Cloud concentration and resilience: how regulators treat dependence on a few providers, outlook to 2027

Europe and the UK now oversee the largest cloud providers directly; US regulators in finance, health care and government still manage the risk through the organizations they already supervise.

The question for 2027

Banks, health systems and public agencies now run much of their critical work on a small number of cloud platforms and on a few software products that sit on almost every machine. Regulators in all three sectors have said so in writing. What they have done about it differs sharply: Europe and the UK now oversee the largest providers directly, while in the US each sector still works through the organizations it already supervises. This outlook sets out where each strand stands as checked on November 16, 2026, what the official record of recent outages says, and what is likely to change through 2027. It describes official documents; it is not legal advice.

Financial services: a diagnosis from 2023, still without a US overseer

Treasury's February 8, 2023 cloud report named six challenges, including the potential impact of market concentration on the sector's resilience and contract dynamics given that concentration, and said the market is concentrated around a small number of providers, so that an incident at one could affect many financial clients at once [1]. Treasury also said that it and the financial regulators need to close significant data gaps to assess how the sector might be affected, and that the report does not impose any requirements [1]. The follow-up was a public-private Cloud Executive Steering Group, launched in May 2023 at the direction of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), whose deliverables of July 17, 2024 included a shared cloud lexicon, whose development the release says the OCC led, and a coordinated information sharing and examinations initiative led by the CFPB [2]. The dates agree across Treasury's own documents: the lexicon's cover reads "Version July 17, 2024" [24], the steering group page lists it among the first deliverables without a date [3], and the February 2023 release had said only that a steering group would launch within the next year [1]. Treasury said then that it planned further items on cloud incident response coordination and cloud concentration risk [2]; its steering group page still describes those as planned [3], and we found no published concentration deliverable as checked on November 16, 2026.

FSOC has carried the issue in its annual reports. The 2024 report said disruptions at service providers that are not easily substitutable, such as cloud providers, can have impacts across firms, and that regulators and market participants can have low visibility into which common providers firms use [4]. It noted that the Council had recommended every year since 2015 that Congress give FHFA, NCUA and other agencies adequate examination and enforcement powers over third-party service providers [4]. The 2025 report, approved December 11, 2025 [6], warns that incidents at a significant third-party provider could affect multiple institutions, particularly where there is limited substitutability, encourages the banking agencies to keep coordinating provider examinations, and narrows the request to Congress to FHFA, noting that NCUA has determined it may have sufficient authority through information sharing agreements [5].

For banks, the main interagency cloud document is the April 30, 2020 joint statement on security in a cloud computing environment issued by the FFIEC members, which the OCC published as Bulletin 2020-46; the OCC says it contains no new regulatory expectations [7]. As checked on November 16, 2026, Bulletin 2020-46 is not among the issuances rescinded by OCC Bulletin 2025-46 of December 18, 2025 [25], it is not on the OCC's list of rescinded OCC bulletins [26], and its page shows no rescission [7]; we found no OCC bulletin of 2026 that rescinds it. At state level, New York's Department of Financial Services issued third-party guidance on October 21, 2025 that names cloud computing among growing dependencies and says that where limited vendor options or industry concentration constrain a firm, it should document the risks, apply compensating controls and reassess regularly whether viable alternatives have emerged; the letter says it imposes no new requirements [8].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the US approach treats concentration as each institution's contract and exit problem, backed by examiner reach into service providers, and leaves the system-wide question with FSOC, which can recommend but not designate. We read the 2025 FSOC change on NCUA as a sign that the push for new statutory authority is weakening, not growing.

Europe and the UK: the providers themselves are overseen

On November 18, 2025 the European Supervisory Authorities published their first list of critical ICT third-party providers under the Digital Operational Resilience Act, built from the registers of information that financial entities keep on their ICT contracts and from a criticality assessment that weighed systemic importance and substitutability [16]. The list names 19 providers, among them the EU entities of AWS, Google Cloud, Microsoft and Oracle as well as data, telecoms, data center and IT services firms [17]. The list is issued under Article 31(9) of DORA [17]. Each designated provider has a lead overseer supported by a joint examination team, and the ESAs publish and update the list annually; a provider left off can apply to be designated, with an opt-in fee of EUR 50,000 [18].

HM Treasury designated Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited, Google Cloud EMEA Limited, Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL and Oracle Corporation UK Limited as critical third parties from July 13, 2026, under joint oversight by the Bank of England, PRA and FCA, and said that there is no statutory limit on the number of designations and that financial firms remain responsible for managing risks from their suppliers [19]. In a July 28, 2026 blog, FCA and PRA directors wrote that firms increasingly rely on a relatively small number of common providers, and that in 2025, 27% of incidents firms reported to the FCA were attributed to a third party issue, 37% of those cyber-related [21].

Europe and the UK: the providers themselves are overseen
JurisdictionWho is overseen for cloud concentrationStatus as checked on November 16, 2026
US financial regulatorsRegulated firms; providers through examiner reach and coordinationNo designation power; FSOC recommends continued joint provider examinations [5]
US health care (HHS)Covered entities and business associates, including cloud providers that hold patient dataGuidance last reviewed 2022; Security Rule update proposed, not final [9] [11]
US federal agencies (FedRAMP)Cloud services used by agencies, certified once and reused2026 rules mandatory from January 1, 2027 [15]
EU (DORA)Designated critical ICT providers, directly19 designated November 18, 2025 [16] [17]
UK critical third partiesDesignated providers' services to the financial sector, directlyFour designated from July 13, 2026 [19]

Health care: the cloud provider is a business associate, and resilience is a question

HHS's Office for Civil Rights treats a cloud provider that stores or processes electronic protected health information as a business associate even if it stores only encrypted data and holds no decryption key, so a business associate agreement is required; its guidance says service level agreements can cover system availability, backup and data recovery, and the return of data at the end of service, and must not stop the customer reaching its own data [9]. That guidance was last reviewed December 23, 2022 [9].

The January 6, 2025 Security Rule proposal would require written procedures to restore critical systems and data within 72 hours of a loss, and would have business associates report activation of their contingency plans within 24 hours [10]. As checked on November 16, 2026, the only Federal Register document under its regulation number is that proposal [11]. In April 2026, CMS added a request for information on health care resiliency to a proposed interoperability rule; it says reliance on large IT systems run by industry players that span the nation may create vulnerabilities, and asks how offsite backups and redundant systems help and how clearinghouse enrollment affects resilience [12]. Comments were due June 15, 2026 [12].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: health care has the clearest legal hook on cloud providers of the three US sectors, since a provider holding patient data is directly liable as a business associate, but the hook is about privacy and security, not availability. We think concentration in health care shows up first in clearinghouses and EHR hosting rather than in the hyperscale platforms, and CMS's questions point there. We expect any federal resilience requirement for hospitals to arrive as restoration and contingency duties on the hospital, not as oversight of the provider.

Government: certify once, reuse everywhere

For federal agencies, FedRAMP is the control point. OMB's M-24-15 says that under the FedRAMP Authorization Act agencies must presume the security assessment in a FedRAMP authorization package adequate for their own authorizations at or below its impact level, and that FedRAMP should not push commercial providers to build separate, dedicated offerings for federal use [13]. The same memo says services with high reuse across the federal enterprise are likely candidates for joint authorizations, to manage availability and other risks that a single agency's impact rating cannot capture [13]. The Act's core sections are struck five years after its enactment on December 23, 2022 unless Congress acts [14], and FedRAMP's 2026 rules become mandatory on January 1, 2027 [15].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: federal policy deliberately pushes agencies onto the same commercial platforms the private sector uses, so the government shares the private sector's concentration rather than avoiding it. FedRAMP looks at the security of each service; we have found nothing in the federal framework that yet measures how many agency missions depend on one provider's region or identity system. Our companion outlook on federal cloud procurement covers the program changes in detail.

What the official record of outages says

Two events have official US or UK accounts that bear on dependence on a few providers. On July 19, 2024 CISA reported a widespread outage affecting Microsoft Windows hosts due to an issue with a CrowdStrike update, which CrowdStrike confirmed was a content update and not malicious cyber activity; CISA also warned of phishing that exploited the outage [22]. FSOC's 2024 report said the faulty update caused 8.5 million Windows computers to crash, that financial firms reported disruption to websites, mobile banking, ATMs, trading software and payments, and that many were hit through their third parties (fourth-party risk) [4]. The FCA's October 31, 2024 lessons said firms that had mapped third and nth party relationships understood their exposure quickly, and that firms should test updates before deployment and consider phasing releases [20].

The second is security, not availability. The Cyber Safety Review Board found that in May and June 2023 a threat actor compromised the Exchange Online mailboxes of 22 organizations and over 500 individuals, concluded that Microsoft's security culture was inadequate, and recommended that FedRAMP set a threshold for periodically re-evaluating legacy authorization packages [23]. As checked on November 16, 2026, we found no official post-incident review by CISA or a US financial regulator of any other cloud outage, so this piece discusses no other outage and assigns no fault beyond what the cited official sources state.

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the July 2024 outage was not a cloud failure, and that is why it changed the debate. It showed that concentration sits in any software layer with deep access to many machines, including security agents, and that many firms had limited visibility into their fourth parties. Regulators that oversee only named cloud platforms will miss the next event of this kind.

What to watch in 2027

  • The ESAs' second DORA list, and whether it adds providers through the annual review or the opt-in route [18].
  • Further UK designations under a regime HM Treasury describes as rolling [19].
  • FSOC's next annual report and whether it repeats the call for provider oversight powers [5].
  • Whether Treasury publishes the cloud concentration work it described as planned in 2024 [3].
  • Any HHS or CMS action on restoration time and clearinghouse resilience [11] [12].
  • Congressional action on the FedRAMP Authorization Act before its five-year sunset [14].

What this means for you

  • Banks and credit unions: Expect examiners to ask how exit and substitution would work for each critical cloud service, in line with FSOC's focus on limited substitutability [5]; where a sole provider is unavoidable, New York's guidance describes documenting the risk and compensating controls [8].
  • Health systems: Check that cloud business associate agreements and service levels cover availability, backup, recovery and data return, as OCR's guidance describes [9], and test whether critical systems could be restored within the 72 hours the proposal sets out [10].
  • Public agencies: Use FedRAMP reuse for security assurance [13], but map separately which missions depend on a single provider, since an authorization's impact level does not capture shared availability risk [13].
  • Technology providers: Prepare for the same resilience questions from all regions: EU and UK overseers already oversee designated providers directly [18] [19], and the UK regime aims to promote joint testing exercises and the sharing of self-assessments with clients where appropriate [21].

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 90% Open

    No US federal law is enacted that gives federal financial regulators power to designate cloud service providers and oversee them directly, in the manner of DORA or the UK critical third parties regime.

    How we will check: No public law enacted on or before December 31, 2027 authorizes a federal financial regulator or FSOC to designate cloud or other technology service providers as critical and supervise them directly.

    Basis: FSOC has recommended provider oversight powers annually since 2015 [4], and its 2025 report still asks Congress to act, now only for FHFA [5].

  2. P2 By Confidence 85% Open

    FSOC's next annual report again recommends that Congress give at least one agency examination and enforcement powers over third-party service providers.

    How we will check: The first FSOC annual report approved after November 16, 2026, and published on or before March 31, 2027, contains a recommendation that Congress grant FHFA, NCUA or another agency examination or enforcement authority over third-party service providers.

    Basis: The 2024 report says the Council has made the recommendation annually since 2015 [4], and the 2025 report repeats it for FHFA [5]; the last two reports were approved on December 6, 2024 and December 11, 2025 [4] [6].

  3. P3 By Confidence 65% Open

    Treasury does not publish a Cloud Executive Steering Group deliverable on cloud concentration risk.

    How we will check: Neither Treasury's Cloud Executive Steering Group page nor a Treasury press release dated on or before December 31, 2027 publishes a document described as the steering group's cloud concentration risk deliverable.

    Basis: Treasury said in July 2024 that concentration risk items would follow during the year [2], and as checked on November 16, 2026 its steering group page still describes them as planned [3].

  4. P4 By Confidence 50% Open

    The ESAs' next published list of designated critical ICT third-party providers under DORA names more than 19 providers.

    How we will check: A list of designated critical ICT third-party providers published by the ESAs after November 18, 2025 and on or before December 31, 2027 contains 20 or more providers.

    Basis: The first list names 19 providers [17]; the list is updated annually and providers not on it can apply for designation [18].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

  • cloud concentration
  • operational resilience
  • critical third parties
  • DORA
  • FSOC
  • FedRAMP
  • HIPAA business associates
  • CrowdStrike outage