NBIB’s 2016 design gave OPM the investigators and DoD their systems; a 2019 order moved both to DoD
On January 22, 2016, the administration announced a background investigations bureau inside the personnel office, with the Defense Department building and running its IT. That split between mission owner and system owner ended in 2019; GAO reported delays in the new system in 2025.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On January 22, 2016, the administration announced a background investigations bureau inside the personnel office, with the Defense Department building and running its IT. That split between mission owner and system owner ended in 2019; GAO reported delays in the new system in 2025.
- The week It also described a separate incident.
- The mission owner: investigators in OPM The fact sheet said NBIB would assume the investigative mission and absorb FIS. [1] By its numbers, FIS served over 100 agencies and conducted approximately 95 percent of all background investigations government-wide. [1] That is a service business: investigators, a queue of cases and customer agencies waiting on results.
- The system owner: DoD builds and runs the IT The fact sheet’s phrase was incorporating security into the fundamental design of the systems. [1] That is a statement about method as well as ownership.
- The data steward: who protects the records OPM’s page described what the stolen background investigation records held.
- The referee: the PAC and the executive agents So the 2016 design added two operators, NBIB and DoD’s IT function, under an existing referee.
- How the split appears in other organizations State agencies that use a central IT department’s platform for licensing, benefits or case management face the NBIB question.
- Objections, in order It did.
- Checks for a program owner who does not own the system List the mission, the system, the data and the oversight roles, and name an owner for each.
- With hindsight The structure announced in January 2016 was put into an executive order that autumn.
The week
On January 22, 2016, the White House published a fact sheet titled “Modernizing & Strengthening the Security & Effectiveness of Federal Background Investigations.” [1] It announced a series of changes to how the federal government performs and safeguards background investigations for its employees and contractors. [1]
The fact sheet tied the changes to the breaches at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2015. [1] The personnel office’s own page on those incidents, in an Internet Archive copy captured on January 10, 2016, described what was taken. [2]
The page said that in June 2015 the office discovered that the background investigation records of current, former and prospective federal employees and contractors had been stolen. [2] It said sensitive information, including the Social Security numbers of 21.5 million individuals, was stolen from the background investigation databases. [2]
The page said that figure included 19.7 million individuals who applied for a background investigation and 1.8 million non-applicants, primarily spouses or co-habitants of applicants. [2] It said some records included findings from interviews conducted by background investigators, and approximately 5.6 million included fingerprints. [2]
It also described a separate incident. It said that earlier in 2015 the office discovered that the personnel data of 4.2 million current and former federal employees had been stolen. [2]
The fact sheet said the administration had responded by starting a 90-Day Suitability and Security review. [1] It said the review was conducted by the interagency Performance Accountability Council (PAC), chaired by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). [1]
The PAC’s members, as the fact sheet listed them, included the Director of National Intelligence and the office’s Director, in their roles as Security and Suitability Executive Agents. [1] It also named the Departments of Defense, the Treasury, Homeland Security, State, Justice and Energy, and the FBI, among others. [1]
That governance structure dated from 2008. Executive Order 13467, signed June 30, 2008, established the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council with OMB’s Deputy Director for Management as chair. [3] It made the OPM Director the Suitability Executive Agent and the Director of National Intelligence the Security Executive Agent. [3] Among the Council’s listed duties was to establish requirements for enterprise information technology. [3]
The fact sheet then described the scale of the office’s investigative work. It said its Federal Investigative Services (FIS) conducted investigations for over 100 federal agencies, approximately 95 percent of all background investigations government-wide. [1] It said that included more than 600,000 security clearance investigations and 400,000 suitability investigations each year. [1]
The central announcement was a new organization. The fact sheet said the administration was establishing the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), a new government-wide service provider that would absorb FIS. [1] NBIB would report to the office’s Director. [1]
The technology was assigned elsewhere. The fact sheet said the Department of Defense (DoD) would assume responsibility for the design, development, security and operation of the background investigations IT systems for the new entity. [1] It said NBIB’s systems would be designed, built, secured and operated by DoD in accordance with NBIB requirements. [1]
The fact sheet listed other features. NBIB’s head would be presidentially appointed and a full member of the PAC. [1] NBIB would take policy direction from the PAC and be accountable to it and to customer agencies. [1] It would be headquartered in Washington, D.C., and have a dedicated senior privacy official. [1]
It named money and advice. The President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget would include $95 million in additional resources for the IT work, the fact sheet said. [1] The PAC would establish an interagency cybersecurity advisory group. [1]
On governance, the fact sheet said the PAC and Executive Agent structure under Executive Order 13467 would remain. [1] It said the administration would establish a Credentialing Executive Agent with policy and oversight responsibility for credentialing, which it said was then spread across multiple agencies. [1]
The fact sheet also listed security steps taken since the 2015 incidents. These included expanding strong authentication for all users, increasing scans for indicators of compromise, patching critical vulnerabilities and tightening policies for privileged users. [1] It said the office had hired a new senior cyber and information technology advisor. [1]
Finally, it described a transition team in Washington. The team’s tasks included standing up NBIB, transitioning the management of FIS IT systems to DoD and migrating FIS’s mission, personnel and support structure. [1] The PAC and the Performance Improvement Council would develop outcome-based metrics for the vetting process. [1]
The January 2016 announcement is remembered as the government’s institutional answer to the OPM breach. [1] Its design choice deserves more attention than its name. It put the investigators in one department and the systems they would depend on in another. [1]
Our argument is that the NBIB design tested a split other organizations also attempt: a mission owner that does not own its technology. The fact sheet gave OPM the people, the customers and the accountability, and gave DoD the build, the security and the operation of the IT. [1] In 2019, an executive order moved primary responsibility for the investigations to DoD as well. [5]
The split is worth studying outside government. Banks run on processors they do not own. Health systems run on vendor platforms. State programs run on central IT. Each faces the question NBIB faced: how a mission owner stays accountable for outcomes that depend on someone else’s delivery. The 2016 design answered with requirements, metrics and a referee. [1] The record that followed shows where those answers held and where they did not. [5] [6]
We take the split in four parts, each a different role the design had to assign:
- The mission owner: who runs the investigations and answers to customer agencies.
- The system owner: who designs, builds, secures and operates the technology.
- The data steward: who protects the investigative records and decides how they are used.
- The referee: who sets policy, measures performance and settles disputes between the others.
The parts do not overlap. The first is about operations and workforce, the second about technology delivery, the third about the records themselves, and the fourth about oversight. After them we look at how the same split appears in other organizations, take the objections in order, and end with checks for a program owner who does not own the system.
The mission owner: investigators in OPM
What NBIB inherited
The fact sheet said NBIB would assume the investigative mission and absorb FIS. [1] By its numbers, FIS served over 100 agencies and conducted approximately 95 percent of all background investigations government-wide. [1] That is a service business: investigators, a queue of cases and customer agencies waiting on results.
The fact sheet said NBIB would concentrate solely on providing effective, efficient and secure background investigations. [1] It would report to the OPM Director. [1] Its head would be presidentially appointed and a full member of the PAC. [1]
A seat at the referee’s table
The fact sheet made NBIB’s head a full member of the PAC. [1] That gave the mission owner a voice in the body that sets policy and measures performance. It is a meaningful lever. A mission owner that can raise a delivery problem at the council where the system owner also sits has a forum to resolve it.
The fact sheet did not say DoD’s IT function would hold a separate seat for this purpose; DoD was already listed among the PAC’s participants in the review. [1] In our reading, both halves of the split were represented at the referee’s table, which is a precondition for the referee to act on disputes between them.
What the mission owner controls
In this design, the mission owner controlled the work: how investigations are staffed, scheduled, quality-checked and delivered. It also controlled the relationship with customer agencies, which the fact sheet said NBIB would be accountable to. [1]
It did not control the tools of that work. The plan gave DoD the design, development, security and operation of the background investigations IT systems. [1] In our reading, that covered the case management, the forms intake, the records repository and the security of all of them. For an investigative workforce, those systems are the workplace. An investigator’s productivity depends on how quickly a case can be opened, records can be pulled and a report can be filed.
What the mission is measured on
The fact sheet named the measures it expected: security, investigative and adjudicative quality, cost, timeliness, reciprocity, customer service and other performance characteristics. [1] Several of those belong to the mission owner alone. Investigative quality is about the investigators’ work. Customer service is about how NBIB treats agencies.
Others are shared. Timeliness depends on staff and on systems. Cost depends on how much work the systems automate. Security depends almost entirely on the systems. A scorecard that mixes these without saying which owner moves each number invites the two owners to argue about the score instead of improving it.
What investigators need from the systems
An investigation is a sequence of records: the applicant’s form, record checks against other databases, interviews, the investigator’s report and the adjudicator’s decision. Each step touches a system. In our reading of the 2016 design, every one of those systems was to be designed and run by DoD. [1]
That makes the investigator a daily user of another department’s product. The quality of that product shows up in hours: time spent re-entering data, waiting for record checks or working around a missing feature. Those hours are the mission owner’s cost and the system owner’s backlog.
Accountability without the levers
The design created a familiar problem: accountability for outcomes that depend on someone else’s delivery. Customer agencies would hold NBIB accountable for timeliness and quality. [1] Timeliness depends in part on the systems. If the systems were slow to arrive, NBIB would answer for delays it could not fix on its own.
The fact sheet anticipated part of this. It said NBIB’s systems would be built in accordance with NBIB requirements. [1] That makes NBIB the customer of DoD’s build. A requirement is a lever, but a weaker one than a budget line or a reporting relationship.
The workforce in transition
The transition team’s tasks included migrating the existing mission, functions, personnel and support structure of OPM FIS to NBIB. [1] It also had to provide continuity of service to customer agencies during the transition. [1]
That is two transitions at once. The workforce moved from one organizational label to another inside OPM. The systems moved from OPM management to DoD management. [1] Each carried risk to continuity. Running them in parallel meant any delay in one could stall the other.
The transition team itself shows the challenge. It had five listed tasks, from standing up NBIB to providing continuity of service to customer agencies. [1] Its tasks crossed both halves of the split. A team with authority over only one half would struggle with the other. The fact sheet placed the team in Washington, near both. [1]
The system owner: DoD builds and runs the IT
What DoD was given
The fact sheet said DoD would assume responsibility for the design, development, security and operation of the background investigations IT systems for the new entity. [1] It gave the reason: to bring DoD’s national security, IT and cybersecurity expertise to bear and to incorporate security into the fundamental design of the systems. [1]
The fact sheet attached $95 million in additional resources in the President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget for developing these IT capabilities. [1] It said the PAC would establish an interagency cybersecurity advisory group to advise on system development and threat mitigation. [1]
Security built in, not added later
The fact sheet’s phrase was incorporating security into the fundamental design of the systems. [1] That is a statement about method as well as ownership. A system designed with security from the start makes different choices about data storage, access paths and logging than one secured after it is built.
The method has a cost in time. Security design reviews, threat modeling and accreditation add steps before a system goes live. A mission owner waiting for new tools experiences those steps as delay. The design accepted that cost on the mission owner’s behalf.
Why separate the system from the mission
The logic was security. The breaches had taken data from OPM’s systems. [2] Moving the systems to a department the fact sheet credited with significant cybersecurity expertise was a direct response. [1] The fact sheet framed it as creating a more secure and effective infrastructure. [1]
There was also a modernization logic. The fact sheet linked the plan to the Federal Chief Information Officer’s call for agencies to phase out legacy IT where possible. [1] A new build by a new owner can avoid inheriting the old system’s design.
The advisory group
The fact sheet said the PAC would establish an interagency cybersecurity advisory group to provide advice and counsel on system development and threat mitigation. [1] An advisory group can widen the expertise available to a build. It does not own delivery. In a split design, it is a third voice in decisions already shared between two owners.
Funding the build
The fact sheet said the President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget would include $95 million in additional resources dedicated to developing the IT capabilities. [1] It did not say, in the passage we read, which agency’s account would carry the money.
That detail matters in a split. The party that holds the funds sets the pace. If the funds sit with the system owner, the mission owner’s requirements compete with the system owner’s other work. If they sit with the mission owner, the system owner works as a contractor paid per deliverable. Each arrangement has different incentives. The choice should be explicit.
Who accepts delivered work
In any build, someone decides when a release is good enough to use. In a split, that decision is contested. The system owner can declare a release complete against its reading of the requirements. The mission owner can refuse to use it if it does not support the work.
A clear acceptance process, with test cases written by the mission owner and signed off before release, settles that in advance. Without one, a system can be delivered on paper and unused in fact, while both owners report progress.
What separation costs
Separation adds a contract-like boundary inside government. The mission owner writes requirements. The system owner interprets them, schedules them and decides trade-offs among them. Each change becomes a request across that boundary.
For a workforce that uses the system every day, the boundary shows up as friction. A form that needs a new field, a report that needs a new filter, a workflow that needs a new step: each must be specified, prioritized and delivered by another department. In our reading, the design traded speed of change for security of build.
Requirements as the interface
In a split, requirements are the interface between the two owners. The fact sheet said NBIB’s systems would be built in accordance with NBIB requirements. [1] That puts weight on how well the mission owner can write them.
Writing requirements for an investigative system is a skill of its own. It needs people who understand the investigative process and can express it in terms a development team can build and test. A mission owner staffed with investigators and managers may lack that capacity at the start. If it does, the system owner fills the gap with its own assumptions.
The 2008 order had already given the Council the duty to establish requirements for enterprise information technology. [3] In our reading, the 2016 design left three parties with a hand in requirements: the PAC, NBIB and DoD as builder. Clear rules on whose requirement wins are a precondition for delivery.
Legacy systems in the meantime
The fact sheet said the transition team would transition the management of FIS IT systems to DoD. [1] In our reading, that meant DoD was to run the old systems while building new ones. OPM’s page said the background investigation records had been stolen from the background investigation databases. [2]
That period of dual operation is where the split is exposed. The mission owner depends on old systems that the system owner did not design and is replacing. Neither party has full control. The plan’s security steps, such as strong authentication and more scans, were the bridge. [1]
The data steward: who protects the records
What the records contain
OPM’s page described what the stolen background investigation records held. Beyond Social Security numbers, it said some records included findings from interviews conducted by investigators, and approximately 5.6 million included fingerprints. [2] It also said usernames and passwords applicants used to fill out their forms were stolen. [2]
Those records are the product of the investigative workforce. They also contain information about people who never applied for anything: OPM counted 1.8 million non-applicants, primarily spouses or co-habitants. [2]
Fingerprints cannot be reissued
OPM’s page said approximately 5.6 million of the stolen records included fingerprints. [2] A stolen password can be changed. A stolen fingerprint cannot. Biometric records therefore carry a permanent exposure once lost.
For a data steward, that changes the retention question. Keeping biometrics only as long as needed, and separating them from other identifying data where the process allows, limits what a future breach can take. Those are design decisions, which in the 2016 split sat with the system owner. [1]
Records about people who never applied
OPM’s count of 1.8 million non-applicants, primarily spouses or co-habitants, marks a feature of investigative data. [2] It holds information about people who are not the subject of the investigation and have no relationship with the agency.
Those people cannot consent in any practical sense, and they may not know the records exist. A steward deciding retention, access and sharing for investigative files has to account for them. Their interests are present in the data even though they are absent from the process.
Who decides use and who guards storage
The design split stewardship too. NBIB, inside OPM, would generate and use the records. DoD would secure the systems that held them. [1] NBIB would have a dedicated senior privacy official to advance privacy by design. [1]
In our reading, that creates two stewards with different questions. The privacy official asks what the records should contain, who may see them and for how long. The system owner asks how to keep them from being stolen. Both are necessary. Neither alone answers whether a given use is appropriate and safe.
Privacy by design in a split
The fact sheet gave NBIB’s senior privacy official the task of advancing privacy by design. [1] Privacy by design is a build-time discipline. It means decisions about what to collect, how long to keep it and who may see it are made into the system’s structure.
In the 2016 design, the build belonged to DoD. [1] So the privacy official sat in the mission organization while the design work happened in the system organization. For privacy by design to work across that boundary, the official needs standing in the build’s decisions: a seat at design reviews, a sign-off on data models, and a channel to escalate. Without those, privacy becomes a review of finished work.
Delegation as the legal link
The later executive order shows how the split was stitched together in law. It said the Secretary of Defense would operate the database containing clearance-related data, consistent with and following an explicit delegation from the Director of OPM. [4] The legal authority stayed with OPM. The operation moved to DoD.
The same pattern appears in shared services: authority in one place, operation in another, linked by a delegation. The delegation is where accountability is written down. Its terms on security, access and incident handling decide what each side owes the other when something goes wrong.
Security steps already in place
The fact sheet listed measures taken since the 2015 incidents. [1] They were strong authentication for all users, more scans for indicators of compromise, patching of critical vulnerabilities, tighter policies for privileged users, and extra security for high value assets. [1] These are controls on the existing systems, under OPM’s management at that time.
It also tied the work to government-wide efforts: the 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint and the Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan. [1] The data steward’s role, then, sat across agency and government-wide programs at once.
Continuous evaluation and more data
The fact sheet listed related reforms. It mentioned programs to continuously evaluate personnel with security clearances, and recommendations to enhance information sharing with state, local and federal law enforcement during background investigations. [1]
Continuous evaluation means more data, collected more often, about more people already cleared. Each new feed adds records the steward must protect and a use the privacy official must justify. The design that split stewardship in 2016 was about to carry more data, not less.
The referee: the PAC and the executive agents
Governance kept in place
The fact sheet said the PAC and Executive Agent structure under Executive Order 13467 would remain. [1] That order, from 2008, made OMB’s Deputy Director for Management the Council’s chair and gave it duties that included holding agencies accountable and establishing requirements for enterprise IT. [3]
So the 2016 design added two operators, NBIB and DoD’s IT function, under an existing referee. The referee did not change. Its load did.
The missing credentialing agent
The fact sheet identified a gap. It said responsibility for credentialing was spread across multiple agencies, and that the administration would establish a Credentialing Executive Agent paralleling the Security and Suitability Executive Agents. [1]
Credentials are where vetting meets daily operations: the card that opens a door or a network. A gap there touches every agency’s facilities and systems. Naming an owner was the governance step that matched the operating reality.
Metrics as the referee’s tool
The fact sheet said the PAC and the Performance Improvement Council would develop and revise outcome-based metrics. [1] It listed security, investigative and adjudicative quality, cost, timeliness, reciprocity and customer service among them. [1]
In our reading, metrics are what let a referee manage a split. Without them, the mission owner and the system owner can each point to the other. With them, a delay can be traced to the step where it occurred. The metrics also give customer agencies a basis to judge the service they pay for.
Reciprocity
The 2008 order called for a reciprocal and aligned system. [3] Reciprocity means one agency accepts another’s investigation or clearance determination instead of repeating it. The fact sheet listed reciprocity among the metrics. [1]
Reciprocity depends on shared records. If an agency cannot see another agency’s completed investigation, it cannot accept it. In our reading, that made the system owner’s design a reciprocity question as much as a security question. A system that serves one department’s needs well but shares poorly with others would undercut the referee’s own goal.
Clearance counts and reinvestigation
The fact sheet listed earlier reforms. It cited a five-year reinvestigation requirement for all individuals with a security clearance, regardless of access level, and a 17 percent reduction in the number of individuals with active clearances. [1]
Both are workload levers. A shorter reinvestigation cycle adds cases. Fewer active clearances removes them. The referee that sets those policies sets the mission owner’s volume and, through it, the load on the system owner’s tools. Policy choices at the top flow down to both halves of the split.
Customer agencies as a check
The fact sheet said NBIB would be accountable to the PAC and to its customer agencies for continuous improvement of the investigative process. [1] Customer agencies see the service from outside: how long a case takes, how complete a report is, how often a case is returned. Their view is a check the two owners cannot fully control.
For that check to work, customer agencies need regular, comparable data and a channel to raise problems. A service provider that reports only in aggregate makes it hard for any one customer to see whether its own cases are being handled well. Per-customer reporting turns customer accountability from a phrase into a practice.
Metrics need reliable data
Metrics are only as good as the data behind them. GAO’s 2025 report illustrates the point for the clearance process. It said ODNI’s clearance timeliness data were not sufficiently reliable for GAO to determine how many agencies met timeliness objectives. [6]
GAO said the Intelligence Community Inspector General reported in November 2023 that multiple intelligence community elements did not accurately collect, document and report required timeliness information. [6] It said timeliness data for a sample of six agencies contained inaccuracies. [6]
In our reading, a referee managing a split needs the data pipeline for its metrics to be as deliberate as the metrics themselves. Each owner should know how its numbers are calculated, and the calculations should be checked.
The referee’s limits
A council chaired by OMB can set policy, measure and arbitrate. It does not run either the investigations or the systems. When a build runs late, the referee can report the delay. It cannot staff the build.
How the split appears in other organizations
A state agency on a shared services platform
State agencies that use a central IT department’s platform for licensing, benefits or case management face the NBIB question. The program owns the caseload and the public’s complaints. The central IT department owns the build and the security. The checks at the end of this piece apply directly.
A county using a state system
Counties that administer state programs on state-run systems are in a sharper version. The county’s workers depend on a system the county does not specify alone, cannot change and may not see the roadmap for. Accountability to residents sits with the county either way.
A bank on a core processor
A community bank or credit union that runs on an outsourced core platform owns the customer relationship and the regulatory accountability. The processor owns the build. The bank’s influence comes from its contract and its participation in user groups. The bank remains the regulated party for what the processor does on its behalf, in our reading, and should keep evidence of how it oversees that work. The NBIB design’s reliance on requirements is the same lever.
A health system on a vendor platform
A health system running a vendor-hosted electronic health record owns patient care and the clinical workflow. The vendor owns the code and much of the hosting. Requests for change travel across the same kind of boundary NBIB faced. The health system’s metrics on system performance are its evidence when it asks for priority.
A broker-dealer or bank with an outsourced function
A broker-dealer that outsources trade surveillance, or a bank that outsources its anti-money-laundering monitoring platform, keeps the regulatory duty. The vendor runs the system. The firm’s compliance staff work inside it every day. The questions in the NBIB design apply: who writes requirements, who accepts releases, who protects the data, and who referees disputes. Supervisors will hold the firm accountable whichever party built the tool.
A federal agency buying investigations
For an agency that bought investigations from NBIB, the split was mostly invisible. Its contract was with the service provider. The agency’s own exposure came through the data it sent and the delays it experienced. An agency in that position can ask its provider who runs the systems holding its employees’ records, and how that party reports security incidents.
An agency’s own IT department
Inside a single agency, the same split appears between program offices and the CIO’s organization. The program owns outcomes. The CIO owns the platform. The fact sheet’s design made that internal split into an interdepartmental one, with a formal boundary and two budgets. [1]
A contractor workforce
The fact sheet covered investigations for contractors as well as employees. [1] Defense and civilian contractors whose staff need clearances depended on the same pipeline. For them, any delay in the pipeline is a delay in putting cleared staff on contracts.
Objections, in order
1. Security had to come first after the breach
It did. OPM’s page described the theft of sensitive information on 21.5 million individuals. [2] Moving the build to a department the fact sheet credited with significant cybersecurity expertise had a clear rationale. [1] The argument here is not that the choice was wrong. It is that the split created a dependency that needed active management and metrics from the start.
2. DoD was a major customer anyway
The fact sheet did not give DoD’s share of the caseload, so we do not state one. The 2019 order said the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 gave the Secretary of Defense authority to conduct investigations for DoD personnel. [5] That points to DoD’s weight as a customer. A large customer running the build has incentives aligned with the mission. It may still set priorities that favor its own cases.
3. Requirements give the mission owner control
Requirements give influence. Control comes from budget, staff and the authority to accept or reject delivered work. The fact sheet put the build funding in the President’s budget for the IT capabilities. [1] In our reading, whoever held that money would decide much of what got built first.
4. The split was temporary
It ended in 2019, when the investigations followed the systems to DoD. [5] That outcome supports the argument. A split that resolves by merging the two halves shows where the seam was.
5. Any reorganization causes delay
True. The question is whether the delay is measured and owned. The fact sheet’s metrics plan was the right tool. [1] The record that followed shows IT delivery slipping. [6]
6. Putting both halves under DoD solved the problem
The 2019 order joined the mission and the systems in one department. [5] GAO’s 2025 report still described delays in the NBIS system and gaps in cybersecurity planning and privacy controls for it. [6] Unifying ownership removed one seam. It did not by itself deliver the system. Delivery capacity is a separate question from organizational design. A single owner still needs a reliable schedule, a reliable cost estimate and an oversight process, which GAO found lacking in parts of the NBIS effort. [6]
7. The breach, not the structure, was the problem
The breach was the trigger. [1] The structure was the response, and it shaped what came next. A response that splits a mission from its tools creates its own operating risks, which have to be managed alongside the original one.
Checks for a program owner who does not own the system
Write down who owns what
List the mission, the system, the data and the oversight roles, and name an owner for each. The NBIB plan named them. [1]
Tie the build to the mission’s metrics
Agree on metrics that cover both sides: case timeliness and quality for the mission owner, delivery dates and availability for the system owner. Report them together.
Put the requirements in a governed backlog
Keep a single, visible backlog of requirements with dates and a named decision-maker for priority. Review it at the level where both owners report.
Plan for dual operation
When a new system replaces an old one, set controls for the old one until it is retired. The 2016 plan’s interim security steps were that bridge. [1]
Give the data steward a seat
Make the privacy official a party to system design decisions, not a reviewer after the fact. The 2016 plan gave NBIB a senior privacy official. [1]
Check the data behind the metrics
Before relying on a shared scorecard, test how each number is calculated from source records. GAO found timeliness data for the clearance process unreliable in its 2025 review. [6]
Fund the build where the accountability is
Decide which owner holds the build budget, and make sure the other owner can see how it is spent. Tie releases to the mission owner’s acceptance.
Share one risk register
Keep a single risk register for the program that both owners update. A risk in the system, such as a delayed release, should sit next to its effect on the mission, such as a growing case backlog.
Test continuity across the boundary
Run an exercise in which the system owner’s platform fails and the mission owner must keep working. Record who decides on workarounds and how customers are told.
Agree on incident notice
Agree in writing how fast the system owner tells the mission owner about a security incident, and what the notice contains. The mission owner answers to customers and the people in the records.
Set a decision date
Decide in advance when the split will be reviewed, and what evidence would lead to combining or separating the roles.
With hindsight
The structure announced in January 2016 was put into an executive order that autumn. Executive Order 13741, signed September 29, 2016 and published October 4, 2016, amended Executive Order 13467. [4]
It defined NBIB as a bureau established within OPM with responsibility for conducting effective, efficient and secure personnel background investigations. [4] It required NBIB to have dedicated resources, including a senior privacy official, and to be headquartered in or near Washington, D.C. [4]
It assigned the technology in the terms the fact sheet had used. The Secretary of Defense was to design, develop, deploy, operate, secure, defend and continuously update and modernize, as necessary, the background investigation IT systems that support NBIB. [4] It said the Secretary would operate the database relevant to clearance decisions, following an explicit delegation from the OPM Director. [4]
It also asked the PAC to recommend governance changes. One was to create a Credentialing Executive Agent with authorities paralleling the Security and Suitability Executive Agents. [4]
The split did not last. On April 24, 2019, Executive Order 13869 transferred primary responsibility for background investigations government-wide from OPM to DoD. [5] It cited section 925 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which it said gave the Secretary of Defense authority to conduct background investigations for DoD personnel and required a phased transition to DoD of those investigations then conducted by NBIB. [5]
The order directed the renaming of the Defense Security Service as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). [5] It said DCSA would serve as the primary entity for conducting background investigations for the federal government no later than June 24, 2019. [5] It described a transition period ending on or before September 30, 2019. [5]
It also reassigned the systems in broader terms. The Secretary of Defense was to design and operate IT systems that support all personnel vetting processes conducted by DoD. [5] The order required reports to the President every 180 days until the transfer was complete. [5]
GAO later reported delays in the IT build. Its high-risk report published February 25, 2025 said DCSA conducts background investigations for 95 percent of the federal workforce. [6] It described DCSA’s National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) as an IT system critical to the Trusted Workforce 2.0 reform, replacing legacy personnel vetting systems. [6]
GAO said DoD planned for NBIS to be fully operational in 2019 but missed that goal and later goals. [6] It said that in early 2024 DoD notified Congress it would not meet its goal of being operational by the second quarter of fiscal year 2025. [6] It said DoD finalized a new NBIS roadmap in September 2024 with milestones through fiscal year 2027. [6]
GAO also said OPM had taken some steps to strengthen its IT environment where legacy systems still reside. [6] It found that DoD had not fully planned for the cybersecurity of, or fully implemented privacy controls for, NBIS and legacy systems. [6] It attributed that largely to the absence of an oversight process that would ensure accountability. [6]
As of January 2025, GAO counted 12 open recommendations to ODNI and DoD in the area. [6] It rated leadership commitment and action plan as met, the latter raised since its 2023 update, and capacity, monitoring and demonstrated progress as partially met. [6]
What held up from 2016 is the governance spine. The PAC and executive agents remained, and GAO’s 2025 report describes the PAC overseeing the personnel vetting reform it initiated in 2018. [6] What did not hold up is the split. The investigations followed the systems to DoD in 2019, and the system that was to replace the legacy tools was still being built as of GAO’s 2025 report. [5] [6]
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