Purchase cards kept the security bans but dropped the clauses

The October 2019 FAR proposal would lift the micro-purchase threshold to $10,000. Below it, purchases need no contract clauses, so supply chain bans bind the government buyer alone. Small technology buys made the purchase card program a security control.

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Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

The October 2019 FAR proposal would lift the micro-purchase threshold to $10,000. Below it, purchases need no contract clauses, so supply chain bans bind the government buyer alone. Small technology buys made the purchase card program a security control.

  1. The week On October 2, 2019, the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration and NASA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, at 84 FR 52420, to amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
  2. How a purchase without clauses works Most federal contracts are built from clauses.
  3. The prohibitions that reach the card The FAR does not exempt micro-purchases from supply chain prohibitions.
  4. The buyer: cardholders and approving officials If the cardholder is the control point, the card program becomes part of the agency’s supply chain risk management.
  5. What the government gives up on the seller side The clause that carries the section 889 prohibition into contracts above the threshold shows what a clause-free purchase lacks.
  6. Grant-funded state and local governments The FAR governs federal agencies’ own purchases.
  7. The strongest objections The argument here is that raising the micro-purchase threshold, in a period of new supply chain prohibitions, made the purchase card program a security control.
  8. With hindsight The FAR Council published the final rule on July 2, 2020, at 85 FR 40064, effective August 31, 2020.

The week

On October 2, 2019, the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration and NASA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, at 84 FR 52420, to amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The rule, FAR Case 2018-004, would implement a section of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 and several sections of the act for Fiscal Year 2018. Those statutes had raised two thresholds that decide how much process a federal purchase needs. The micro-purchase threshold would go from $3,500 to $10,000. The simplified acquisition threshold would go from $150,000 to $250,000. Comments were due by December 2, 2019.

The proposal did more than change two definitions in FAR part 2. It replaced stated dollar figures throughout the regulation with the names of the thresholds, so that future changes would carry through without hunting for every “$3,500.” It set a micro-purchase threshold of $10,000, or a higher amount the agency head determined, for buys from institutions of higher education and certain nonprofit research organizations, consistent with clean audit findings, an internal risk assessment or state law. It removed several laws from the FAR’s list of statutes that do not apply at or below the simplified acquisition threshold, because those laws were tied to a fixed dollar value that would not rise with the new threshold. And it updated thresholds in clauses on tax delinquency, small business set-asides and other matters.

The proposal was candid about what the change would do. It said increasing the thresholds meant additional awards could be made under the micro-purchase threshold, and those awards would not require provisions or clauses, except as provided in two narrow sections of the FAR. It said contractor financing costs could fall because the Governmentwide purchase card is the preferred method of purchase and payment for micro-purchases. It described the rule as reducing burden on contractors by raising the thresholds at which various regulatory requirements apply. It added no new solicitation provisions or contract clauses.

A different FAR change had already pulled in the opposite direction. The first part of section 889 of Public Law 115-232 had applied since August 13, 2019. It bars agencies, on or after that date, from procuring equipment, systems or services that use covered telecommunications equipment or services from named manufacturers as a substantial or essential component. As the FAR reads today, it carries that prohibition into contracts through clause 52.204-25, and into micro-purchases through a paragraph of FAR 13.201, the general section on purchases at or below the micro-purchase threshold, which tells buyers not to procure such items on or after August 13, 2019. The same section tells buyers not to purchase Kaspersky Lab hardware, software or services that the government will use on or after October 1, 2018.

So in the autumn of 2019, two developments met in one section of the FAR. Supply chain prohibitions were being added, and both of those then in force reached even the smallest purchase. At the same time, the FAR’s ceiling below which purchases carried no clauses at all was about to rise from $3,500 to $10,000. The rule that made a purchase card the preferred tool also made it the place where those prohibitions had to be enforced.

The FAR change proposed in October 2019 was presented as reducing burden on contractors and on government buyers. The proposal did not discuss its security effect. Below the micro-purchase threshold, the FAR does not require provisions or clauses. A supply chain prohibition that is enforced above the threshold through a clause, a representation and a reporting duty on the seller is enforced below it only through an instruction to the government buyer. Raising the threshold to $10,000 moved a larger slice of technology buying into that regime. The argument here is that the purchase card program, with its cardholders, approving officials and transaction data, became a supply chain security control whether or not agencies designed it as one. The analysis covers five parts: how a clause-free purchase works, the prohibitions that reach it, the buyer who has to apply them, what the government gives up on the seller side, and how the picture differs for grant-funded state and local governments, followed by the strongest objections.

How a purchase without clauses works

Most federal contracts are built from clauses. A clause puts an obligation on the seller: to represent a fact, to report a problem, to flow a requirement down to subcontractors. The FAR assembles those clauses according to the dollar value and type of purchase. Micro-purchases are the exception.

The rule in FAR 13.201

FAR 13.201 sets the general rules for purchases at or below the micro-purchase threshold. It encourages agency heads to delegate micro-purchase authority. It makes the Governmentwide commercial purchase card the preferred method to purchase and pay. It allows other simplified methods if the purchaser is authorized and trained under agency procedures. And it says micro-purchases do not require provisions or clauses, except as provided in two other sections, and that this paragraph takes precedence over any other FAR requirement to the contrary. It does not prohibit the use of any clause, but it requires none.

The effect is that a micro-purchase can be a transaction on commercial terms. The buyer pays the seller’s listed price with a government card, and the seller’s own terms of sale apply. For a laptop accessory or a software subscription, those terms are written by the seller for every customer. They say nothing about federal supply chain prohibitions, because the seller has no reason to address them.

Many buyers, each a decision point

The FAR encourages agency heads to delegate micro-purchase authority, and the purchase card can put that buying in the hands of people outside contracting offices. The result is a large population of buyers, each making small decisions. A contracting officer handling a larger purchase works inside a system of clauses, reviews and files. A cardholder in a field office works with a card, a limit and whatever training the agency provided. Raising the threshold extended that second model to purchases worth up to $10,000, and the number of decision points that had to apply security rules grew with it.

Why the threshold change mattered for technology

At $3,500, a micro-purchase covered small hardware items, a few software licenses and low-cost services. At $10,000, it covered more. A year of a cloud software subscription for a small team, a set of network cameras, a batch of routers or a small device order can fall in that range. The higher threshold meant that more technology purchases could be made on a card, by a cardholder, without the contract file that a larger purchase would carry.

That was intended. The proposal presented the higher thresholds as reducing burden and bid and proposal costs. The question for security officials was not whether the change was sensible, but where the controls that clauses provide would now come from.

Research purchases

The proposal set a separate rule for buys from institutions of higher education and certain nonprofit research organizations: $10,000, or a higher amount the agency head determined, consistent with clean audit findings, an internal risk assessment or state law. Research purchases from those institutions can include instruments, data services and software. A higher, agency-set threshold for them widens the clause-free zone further for a category where technical content is high.

Emergency thresholds

The FAR also raises the threshold in emergencies. As FAR 13.201 reads today, for supplies or services that the agency head determines will be used to support a contingency operation, to facilitate defense against or recovery from cyber, nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological attack, or to respond to an emergency or major disaster, the micro-purchase threshold is $25,000 inside the United States and $40,000 outside it. Purchases under this authority must have a clear and direct relationship to that purpose.

The cyber clause deserves attention. During recovery from a cyberattack, an agency may need replacement equipment, software and services fast. The emergency authority fits that need, and it raises the clause-free ceiling at the moment when the pressure to skip checks is highest. An incident response plan that includes emergency purchasing should name who applies the supply chain prohibitions to those purchases, and keep a pre-approved list of replacement products so the check takes minutes.

Splitting and aggregation

Thresholds create an incentive to stay below them. A need that exceeds the micro-purchase threshold could be met through several smaller purchases. The grant rules address this by measuring a micro-purchase by the aggregate amount of the procurement transaction. The higher the threshold, the more a single team’s technology needs can be met through a handful of card transactions, each one legitimate on its face. For a security office, a pattern of related technology purchases just under the threshold is a signal worth reviewing whatever its procurement explanation.

The prohibitions that reach the card

The FAR does not exempt micro-purchases from supply chain prohibitions. It writes them into FAR 13.201 as instructions to the purchaser. As the section reads in the Code of Federal Regulations today, it lists several.

The list in FAR 13.201 today

  • Do not purchase hardware, software or services developed or provided by Kaspersky Lab that the government will use on or after October 1, 2018.
  • On or after August 13, 2019, do not procure or obtain, or extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, any equipment, system or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system, unless an exception applies or a waiver is granted.
  • On or after August 13, 2020, do not enter into, extend or renew a contract with an entity that uses such equipment, system or service, regardless of whether that use is in performance of work under a federal contract.
  • The prohibition on use of a covered application, identified in the FAR as TikTok, applies to micro-purchases where performance may require the presence or use of the application, such as social media advertising services, unless an exception is granted under the Office of Management and Budget’s memorandum M-23-13.
  • Do not procure products or services where an applicable Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act order prohibits it.
  • The FAR’s prohibitions on certain unmanned aircraft systems apply at the micro-purchase level.

Every item on that list is addressed to the government buyer. None is phrased as an obligation on the seller, because below the threshold there is no clause to carry one.

What each prohibition asks the buyer to know

The prohibitions differ in what a buyer needs to know to comply. The Kaspersky rule is a brand rule: a buyer who knows the product’s maker can apply it. The first part of section 889 is a component rule. It reaches equipment, systems or services that use covered telecommunications equipment as a substantial or essential component, which a buyer cannot see on a product page. The second part is an entity rule. It reaches sellers that use covered equipment anywhere, even outside federal work. A cardholder buying from an online retailer has no practical way to know how the retailer’s own networks are built.

The supply chain security orders are list rules: the buyer must check whether an order covers the source or product. The covered application rule is a use rule: it depends on whether performance may require the app. Each type demands different information. A buyer needs a brand list for one, a component list for another, a list of orders for a third, and a judgment about intended use for a fourth. A single instruction in FAR 13.201 to “not procure” leaves the method entirely to the agency.

Renewals are purchases too

Several of the prohibitions reach extensions and renewals as well as new purchases. The section 889 paragraphs say not to “extend or renew” a contract to procure or obtain covered equipment, systems or services, and the supply chain security order paragraph uses the same words. For a software subscription or support plan paid on a card, each renewal is a point where the rule applies again. A product that was permitted when first bought can become prohibited by a later order, and a seller can change its own infrastructure between renewals.

Card purchases of subscriptions can renew automatically. An auto-renewing charge has no human decision attached to it, so no one applies the check. Requiring that technology subscriptions on cards renew only after a short review, or at least appear on a list the security office checks before each renewal date, narrows that gap.

Covered applications inside services

The covered application paragraph shows how a prohibition can attach to a service rather than a product. It applies where performance of the purchase may require the presence or use of the application, and the FAR text gives social media advertising services as an example. A communications office buying a small advertising campaign on a card is unlikely to see that as a supply chain decision. The prohibition makes it one, subject to any exception granted under the OMB memorandum. Card training that covers only hardware misses it.

Where the knowledge has to live

Above the threshold, much of that knowledge is pushed to the seller. The seller represents its status and accepts a clause that makes it responsible for the components it supplies. Below the threshold, the knowledge has to live with the buyer, or in tools the agency gives the buyer. Here lies the core of the argument. The prohibitions did not weaken at the card. Their enforcement mechanism changed, from a contractual promise by a seller to a decision by a government employee at checkout.

The buyer: cardholders and approving officials

If the cardholder is the control point, the card program becomes part of the agency’s supply chain risk management. The FAR text supplies two levers directly: micro-purchase authority is delegated, and purchasers must be authorized and trained under agency procedures. An agency can add others around them, such as spending limits, merchant category restrictions, transaction review by an approving official, and audit. Each can carry security requirements.

Delegation and training

FAR 13.201 lets purchasers use simplified methods for micro-purchases only if they are authorized and trained under agency procedures. That training is the natural place to teach the supply chain prohibitions: what each one covers, how to recognize covered brands and products, which items need an IT review before purchase, and whom to ask. Training that covers only spending rules and prohibited personal purchases leaves the cardholder to discover security rules on their own.

A short, specific module works better than a general warning. It can show the named manufacturers, explain that relabeled equipment may still be covered, and list the categories that always need a check: network equipment, cameras and video recorders, radios, drones, and any software or service that will connect to agency systems.

Category controls

A card program can be configured to restrict which merchant categories a card can be used with and to set lower limits for some of them. An agency can route technology categories to a smaller group of cardholders who receive deeper training, or require a pre-approval step for them. The control is imperfect, because merchant categories describe the seller’s business, not the item bought. A general retailer can sell both office supplies and network cameras. But category controls narrow the field and create a record.

A pre-purchase technology check

An agency can require a review before staff buy software or connected devices on a card. For card purchases, that review is the step that applies the FAR 13.201 prohibitions. It can be light: a short form, a check against an approved products list, a confirmation from the security office for anything that will connect to the network. What matters is that the cardholder has a defined route and that the approving official can see the result.

Review after the fact

Where an approving official reviews card transactions after they occur, that review can include security, with a few additions: a flag for transactions in technology categories, a check that the pre-purchase review exists, and a sample test of whether items bought match the approved list. A card program also generates transaction-level data. Analyzing it for technology purchases, split transactions and merchants associated with prohibited brands turns a payment dataset into a supply chain monitoring tool.

Owners and evidence

The roles are clear once the card program is treated as a control. The agency’s card program coordinator owns training and card configuration. The chief information security officer’s team owns the list of prohibited and approved products and the pre-purchase review. The supply chain risk management function, where one exists, owns the mapping from each prohibition to a check. Inspectors general and auditors test the result. The evidence an auditor would look for is concrete: training records for cardholders with technology categories, the pre-purchase reviews matched to transactions, the approving officials’ sign-offs, and the record of any prohibited item found and removed.

What to measure

A small set of measures shows whether the control works. The share of technology-category card transactions with a matching pre-purchase review. The number of prohibited items found after purchase, and how long they stayed in service. The number of recurring technology charges with no named owner. The time it takes a cardholder to get an answer from the security office. Falling numbers on the first three and a short answer time on the last indicate a control people use rather than avoid.

An approved products list

The fastest check is one the cardholder does not have to perform. A security office can publish a short list of pre-approved products in the high-risk categories, with makers and model numbers, that cardholders may buy without further review. Anything off the list goes to the pre-purchase check. The list needs an owner and a review cycle, because a supply chain order or a change in a maker’s ownership can move an item off it. Kept current, it can turn many technology card purchases into a lookup and reserves expert time for the exceptions. Publishing the list where cardholders already work, in the card program’s own guidance, matters more than its format.

What the government gives up on the seller side

The clause that carries the section 889 prohibition into contracts above the threshold shows what a clause-free purchase lacks. Clause 52.204-25, as it reads today, does three things that matter here.

Reporting

The clause requires a contractor that identifies covered telecommunications equipment or services used as a substantial or essential component of any system, during contract performance, or is told of it by a subcontractor or any other source, to report it. The first report goes to the contracting officer, or for the Department of Defense to a designated website, within one business day, with details such as the supplier, brand, model number and item description. That is a detection mechanism. It turns the seller into a source of information about covered equipment that has reached the government.

Checks the card skips

The FAR relaxes other checks for card purchases as well. FAR 13.201 says that when the purchase card is used as the method of payment, purchases at or below the micro-purchase threshold are exempt from verification in the System for Award Management of whether the contractor has a delinquent debt subject to collection under the Treasury Offset Program. That exemption is sensible for small payments. It also shows the general pattern: the card path is designed to remove steps that a contract would require, and any step the agency still wants has to be added on purpose.

Flow-down

The clause also requires the contractor to insert its substance into subcontracts and other contractual instruments, including those for commercial products and services. That extends the obligation down the supply chain. A purchase without the clause has no flow-down. Whatever the seller buys from its own suppliers is outside any federal requirement.

A promise that can be enforced

Finally, a clause creates a contractual obligation the government can enforce. If a seller under contract delivers covered equipment, the government has a contractual basis to act against the seller. If a cardholder buys covered equipment on commercial terms, the error is the government’s own. The remedy is internal: remove the item, retrain, and report the violation as the agency’s procedures require.

Why this matters more for some items than others

The loss is small for a commodity item from a well-known brand. It grows with the item’s complexity and connectivity. It is larger for items where the covered component is hidden: a recorder inside a camera system, a module inside a network device, a service provider whose infrastructure uses covered equipment. It is largest for services bought on a card that connect to agency systems, because those carry ongoing data flows and can change suppliers without notice. Card policy can reflect that gradient by requiring contracts, with clauses, for categories where hidden components or ongoing services are common, even when the dollar value would allow a card.

Terms of service as the contract

When a card purchase is a subscription to an online service, the seller’s terms of service become the working contract. Those terms carry whatever security commitments the seller offers every customer, and no more. They will not mention section 889, supply chain security orders, or reporting of covered equipment. If the service stores agency data, the agency has no clause requiring notice of a change in hosting or ownership. For low-risk services that may be acceptable. For services that hold agency data or connect to agency systems, the gap is a reason to buy through an instrument that can carry clauses.

Detection without a seller’s report

Without the clause’s reporting duty, the agency has to find covered equipment itself. Its main tool is its own inventory: network discovery scans that identify devices by maker and model, and asset records that should list every connected device. Those tools work better when they can be matched to purchase records. A card transaction that names a maker and model, linked to the asset record created when the device was connected, lets the security office trace a prohibited item back to its purchase and fix the process that allowed it. A device found on the network with no purchase record points to a gap in either the card controls or the asset process.

Grant-funded state and local governments

The FAR governs federal agencies’ own purchases. States, counties, cities, school districts and other recipients of federal grants follow a different set of rules for purchases made with grant funds: the Uniform Guidance in 2 CFR part 200. The differences are instructive.

A threshold the recipient sets

Under 2 CFR 200.320 as it reads today, a recipient may use micro-purchases when the aggregate amount does not exceed the micro-purchase threshold, may award them without soliciting competitive quotations if it considers the price reasonable and documents why, and may use purchase cards to pay. The recipient is responsible for determining and documenting an appropriate threshold based on internal controls, an evaluation of risk and its documented procurement procedures, and the threshold must be authorized or not prohibited under state, local or tribal law. A recipient may set a threshold higher than the FAR’s and may self-certify one of up to $50,000 on an annual basis, subject to documentation requirements.

The self-certification has to include a justification, a clear statement of the threshold, and support from one of three bases: qualification as a low-risk auditee in the most recent audit, an annual internal institutional risk assessment that identifies, mitigates and manages financial risks, or, for public institutions, consistency with state law. The documentation must be available to the federal agency or pass-through entity and to auditors. Two of the bases concern financial risk and the third is state law. None mentions information security or supply chain risk, so a recipient that raises its threshold has to add those considerations itself.

A county using federal grant funds can therefore make clause-free purchases at values well above the federal agency threshold, if its own law and risk assessment allow it. The same question applies with more force: where do the security controls come from?

A prohibition with no threshold

The Uniform Guidance carries its own version of the section 889 prohibition. Under 2 CFR 200.216, recipients and subrecipients are prohibited from obligating or expending loan or grant funds to procure or obtain covered telecommunications equipment or services, to extend or renew a contract to do so, or to enter into such a contract. The section names the covered manufacturers. It contains no micro-purchase exception. A grant-funded camera bought on a county purchase card is subject to it.

Pass-through grants

The prohibition binds subrecipients as well as recipients. When a state agency passes federal funds to counties, cities or nonprofits, each of them inherits the rule. The state, as pass-through entity, has an interest in making sure its subrecipients know about it, because the expenditures sit within its award. A short clause in subaward agreements naming the prohibition, and a question about card controls in subrecipient monitoring, carry the requirement down the chain in the way a FAR clause would for a federal contract.

Tribal governments and nonprofits

The Uniform Guidance threshold rules mention tribal law alongside state and local law, and the same purchase card logic applies to tribal governments and to nonprofit recipients of federal funds. A nonprofit health center or community organization that buys a network camera or router with grant funds is bound by 2 CFR 200.216 in the same way as a county. Its controls may be lighter still, which makes a short prohibited-brands list and an IT check for connected devices a practical defense.

Different organizations, different gaps

A large federal agency can assign a security office, a card program coordinator and a supply chain risk function to the problem. A small county or school district may have a finance office that runs purchase cards and a single IT manager. Its exposure runs two ways. Prohibited equipment on its network is a security risk, and because 2 CFR 200.216 prohibits obligating or expending grant funds on it, the purchase itself is a grant compliance problem. For those organizations, a workable control is a list of prohibited brands attached to the purchase card policy, a rule that network-connected devices and software bought with grant funds go through the IT manager first, and a periodic review of card statements for technology purchases.

Public health and education buyers

Public hospitals, health departments, universities and school systems that spend federal funds through decentralized buying face the same pattern: many cardholders, and technology purchases that are small one at a time. The same design applies: identify the technology categories, train the cardholders who buy in them, attach a check to the purchase, and review the transactions. What differs is who owns the policy. In a university it may be research administration and the central IT office; in a health department, the finance office and the state’s IT agency. In a school district, it may be the business office and a technology director who also runs the network. Whoever owns it, the policy should say in one place which technology categories need a check, who performs it, and how a cardholder reaches that person on the day of the purchase. A rule that exists only in an IT policy that cardholders never read does not reach the card.

The strongest objections

The argument here is that raising the micro-purchase threshold, in a period of new supply chain prohibitions, made the purchase card program a security control. Five objections deserve an answer.

The dollar amounts are trivial

Micro-purchases are small by definition, and the risk from any one of them is small. True of value; untrue of access. A $9,000 network device on an agency network carries the same technical exposure as one bought under a large contract. Supply chain prohibitions are written around what an item is and who made it, not what it costs. The threshold measures paperwork, and security risk does not scale with paperwork.

Clauses do not stop violations either

A second objection is that clauses and representations are themselves weak controls. Sellers may not know what is inside their products, and representations can be wrong. That is fair. But the clause adds a reporting duty, a flow-down and a remedy, which give the government more chances to find a problem and a party to hold responsible. A purchase without the clause has none of those. The objection argues for stronger checks on the buyer side, which is the same conclusion.

Agencies can simply ban card purchases of technology

A third objection is that the answer is to forbid technology purchases on cards entirely and route them all through contracts. Some categories may justify that. As a general rule it works against the threshold change, which the proposal presented as reducing burden and cost. It can also push buying into workarounds. A targeted approach, with category controls and a light pre-purchase check, can keep much of the efficiency and puts the control where the risk is.

Security belongs with IT, not finance

A fourth objection is organizational. Card programs may be run by finance or acquisition offices, which are not security experts, and security officers may not want to review receipts. The answer is division of labor, not transfer. The security office defines what is prohibited and what needs a check, and owns the approved products list. The card program builds those rules into training, card configuration and transaction review. Neither office can do the job alone, because the security office does not see the purchase and the card office does not know the risk.

The number was set by Congress

A fifth objection is that the FAR Council had no choice. The proposal implemented statutory increases, and the agencies that wrote it could not keep the old figure. That is correct, and the argument here does not criticize the number. It concerns what agencies did around it. A statute can move a threshold overnight. The training, card configuration, pre-purchase checks and transaction review that apply supply chain rules below it have to be built by each agency, and nothing in the 2019 proposal required them.

Where the argument is weakest

The weakest point is evidence. This article has no transaction-level card data, and the scale of technology purchasing on cards is not something it can measure. The argument rests on the structure of the rules: the FAR’s own statement that micro-purchases carry no clauses, the prohibitions it applies to them anyway, and the threshold that defines the space in between. Whether a given agency’s card program already works as a control is an empirical question that its own data can answer.

With hindsight

The FAR Council published the final rule on July 2, 2020, at 85 FR 40064, effective August 31, 2020. It made no changes as a result of public comments. With it, the micro-purchase threshold in the FAR text became $10,000 and the simplified acquisition threshold $250,000.

The list of prohibitions that reach micro-purchases kept growing. The second part of section 889, barring contracts with entities that use covered telecommunications equipment or services, took effect August 13, 2020, and FAR 13.201 says it applies regardless of whether the use is in performance of federal work. The section now also carries paragraphs on the covered application identified as TikTok, on Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act orders and on certain unmanned aircraft systems. Each was written as an instruction to the government buyer. Clause 52.204-25, which carries the section 889 prohibition into contracts above the threshold, still requires contractors to report covered equipment within one business day and to flow the clause down to subcontracts.

The threshold rose again. A FAR rule published August 27, 2025, effective October 1, 2025, adjusted acquisition-related thresholds for inflation under a statute that requires an adjustment every five years. The micro-purchase threshold went from $10,000 to $15,000 and the simplified acquisition threshold from $250,000 to $350,000. Using Federal Procurement Data System data for fiscal years 2022 through 2024, the rule put the average number of awards valued at or below $10,000 at about 562,324, with another 49,321 awards between $10,000 and $15,000, an increase of about 9 percent in the actions that would be considered under the threshold.

Then the whole regulation came up for rewriting. Executive Order 14275 of April 15, 2025, directed the FAR Council to produce a streamlined FAR. On September 18, 2026, the Council proposed rewriting parts 8, 12, 13 and others, moving micro-purchase procedures into a new subpart 12.4. The proposed text keeps the design this article describes. Micro-purchases would not require written provisions or clauses. The security prohibitions and exclusions in subpart 40.2 would apply to micro-purchases, but the provisions and clauses in that subpart would not be used for them. Comments were due October 19, 2026. As checked on November 14, 2026, the rule was still a proposal. The same proposal notes that one paragraph of the commercial terms clause, on unauthorized obligations, would apply automatically to any micro-purchase, including card purchases, to prevent violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act. A fiscal-law protection would travel with every card purchase by operation of the rule. The supply chain prohibitions would not; they would remain duties of the government buyer.

For grant recipients, the Uniform Guidance now lets a recipient self-certify a micro-purchase threshold of up to $50,000, while its telecommunications prohibition in 2 CFR 200.216 carries no threshold at all. Its threshold rules set out three bases for self-certification, none of them about security. What held up was the 2019 structure: the threshold grew, the prohibitions multiplied, and the government buyer remained the only place below the line where they could be enforced before a purchase was made.

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  • FAR
  • micro-purchase threshold
  • purchase card
  • Section 889
  • supply chain security
  • grants