such a relationship, whether data they provided to a wallet or ramp could reach the wallet’s parent company under any of the exceptions, because their customers would hold them responsible if it did.

The bank’s own view of the network

A bank serving ramps would also accumulate its own data about the network: which customers send funds to which wallet providers and exchanges, in what amounts and at what times. That data is part of the bank’s monitoring, and it may show patterns the ramp cannot see, such as one bank customer funding several wallets. We think banks should treat their view of network-related flows as a monitoring asset, with rules designed for it, rather than relying on general rules built for other payment types. The ledger is public, but the link between a bank account and a network address is known only to the bank and the ramp, and that link is where much of the compliance value lies.

Data as a reason to restrict issuers

The House chairwoman’s draft bill went further than a wall. It would have kept large platform companies from becoming financial institutions or creating their own currencies at all. That proposal treated the combination of a platform’s data and a payment network as a risk that separation controls could not manage. Whether or not that was right, it put a different option on the table: rather than regulating the wall, prevent the combination. The hindsight below shows which approach Congress eventually took.

The supervisor: one regulator for the network, many for its edges

The testimony’s answer to the oversight question was Switzerland for the association and FinCEN registration for the association and Calibra. It said the association expected to be licensed, regulated and subject to supervisory oversight, with the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority as its supervisor, and that it expected the Libra Reserve to be subject to supervisory oversight, internal and external audit, and public reporting requirements.

The gap between supervisors

That design meant no single U.S. supervisor would see the whole system. A Swiss supervisor would oversee the association and reserve. FinCEN, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Federal Trade Commission and state regulators would oversee Calibra’s wallet, according to the testimony. Banks holding reserve deposits, providing custody, or serving ramps would answer to their own federal and state banking supervisors. Each supervisor would see its own institution’s part. None would see the flows across them in full.

For a U.S. bank, that fragmentation shifts weight onto its own due diligence. Its supervisor would examine the bank’s relationship with the network, not the network itself. If the network’s own oversight was located abroad and still being designed, the bank could not rely on another supervisor’s review to answer its questions. It would need its own view of the network’s governance, its reserve management and its controls.

What an examiner would ask

A bank’s examiners would not examine Libra. They would examine the bank’s decision to serve it. We think their questions would follow the bank’s existing frameworks: whether the new activity went through the bank’s new product process, whether the board or a committee approved it with an understanding of the risks, whether the anti-money-laundering program was updated for the new customer types and flows, whether third-party risk management covered the issuer, the custodians and the ramps the bank dealt with, and whether the bank could exit the relationship in an orderly way if it needed to. None of those questions requires a new rule. Each requires evidence the bank would have to produce from its own files.

The exit question deserves emphasis. A bank holding reserve deposits or serving a large ramp could find that ending the relationship is itself disruptive, for the customer and for the bank’s own liquidity and payments. A plan for orderly exit, agreed before entry, is a control that an examiner may ask to see and that the bank may one day need.

Promises conditional on approvals

The repeated commitment that Facebook would not offer Libra until it had addressed regulators’ concerns and received appropriate approvals moved the decision to the regulators. That was a reasonable position for a witness. For banks, it created a timing question. A bank preparing to serve the network would be preparing for a launch that depended on approvals from several regulators in several countries, with no fixed date. We think banks considering such work would be wise to plan in stages, committing resources as each approval arrives rather than all at once.

Coordination among supervisors

When several supervisors each see a part, someone has to join the parts. In 2019, the testimony offered a commitment, made for Facebook, to work with regulators here and around the world. That is a commitment by the supervised party, not an arrangement among supervisors. For banks, the practical effect was that their own supervisor might ask about risks that originated in parts of the system the supervisor could not see. A bank that could explain the whole arrangement, with documents from the issuer and its other service providers, would be better placed than one that could explain only its own part. We think that argues for banks asking issuers for a standing information package, covering governance, reserve reports and the list of significant service providers, that the bank can share with its supervisor.

Cross-border reach

The reserve would hold four currencies, the association would sit in Switzerland, and the users would be worldwide. A U.S. bank providing services to any part of that system would be dealing with counterparties and activity under several legal systems. Its own obligations would follow U.S. law, but the information it needed to meet them, about the reserve, the association’s governance or a foreign ramp’s customers, might sit abroad and be governed by other countries’ privacy and secrecy rules. We think banks would need contractual rights to that information, tested against the relevant foreign rules, before they relied on it to meet their own compliance duties.

The question the chairman listed

The Senate chairman’s list included how Libra, the association, Calibra and Facebook would all interact. That is a governance question, and banks have a version of it: how would they interact with each of those entities, under which contracts, with which obligations? A bank that could not map its relationship to each would not be ready to serve the network, whatever the network’s own regulatory status.

Objections

Five objections deserve answers.

Libra never launched

The first objection is that Libra did not launch, so the design questions are moot. The specific coin did not launch; the 2022 filing on the sale of the network’s assets said the sellers had been in a pre-launch phase of development. But the structure it described, a reserve of deposits and short-term securities, regulated entry and exit points, and a supervisor for the issuer, is the structure later stablecoin law addressed. The questions a bank would have asked in 2019 are the ones it would ask of any stablecoin it now serves.

Banks could simply decline

The second objection is that banks are not obliged to serve any network, and could avoid these questions by staying out. That is true, and it is a legitimate choice. But a bank does not always know when it is serving a network. A business customer may begin acting as a ramp, or a deposit may come from a reserve, without the bank having set out to participate. The questions in this article are also the questions a bank needs to recognize such activity in its existing customer base.

The testimony was a sales pitch

The third objection is that a witness describing an unlaunched product will put it in the best light, so its design claims are weak evidence. We agree, and we have treated the testimony as a description of intended design, not of an operating system. The argument does not depend on whether the controls would have worked. It depends on where the testimony placed them, and that placement is clear from the record.

Regulators would have filled the gaps

The fourth objection is that regulators, had Libra proceeded, would have imposed requirements that closed the gaps we describe. Perhaps. The hindsight below shows that later law did close some of them. In 2019, a bank could not wait for that law. It had to decide under the rules then in force, and those rules placed the obligations on the bank for its own customers and activity.

Community banks will not see this

A fifth objection is that only large banks would ever hold a global stablecoin’s reserve or serve its major ramps, so the questions are irrelevant to community banks and credit unions. That may be true for the reserve. It is less true for the ramps. A community bank’s business customer may start offering conversion services, or its retail customers may send funds to and receive funds from wallet providers and exchanges. The House chairwoman’s opening statement noted that the Independent Community Bankers of America supported the call for Facebook to pause, which suggests community banks saw their interests engaged. The questions about ramps, sanctions and customer complaints reach any bank whose customers use the network.

What a bank should ask of any stablecoin it touches

The four places translate into four sets of questions a bank can ask of any stablecoin arrangement, whether it is holding reserves, providing custody, serving a ramp or offering conversion directly.

  • Reserve: what share of the reserve would the bank hold, how stable would those deposits be under redemption pressure, and what liquidity would it hold against them?
  • Custody: what would the bank attest to, how often, and would the issuer publish anything that relies on the bank’s records?
  • Ramps: who identifies the customers, what analysis is done on funds arriving from the network, and what limits apply to activity the bank cannot trace?
  • Data: what data does the bank share, with whom, under which exceptions, and with what evidence that the boundaries hold?
  • Supervision: which regulator oversees the issuer, what does that regulator see, and what must the bank verify itself because no one else will?

Starting from the customers the bank already has

A bank does not need a stablecoin proposal on its desk to begin. It can start by asking which of its existing customers already act as ramps, custodians or reserve holders for any digital asset arrangement, and whether those relationships went through the reviews described here. Customer due diligence records, payment monitoring and the bank’s list of money services business customers are the places to look. The answer may be none. If it is not, the bank has a set of relationships that already carry the obligations the Libra testimony described, and that may have been onboarded as ordinary business accounts.

That review is also a test of the bank’s monitoring. If its systems cannot identify payments to and from known wallet providers and exchanges, the bank cannot tell how much of its customers’ activity touches the network, and cannot size the risk. Building that visibility is a sensible step whatever the bank’s strategy for digital assets.

Each question has an owner inside the bank. Reserve and redemption questions belong to treasury and liquidity risk. Custody attestations belong to the custody business and its legal counsel. Ramp questions belong to the anti-money-laundering and sanctions program and to the relationship managers who bring in money services business customers. Data questions belong to privacy and information security. Supervision questions belong to compliance and, where the arrangement is significant, to the bank’s conversations with its own supervisor. A review that collects answers from each owner, before the bank commits, is the practical form of the map this article draws.

After the decision

A bank that decides to serve a stablecoin arrangement takes on a relationship that will change. The issuer’s reserve mix may shift, new ramps may join, the network’s volume may grow, and rules may change, as they did after 2019. We would set triggers for re-review at the start: a change in the reserve’s composition or banks, a material increase in flows through the bank, a new regulatory development, or a significant incident on the network. Each trigger would send the relationship back through the same questions, answered again with current evidence.

A bank that declines should record why, and what would change its mind. That record helps when the question returns, as it may when a customer asks for the service or a competitor offers it. It also shows a supervisor that the bank considered the activity deliberately rather than by default.

Those questions belong in the bank’s new product and third-party risk processes. They would have been the right questions to ask in July 2019, before the answers were written into law, and they remain the questions a bank’s own supervisor would expect it to have answered before it touched the coin.

With hindsight

On January 31, 2022, Silvergate Capital Corporation, the holding company for Silvergate Bank, acquired intellectual property and technology assets for running a blockchain-based payment network from a group of sellers that its Form 8-K listed as the Libra Association, a Swiss association, and its Diem subsidiaries. The filing said the sellers had been in a pre-launch phase of development, and put the aggregate purchase price at $201,150,000 in cash and stock. On March 8, 2023, Silvergate announced its intent to wind down operations and voluntarily liquidate Silvergate Bank, in light of what it called recent industry and regulatory developments, with a plan that included full repayment of all deposits. It said the bank had decided to discontinue the Silvergate Exchange Network, which it had announced on March 3.

The policy questions the hearings raised moved forward without Libra. On November 1, 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, joined by the FDIC and the OCC, released a report on stablecoins. It recommended that Congress require stablecoin issuers to be insured depository institutions, require custodial wallet providers to be subject to appropriate federal oversight, and require issuers to comply with activities restrictions limiting affiliation with commercial entities. It said Congress might also consider limits on custodial wallet providers’ affiliation with commercial entities or use of users’ transaction data.

Congress’s answer became law on July 18, 2025, when the GENIUS Act was approved as Public Law 119-27. The law requires permitted payment stablecoin issuers to hold reserves backing outstanding coins on an at least 1 to 1 basis in listed assets, including coins and currency, balances at a Federal Reserve Bank and demand deposits at insured depository institutions; to publish the monthly composition of their reserves; and to have that monthly report examined by a registered public accounting firm. It treats a permitted issuer as a financial institution for purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act, with an anti-money-laundering program, customer identification, suspicious activity monitoring and the technical capability to block, freeze and reject impermissible transactions. It bars issuers from paying holders interest or yield solely for holding the coin. And it provides that a public company not predominantly engaged in financial activities may not issue a payment stablecoin unless a Stablecoin Certification Review Committee finds unanimously, among other things, that it will comply with data use limits under which, without consumer consent, nonpublic personal information from stablecoin transaction data may not be used to target, personalize or rank advertising or other content, sold to third parties, or shared with non-affiliates. The law takes effect on the earlier of 18 months after enactment or 120 days after the regulators issue final implementing rules.

What held up is the map of where obligations land. The 2025 law placed reserve, disclosure and anti-money-laundering duties on the issuer directly, closing part of the gap the ramp-based model left. It answered the platform question with a conditional bar rather than a wall alone. What we would add today is that banks can still hold the deposits, provide the custody and serve the ramps: the law lists demand deposits at insured depository institutions among the permitted reserve assets. The statute now answers some of the questions a bank would have asked in July 2019, but for the issuer, not for the bank. They remain the bank’s to ask.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.

  • Libra
  • stablecoins
  • Bank Secrecy Act
  • GENIUS Act
  • custody
  • know your customer