Regulation CC’s inflation clock turned deposit hold limits into a release every five years
The July 2019 Regulation CC rule indexed check hold amounts to inflation on a fixed five-year cycle. That made statutory numbers into scheduled parameter changes that touch deposit systems, notices, fraud models and examiner evidence every time.
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Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The July 2019 Regulation CC rule indexed check hold amounts to inflation on a fixed five-year cycle. That made statutory numbers into scheduled parameter changes that touch deposit systems, notices, fraud models and examiner evidence every time.
- The week On Wednesday, July 3, 2019, the Federal Register published a joint final rule from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau amending Regulation CC, Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks.
- The hold logic in deposit systems Funds availability rules are enforced by software.
- Disclosures and notices Regulation CC requires institutions to give consumers a written notice of changes to their funds availability policy.
- Fraud and loss models Every dollar of mandatory next-day availability is a dollar the institution may pay out before it knows a check is good.
- Evidence that the right amount applied Because the amounts change on a known date, an examiner can test compliance precisely.
- Objections One objection holds that the changes are too small to warrant this attention.
- How it differs by institution Large banks have many places where the amounts can hide: multiple deposit platforms, acquired institutions on different systems, and many document sets.
- With hindsight The cycle ran as designed.
The week
On Wednesday, July 3, 2019, the Federal Register published a joint final rule from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau amending Regulation CC, Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks. Regulation CC implements the Expedited Funds Availability Act, the law that limits how long depository institutions may hold deposited funds before letting customers withdraw them. For this purpose the regulation defines “bank” to include banks, savings institutions and credit unions.
The rule did two things. First, it carried out a requirement that the Dodd-Frank Act had added to the funds availability law in 2010: the law’s dollar amounts must be adjusted every five years after December 31, 2011, by the increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), rounded to the nearest multiple of $25. Second, it put into the regulation the amendments made by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, which extended the law to banks in American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam.
The amounts affected were the core numbers of a deposit hold policy. The minimum amount that must be available on the next business day for certain check deposits rose from $200 to $225. The cash withdrawal amount rose from $400 to $450. Three thresholds, for new accounts, large deposits and repeatedly overdrawn accounts, rose from $5,000 to $5,525. The civil liability ceiling for an individual action rose from $1,000 to $1,100, and for class actions from $500,000 to $552,500; the $100 floor did not change. The rule took effect on September 3, 2019, but the new dollar amounts took effect on July 1, 2020.
The rule also fixed the method for every future cycle. The agencies would use the July CPI-W. The first adjustment measured inflation from July 2011 to July 2018. The second would measure July 2018 to July 2023 and take effect on July 1, 2025, with later adjustments on July 1 of every fifth year after 2025. The agencies said they expected to publish each set of new amounts at least a year before it took effect. If inflation was negative, or too small to move an amount after rounding, the change would carry forward into the next period.
The same document also fixed errors in the CFPB’s Regulation DD, which implements the Truth in Savings Act: exponents in its annual percentage yield formulas had been shown incorrectly since the CFPB restated that regulation in December 2011. The agencies had proposed the rule in December 2018 and received 32 responses; counted separately, the Board received 18 comments and the CFPB 23, with nine commenters sending identical letters to both agencies. Twelve commenters supported the one-year lead time. Three institutions opposed the adjustments on fraud grounds, one arguing that individual check amounts do not track inflation. Credit unions and their associations worried about the cost of sending customers notices of changed terms every five years. The agencies declined to create an exception from the notice requirement, which comes from the statute, but pointed out that notices could be sent electronically or with periodic statements.
A Regulation CC amendment that moves a hold amount by $25 does not look like a technology story. The July 2019 rule was something more durable than a one-time change, though. It turned the dollar amounts in the funds availability law into parameters with a statutory schedule. Every five years, on July 1, a set of numbers embedded in deposit systems, customer disclosures, fraud models and procedures would change, and they would keep changing indefinitely. The first change was small. The method guaranteed more.
Our argument is that the rule made funds availability amounts a recurring configuration change, and that institutions handle recurring configuration changes well only when they treat them as managed parameters with a single source, a named owner and a test. We look at the four places those amounts live, which together cover the exposure. First, the hold logic in the systems that take deposits. Second, the customer disclosures and notices that state the amounts. Third, the fraud and loss models that depend on them. Fourth, the evidence that shows the right amount was applied on the right day. A fifth section tests the argument against objections, and the last looks at how it differs by institution.
The obligations here are specific to depository institutions under Regulation CC. They do not apply in the same way to broker-dealers or non-bank fintechs, although a fintech that offers accounts through a partner bank presents that bank’s availability policy to its customers, in our reading. Institutions should check the details of their own obligations with counsel.
The hold logic in deposit systems
Where the numbers sit
Funds availability rules are enforced by software. When a customer deposits a check at a branch, through an ATM, by mobile capture or by mail, a system decides how much is available when. It applies the next-day minimum, checks whether the account is new, sums the day’s check deposits against the large-deposit threshold, looks back at overdraft history, and sets holds accordingly. Each of those steps uses a dollar amount that the July 2019 rule indexed.
In a bank of any size, those amounts may appear in several places. The core deposit system may hold one set. The teller platform may hold another, for the receipt it prints. The mobile deposit service, which may come from a vendor, may hold a third. ATM deposit processing, branch capture and back-office exception tools may each have their own. If any one of them is missed, the institution applies the wrong amount for that channel. A customer depositing by phone gets a different hold than one depositing at a branch, and only one of them is right.
How the next-day minimum works
The commentary the agencies revised in July 2019 shows how much logic hangs on one number. Up to $225 of the aggregate deposit by checks that do not already get next-day availability must be available on the next business day. If a customer deposits $70 by check on a Monday, all $70 must be available at the start of business on Tuesday. If the customer deposits $400, $225 must be. The $225 is in addition to amounts that other provisions already make available the next day: a $1,000 Treasury check and a $1,000 local check deposited on Monday mean $1,225 available on Tuesday.
The commentary adds detail that systems must reproduce. The bank chooses which part of the deposit the $225 applies to, as long as it is not a check already entitled to next-day availability. The rule does not apply to deposits at nonproprietary ATMs. A bank may aggregate deposits to a customer’s individual and joint accounts. Cash back at the time of deposit can satisfy the requirement, and so can applying the amount to a negative balance. Each of those branches is a rule in code, and each one uses the indexed amount. A change to the number is a change to every branch.
From constant to parameter
The regulation’s own history of the minimum shows $100 before July 21, 2011, when Dodd-Frank’s changes took effect, and $200 from then until June 30, 2020. Systems built in that environment may have treated the numbers as constants, written into code or scattered across configuration tables. The July 2019 rule made them variables with a known schedule. Good architecture for a variable with a schedule looks different from good architecture for a constant.
The ideal design holds each regulated amount once, with an effective date, and lets every channel read from that one place. A new set of amounts can then be loaded in advance and take effect automatically on July 1. The regulation itself takes this form: section 229.11 lists each amount with the period it applies to, prior and current. An institution whose systems mirror that table, with dates, can implement each cycle as a data change. An institution whose systems scatter the numbers must run a search-and-replace project every five years.
Vendors and the effective date
Where deposit systems come from vendors, the question is whether the vendor will deliver the change in time, test it, and switch it on at the right moment. The agencies’ one-year lead time between publication and effect helps, but only if the institution asks early. Vendor contracts should say who is responsible for regulatory parameter changes, how much notice the vendor needs, and how the institution will verify the change before the effective date.
The effective date itself deserves attention. July 1 falls on different days of the week in different years. If it falls on a weekend or a holiday, the institution must decide how deposits made on that day and processed on the next business day are treated, consistent with the regulation’s definitions of banking day and business day. The answer should be decided and tested in advance, not inferred by whichever system processes the item first.
Consumer and business accounts
The availability schedules apply to accounts generally, but the notice requirements differ. The statutory change-in-terms notice runs to consumer account holders. Business accounts follow the same availability rules but may be governed by different disclosure terms in their agreements. Deposit systems that handle both must apply the right amounts to each and route notices only where the law or the agreement requires them. Treasury management products, with their own deposit channels and terms, need to be included in the inventory even though the consumer notice rules do not reach them.
Exception holds and their calculations
The indexed amounts also feed the exception holds that let an institution extend availability. The new-account exception applies to the first 30 calendar days after an account is opened and limits the next-day availability that certain checks would otherwise get to the first new-account amount deposited on any one banking day. The large-deposit exception applies to aggregate check deposits above the threshold on one banking day. The repeated-overdraft exception turns on how many banking days an account was overdrawn, and on whether it was overdrawn by the threshold amount or more. When an institution invokes the large-deposit or repeated-overdraft exception, it must give the depositor a written notice that states, among other things, the reason and the time period within which the funds will be available.
Those exceptions are where errors are costly. An institution that applies the old threshold after July 1 will place large-deposit holds it is not entitled to place. Each such hold is a potential violation and a likely complaint. An institution that applies the new threshold early will give up holds it was entitled to keep. The exception logic must switch on the effective date and must produce notices that state the correct amounts.
Disclosures and notices
The change-in-terms notice
Regulation CC requires institutions to give consumers a written notice of changes to their funds availability policy. The statute says the notice must come at least 30 days before the change, and that a change which speeds availability must be disclosed no later than 30 days after it takes effect. The agencies said the inflation adjustments would trigger the notice requirement, and they declined to create an exception. Every five years, therefore, every institution subject to the rule must tell its consumer customers about the new amounts.
The agencies offered ways to reduce the cost. Institutions could send the notice electronically, if they had met the E-Sign Act’s consent requirements, and could include it on or with a periodic statement. They need not send a whole new disclosure; if they did, they had to direct the customer to the changed terms by a letter, an insert or highlighting. The one-year lead time gave room to fold the notice into a regular statement cycle.
Timing the notice
The calendar for each cycle is set by two dates the institution does not control and one it does. The agencies publish the new amounts; they said they expected to do so at least a year before the effective date. The effective date is July 1. Between them, the institution chooses when to notify customers. Because a higher hold amount speeds availability, the statute allows that change to be disclosed up to 30 days after it takes effect. A change that delays availability needs notice at least 30 days before. An institution that is also changing its own policy in a way that delays availability must meet the earlier deadline for that part.
The practical choice is to fold the notice into a statement cycle that falls comfortably before July 1, with the electronic version sent to customers who have consented. Planning backward from that statement date gives the dates by which notice text must be approved, translated where the institution serves customers in other languages, and loaded into statement production.
Why the agencies kept the specific numbers
One commenter asked the agencies to let institutions describe the minimum as the “minimum amount required by regulation” rather than state a dollar figure. That would have removed the need for notices every five years. The agencies declined, saying it would confuse consumers and defeat the statute’s purpose of telling consumers the specific amount available to them. That choice fixed the operational burden in place. Every disclosure document, every website page and every branch poster that states a number must be updated each cycle.
An inventory of where the numbers appear
The disclosure side has its own scatter problem. The amounts appear in account agreements, funds availability policy disclosures, exception hold notices, mobile deposit terms, website help pages, branch signage, call center scripts and staff training. Some of those are controlled documents with version numbers; others are not. An institution that wants to update them reliably needs an inventory of every place the amounts appear, with an owner for each.
The same inventory protects against the opposite error. A notice sent on time is of little use if the website still shows the old amount after July 1, or if a branch employee quotes it from memory. Complaints in the weeks after an effective date are a good test of whether the inventory was complete. They should be tracked as a category for that reason.
Staff who quote the numbers
Branch staff, call center agents and treasury management officers answer questions about holds every day. They quote amounts from training, scripts and memory. Each cycle needs a short briefing for them before July 1, with the new amounts, the effective date and the answer to the question customers will ask: why more of a deposit is available than last month. Scripts and knowledge-base articles should be updated on the same date as the systems. A customer told the wrong amount by an employee has received a disclosure, in effect, and a wrong one.
Cost estimates and who carries them
The CFPB estimated that covered institutions would face an average paperwork cost of about $2,241 every five years, or 60 hours at a weighted average wage of $37.35. After comments, it weighted that wage across compliance officers, operations staff and computer programmers, because commenters noted that technical staff would be needed for system updates. Commenters said the original estimate was too low. The estimate covered updating notices. The Bureau also said it had no representative data on the mix of staff used in recurring system changes of this kind. An institution budgeting for each cycle should therefore treat the figure as an estimate for the notice work, not a full cost that includes vendor fees and testing.
Fraud and loss models
Higher amounts, more exposure
Every dollar of mandatory next-day availability is a dollar the institution may pay out before it knows a check is good. The commenters who opposed the adjustment made that point: higher amounts expose institutions to more fraud losses, and one said institutions would pass those costs on to consumers. The agencies answered that the adjustments are required by statute, that Congress set a five-year cycle to balance burden against the need to keep the amounts from being eroded by inflation, and that Congress specified the CPI-W. The rule kept expected losses constant in real terms, in the CFPB’s analysis, because it adjusted the amounts for inflation and no more.
That analysis assumes fraud stays proportionate to the value of money. If fraud patterns change, the balance shifts regardless of inflation. A fraud team should treat each adjustment as an event to model: what the new amounts do to expected losses, given current fraud rates by channel and by account type, and whether other controls need to compensate. The controls an institution can use are limited by the regulation itself, which brings us to the exceptions.
Customer access is a risk too
Fraud teams see the cost of paying out too early. Customers see the cost of waiting. A hold on a paycheck or a benefit check can mean a missed rent payment or an overdraft fee elsewhere. The legislative history the agencies cited describes the law’s aim as a fairer balance between banks’ interest in avoiding fraud and consumers’ interest in speedy access to their funds. A fraud response that extends holds broadly shifts loss from the institution to its customers, and the complaint data will show it.
An institution should therefore measure both sides: fraud losses on deposited items and the volume, duration and customer impact of holds. Complaint categories, hold reversal rates and the share of exception holds later released without loss are useful measures. If the second set rises while the first does not fall, the controls are imposing cost without return.
Reasonable cause to doubt collectibility
The regulation lets an institution extend a hold when it has reasonable cause to believe a check is uncollectible. The rule requires facts that would cause a well-grounded belief in the mind of a reasonable person. The belief may not rest on the fact that the check is of a particular class or deposited by a particular class of persons. The reason must be stated in the notice to the depositor. If the institution does not give written notice at the time of deposit, it generally may not charge fees for overdrafts or returned items that occur only because of the extended hold, where the deposited check is later paid, unless its exception notice included a notice about such fees and it refunds them when required.
For fraud operations, that exception is the most flexible tool the regulation offers beyond the fixed exceptions. Its use must be documented case by case. An institution that applies it broadly to a category of customers or checks risks violating the prohibition on class-based belief. Fraud models that flag deposits for extended holds therefore need to produce reasons tied to the specific item and account, and the reasons must be recorded and reproduced in the notice.
The data a fraud team needs
To model the effect of each adjustment, the fraud team needs deposit data by channel, account age, account type and item type, joined to return and loss data. It needs to know which holds were placed under which exception, and which were released. It needs the reasons recorded for reasonable-cause holds. That data may sit in different systems from the deposit platform. Building a joined view once, and keeping it current, makes each cycle’s analysis a refresh rather than a project.
Return timing
Funds availability is one half of the timing problem; returns are the other. Regulation CC requires a paying bank that decides not to pay a check to return it expeditiously, so that the depositary bank is more likely to learn of the return before making funds available. When returns arrive quickly, a higher next-day amount carries less risk. When they arrive late, as can happen with altered or counterfeit items discovered after the fact, the institution has already paid out. Fraud models should therefore look at return timing by item type and by paying bank, as well as at loss rates, when assessing what a new set of amounts does to exposure.
Channel differences
The adjustment applies to all channels, but fraud risk does not. Mobile deposit, ATM deposit and branch deposit present different risks, from duplicate presentment to altered items. The regulation sets availability by type of check and deposit, with some differences for deposits at nonproprietary ATMs. Within those limits, the institution’s own policy may be more generous than the regulation requires. The fraud team and the deposit product owner need to agree, each cycle, whether the institution’s policy should simply track the new minimums or keep its own amounts where it already exceeded them.
Evidence that the right amount applied
What an examiner would want to see
Because the amounts change on a known date, an examiner can test compliance precisely. A sample of deposits from the days before and after July 1 should show the old amounts before and the new amounts after, in every channel. Exception hold notices from the same period should state the correct thresholds. Change-in-terms notices should be dated at least 30 days before any change that delays availability. Each of those tests is cheap for the institution to run on itself first.
Testing before the date
The new amounts can be tested before they take effect if systems support future-dated configuration. A test environment set to a date after July 1 should show the new holds in each channel, the new thresholds in exception logic and the new figures on generated notices. Where a vendor delivers the change, the institution should test the vendor’s release in its own environment, with its own settings. Testing only after the effective date turns a preventable error into a live one, with customers affected while the fix is made.
Change control for the amounts
If the amounts live in one table, that table becomes a sensitive control. Whoever can edit it can change hold behavior for every customer. Access should be limited, changes should require a second approver, and every change should be logged with the source document that justified it. The effective-dated entries for each cycle should be loaded well before July 1 and reviewed by compliance before they activate. An unexpected change to the table outside the cycle should raise an alert, since there is no legitimate reason for it.
The same discipline applies to any bank-specific policy amounts that sit beside the regulatory ones. An institution may set its own availability terms above the regulatory floor for some products. Keeping those in the same governed table, clearly marked as policy rather than regulation, lets the institution see at a glance whether a new regulatory amount overtakes an existing policy amount.
Second-line review
Compliance testing after the effective date should be independent of the team that made the change. A second-line reviewer can sample deposits across channels, compare holds with the published amounts, check that exception notices state the new thresholds, and confirm that customer notices went out on time. Findings should go into the issue management system like any other compliance finding, with owners and due dates. That review is also the right place to confirm that partner and vendor channels changed when the bank’s own systems did.
A release checklist
We would treat each cycle like a software release with a regulatory deadline. The checklist starts when the agencies publish the new amounts. It identifies every system and document that holds them, assigns owners, schedules vendor changes, drafts and approves customer notices, sets the notice mailing date, plans testing, and defines the post-effective-date verification. It ends with a sign-off by compliance that the sample tests passed. The checklist should be kept for the next cycle, because five years is long enough for every person involved to have changed roles.
Institutional memory
That last point is the hidden cost of a five-year cycle. A change that happens every year becomes routine. A change that happens every five years is forgotten between occurrences. The people who ran the 2020 adjustment may not be there for 2025. The vendor’s contacts may have changed. The documents may have moved. An institution that keeps the inventory, checklist and test results from the last cycle can start the next one from a known position. One that does not starts again from a search of its own systems.
Reporting to management and the board
A routine adjustment does not need a board agenda item. It does need a line in the compliance report: the change was made, on time, across all channels, with test results attached. If anything went wrong, the report should say what, how many customers were affected and what was done to remediate. That record shows examiners a functioning change process and gives the next cycle’s team a starting point. It also surfaces the cases where a missed system was found late, which is the evidence that the inventory needs work.
Testing the carry-forward rule
The method contains one rule that is easy to get wrong. If an aggregate inflation change rounds to no change for a particular amount, that change is not lost; it carries into the next period’s calculation. The agencies publish the resulting amounts, so institutions do not need to compute them. But an institution that tries to predict the next amounts for budgeting, or that checks the published figures, must apply the carry-forward. The rule also means an amount that did not change in one cycle may change in the next by more than one period’s inflation would suggest.
Objections
Twenty-five dollars does not need a program
One objection holds that the changes are too small to warrant this attention. In money terms they are small for any single deposit. In operational terms they are not, because a single missed system or document creates a violation that repeats on every affected deposit until it is found. The size of the change does not set the size of the error. A program built for the 2020 change would be reusable for every later one, so its cost spreads over many cycles.
Vendors will handle it
A second objection holds that core and mobile deposit vendors will make the change for all their clients, so the institution has little to do. Vendors may well make the change. But the institution remains responsible for compliance, and only the institution knows every place it uses the amounts, including its own documents, scripts and any custom logic. Relying on a vendor without verifying is a control gap. The vendor’s change is one item on the checklist, not the checklist.
Checks are fading anyway
A third objection holds that check volumes are falling, so the funds availability rules matter less each year. Volumes have fallen. But checks still carry large values for some customers and businesses, and fraud on them has risen, as we discuss below. A rule that governs how fast an institution pays out on a check, at a time of rising check fraud, matters more per item even as the number of items declines.
The agencies could have made it simpler
A fourth objection holds that the burden comes from the agencies’ choices, such as keeping specific numbers in disclosures, and that institutions should press for simplification rather than build processes. Institutions did press: credit union commenters objected to the cost of change-in-terms notices, and one institution asked to describe the amount generically. The agencies declined to create an exception from the notice requirement, because it comes from the statute, and declined the generic description because it would confuse consumers. They did say they recognized the benefit of efforts, if appropriate and feasible, to coordinate the effective dates of future disclosure changes with the adjustment dates. Until rules change, the process is what remains in an institution’s control.
Where the argument is weakest
Our argument is weakest for small institutions with one core system, one vendor and a short list of documents. For them, the change may be genuinely simple, and a full release process may be more than they need. Even then, the inventory and the post-change test are cheap and worth doing. What can be scaled down is the ceremony, not the verification. A small institution can run the whole cycle from a one-page checklist, provided the checklist names every channel and every document, and someone signs it after testing a handful of real deposits.
How it differs by institution
Large banks with many channels
Large banks have many places where the amounts can hide: multiple deposit platforms, acquired institutions on different systems, and many document sets. For them, the single source of truth is the first priority, followed by a test that covers each channel and each legacy platform. Acquisitions between cycles deserve special care, because an acquired bank’s systems may carry the old amounts.
Credit unions
Credit unions are covered by Regulation CC as banks. Several credit union commenters on the 2018 proposal said the cost of printing and distributing notices could exceed the agencies’ estimate, and one stressed the disproportionate cost for smaller credit unions. The agencies’ answer, electronic notices and notices with statements, works best for credit unions that have already obtained E-Sign consent from members. Credit unions that rely on mailed statements for many members should plan the notice into a regular mailing well ahead of the 30-day window.
Banks in the territories
For banks in American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam, the July 2019 rule did more than adjust numbers. It confirmed that the funds availability rules applied to them, as Congress had provided in 2018. The agencies noted that these banks could use the one-day extension of the availability schedules that the law permits. The CFPB identified five institutions that the 2018 amendments newly required to comply. For those institutions, the 2019 rule was an implementation project for the whole regulation, not a parameter change.
Institutions growing by acquisition
An institution that acquires another between cycles inherits its systems, documents and customers, and possibly its own way of holding the amounts. Conversion plans should include Regulation CC parameters explicitly: which platform holds them, when the acquired customers move to the acquirer’s policy, and what notice they receive if their availability terms change. A conversion that falls close to a July 1 adjustment needs a single plan covering both changes, so that customers do not receive two notices weeks apart or, worse, none.
Community banks on outsourced cores
Community banks that run on a service bureau or outsourced core depend on their provider for the hold logic. Their own work centers on documents, notices and verification. For them, the useful steps are to ask the provider early for its delivery and testing plan, to confirm which bank-specific settings exist and who changes them, and to test a few deposits in each channel after July 1. Their inventory is shorter, but they are also less likely to have staff who remember the last cycle, so the written checklist matters more.
Business customers using remote deposit capture
Banks that offer remote deposit capture to business customers have one more channel to cover, possibly with its own vendor and its own terms. Business deposits can be large, which may bring the large-deposit threshold into play. A change to the threshold changes which deposits qualify for the exception. Treasury management staff should know the new amounts and the date, so they can explain changes in availability to business clients who notice them.
Fintech partners and banking-as-a-service
Fintechs that offer deposit accounts through partner banks present funds availability to customers through their own apps and terms. The partner bank remains responsible under Regulation CC. The fintech’s app, terms and support scripts are among the places the amounts appear, and the bank’s inventory must include them. A partner program agreement should say who updates which documents and systems, and how the bank verifies the result before the effective date.
With hindsight
The cycle ran as designed. On May 20, 2024, the Board and the CFPB published the second set of adjustments, effective July 1, 2025. They reported a 21.8 percent increase in the CPI-W between July 2018 and July 2023. The minimum next-day amount rose to $275, the cash withdrawal amount to $550, and the new-account, large-deposit and repeatedly overdrawn thresholds to $6,725. The civil liability amounts became $125, $1,350 and $672,950. The agencies explained that the $100 floor had not moved in the first cycle because of rounding, so the second adjustment used inflation from both periods. The carry-forward rule written in 2019 had its first real use. As checked on November 14, 2026, the eCFR text of section 229.13 shows the $6,725 thresholds.
The fraud backdrop changed sharply. On February 27, 2023, FinCEN issued an alert on a nationwide surge in check fraud tied to mail theft. It said institutions filed over 350,000 suspicious activity reports on potential check fraud in 2021, a 23 percent increase over 2020, and over 680,000 in 2022. In June 2025, the OCC, the Board and the FDIC asked for public input on payments fraud. The Board said it was not proposing changes to Regulation CC, but asked whether funds availability periods should be shortened, whether the return rules needed changes, and whether the reasonable-cause exception let institutions manage check fraud while giving timely access to funds. It noted an October 2024 petition asking the Board and the CFPB to shorten maximum hold times.
The 2025 request also recalled how the clearing system had changed since the law was written. The Reserve Banks had cut their paper check-processing offices from 45 in 2003 to a single office in 2010, which made every check a local check under Regulation CC. The request noted that the law requires the Board and the CFPB to reduce the hold periods for certain check and ATM deposits to as short a time as possible, equal to the time an institution can reasonably expect to take to learn of the nonpayment of most items. That framing puts any future change to hold periods on the same systems and documents that each inflation cycle already touches.
In December 2025, the Board went further and asked for views on the future of the Reserve Banks’ check services, given declining check use and aging infrastructure. It said about 11 billion checks were written in 2021, roughly 5 percent of noncash payments by number but about 21 percent by value. It reported that the share of returned checks handled by the Reserve Banks that were potentially fraudulent rose from 10.2 percent to 15 percent between 2018 and 2021.
What held up was the 2019 design: a fixed method, a one-year lead time and a predictable date. What changed was the environment around it. The amounts rose on schedule while check fraud reports rose sharply, and by 2025 the regulators were asking whether the balance between access and protection still worked. As checked on November 14, 2026, the Federal Register shows no proposal to change the availability rules themselves since that request. The 2019 rule said the third set of adjustments would take effect on July 1, 2030, based on inflation from July 2023 through July 2028, and that the agencies anticipated publishing it in the first half of 2029.
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