Privacy Shield ran on FTC jurisdiction; the 2020 ruling that ended it put US-law checks on contract clauses
The February 2, 2016 agreement split into company promises enforced by the FTC and US government promises on surveillance. The FTC’s own letter put banks and most nonprofits outside its jurisdiction; in 2020 the Court upheld contract clauses but required exporters to check US law.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The February 2, 2016 agreement split into company promises enforced by the FTC and US government promises on surveillance. The FTC’s own letter put banks and most nonprofits outside its jurisdiction; in 2020 the Court upheld contract clauses but required exporters to check US law.
- The week The agreement answered a judgment.
- The gate: who could join Privacy Shield Privacy Shield was voluntary.
- The company promises: what a participant took on The Notice Principle required more than Safe Harbor had.
- The government promises: access and redress The Commerce notice listed the US government documents in the Privacy Shield package.
- The other channels: how outsiders moved data, and why they faced the same question Organizations outside the gate had other routes.
- How the arrangement reached different organizations Privacy Shield touched each kind of organization differently.
- Objections, in order Regulated institutions could not certify, but their vendors could. [2] A bank or health system that used certified vendors for European data had an indirect dependency on the program.
- Checks a privacy or compliance lead could run List every flow of personal data from Europe into the organization or its vendors.
- With hindsight The adequacy decision followed the February agreement.
The week
On February 2, 2016, the European Commission announced that it and the United States had agreed on a new framework for transatlantic data flows, called the EU-US Privacy Shield. [1] The Commission’s release said the College of Commissioners had approved the political agreement that day. [1] It mandated a Vice-President and a Commissioner to prepare the steps needed to put the arrangement in place. [1]
The agreement answered a judgment. The release recalled that on October 6, 2015, the Court of Justice had declared the Commission’s Safe Harbor decision invalid. [1] It said the new framework reflected the requirements set out in that judgment, and presented it as the successor to the arrangement that had been struck down. [1]
The release described three groups of commitments. The first fell on firms. US businesses wishing to import personal data from Europe would need to commit to obligations on how personal data is processed and individual rights are guaranteed. [1] The Department of Commerce would monitor that companies publish their commitments, which the release said makes them enforceable under US law by the Federal Trade Commission. [1] Any firm handling human resources data from Europe would have to commit to comply with decisions by European data protection authorities. [1]
The second group fell on the US government. The release said the United States had given the EU written assurances that access by public authorities for law enforcement and national security would be subject to clear limitations, safeguards and oversight mechanisms. [1] It said Washington had ruled out indiscriminate mass surveillance of the personal data transferred under the deal. [1] An annual joint review, run by the Commission and the Department of Commerce, would include the issue of national security access. [1]
The third group concerned remedies for individuals. Firms would have deadlines to reply, and national data protection authorities could refer cases to the Department of Commerce and the FTC. [1] Alternative dispute resolution would be free of charge. [1] For concerns about possible access by intelligence agencies, a new Ombudsperson would be created. [1]
Nothing took legal effect that day. The release said the College had mandated the preparation of a draft adequacy decision in the coming weeks. [1] The College could adopt it after obtaining the advice of the Article 29 Working Party, the group of national data protection authorities, and after consulting a committee of Member State representatives. [1] In the meantime, the release said, the US side would prepare the framework, its monitoring mechanisms and the new Ombudsperson. [1]
The release also set out the months that led to the deal. After the judgment, it said, the national data protection authorities had issued a statement on its consequences on October 16. [1] On November 6, the Commission had issued guidance for companies on the possibilities for transatlantic transfers until a new framework was in place. [1] On December 2, the College had discussed the negotiations and renewed the mandate to pursue them. [1]
For a US bank, health system or public agency reading the release that week, two features stood out. The firms’ promises ran through the FTC’s enforcement power. [1] The government’s promises ran through written assurances from Washington about its own agencies. [1] The rest of this article is about the gap between those two channels and who fell into it.
The February 2016 release presented Privacy Shield as one framework. [1] For regulated institutions it was two. One channel ran through companies’ public promises, enforced by the FTC or the Department of Transportation. [1] [2] The other ran through the US government’s promises about its own access to data. [1] [2] Our argument is that banks, insurers and most nonprofits fell outside the FTC jurisdiction the first channel required, yet the second still reached them through the contract clauses they could use.
The framework’s own rules show the first half. The Commerce Department’s notice publishing the framework said an organization must be subject to the investigatory and enforcement powers of the FTC, the Department of Transportation or another statutory body to enter Privacy Shield. [2] The FTC’s letter in the same package said there are exceptions to its jurisdiction, including banks and the business of insurance. [2] It said the FTC also does not have jurisdiction over most non-profit organizations. [2]
The court record shows the second half. When the Court of Justice invalidated the Privacy Shield decision in July 2020, its reasons concerned US surveillance law and the Ombudsperson, not company compliance. [5] In the same judgment the Court upheld the standard contractual clauses, but said exporters must verify the level of protection in the destination country, including public authorities’ access. [5] In our reading, that put the institutions left outside Privacy Shield in front of the same question the framework had tried to answer.
We take the issue in four parts:
- The gate: who could join Privacy Shield, and who could not.
- The company promises: what a participating organization took on.
- The government promises: what the United States committed about its own access, and how redress worked.
- The other channels: how organizations outside the gate moved data, and why they faced the same question.
The parts do not overlap. The first is eligibility, the second the private obligations, the third the public obligations and the fourth the alternatives. After them we look at how the arrangement reached different kinds of organization, take the objections in order and end with checks a privacy or compliance lead could run.
The gate: who could join Privacy Shield
Jurisdiction as the entry ticket
Privacy Shield was voluntary. The Commerce notice said a company’s decision to self-certify would be voluntary, but once it publicly committed, its commitment would be enforceable under US law by the FTC or the Department of Transportation. [2] Which agency applied depended on which authority had jurisdiction over the organization. [2]
That made jurisdiction the entry ticket. The notice’s first condition for entry was being subject to the investigatory and enforcement powers of the FTC, the Department of Transportation or another statutory body that would effectively ensure compliance. [2] It added that other US statutory bodies recognized by the EU may be included as an annex in the future. [2]
The design followed from how the framework was enforced. A self-certification is a public promise. The FTC’s tool for broken promises is its authority over deceptive practices. [2] The notice said failures to comply with the Principles would be actionable as a deceptive practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act or a similar statute. [2] Without an enforcer, the promise had no backstop, so the framework required one.
Who the FTC letter left out
The FTC described its own limits in the package. It said there are exceptions to its jurisdiction over commercial activities, including with respect to banks, airlines, the business of insurance and the common carrier activities of telecommunications service providers. [2] Airlines fell to the Department of Transportation, which had its own letter. [2] Banks and insurers had no such letter in the package.
The letter also addressed nonprofits. It said the FTC does not have jurisdiction over most non-profit organizations. [2] It said the FTC does have jurisdiction over sham charities, nonprofits that in fact operate for profit and nonprofits that operate for the profit of their for-profit members. [2] In our reading, a nonprofit hospital system or a university medical center would have needed to check carefully before assuming it could certify.
Public agencies were not the audience at all. The notice described a list of US organizations that self-certify to the Department and commit to the Principles. [2] In our reading, the framework was not written with federal, state or local agencies as participants. Their role was different, as the third part shows.
The enforcer’s own limit
The FTC letter drew a second line that mattered as much as the first. It said the FTC does not have jurisdiction over criminal law enforcement or national security matters. [2] It added that the FTC cannot reach most other governmental actions. [2]
In our reading, that sentence explains the shape of the whole framework. The agency that enforced the company promises could not, by its own account, police the government promises. [2] Those had to come from the agencies that make the requests, in their own letters, with their own oversight. [2] The gate and the split were the same design choice seen from two sides.
For a compliance officer, the practical meaning is that a vendor’s certification answered one question only. It said the vendor had promised to handle data in certain ways and could be held to that promise. It said nothing a vendor could control about what a US agency might request.
What the gate meant for a sector
For banks, the consequence was direct. In our reading, a bank holding EU customer or employee data in the United States could not use Privacy Shield for that data, on the FTC’s own description of its reach. [2] It needed another lawful basis for the transfer. We describe those channels in the fourth part.
For health care the picture was mixed. A for-profit physician group or a health technology vendor could be within FTC jurisdiction. A nonprofit health system could fall outside it. [2] A life sciences company sponsoring trials in Europe could be inside it, and the framework had a supplemental principle for pharmaceutical and medical products. [2] That principle addressed research uses of data and adverse event reporting to agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration. [2]
For the vendors that serve these sectors, the gate opened. A US cloud, software or payment processing company within FTC jurisdiction could certify. In our reading, that created a split for regulated buyers. Their vendors could rely on Privacy Shield for data they received directly from Europe, while the institution itself could not.
The list as a control
The framework turned membership into a public record. The Department would maintain the Privacy Shield List and remove organizations that withdrew, failed to re-certify annually or persistently failed to comply. [2] It would also keep a public record of organizations removed from the list. [2]
Benefits started only when the Department placed an organization on the list. [2] An organization removed from the list could no longer benefit from the adequacy decision. [2] It had to keep applying the Principles to data it had received for as long as it kept the data, and affirm that annually. [2] Otherwise it had to return or delete the data, or protect it by another authorized means. [2]
For a regulated buyer relying on a vendor’s certification, that made the list a control to monitor. A lapsed re-certification ended the vendor’s benefit from the date of removal. [2] A contract that cited Privacy Shield without a fallback depended on a status the buyer did not control.
The company promises: what a participant took on
Principles written as a privacy policy
A participant had to develop a conforming privacy policy and publicly commit to comply with the Privacy Shield Principles. [2] It had to re-certify annually, provide free independent dispute resolution to EU individuals and be subject to the authority of a US enforcement agency. [2]
The Notice Principle required more than Safe Harbor had. The Commerce notice said Privacy Shield required a declaration of participation, a statement of the individual’s right to access personal data and the identification of the independent dispute resolution body. [2] The policy also had to state the types of data collected, the purposes of use and how to contact the organization. [2]
Sensitive data and onward transfers
Health data had its own rule. For sensitive information, including medical or health conditions, organizations had to obtain affirmative express consent before disclosing it to a third party or using it for a new purpose. [2] That is an opt-in standard, and it sat alongside whatever HIPAA or state law already required of a US covered entity.
Onward transfers were tightened. The Commerce notice said the framework strengthened protection of data passed from a Privacy Shield organization to a third-party controller by requiring the parties to enter into a contract. [2] For transfers to agents, an organization had to take reasonable steps to stop and remediate unauthorized processing on notice. [2] It also had to give the Department a summary or representative copy of the relevant contract terms on request. [2]
For a vendor’s regulated customers, these rules arrived as contract language. A bank or health system that sent EU data to a certified vendor, or received it from one, would see onward transfer clauses in the paper. The obligation ran to the certified company, but the evidence of it sat in the customer’s contract file.
Retention and purpose
The Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation Principle required an organization to adhere to the Principles for as long as it retains the information. [2] Identifiable data could be kept only as long as it served a purpose of processing permitted by the Principles. [2]
Those two sentences outlasted any one certification. A company that left the program still owed the Principles for the data it kept, unless it returned, deleted or otherwise protected it. [2] For records managers, that meant a lapse could not be cured by simply stopping new transfers. The old data carried the old promise.
Human resources data
Employee data carried an extra commitment. An organization extending Privacy Shield to human resources data had to say so when it self-certified and commit to cooperate with EU data protection authorities for that data. [2] It had to give the Department a copy of its human resources privacy policy. [2]
For a US firm with European staff, this was the clause that brought a European regulator closest. The February release had flagged it: any company handling human resources data from Europe would have to comply with decisions by European data protection authorities. [1]
What the company layer could and could not fix
Everything in this part was within a company’s control. It could write the policy, sign the contracts, train staff and pay for dispute resolution. The FTC could enforce each promise as a deceptive practice if it was broken. [2]
None of it could bind the US government. A company could not promise that an intelligence agency would not request data, and the framework did not ask it to. That promise came from the United States in the separate set of letters. [2] In our reading, the split explains the outcome in 2020: the company layer was never the part the Court found deficient. [5]
The government promises: access and redress
Written assurances from agencies
The Commerce notice listed the US government documents in the Privacy Shield package. They included two letters from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on safeguards and limitations for national security authorities. [2] They also included a letter and memorandum from the Department of State describing its commitment to establish an Ombudsperson. [2]
The Commission’s July 2016 release summarized the result. It said the United States had given assurance that access by public authorities for law enforcement and national security is subject to clear limitations, safeguards and oversight mechanisms. [4] It said the Office of the Director of National Intelligence had clarified that bulk collection could be used only under specific preconditions and must be as targeted and focused as possible. [4]
The Ombudsperson
Redress for intelligence access went through the Department of State. The July release said the Secretary of State had established an Ombudsperson mechanism within that department. [4] It described the Ombudsperson as independent from the US intelligence services. [4]
The Court of Justice later disagreed about what that mechanism provided. Its July 2020 press release said the Ombudsperson mechanism did not give data subjects any cause of action before a body offering guarantees substantially equivalent to those required by EU law. [5] The Court pointed to the independence of the Ombudsperson and the absence of rules empowering it to adopt decisions binding on the intelligence services. [5]
The Judicial Redress Act
Congress passed a related law later that month. The Judicial Redress Act of 2015 became Public Law 114-126 on February 24, 2016. [3] Its title describes it as an Act to extend Privacy Act remedies to citizens of certified states. [3]
The Act let a covered person bring certain civil actions against an agency for covered records. [3] It reached disclosures intentionally or willfully made in violation of the Privacy Act and, against a designated federal agency or component only, two further Privacy Act actions, which in our reading are the amendment and access actions. [3] The Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of State, the Treasury and Homeland Security, could designate covered countries. [3]
One of the conditions for designation tied the law to commercial data flows. A country had to permit the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes between its territory and the United States, by agreement or otherwise. [3] The Attorney General also had to certify that the country’s policies on commercial transfers did not materially impede US national security interests. [3] The Attorney General had to publish each determination. [3]
For federal agencies, the Act is the piece of this history that changed their own obligations. In our reading, a designated agency’s Privacy Act processes for access and amendment requests became reachable by covered foreign persons for covered records, within the limits the Act set. [3] Agencies should check with counsel on which components and records were designated.
Two layers, two kinds of check
The two layers were checked by different people. The company layer was checked by the Department of Commerce, which verified certifications and maintained the list, and by the FTC, which could enforce. [2] The government layer was checked by an annual joint review and, as it turned out, by the Court of Justice. [1] [5]
The difference mattered for anyone relying on the arrangement. A company-layer failure was specific to one organization: it could be removed from the list, and its customers could switch. A government-layer failure reached every organization at once, because every participant relied on the same US law.
That asymmetry is the reason we treat the two layers as separate parts of this analysis. A vendor risk program is built for the first kind of failure. The second kind arrives as a legal event, on a date nobody in the vendor relationship chooses.
The annual review
The government layer was also meant to be checked. The February release said an annual joint review, run by the Commission and the Department of Commerce, would include national security access. [1] The July release said the review would associate national intelligence experts from the United States and European data protection authorities, and that the Commission would issue a public report. [4]
A review can confirm that commitments are being met. It cannot change the legal standard a court applies. The Court of Justice measured the US legal framework against EU law’s requirements of proportionality and effective judicial protection. [5] In our reading, no annual report could have answered that test on the companies’ behalf.
The other channels: how outsiders moved data, and why they faced the same question
Contract clauses as the default route
Organizations outside the gate had other routes. The Court’s 2020 press release described the general rule under the GDPR. [5] Absent an adequacy decision, a transfer may take place if the exporter in the EU has provided appropriate safeguards. [5] Those may arise from standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission. [5] The data subjects must also have enforceable rights and effective legal remedies. [5]
The 2023 release named another tool, binding corporate rules. [7] In our reading, for a bank with a European subsidiary, or a health system with a European research partner, these were the working tools. Privacy Shield was the vendor’s tool, not theirs.
The case that tested the clauses
The 2020 case began with transfers made under standard contractual clauses, not Privacy Shield. The Court’s press release said the complaint concerned transfers that Facebook Ireland carried out under the clauses in Decision 2010/87. [5] The Irish authority took the case to the High Court, which referred questions to the Court of Justice. [5]
The Court upheld the clauses. It said the validity of Decision 2010/87 was not called into question merely because contractual clauses do not bind the authorities of the third country. [5] It found that the decision includes mechanisms that can ensure compliance with EU law’s level of protection and suspend or prohibit transfers when the clauses are breached or cannot be honored. [5]
The verification duty
The Court then placed the government-access question on the exporter. It said the assessment of protection must consider both the contractual clauses and, as regards any access by public authorities of the third country, the relevant aspects of that country’s legal system. [5] It said the decision obliges the exporter and the recipient to verify, prior to any transfer, whether that level of protection is respected in the third country. [5]
The recipient must tell the exporter if it cannot comply with the clauses. [5] The exporter is then obliged to suspend the transfer or terminate the contract. [5] Unless there is a valid adequacy decision, supervisory authorities must suspend or prohibit a transfer when the clauses cannot be complied with and the exporter has not itself ended it. [5]
In our reading, this is where the two channels met. A bank that never touched Privacy Shield still had to assess the same US surveillance law the Court had just found wanting in the Privacy Shield decision. [5] The contract route survived in form. Its practical weight moved to an assessment of a legal system the exporter could not change.
What a verification file can contain
The Court described the duty but not a format. [5] The following is our suggestion of what a usable file holds, not a requirement drawn from any source. Each item answers a question a supervisory authority or an auditor could ask about one transfer.
- The transfer: what data, about whom, from which EU entity to which US entity, for what purpose.
- The mechanism: which clauses or group rules apply, with the signed version and its date.
- The destination law: the US authorities that could request the data, and the safeguards and redress that apply, each with its source and date.
- The importer’s position: whether it has received requests of the relevant kind, to the extent it may say.
- Supplementary measures: technical or contractual steps taken, such as encryption with keys held in Europe.
- The decision: who approved continuing the transfer, on what date, and when it will be reviewed.
The file is only as current as its review date. When the US instruments behind the assessment change, the file is out of date the same day, whatever the calendar says.
Why the outsiders could not opt out of the government layer
The government layer was never specific to Privacy Shield. The Court said the GDPR applies to a commercial transfer even if the data may later be processed by third-country authorities for public security, defense and state security. [5] The question of what those authorities could do applied to every route.
The 2023 release made the same point from the other side. It said the new US safeguards would also facilitate transfers made with other tools, such as standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules. [7] In our reading, the US government’s commitments were the shared foundation under every route, whether or not an organization could join the self-certification list.
How the arrangement reached different organizations
Privacy Shield touched each kind of organization differently. The differences follow from the gate and from the role each plays in a transfer.
A regional bank
A bank could not certify, on the FTC’s description of its jurisdiction. [2] Its exposure came from two directions. It might export data itself, through a European branch or affiliate, under contract clauses. It might also rely on US vendors that received European data under Privacy Shield.
After July 2020, both directions needed attention. The bank’s own clauses required a verification of protection in the destination. [5] Its vendors’ Privacy Shield reliance had lost its legal basis with the invalidation of the decision. [5]
A credit union
Consider a credit union with a member who moves to Europe. Its member file is created and kept in the United States. Where a European service provider or a member’s European address is involved, the question is whether any transfer from Europe occurs at all. That is a fact question for counsel, and it decides whether any of this applies.
A broker-dealer or wealth manager
A broker-dealer serving European clients can sit inside a group with European entities. The FTC letter in the package did not list broker-dealers among its stated exceptions. [2] Eligibility therefore turned on facts about the entity and its regulators, which a firm had to confirm before certifying. In our reading, a firm in a group with binding corporate rules had a group route available. [7]
A nonbank lender or fintech
A nonbank financial firm sat on the other side of the gate from its bank partners. The FTC letter noted that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defines financial institutions broadly, including check-cashing businesses, payday lenders, mortgage brokers and nonbank lenders. [2] It said the FTC retains enforcement authority under that Act. [2]
In our reading, a fintech under FTC jurisdiction could be eligible to certify while the bank it partnered with could not. [2] A partnership that shared European customer data then ran on two different transfer bases at once. The partnership agreement needed to say which applied to which flow.
A US cloud or software vendor
A vendor within FTC jurisdiction was the program’s natural participant. [2] Its regulated customers depended on its certification without being able to hold one themselves. When the decision was invalidated in 2020, the vendor needed a new basis and its customers needed to confirm it. [5]
A nonprofit health system
A nonprofit health system could fall outside FTC jurisdiction, on the letter’s own terms. [2] European patient data could reach it through international patients, research collaborations or a foreign affiliate. Each of those needed its own transfer basis, and none could rely on the health system’s own certification.
Its vendors were a separate matter. A for-profit telehealth or analytics vendor could certify. The health system then needed to know whether data reached the vendor from Europe directly, or through the health system, and on what basis.
A life sciences company
A for-profit life sciences company could be inside the gate. The framework addressed it directly in a supplemental principle on pharmaceutical and medical products. [2] That principle discussed future research uses of data and reports by health care providers to manufacturers and by manufacturers to agencies such as the FDA. [2]
After 2020, a trial sponsor relying on Privacy Shield had to move to another route for new transfers. A sponsor that had certified still owed the Principles for data it had received and kept. [2]
A federal agency
A federal agency was not a participant. Its exposure came through the Judicial Redress Act, if the Attorney General designated it, and through the government-access commitments its own intelligence and law enforcement colleagues made. [3] [4] An agency that runs a Privacy Act system with records about European nationals had to know whether it was designated and how its access and amendment process would handle a covered person. [3]
A state or county agency
A state or local agency was outside both the self-certification list and the Judicial Redress Act, which addressed federal agencies. [3] Where it holds European data, the routes we can identify run through contracts with vendors or partners. Its questions are about those vendors’ transfer bases, not its own.
Objections, in order
1. Privacy Shield was a company program, so regulated institutions could ignore it
Regulated institutions could not certify, but their vendors could. [2] A bank or health system that used certified vendors for European data had an indirect dependency on the program. When the decision fell, those vendors needed a new basis, and their customers needed to know which one. [5]
2. The contract clauses were a safe harbor of their own
The Court upheld the clauses but attached a verification duty to them. [5] The exporter had to assess the destination’s law on public authorities’ access, and suspend or terminate if the importer could not comply. [5] In our reading, the clauses were valid but not self-executing.
3. The government layer was the government’s problem
It was, in the sense that only the government could change it. But the Court put the consequences on exporters and on supervisory authorities, who must act when protection cannot be ensured. [5] An institution that ignored the government layer would find it in its own transfer assessments.
4. The 2023 framework solved the problem, so the history no longer matters
The 2023 framework rests on a different set of US instruments, which the Commission said address the Court’s concerns. [7] In September 2025 the General Court dismissed an action for annulment of the 2023 decision. [8] But the General Court also noted that the Commission must monitor the US legal framework and may suspend, amend or repeal its decision if that framework changes. [8] The same structural dependency remains.
5. Banks were never meant to be covered, so there was no gap
The framework left room for other statutory bodies to be annexed in the future. [2] We did not find one added for banks in the documents we reviewed. Whether or not banks were meant to be covered, in our reading they relied on other channels, which the 2020 judgment tied to an assessment of the same US law on public authorities’ access. [5]
6. A vendor on the list had been audited
The list recorded a self-certification. The Commerce notice described what the Department would verify before placing an organization on the list. [2] The organization had to have provided contact information, described its activities with EU data and indicated what information its certification covered. [2] In our reading, those are checks of the submission’s completeness.
The notice also described follow-up work: reviewing the policies of organizations removed from the list and searching for false claims of participation. [2] In our reading, none of that amounted to an audit of a vendor’s controls. A regulated buyer that needed assurance about how a vendor handled data still needed its own due diligence.
Checks a privacy or compliance lead could run
Transfer inventory
List every flow of personal data from Europe into the organization or its vendors. For each, record the legal basis the exporter relies on: an adequacy decision with certification, contract clauses or binding corporate rules. A flow with no recorded basis is the first finding.
Eligibility check
For any reliance on a self-certification framework, record which US agency has jurisdiction over the certifying entity. [2] For your own institution, confirm with counsel whether you are eligible at all. For vendors, confirm that the entity receiving the data is the one on the list.
List monitoring
Check the status of each vendor’s certification on a schedule. The framework removed organizations that failed to re-certify, and benefits ended on removal. [2] Put the check in the vendor management calendar, with an owner.
Fallback clauses
Make sure each vendor contract that relies on a certification names a fallback mechanism and a process for switching to it. The fallback should not need a new negotiation to take effect.
Assessment file
For transfers under contract clauses, keep the written assessment of the destination’s legal system that the Court described. [5] Date it, name the sources it relies on and record when it will be reviewed. Revisit it when the US framework changes.
Retained data
For any certification that lapsed or ended, identify the data received under it. The framework required continued protection, return or deletion of such data. [2] Record which was done.
Federal agency check
A federal agency should confirm whether the Attorney General designated it or any component under the Judicial Redress Act, and whether its Privacy Act procedures address covered persons. [3]
With hindsight
The adequacy decision followed the February agreement. The Commission adopted the EU-US Privacy Shield on July 12, 2016, and its release said the decision entered into force on notification to the Member States that day. [4] The release recorded that the Commission had presented the draft texts on February 29, 2016. [4] It said companies could certify with the Commerce Department starting August 1. [4] The Commerce notice published on August 2, 2016, confirmed that date. [2]
On July 16, 2020, the Court of Justice declared Decision 2016/1250 invalid in Case C-311/18. [5] Its press release gave two reasons. US surveillance programs were not limited to what is strictly necessary, and the Ombudsperson mechanism did not provide a cause of action before a body with guarantees equivalent to EU law. [5] The same judgment upheld the standard contractual clauses in Decision 2010/87. [5]
The US government then changed the government layer. On October 7, 2022, the President signed Executive Order 14086, Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities, published in the Federal Register on October 14, 2022. [6] The Commission’s 2023 release said the order was complemented by regulations issued by the Attorney General. [7] The General Court’s 2025 press release described the same order as one that strengthened the privacy safeguards governing US intelligence agencies’ activities. [8]
On July 10, 2023, the Commission adopted an adequacy decision for the EU-US Data Privacy Framework. [7] The release said the framework limits US intelligence access to what is necessary and proportionate and establishes a Data Protection Review Court that EU individuals can use. [7] It said the new safeguards would also apply to transfers made under standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules. [7] It also said the FTC would enforce US companies’ compliance. [7]
The new decision was challenged in the General Court. On September 3, 2025, the General Court dismissed an action for annulment in Case T-553/23. [8] Its press release said the Court found that, on the date of adoption, the United States ensured an adequate level of protection. [8] It rejected the pleas about the Data Protection Review Court’s independence and about bulk collection. [8] The release noted that an appeal on points of law may be brought to the Court of Justice. [8]
What held up is the split this article describes. The company layer was never the ground for invalidation; the government layer was. [5] The 2023 release confirmed that the government layer serves every transfer route, including standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules. [7] The General Court’s release said the Commission must keep monitoring the US legal framework and may suspend, amend or repeal its decision if that framework changes. [8]
What held up less well is the idea that a political agreement settles the question. The February 2016 release spoke of legal certainty for businesses. [1] The decision built on it was invalidated in 2020. [5] As checked on November 16, 2026, we did not confirm the status of any appeal from the September 2025 judgment in the sources we opened, so we state none. [8]
In our reading, for regulated institutions outside the self-certification gate, the practical record is consistent across all three frameworks. Their transfers ran on contracts or group rules, and those routes depended on the same US commitments as the list did. [2] [5] [7] In our view, the useful planning assumption is that the government layer can change, through a court in Luxembourg or an order in Washington. Every transfer file should say what happens next if it does.
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