After the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool: bank and credit union cyber exams, outlook to 2027

No single tool replaced the CAT. The agencies point to NIST and CISA, credit unions keep ACET, and the real change is in how examiners scope, rate and write up cyber findings.

A tool retired, a menu offered

For a decade the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool, released in June 2015 as a voluntary self-assessment, gave banks and credit unions a shared yardstick for cyber preparedness [1]. The FFIEC announced its sunset on August 29, 2024, set August 31, 2025 as the date to remove it from its website, and the tool was sunset on that date [2] [3] [16]. The agencies did not call the tool wrong: they said its controls remain sound but that newer resources exist, and that the FFIEC chose not to update it for the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 or CISA's performance goals [1] [2]. This outlook covers what replaced it in practice, which turns out to be less about any one framework than about how examiners scope, rate and write up cyber findings, and what is likely to change through 2027. Our explainer covers the sunset itself in more detail.

What the agencies named instead

No agency picked a successor. The FFIEC statement, as the OCC passed it on, said supervised institutions could refer directly to the NIST CSF 2.0 and CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals [2]. The Federal Reserve's SR 24-7 lists four resources from the FFIEC statement (the NIST CSF 2.0, the CISA goals, the Cyber Risk Institute's Cyber Profile and the CIS Critical Security Controls), says the Federal Reserve endorses no self-assessment tool, and says that because cyber risk changes continuously examiners may look at areas no single tool covers [3]. The FDIC said its institutions may use industry-developed resources for self-assessment [1]. Moraph cites only the two government resources below; the industry documents are privately licensed and are named here only because the agencies name them.

NIST released CSF 2.0 on February 26, 2024, six months before the sunset statement, adding a Govern function to the five existing functions and widening the framework's stated audience to organizations of every type [4]. After the statement, CISA released version 2.0 of its Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals on December 11, 2025, with a new governance component and alignment to NIST's latest framework revisions [5]; CISA describes the cross-sector goals as voluntary and lists Financial Services sector-specific goals as available [6].

Credit unions kept a government tool

Credit unions are the exception. NCUA kept its Automated Cybersecurity Evaluation Toolbox (ACET), which the OCC's sunset bulletin describes as derived from the CAT [2]. On September 16, 2025 NCUA told credit unions that ACET had been updated with CSF 2.0 content [9], and NCUA's download page, modified November 13, 2026, still offers it and states that the maturity assessment is entirely voluntary and adds no new requirements or expectations [8].

The examination side runs on NCUA's Information Security Examination program: every NCUA examination includes an information security review, and the examiner toolbox draws on standards from NIST, the Center for Internet Security and CISA [9]. The January 2026 supervisory priorities letter (26-CU-01) does not list cybersecurity as a separate priority: it covers cyber threats under payment systems, says NCUA will keep enforcing information security laws, and keeps defined-scope examinations for most federal credit unions with assets of $50 million or less [10]. Credit unions reported 588 cyber incidents to NCUA between May 1, 2025 and April 30, 2026 [9].

Treasury's sector goals aim at service providers

The newest government document in this space comes from Treasury. Its Financial Services Sector Specific Goals, dated August 24, 2026, were developed under the lead of the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council, with Treasury's and CISA's coordination and input, as a voluntary bridge between CISA's cross-sector goals and practices already expected of regulated institutions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [7]. Treasury says the goals were provided to Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee members for their awareness and create no new obligations, requirements or supervisory expectations [7]. They are aimed mainly at third parties: a Baseline level for providers handling non-sensitive data or non-critical functions, and a Moderate level for those handling sensitive data or critical operations [7]. Treasury's own count puts 113 controls in the Baseline level and 167 in the Moderate level, against 81 in CISA's cross-sector goals [7].

Moraph's view

Moraph's reading: for a bank, the sector goals are most useful as a ready-made vendor questionnaire tiered by data sensitivity, not as a self-assessment of the bank itself. Treasury's disclaimer is explicit, so an examiner who cites them as an expectation would be going beyond the document.

Where the exam itself is changing

The real changes since the sunset sit inside the examination process, and most of them narrow it.

  • Work programs mapped to CSF. On September 21, 2026 the OCC reissued its Cybersecurity Supervision Work Program, restructured around the updated NIST CSF categories and subcategories with no procedures added or changed; the OCC says the program sets no new expectations, that banks need not use it to assess themselves, and that it encourages but does not require a standardized assessment approach [11]. OCC examiners still complete an IT core assessment for each bank every supervisory cycle [12].
  • Narrower community bank IT exams. In May 2026 the OCC said its examiners must use a newly updated resource to narrow the scope of and simplify IT and cybersecurity examinations at community banks; the release does not name the resource [13]. This follows the OCC's removal, from January 1, 2026, of all policy-set examination requirements for community banks, which it defines as banks with up to $30 billion in assets [22].
  • Stale interagency procedures. The Federal Reserve, the FDIC and state regulators examine IT at smaller banks with InTREx [16] [17]. The Federal Reserve's inspector general found in May 2025 that most InTREx work programs were last updated in 2019 or 2016, that they do not cover artificial intelligence, and that the authentication work program had not been updated for SR 21-14, the 2021 authentication guidance; the interagency committee's charter, revised in August 2023, calls for review at least every 3 years, and the report made five recommendations [14]. The Board agreed and set September 30, 2026 to assess the work programs and December 31, 2026 to formalize examiner training [14]. All five recommendations were open as of March 31, 2026 [15], and the Board's September 2026 report to Congress says it is addressing them [16].
  • Ratings tied to material financial risk. The FDIC folds the IT rating, assigned under the FFIEC Uniform Rating System for Information Technology, into the management component of CAMELS, and it conducted 1,205 IT examinations of supervised institutions and service providers in 2024 [17]. The FFIEC's proposal to revise CAMELS, published May 19, 2026, would remove the "special consideration" given to the management component in the composite rating, set a material financial risk threshold for management ratings of 3 or worse based on risk management weaknesses, and let findings from specialty reviews, which include information systems, affect ratings only to the extent they affect overall financial condition, represent material financial risk or reflect significant noncompliance with laws and regulations [18]. Comments closed August 17, 2026 [18]; as checked on November 16, 2026, the Federal Register lists no final FFIEC notice [19].
  • A higher bar for findings. The OCC and FDIC final rule on unsafe or unsound practices and matters requiring attention takes effect November 2, 2026 [20]. Its preamble says a significant risk of disruption through IT systems may in some cases be likely to cause material financial harm, that whether a cybersecurity vulnerability counts as an unsafe or unsound practice depends on the severity and likelihood of material harm and on compensating controls, and gives weaknesses in unsupported operating systems and patch management as weaknesses other controls may not readily offset [20].
  • Longer gaps between exams. An interim final rule from the FDIC, Federal Reserve and OCC, issued September 10, 2026, writes into the agencies' rules the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act's increase in the asset ceiling for the extended 18-month examination cycle from $3 billion to $6 billion, for institutions that meet the law's criteria, including being well managed and well capitalized [21].

One piece of continuity: the Federal Reserve says the FFIEC's cybersecurity subcommittee keeps working on materials to help banks with cybersecurity assessment after the sunset, and that the FFIEC keeps maintaining the IT Examination Handbook [16]. NCUA notes that the February 2026 Handbook update removed references to reputational risk and set no new requirements [9].

What examiners are likely to ask in 2027

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the CAT left a gap in the inherent-risk step more than in the controls. Examiners will still expect a bank to say which framework it uses and why it fits its risk, but the framework choice itself matters less each year. The pressure through 2027 runs the other way from more requirements: fewer mandatory exam steps, findings that must be tied to material financial harm, and longer cycles for small banks.

That raises the stakes on the findings that survive. Under the new MRA standard, the cyber weaknesses most likely to be written up are the ones the agencies themselves cited, unsupported operating systems and weak patch management, plus anything that threatens continuity of operations. We expect fewer, sharper cyber findings at OCC- and FDIC-supervised community banks rather than long lists of documentation gaps.

Two uncertainties remain. If the FFIEC finalizes CAMELS changes in 2027, IT findings would carry less weight in ratings unless they reach material financial risk or significant noncompliance. And InTREx, the procedure set the Federal Reserve and FDIC use for smaller banks, was found out of date; when it is updated is in the hands of a committee of agencies, which is why we put only moderate confidence on a public update by the end of 2027.

What this means for you

  • Community banks: Document which framework the bank uses and why it suits the bank's risk: SR 24-7 asks that any tool support an effective control environment and be commensurate with risk [3]. Expect fewer exam steps but closer attention to weaknesses the agencies name as hard to offset, such as unsupported systems and patching [20].
  • Credit unions: ACET with CSF 2.0 content remains available and voluntary [8]; every NCUA examination includes an information security review [9], so keep the self-assessment current even though it is optional.
  • Larger and regional banks: Map the security program to CSF 2.0 categories; the OCC's examiner work program now follows them and cross-references other frameworks banks use [11].
  • Bank technology and service providers: Expect bank clients to use Treasury's Baseline and Moderate goals in due diligence, tiered by data sensitivity and service criticality [7].
  • Boards and audit committees: Watch the final CAMELS revisions: the proposal would let information systems findings move ratings only to the extent they affect financial condition, represent material financial risk or reflect significant noncompliance [18].

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 65% Open

    The FFIEC publishes final revisions to the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (CAMELS) in the Federal Register.

    How we will check: A Federal Register notice from the FFIEC adopting revised UFIRS (CAMELS) rating definitions, dated on or before December 31, 2027.

    Basis: The FFIEC's proposal was published on May 19, 2026 with comments due August 17, 2026 [18]; no final notice was listed as of November 16, 2026 [19].

  2. P2 By Confidence 70% Open

    The Federal Reserve Board's inspector general reports at least three of the five recommendations in evaluation 2025-SR-B-008 as closed.

    How we will check: The OIG's semiannual report to Congress or open-recommendations listing, published on or before December 31, 2027, shows two or fewer of the five recommendations open.

    Basis: The Board agreed to all five and set target dates of September 30 and December 31, 2026 [14]; all five were open as of March 31, 2026 [15], and the Board says it is addressing them [16].

  3. P3 By Confidence 80% Open

    No FFIEC member agency issues a new FFIEC cybersecurity self-assessment tool with maturity levels to replace the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool.

    How we will check: No OCC bulletin, FDIC Financial Institution Letter, Federal Reserve SR letter or NCUA letter dated on or before December 31, 2027 announces a new FFIEC cybersecurity assessment tool.

    Basis: The agencies chose not to update the CAT and pointed to existing frameworks [1] [2]; the Federal Reserve endorses no tool [3], and the OCC says it does not require a standardized approach [11]. The FFIEC's cybersecurity subcommittee is still developing materials to help banks with assessment after the sunset, which is the main risk to this prediction [16].

  4. P4 By Confidence 85% Open

    NCUA still offers ACET for download on its website.

    How we will check: NCUA's ACET and Other Assessment Tools page offers an ACET download on December 31, 2027.

    Basis: NCUA updated ACET with CSF 2.0 content in September 2025 [9] and its download page, modified November 13, 2026, still offers it [8].

  5. P5 By Confidence 60% Open

    The FDIC or the Federal Reserve publicly reports an update to the InTREx examination work programs.

    How we will check: An FDIC Financial Institution Letter, a Federal Reserve SR letter, or either agency's annual cybersecurity report to Congress, published on or before December 31, 2027, states that InTREx work programs were updated in 2026 or 2027.

    Basis: The inspector general found most InTREx work programs last updated in 2019 or 2016 and the Board committed to assess them by September 30, 2026, while the committee's charter calls for review at least every 3 years [14]; the FDIC says the agencies update InTREx periodically [17].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

  • FFIEC
  • Cybersecurity Assessment Tool
  • NIST CSF 2.0
  • CISA CPGs
  • NCUA ACET
  • InTREx
  • CAMELS
  • matters requiring attention
  • Treasury sector-specific goals