OMB M-26-14: the federal logging memo that replaced M-21-31, explained
Issued May 22, 2026, M-26-14 rescinds M-21-31 and sets a risk-based logging baseline. Agency logging plans and maturity targets run from CISA’s Logging Reference Architecture, which CISA published on August 20, 2026.
OMB Memorandum M-26-14, dated May 22, 2026, sets federal agencies’ logging requirements. It rescinds M-21-31, the 2021 memorandum that raised logging baselines, effective immediately [1]. OMB says M-21-31 improved foundational capabilities, but that some of its requirements, such as retaining vast quantities of logging data without clear utility, proved neither operationally feasible nor cost-effective for most agencies. M-26-14 directs a risk-based, prioritized approach instead [1].
The memo applies to agencies as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502. It does not apply to national security systems or to Department of Defense or Intelligence Community systems described in 44 U.S.C. 3553(e) [1]. It covers every information system owned or operated by an agency or by third parties on its behalf, including IoT devices and operational technology that are part of such a system [1].
Two objectives that set the priorities
- Continuous event monitoring (CEM): logs and logging infrastructure that let an agency monitor network activity in real time, flag anomalies and respond in a timely way, typically through a security operations center (SOC).
- Threat hunting, investigation, response and forensics (THIRF): logs and infrastructure for investigating and analyzing activity after a known or suspected compromise. The memo says agencies must keep sufficient hot and cold storage and be able to retrieve and centralize log data from multiple sources [1].
The minimum logging baseline (Appendix B)
- Retention. Logs must be actively searchable for at least 6 months after creation, for CEM, and retrievable for a year after creation, for THIRF. The memo says this does not relieve agencies of other obligations such as records schedules. “Searchable” means usable immediately for cyber defense; “retrievable” means usable after preparation steps such as restoring from cold storage [1].
- Access. Storage may be decentralized, but logs must be readily available to the agency’s top-level SOC [1].
- Time. Logs need a consistently accurate timestamp, with network time synchronized through NTP or an equivalent to a traceable time source the agency designates. The memo encourages sources traceable to the U.S. Naval Observatory or NIST where feasible [1].
- Coverage. Agencies should use CDM, hardware asset management and software asset management data to check that log coverage includes all IT, IoT and OT [1].
- Content. At a minimum, logs must support determining the identity behind operations; source and destination network addresses, protocols, ports and session attributes; access to, change or destruction of objects and data; privilege changes; infrastructure changes; alerts from security tools; hunting for known indicators of compromise and for anomalous activity; the quantity and types of data affected in an incident; and attack vectors, including initial access and lateral movement, with automated alerts for all of these [1].
For comparison, M-21-31’s technical table set minimum retention periods by log category, typically 12 months in active storage and 18 months in cold storage, with full packet capture kept for 72 hours [3].
The plan, the maturity model and the deadlines
CISA, with OMB and the CISO Council, was to publish a Logging Reference Architecture (LRA) within 90 days of the memo [1]. CISA’s resource page gives the LRA a publish date of August 20, 2026 [2]. The memo says the LRA will cover prioritization with an emphasis on High Value Assets and High Impact Systems, alignment with CISA’s Zero Trust Maturity Model, centralization options, protecting sensitive data in logs, IoT and OT, use of AI, self-assessment and retention practices beyond the minimum, and that it will be re-evaluated at least once a year [1].
Each agency must write an Agency Logging Plan describing how it will meet the CEM and THIRF objectives and the minimum baseline, given its threat environment, risk profile and mission, and update it as needed [1]. Progress is measured with the maturity model in Appendix C, which scores each information system from Level 0 to Level 4 on five elements: inventory visibility, collection coverage, collection operations, data retention and log management. A system’s overall level is its lowest element, and agencies report the percentage of systems at each level [1].
The memo’s deadlines run from the LRA’s release [1], which CISA published on August 20, 2026 [2]:
- Within 90 days: complete the first Agency Logging Plan and submit it to OMB and CISA.
- Within 120 days: at least Level 1 across all elements.
- Within 180 days: at least Intermediate (Level 2).
- Within 320 days: at least Advanced (Level 3).
The memo’s table calls Level 1 “Basic”, while its maturity model names it “Initial” [1]. When CISA announces an updated LRA, agencies have 30 calendar days to update their plan, 60 days to reach at least Intermediate and 120 days to reach at least Advanced [1].
What Level 3 asks for, per system: at least 90 percent of assets in a centralized hardware and software inventory updated daily; required logs searchable and retrievable for at least 90 percent of inventoried assets; actionable alerts covering at least 70 percent of baseline requirements, with detections routinely tuned; logs searchable for 3 months and retrievable for 12; and logs encrypted in transit and at rest and regularly hashed [1].
Sharing logs during an incident
When one or more federal networks are known or suspected to be compromised, agencies must give logs and other relevant data to CISA and the FBI on request, to the extent consistent with law, in an agreed format and, as far as practicable, within the timeframes requested. Where data is subject to statutory, regulatory or judicial access limits, CISA and the FBI will follow the required processes or work out an accommodation with the agency [1].
In our view, the work this creates is largely operational: SOC access to logs held across the agency, alert tuning measured against the baseline, and inventory data good enough to prove coverage. Agencies with log stores built to the periods of M-21-31, which M-26-14 rescinded, also have a decision to make about which data still serves CEM or THIRF; the memo sets minimums and says the LRA will offer recommendations on retention beyond them [1]. Questions about the memo go to the OMB Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer, and questions about the LRA go to CISA [1].
This explainer describes the memorandum; it is not legal advice, and agencies should confirm with their counsel and CIO how it applies to them.
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