OCC’s 2017 violation labels asked whether a bank had documented a problem before examiners found it

On May 23, 2017, the OCC told examiners to label each violation new, self-identified or repeat, and to close a corrected one only after validating the fix. In our reading, that made a bank’s own records the evidence for how its violations were counted.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

On May 23, 2017, the OCC told examiners to label each violation new, self-identified or repeat, and to close a corrected one only after validating the fix. In our reading, that made a bank’s own records the evidence for how its violations were counted.

  1. The week The bulletin gave its origin.
  2. The label: what made a violation self-identified The first part asks what a bank had to show.
  3. The memory: the five-year repeat test The second part asks how far back a violation’s history reached.
  4. The format: findings that became tracked obligations The third part asks what each violation contained.
  5. The closure: from open to closed The fourth part asks how a violation ended.
  6. How the bulletin reached different institutions The bulletin applied to OCC examinations of national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies. [1] It did not apply to state banks supervised by other agencies, or to credit unions.
  7. Objections, in order The bulletin was addressed to bank chief executives as well as examiners, and it set rules for what banks would receive in writing. [1] The labels appeared in the bank’s reports. [1] They were the OCC’s bookkeeping and they reached the bank.
  8. What compliance and risk leaders could check The four parts translate into checks any bank can run on its own issue records.
  9. With hindsight The bulletin did not last long as a separate document.

The week

On May 23, 2017, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued Bulletin 2017-18, Violations of Laws and Regulations. [1] It was addressed to the chief executive officers of all national banks and federal savings associations, to OCC department and division heads, to all examining personnel and to other interested parties. [1] The bulletin said the OCC had updated its policies and procedures for violations, effective July 1, 2017. [1]

The updates were reflected in four booklets of the Comptroller’s Handbook: Bank Supervision Process, Community Bank Supervision, Federal Branches and Agencies, and Large Bank Supervision. [1] They also appeared in other handbook sections and internal guidance. [1] A note for community banks said the policies applied to examinations of all national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies. [1]

The bulletin gave its origin. In December 2013, a report titled An International Review of OCC’s Supervision of Large and Midsize Institutions recommended that the OCC analyze its process for matters requiring attention and consider developing controls. [1] In October 2014, the OCC had issued Bulletin 2014-52 on matters requiring attention in response. [1] [2] The OCC then decided its process for violations could benefit from similar treatment. [1] The bulletin described itself as an extension of Bulletin 2014-52. [1]

Bulletin 2014-52, dated October 30, 2014, had set a format for matters requiring attention, known as the Five Cs: concern, cause, consequence, corrective action and commitment. [2] It had labeled open concerns as new or repeat, among other categories, and closed a concern when the OCC verified and validated the effectiveness and sustainability of the corrective action, or when a change in the bank’s circumstances meant the practice was no longer a concern. [2]

The 2017 bulletin set three goals for violations. Enhance standard processes for communicating, tracking and resolving them. Make sure the OCC overall and each line of business analyze the volume and trends in violations to see whether risks are changing. And use consistent terms and monitoring within and across lines of business. [1]

It set a standard format for communicating a violation. Each would include the legal citation and description, a summary of the relevant requirement, the facts and root causes, the corrective actions required, and the board and management’s commitments to corrective action. [1] The bulletin also said examiners should convey how violations relate to matters requiring attention, to CAMELS, ITCC or ROCA ratings, and to the bank’s risk appetite and profile. [1]

On communication, the bulletin set firm rules. Examiners must communicate all OCC-identified violations. [1] Substantive violations had to go in a report of examination or supervisory letter, including substantive self-identified violations in certain circumstances. [1] Less substantive OCC-identified violations left out of a report or letter had to be communicated in a separate written document. [1] Examiners had discretion over whether less substantive self-identified violations warranted a separate written document. [1] If management failed to correct a violation communicated in a separate document, the examiner should include it in the next report or letter. [1]

The first time an examiner communicated a violation, it had to carry one or more labels. [1] New meant the OCC had not communicated the same or a substantially similar violation in writing during the previous five years. [1] Self-identified meant there was evidence the board or management was aware of the violation and had documented and disclosed it to the OCC before or during the examination. [1] Repeat meant the OCC had communicated the violation in writing in the previous five years, and new violations of the same or similar law had occurred after the bank was notified. [1]

After follow-up, examiners would label each violation past due, pending validation or closed. [1] The bulletin was signed by the OCC’s Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief National Bank Examiner. [1]

A violation of law is a fact about a bank. How a supervisor records it is a choice. Bulletin 2017-18 made that choice explicit. Every violation would carry a label when first communicated and a status after follow-up. [1] Two of the labels and all three statuses turned on evidence. [1] And the evidence that decided them came, in large part, from the bank’s own records.

Our argument is that the bulletin made a bank’s issue records the deciding evidence for how its violations were counted. A violation was self-identified only if the bank had documented and disclosed it before or during the examination. [1] It was repeat if the OCC had communicated a similar violation in writing within five years. [1] A corrected violation was closed only after the OCC verified and validated the fix; the other routes to closure were a change in circumstances or a finding that it was uncorrectable. [1] Each label rewarded a bank that kept good records and exposed one that did not.

We take the bulletin in four parts:

  1. The label: what a bank had to show for a violation to count as self-identified rather than new.
  2. The memory: how the five-year repeat test reached back into a bank’s history.
  3. The format: how the required elements of a violation became tracked obligations.
  4. The closure: what it took to move a violation from open to closed.

The first part is about the moment of discovery. The second is about history. The third is about the content of a finding. The fourth is about resolution. Together they cover a violation from the day it is found to the day it is closed. After the four parts, we look at how the bulletin reached different institutions, answer objections in order, and list what compliance and risk leaders could check.

A note on sources and our reading. We describe the 2017 policy from the bulletin itself, which the OCC has since rescinded, and from Bulletin 2014-52, which it extended. [1] [2] We describe later developments from the OCC’s 2018 bulletin, its current handbook booklet and the 2025 and 2026 rulemaking with the FDIC. [3] [4] [5] [6] The bulletin set procedures for OCC examiners. What it meant for a bank’s internal processes is our reading, and banks should confirm their obligations with counsel.

The label: what made a violation self-identified

The first part asks what a bank had to show. The bulletin’s definition was specific. A violation was self-identified when there was evidence that the board or management was aware of it and had documented and disclosed it to the OCC before or during the examination. [1]

Three elements

The definition has three elements. Awareness: someone with authority knew. Documentation: the bank had recorded it. Disclosure: the bank had told the OCC, before or during the exam. [1] All three had to be shown by evidence. A bank that knew of a problem but had not written it down did not meet the test. A bank that had written it down but not told the OCC did not either.

In our reading, the disclosure element was the easiest to miss. A compliance team can find and track an issue internally with no routine for telling the supervisor before the examiners arrive. The bulletin made that routine the difference between two labels.

Where self-identification can come from

The bulletin listed the sources. A self-identified violation can arise from customer complaints, risk and control self-assessments, independent risk management, internal audit reviews or third-party reviews. [1] That list maps onto the three lines of a bank’s control structure. The business finds problems through complaints and self-assessments. Risk management finds them through independent review. Audit finds them through testing. Outside reviewers find them under contract.

Each source produces its own records. A complaint system logs complaints. An audit system logs findings. A risk system logs control failures. In our reading, the bulletin rewarded a bank that could pull those records together and show that a given violation appeared in one of them, with a date, before the examiners found it.

Why the label mattered

The bulletin did not say what consequence attached to each label. It did say examiners should convey how violations relate to matters requiring attention, ratings and the bank’s risk appetite. [1] In our reading, a self-identified violation told the examiner that the bank’s controls had worked, at least as detection. A new violation found by examiners told the opposite. The same underlying problem could therefore say different things about the bank’s management, depending on the record.

Before or during the examination

The bulletin allowed disclosure before or during the examination. [1] That window has an edge. A violation the bank disclosed on the first day of an exam met the test. One the examiners raised before the bank mentioned it did not. In our reading, a bank preparing for an exam should list its known open violations and disclose them at the start, so no examiner finds one first.

Disclosure between exams is cleaner still. A bank that sends its supervisor a periodic summary of self-identified violations creates a dated record of disclosure. When the next exam comes, the evidence of awareness, documentation and disclosure already exists.

Evidence of awareness at the right level

The definition named the board or management as the parties who had to be aware. [1] A problem known only to a front-line employee did not count. In our reading, the evidence of awareness is an escalation record: a committee report, a management memo, a risk acceptance or a remediation plan that a manager signed. The path from a front-line finding to a management record is therefore part of the label. A bank whose findings stall below management cannot show awareness at the level the bulletin required.

Communication of self-identified violations

The bulletin treated self-identified violations differently in how they were written up. Substantive self-identified violations went into a report of examination or supervisory letter only in certain circumstances. [1] For less substantive self-identified violations, examiners had discretion over whether a separate written document was warranted. [1] OCC-identified violations had no such discretion: examiners must communicate them all. [1] The current handbook booklet carries the same distinction. [4]

That difference in treatment gave the label practical weight. A bank that self-identified a less substantive violation might see it handled more lightly in writing. A bank that let examiners find it would see it written up. The difference turned on the bank’s records.

When the label is disputed

The bulletin made labeling the examiner’s job. [1] A bank that believed a violation should be self-identified had one tool: its records. In our reading, the strongest case is a dated internal record showing awareness at management level, plus a dated record of disclosure to the OCC. A bank that can produce both at the exit meeting has a simple argument. One that relies on recollection has a weak one.

That dynamic shapes how a bank should keep records. An issue logged with a date, an owner and a link to the disclosure is evidence. An issue discussed in a meeting and not minuted is not. The difference costs little at the time and decides the label later.

The memory: the five-year repeat test

The second part asks how far back a violation’s history reached. The bulletin’s answer was five years. [1]

The two definitions together

New and repeat were defined against each other. New meant the OCC had not communicated the same or a substantially similar violation in writing during the previous five-year period. [1] Repeat meant the OCC had communicated it in writing in that period and new violations of the same or similar law occurred after the board or management was notified. [1] The repeat label applied even if the earlier violation had been self-identified. [1]

What repeat said about management

The bulletin said what a repeat violation could indicate. It may be substantive, or a sign that management failed to fix the deficient practices behind it. [1] It may show that management lacks the commitment or ability to ensure prompt correction and prevention. [1] Or it may show that the board has not exercised appropriate oversight or held management accountable for remediation. [1]

Those are serious statements about governance. In our reading, they made a repeat violation a finding about the board and management as well as the rule broken. A compliance officer who saw a repeat label coming would know the conversation had moved from the rule to leadership.

Substantially similar

The test reached beyond identical violations to substantially similar ones. [1] That phrase widened the memory. A bank that fixed one disclosure error on one product, then made a similar error on another product, could face a repeat label. In our reading, the bank’s defense lay in showing that its fix had addressed the deficient practice behind the instance. That requires records of root cause and remediation, which the third part takes up.

The OCC’s side of the memory

The bulletin also set a goal for the OCC itself. It said the OCC overall, and each line of business, would analyze the volume and trends in violations to determine whether risks are changing. [1] Consistent labels made that analysis possible across banks. A repeat label in one bank and a new label in another were now comparable categories.

In our reading, that meant a bank’s violations fed a supervisory dataset. A rising count of repeat violations in one area across many banks could shape where the OCC looked next. A bank whose own records matched the OCC’s categories could see its position in that picture before the examiners described it.

The bank’s own five-year record

The OCC kept its own record of what it had communicated. A bank that wanted to anticipate the repeat test needed a matching record. It had to know, for each area of law, what violations the OCC had cited in writing in the past five years and what the bank had done about each. In our reading, that is a basic register: violation, date communicated, law cited, root cause, corrective action, status. Without it, a bank could not predict which new findings would carry the repeat label.

Five years is long in a bank’s life. Staff turn over. Systems change. Products are launched and withdrawn. A bank that kept its regulatory findings in individual email folders or departmental files would struggle to rebuild the history. One that kept them in a central issue system could search it.

Acquisitions and inherited history

The repeat test asks whether the OCC communicated a similar violation in writing to the bank within five years. [1] In our reading, a bank that acquires another, or merges charters, has to decide how to treat the other institution’s history. Its own register should at least record the acquired bank’s cited violations, their causes and their status. Otherwise a problem that the acquired bank had been told about could resurface under the combined bank without anyone recognizing it.

An integration plan can cover systems, customers and staff and still miss the regulatory history. That history deserves a line in the plan, with an owner who maps the acquired bank’s open and recent findings into the combined register.

The format: findings that became tracked obligations

The third part asks what each violation contained. The bulletin required five elements: the legal citation and description, a summary of the requirement, the facts and root causes, the corrective actions required, and the board and management’s commitments. [1]

Root cause as a required element

The facts supporting the violation and its root cause were required content. [1] That follows Bulletin 2014-52, whose Five Cs included cause, the root cause of a concern when evident. [2] In our reading, requiring a root cause changes what a fix means. Correcting the instance answers the violation. Correcting the cause answers the practice that produced it.

The current handbook makes the link explicit. It says violations are often the result of deficient practices, and that correcting violations alone frequently does not address those practices. [4] If management has not corrected the practices, examiners must communicate the concern in a matter requiring attention. [4] So a violation with an unaddressed root cause can produce a second finding.

Who writes the root cause

A root cause written by the team that caused the violation may be too narrow. A root cause written by a distant reviewer may miss how the work is really done. In our reading, the better practice is for the business to draft it and for compliance or risk to challenge it before it goes to the examiner. The challenge asks whether the stated cause would explain similar failures elsewhere. If it would, the corrective action has to reach those places too, or the repeat test will find them. [1]

Commitments as dated obligations

The bulletin required the board and management’s commitments to corrective action. [1] Bulletin 2014-52 had defined commitment for matters requiring attention as the bank’s action plan, with milestones, completion dates and accountable staff. [2] It required a board-approved plan within 30 days of receipt of the written communication if management could not provide one during the exam. [2]

In our reading, a commitment with milestones and dates is a tracked obligation. The bank has to know who owns it, when each milestone falls and whether it was met. The bulletin also said examiners should reinforce timely and thorough follow-up and tracking of corrective actions and milestones. [1] The tracking ran on both sides.

Board commitments as board work

The commitment element was the board and management’s commitment to corrective action. [1] Under Bulletin 2014-52, a board-approved plan was required within 30 days if management could not provide an action plan during the exam. [2] In our reading, a commitment signed by the board turns a compliance finding into an agenda item. The board then has to track it. Directors who sign a plan with milestones should expect to see each milestone reported, met or missed, until closure.

Relationship to ratings and risk appetite

The bulletin told examiners to convey the relationship of violations to matters requiring attention, CAMELS or ITCC or ROCA ratings, and the bank’s risk appetite and profile. [1] ITCC covered information technology, trust, consumer compliance and the Community Reinvestment Act. [1] That instruction linked a single violation to the bank’s overall assessment.

For a bank’s technology leaders, the ITCC reference matters. A violation in an area rated under information technology, or a consumer compliance violation caused by a system defect, would be described in terms that connect to the bank’s ratings. In our reading, that made system defects with legal consequences a ratings matter, and so one for the board.

The compliance management system behind the format

A bank’s compliance management system is where the format’s elements live day to day. The OCC revised its Compliance Management Systems booklet in June 2018, in the same bulletin that folded the 2017 violations policy into the Bank Supervision Process booklet. [3] In our reading, the pairing is apt. The violations policy says what a finding must contain. The compliance management system is what produces findings, assigns owners and tracks fixes inside the bank.

Technology defects as violations

A consumer compliance violation can start in a system. A pricing engine applies the wrong rate. A disclosure template carries an old figure. A notice is not sent because a batch job failed. In our reading, the format made the technology team part of the response in such cases. The root cause would be a defect, the corrective action a code or configuration change, and the commitment a release date.

That gives technology leaders three jobs. Their change records become evidence of corrective action. Their testing becomes evidence for validation. And their incident and defect logs become a possible source of self-identification, if someone reviews them for legal impact. A defect log that no compliance officer reads is a missed chance to find a violation first. A monthly review of defects with customer impact, by someone who knows the rules, closes that gap.

What the format asked of bank systems

Each element of the format is data. Citation, requirement, facts, root cause, corrective action, commitment, owner, milestones and status. A bank that tracked violations in a structured system could hold all of them. One that tracked them in documents could hold them, but not easily report across them. The bulletin’s goal of analyzing volume and trends applied to the OCC. [1] In our reading, a bank that wanted to see its own trends needed the same structure.

The closure: from open to closed

The fourth part asks how a violation ended. After follow-up, examiners would label it past due, pending validation or closed. [1]

Verification and validation

The bulletin’s status definitions rest on two checks. In its usage, verification confirms that the bank implemented the corrective action. Validation confirms that the action is effective and sustainable. [1] A violation was pending validation when the OCC had verified the action but insufficient time had passed for the bank to show sustained performance, or when the OCC decided more testing was warranted. [1]

Closure required both. A violation was closed when the bank had corrected it and the OCC had verified and validated the corrective action, when a change in circumstances corrected it, or when it was deemed uncorrectable. [1] Bulletin 2014-52 had used the same approach for concerns in matters requiring attention. [2]

What sustained performance means for a bank

Validation needs evidence over time. A fix to a disclosure process is sustained if disclosures after the fix are correct. A fix to a system is sustained if the system keeps producing correct output. In our reading, the bank has to collect that evidence on its own, through testing or monitoring, so it can show the examiner a period of clean results. A bank that fixed a problem and moved on, without testing, would leave its violation pending validation.

Choosing the validation evidence

What counts as sustained performance depends on the fix. In our reading, a bank should decide, when it writes the commitment, what evidence will show the fix held. For a process fix, a sample of transactions tested after the change. For a system fix, a report showing correct output over a defined period. For a training fix, test results and an error rate. Deciding this in advance avoids arguing about it at follow-up.

The period matters too. The bulletin left the length to the OCC’s judgment, describing pending validation as the state where insufficient time had passed. [1] A bank that proposes a validation period in its commitment, and collects the evidence over it, gives the examiner something to accept or adjust.

Past due

A violation was past due if, during verification, the bank had not implemented the expected corrective actions in time, or if, during validation, the corrective action was found ineffective or unsustainable. [1] Once past due, it stayed past due until closed. [1] A violation could be past due and pending validation at the same time. [1]

That last point is subtle. A bank that implemented a fix late, but correctly, would carry both labels until validation. In our reading, it rewards banks that set realistic dates in their commitments. A date missed by a week has a lasting label attached.

Uncorrectable violations

The bulletin allowed a violation to be closed when it was deemed uncorrectable. [1] Some past failures cannot be undone. In our reading, closing such a violation still needs a record: why it could not be corrected, what was done for affected customers where possible, and what stops it recurring. The prevention record carries the most weight, in our reading, because a similar future violation would carry the repeat label. [1]

Reporting status upward

The statuses give a board a compact view. A list of open violations, each marked past due, pending validation or awaiting verification, shows where commitments are slipping and where fixes are waiting for proof. [1] In our reading, a board report built on the OCC’s own status terms has an advantage: directors see the same picture the examiners will describe, and surprises at the exit meeting become rarer.

The bank’s own closure standard

The bulletin set the OCC’s closure standard. A bank’s internal standard can be weaker. An issue system can close an item as soon as the fix is implemented. Under the OCC’s approach, that is verification. In our reading, a bank that aligned its own closure standard with the OCC’s, by requiring a validation step before closing, would avoid reporting items as closed internally that the OCC still treated as open.

How the bulletin reached different institutions

The bulletin applied to OCC examinations of national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies. [1] It did not apply to state banks supervised by other agencies, or to credit unions. The descriptions below are our reading of how its structure fit different institutions.

Large national banks

A large bank has many systems and a steady flow of internal findings. For it, the self-identified label depended on whether their internal findings reached the OCC before examiners raised the same issue. Its risk and audit functions produce findings throughout the year. In our reading, the work was in routing those findings to the regulatory relationship team and disclosing them on a schedule.

Community banks

A community bank with a small compliance staff might rely on an outside firm for compliance reviews. The bulletin named third-party reviews as a source of self-identification. [1] For such a bank, the outside review was the main way to self-identify. The contract with the reviewer, and the bank’s habit of sharing results with the OCC, decided whether that worked.

Federal savings associations

Federal savings associations came under the same policy. [1] In our reading, those that had moved from the former thrift supervisor’s handbook to the OCC’s needed to map their finding history into the OCC’s terms, so the five-year repeat test could be applied consistently.

Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks

Branches and agencies were rated under ROCA, which the bulletin described. [1] Their compliance records may be held partly at the parent. In our reading, a branch needed local access to the parts of that record the repeat test would reach.

Trust and asset management operations

The bulletin’s footnote listed trust among the ITCC rating areas. [1] Trust departments run on their own systems and procedures, sometimes separate from the bank’s main compliance program. In our reading, violations in fiduciary activities faced the same labels and needed the same records. A trust department that tracked its findings apart from the bank’s register would weaken the bank’s ability to show self-identification and to anticipate repeats.

Fintechs and bank partners

Banks working with technology partners had a further question. A violation caused by a partner’s system was still the bank’s violation. The partner’s monitoring could be a source of self-identification, as a third-party review. [1] In our reading, that depended on the partner telling the bank promptly and the bank recording and disclosing it.

Institutions outside the OCC’s reach

State member banks, state nonmember banks and credit unions were outside the bulletin. In our reading, the logic still applied to them as a matter of good governance. A bank that finds, records and discloses its own violations, fixes causes, and tests its fixes before closing them is in a stronger position with any supervisor.

Objections, in order

1. Labels are internal OCC bookkeeping

The bulletin was addressed to bank chief executives as well as examiners, and it set rules for what banks would receive in writing. [1] The labels appeared in the bank’s reports. [1] They were the OCC’s bookkeeping and they reached the bank.

2. Self-identification only changes the paperwork

The label did change how some violations were written up. [1] It also told the examiner whether the bank’s detection had worked, which bears on management assessment. [1] In our reading, that is a substantive signal, even though the bulletin did not attach a penalty or credit to it.

3. Five years is too long a memory

It is long. It is also what the bulletin set, and what the current handbook still uses. [1] [4] A bank can disagree with the length and still needs a record that reaches as far.

4. Root cause analysis is expensive for small violations

It can be. The bulletin required root cause in the communication of a violation. [1] The current handbook ties uncorrected deficient practices to matters requiring attention. [4] The cost of finding a root cause is weighed against the cost of a repeat label and a second finding.

5. Validation delays closure for no benefit

Validation delays closure until a fix is shown to work. [1] A fix that fails produces a repeat violation and the governance statements that come with it. [1] In our reading, a bank benefits from validation even when the OCC does not require it, because it catches failed fixes before the examiner does.

6. Disclosure to the OCC before an exam invites scrutiny

It may. The alternative is a violation the OCC finds itself, which carries the new label and must be communicated in writing. [1] In our reading, disclosure trades a known conversation for an uncertain one.

7. The 2026 rule made the 2017 approach obsolete

The rule kept actual violations of law as a basis for a matter requiring attention, and added other violations that agencies may require banks to remediate. [6] The OCC’s booklet, as we checked it, still carries the 2017 labels and statuses. [4] The route from violation to finding changed. The need for records of discovery, remediation and validation did not.

8. Violations are a compliance team’s business, not technology’s

Where a system defect causes the violation, the root cause, corrective action and validation evidence all sit in technology records. [1] The compliance team cannot produce them alone. A bank that keeps the two sets of records apart will struggle to show its fix held.

9. A bank with strong controls need not worry about repeat labels

A bank with strong controls should see fewer repeats. The test still reaches substantially similar violations across products and units for five years. [1] A large or growing bank can repeat a pattern in a new product without anyone connecting it to an old finding. In our reading, the defense is a register searched by area of law whenever a new product launches, so known failure patterns are designed out before examiners look. The register then works as a design input for new products, as well as a record of past failures. That use costs little once the register exists.

What compliance and risk leaders could check

The four parts translate into checks any bank can run on its own issue records.

  1. For each open violation, can the bank show when it was first recorded internally and when it was disclosed to its supervisor?
  2. Does the bank keep a five-year register of violations its supervisor has cited in writing, searchable by area of law?
  3. Does each violation record hold the citation, root cause, corrective action, owner, milestones and status in a structured form?
  4. Does the bank’s own closure standard require evidence of sustained performance as well as implementation?
  5. Do findings from complaints, self-assessments, risk, audit and outside reviewers reach the same register?

The checks connect to each other. The first depends on the fifth, because a bank cannot show it found a violation first if the finding sat in a system the regulatory team never saw. The second depends on the third, because a five-year register is only searchable if its entries are structured. The fourth depends on the technology and operations teams that produce the evidence of sustained performance.

A bank can run the checks on a sample. Take the last ten violations its supervisor cited. For each, find the first internal record, the disclosure, the root cause, the commitment, the validation evidence and the closure. Where any link is missing, the bank has found where its records would fail under the 2017 labels.

The first check is the one the bulletin made decisive. A violation the bank can show it found first is a sign of working controls. One it cannot is a sign of the opposite, even if the bank knew. [1]

With hindsight

The bulletin did not last long as a separate document. On June 28, 2018, the OCC issued Bulletin 2018-18, which revised the Bank Supervision Process, Community Bank Supervision, Compliance Management Systems and Large Bank Supervision booklets. [3] It rescinded Bulletin 2017-18 and Bulletin 2014-52, saying each had been incorporated into the Bank Supervision Process booklet. [3] The OCC updated the supervision booklets again on September 30, 2019, under Bulletin 2019-44. [3]

The policy itself held. The current Bank Supervision Process booklet, version 1.1, still requires that the first time the OCC communicates a violation, it carry one or more of the labels new, repeat and self-identified. [4] It defines them as the 2017 bulletin did, with the same five-year period. [4] It keeps the follow-up statuses past due, pending validation and closed. [4] A footnote records that the OCC updated its violations policies on May 23, 2017. [4] The booklet’s cover notes that references to reputation risk were removed as of March 20, 2025. [4]

The larger change came through rulemaking. On October 30, 2025, the OCC and the FDIC published a proposal to define unsafe or unsound practice and to set standards for matters requiring attention. [5] They adopted a final rule published on September 1, 2026, effective November 2, 2026. [6]

The final rule limits when the agencies may issue a matter requiring attention. [6] One route is a practice contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation. [6] It must also be one that could reasonably be expected to materially harm the institution’s financial condition or present a material risk of loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund. [6] Another is such a practice that has already materially harmed the institution’s financial condition. [6] The third is an actual violation of a banking or banking-related law or regulation. [6] The violation prong survived.

The final rule also created a category called other violations. [6] An other violation is an actual violation of a banking or banking-related law for which the agency does not take an enforcement action or issue a matter requiring attention. [6] The agency may require the institution to remediate it, and may take other actions required by law. [6] The agencies described it as one of two primary modifications from the proposal, the other being the removal of institution-affiliated parties from the rule’s scope. [6]

The rule left enforcement authority for violations unchanged. The agencies said their authority to take enforcement action under section 8 of the FDI Act based on violations of law is unaffected. [6] They also said supervisory observations do not create an expectation of board presentation or corrective action. [6]

What held up from May 2017? The record-keeping did. A bank still needs to show when it found a violation, what it fixed and whether the fix held. [4] The labels and statuses remain in the OCC’s procedures as we checked them on November 15, 2026. [4] What changed is the route from a violation to a supervisory finding. The 2026 rule sorts violations into those that support a matter requiring attention or enforcement and those treated as other violations to be remediated. [6] How the OCC will reflect that sorting in its handbook procedures is not something we found stated. [4] [6]

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  • OCC
  • violations of law
  • self-identified violations
  • matters requiring attention
  • compliance management
  • issue tracking