# Post-quantum cryptography: FIPS 203, 204 and 205, NIST IR 8547 and the federal deadlines, explained

NIST’s three post-quantum standards took effect on August 14, 2024. NIST IR 8547, final in October 2026, deprecates today’s public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them after 2035, and Executive Order 14412 sets earlier dates for the most sensitive federal systems.

Explainer · Cross-sector · Platforms & Architecture. Published November 14, 2026. Last reviewed November 14, 2026.

## At a glance

- FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, key establishment), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, signatures) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, signatures) were published on August 13, 2024 and took effect on August 14, 2024.
- NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026): quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms such as RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA and elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035.
- Executive Order 14412 (signed June 22, 2026) has OMB require agencies to move high value assets and high impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030 and to post-quantum signatures by December 31, 2031.
- National Security Systems are outside that OMB inventory step; the NSA reports on them separately.
- The order also directs a proposed Federal Acquisition Regulation rule requiring covered contractors to comply with NIST’s FIPS, including the post-quantum ones, by December 31, 2030.
- NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default key-establishment parameter set.

## Three standards for two jobs

Large-scale quantum computers would put at risk the key-establishment schemes and digital signatures based on integer factorization and discrete logarithms [1]. NIST called for replacement algorithms in December 2016, ran a multi-round public evaluation, and announced in the Federal Register on August 14, 2024 that the Secretary of Commerce had approved three Federal Information Processing Standards, each effective that day [1]. The documents themselves carry a publication date of August 13, 2024 [2] [3] [4].

- **FIPS 203, ML-KEM.** A key-encapsulation mechanism, derived from the CRYSTALS-KYBER submission, that two parties can use to establish a shared secret key over a public channel. It has three parameter sets, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024, in order of increasing security strength and decreasing performance [1] [2].
- **FIPS 204, ML-DSA.** A module-lattice digital signature algorithm derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium [1] [3].
- **FIPS 205, SLH-DSA.** A stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm derived from SPHINCS+ [1] [4].

The notice describes the new algorithms as augmenting the public-key methods already in FIPS 186-5 and in SP 800-56A and SP 800-56B, and says NIST intends to develop a further standard for a signature algorithm derived from FALCON [1]. NIST IR 8547 adds that HQC has been selected as an alternative key-establishment scheme and will be approved once its standard is published; until then ML-KEM is the only approved post-quantum key-establishment scheme based on public-key cryptography [5].

## Why the clock started before the computers exist

NIST IR 8547 gives two reasons to move now. The first is the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat: an adversary can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once quantum technology matures, so data that must stay confidential for years is at risk now. The second applies to signatures, which are not exposed to that threat but take longer to migrate because more parties have to coordinate [5]. The report notes that earlier cryptographic transitions took 10 to 20 years and calls the federal deadlines below a schedule that leaves little margin [5].

## NIST IR 8547: the general timeline

NIST published the final version of IR 8547, *Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards*, in October 2026. It names the quantum-vulnerable algorithms in NIST’s existing standards, the post-quantum standards that replace them, and the schedule for the change. Its abstract says it supports Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15 [5].

### Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035

NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035 [5]. The report’s tables apply that schedule to:

- signatures: ECDSA, EdDSA and RSA under FIPS 186;
- key establishment: finite-field and elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman and MQV under SP 800-56A, and RSA under SP 800-56B [5].

Under SP 800-131A, “deprecated” means an algorithm may still be used but carries some security risk that the data owner must weigh; “disallowed” means it is no longer allowed for the stated purpose [5]. The report replaces an earlier projection in SP 800-57 Part 1, which had NIST disallowing 112-bit public-key schemes on January 1, 2031. It keeps the 2035 goal for completing federal migration set by National Security Memorandum 10 [5].

### Earlier dates inside the window

The 2030 to 2035 window is meant for lower-risk systems and those with legacy constraints. The report states that it does not change the earlier deadlines for high value assets, high impact systems and other high-sensitivity federal systems [5]. Application-specific guidance may also require earlier moves, and NIST expects to put key establishment in interactive protocols such as TLS and IKE first. Agencies must support TLS 1.3 no later than January 2, 2030, and the next revision of SP 800-52 will cover quantum-resistant and hybrid key exchange in TLS [5]. Symmetric standards at the 112-bit security level will be disallowed in 2030 [5].

### Parameter choices and hybrids

NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set. A hybrid scheme that combines a classical and a post-quantum secret through the SP 800-56C composite technique can be FIPS 140-validated as long as at least one input comes from an approved scheme, even if the other comes from a disallowed algorithm [5].

## Executive Order 14412: the federal deadlines

Executive Order 14412, *Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks*, was signed on June 22, 2026 and published on June 25, 2026 at 91 FR 38483 [6]. It makes it federal policy to move federal information systems to NIST’s post-quantum FIPS and to help critical infrastructure owners and operators with their own moves [6].

- **Within 30 days:** each agency head names a PQC migration lead, reporting to the agency’s chief information officer [6].
- **Within 90 days:** OMB issues guidance requiring each agency to review its inventory of high value assets and high impact systems, excluding National Security Systems; to move them to post-quantum key establishment by **December 31, 2030** and to post-quantum digital signatures by **December 31, 2031**; and to submit a plan [6]. NIST IR 8547 says the order is put into effect by OMB Memorandum M-26-15 of June 24, 2026, under which agencies must give the same priority to other systems with highly sensitive data, including those holding data expected to remain mission-sensitive in 2030 [5].
- **Within 180 days:** NIST starts a migration pilot on some of its own systems, to finish by December 31, 2027; NIST revises the Cryptographic Module Validation Program to speed up validations; the NSA reports on National Security Systems, then yearly; and the FAR Council publishes a proposed rule requiring covered contractors to comply with NIST’s FIPS, including the post-quantum ones, by December 31, 2030 [6].
- **Within 270 days:** CISA, with NIST, publishes guidance on the minimum elements of a cryptographic bill of materials, and the FAR Council publishes a proposed rule so that covered contractors’ vulnerability disclosure policies take in reports of cryptographic weaknesses, including testing for missing encryption and for algorithms that are not FIPS-approved [6].

As checked on November 14, 2026, a Federal Register search for “post-quantum” returned no proposed Federal Acquisition Regulation rule [7].

## Who else it reaches

The order’s deadlines are set for federal agencies, but its reach is wider. Sector Risk Management Agencies are to work with CISA to help critical infrastructure owners and operators build their migration plans, and the State Department is to encourage foreign governments and industry groups to adopt NIST’s algorithms [6]. Covered contractors are the subject of the two proposed acquisition rules the order directs. NIST IR 8547 is written for federal agencies, technology providers, standards bodies and validation laboratories, and describes itself as a blueprint for critical infrastructure and other organizations making the same change [5].

## Where the work begins

NIST’s own recommendation is to treat the migration as a current operational priority, starting with cryptographic inventories, migration planning and early deployments of products and services that support post-quantum algorithms [5]. The report also says systems that cannot support post-quantum cryptography should be identified and prioritized for replacement or decommissioning [5]. For a non-federal organization these are recommendations, not legal requirements; contracts, sector regulators and customers may turn them into obligations, and counsel can say which apply. This page explains the documents and is not legal advice.

Moraph’s teams help organizations with work like this; see [our solutions](https://www.moraph.com/solutions).

## Sources

1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal Register (via GovInfo). Announcing Issuance of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) FIPS 203, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 (89 FR 66052, August 14, 2024). <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-08-14/html/2024-17956.htm> Checked November 14, 2026.
2. NIST Computer Security Resource Center. FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard. <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final> Checked November 14, 2026.
3. NIST Computer Security Resource Center. FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final> Checked November 14, 2026.
4. NIST Computer Security Resource Center. FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard. <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final> Checked November 14, 2026.
5. National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (October 2026). <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf> Checked November 14, 2026.
6. Executive Office of the President, Federal Register (via GovInfo). Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (91 FR 38483, June 25, 2026). <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-25/html/2026-12909.htm> Checked November 14, 2026.
7. Federal Register. Federal Register search: “post-quantum” (checked November 14, 2026). <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bterm%5D=post-quantum> Checked November 14, 2026.

Published: November 14, 2026
Canonical URL: <https://insights.moraph.com/post-quantum-cryptography-nist-standards-and-federal-deadlines-explained>
Publisher: Moraph Insights
