Known exploited vulnerabilities, 2021 to 2026: more entries, more vendors, three-day deadlines

We counted every entry in CISA's KEV catalog to see how fast listings arrive, which products attackers hit and how federal fix deadlines have shortened.

What the catalog is

CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog lists vulnerabilities that meet three tests: the flaw has a CVE ID, there is reliable evidence it has been actively exploited in the wild, and there is a clear remediation action such as a vendor update [4]. Federal civilian executive branch agencies must remediate listed vulnerabilities within set timeframes, and CISA recommends that state and local governments and private industry, which are not bound, prioritize the same list [4]. The catalog began with BOD 22-01 on November 3, 2021 [2]; on June 10, 2026 CISA revoked that directive and replaced it with BOD 26-04, which keeps the inclusion criteria unchanged [3].

Because every entry is a confirmed exploitation with a date added and a federal due date, the catalog is the closest thing to an official, public record of which flaws attackers use and how fast the government expects them closed. As of the version we analyzed it held 1,781 entries across 295 vendor names [1].

Data and method

Dataset: CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, JSON feed at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json, catalogVersion 2026.11.13, dateReleased 2026-11-13T20:24:18Z, retrieved November 16, 2026 [1]. We counted every record in the feed with a short Python script that reads only the feed's own fields.

  • Additions per year: records grouped by the year of dateAdded [1].
  • Top vendors: records grouped by the vendorProject field exactly as written, so "Microsoft" and "Apple" are each one name; products are not merged across vendors [1].
  • Ransomware share: records whose knownRansomwareCampaignUse field reads "Known", divided by all records [1].
  • Remediation window: dueDate minus dateAdded in calendar days. Entries added from November 3, 2021 to June 9, 2026 count as added under BOD 22-01; entries from June 10, 2026, the date BOD 26-04 revoked it [3], count as added under BOD 26-04 [1].
  • Age at listing: the year in the CVE ID compared with the year the entry was added, a rough proxy we explain below [1]: "five or more years" means the year added minus the CVE year is 5 or more, and "the same or the previous year" means 0 or 1.
  • Distinct vendors per year: the number of different vendorProject values among records added that year; monthly averages: records per calendar month of dateAdded, averaged over the months named [1].
  • Forensic triage: records added from June 10, 2026 whose forensicTriage field reads "Yes" [1].

Counts are exact for this catalog version (its count field reads 1781, matching the number of records [1]); dates are read as calendar dates with no time zone; percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number, and a later version may differ where CISA edits existing entries.

Additions per year: a second surge in 2026

KEV entries by year added, catalogVersion 2026.11.13
Year addedEntriesNote
2021 (from November 3)311 [1]Includes 287 entries on the first day [1]
2022555 [1]Includes large batches in March
2023187 [1]
2024186 [1]
2025245 [1]
2026 (to November 13)297 [1]Already the second-highest year

The first two years are inflated by backfill: 287 entries arrived on the catalog's first day, and 2022 brought 555 as CISA loaded older flaws [1]. In 2022, 47% of new entries carried a CVE ID dated five or more years before the year they were added, against 10% to 12% in each year from 2023 to 2026 [1]. From 2023 the series reflects mostly current exploitation, and it has risen: 187 in 2023, 186 in 2024, 245 in 2025 and 297 in 2026 to November 13 [1].

Compared like for like, CISA added 297 entries between January 1 and November 13, 2026 against 220 in the same span of 2025, a rise of 35% [1]. The monthly average was 17 entries across 2023 to 2025 and 28 from January to October 2026, and September 2026, with 43 additions, was the busiest month since 2022 [1]. The listed flaws are also newer: in 2026, 83% of entries carried a CVE ID from the same or the previous year, up from 78% in 2023 [1].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the rise in 2026 is large enough that it is unlikely to be noise, but the catalog measures what CISA confirmed and listed, which depends on its own capacity and evidence as well as attacker activity. BOD 26-04 also directs CISA to publish updates at the pace it identifies new exploited flaws, so some of the increase may be faster listing rather than more exploitation. For a patching team the practical effect is the same: about one new mandatory item a day, most of them for software less than two years old.

Which products attackers hit

Ten largest vendors by KEV entries (all years), with entries flagged as known ransomware use
Vendor (vendorProject)Entries (share of catalog)Known ransomware use
Microsoft391 (22%) [1]117 [1]
Cisco103 (6%) [1]7 [1]
Apple96 (5%) [1]0 [1]
Adobe83 (5%) [1]11 [1]
Google77 (4%) [1]0 [1]
Oracle46 (3%) [1]13 [1]
Apache41 (2%) [1]8 [1]
Ivanti38 (2%) [1]12 [1]
Linux32 (2%) [1]2 [1]
Fortinet32 (2%) [1]14 [1]

Microsoft alone accounts for 391 entries, 22% of the catalog, and the ten largest vendors together for 939, or 53% [1]. The tail is long: 150 of the 295 vendor names appear only once [1]. Microsoft has had the most additions in every calendar year since the catalog began, though its share of new entries fell to 14% in 2026 [1].

The spread of targets is widening. Entries added in 2025 named 99 distinct vendors and those added in 2026 named 112, against 67 in 2023 and 64 in 2024 [1]. Since January 2025, after Microsoft's 80 entries, the most-listed vendors were Cisco with 29, Apple with 19, Google and Fortinet with 17 each, Linux with 16 and Ivanti with 15 [1]. Their entries since then name gateway, firewall and network management products such as Citrix NetScaler, Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall SMA appliances, Fortinet FortiOS and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager [1].

Ransomware: a smaller share of new entries

Of all 1,781 entries, 361 (20%) are flagged "Known" for use in ransomware campaigns [1]. The share has fallen for recent additions: it was 23% to 27% for entries added in each year from 2021 to 2024, then 13% in 2025 and 9% in 2026 [1]. Microsoft products carry 117 of the 361 flags, about a third of the total [1].

The flag records what CISA knew when this catalog version was published, and the feed does not show when a flag changed. Recent entries have had less time to be tied to a ransomware campaign, so the falling share should be read as a lower bound for 2025 and 2026 rather than proof that ransomware crews have lost interest.

Remediation windows under BOD 22-01

BOD 22-01 set default deadlines of six months for vulnerabilities with a CVE ID assigned before 2021 and two weeks for all others, adjustable in case of grave risk [2]. In practice CISA used a different default for most of the directive's life. Of the 1,617 entries added under BOD 22-01, the remediation window was 21 days for 1,025 (63%), 8 to 14 days for 258 (16%), 7 days or less for 70 (4%) and 181 to 184 days for 257 (16%), with the other 7 between 24 and 43 days and a median of 21 days [1].

Almost all the long windows come from the opening backfill: of the 287 first-day entries, 189 had 181 days and 98 had 14 days, and the remaining 68 long windows were set for entries added between December 2021 and March 2022 [1]. Leaving out the first day, 94% of BOD 22-01 entries had 21 days or less [1]. The 21-day window appears from March 3, 2022 to March 5, 2026; from March 9 to June 9, 2026 new entries had 14 days (55), 3 days (25) or, once, 5 days, three months before the directive changed [1].

For context on speed, CISA's FAQ on BOD 22-01 stated that fewer than 4% of all CVEs had been publicly exploited, and that of those, 42% were used on the day of disclosure, 50% within two days and 75% within 28 days [2]. A 21-day federal deadline was therefore already slower than most exploitation on CISA's own numbers [2].

After June 10, 2026: three days becomes the norm

BOD 26-04 sets remediation deadlines by four factors: whether the asset is publicly exposed, whether the flaw is in the KEV catalog, whether exploitation can be automated, and whether it gives partial or total control [3]. A KEV-listed flaw on a publicly exposed asset must be fixed within 3 days, or 14 days if it is not automatable and gives only partial control; on an asset that is not publicly exposed it has 14 days, or 3 days if it is automatable and gives total control [3]. KEV-listed flaws giving total control that are exposed or automatable also require a forensic triage of the asset [3]. The directive cites attackers' use of AI as a reason the time between patch and exploitation may shrink further [3].

The catalog shows the change at once. Of the 164 entries added from June 10 to November 13, 2026, 128 (78%) carry a 3-day window and 36 (22%) a 14-day window [1]. A new forensicTriage field reads "Yes" for 105 of them, every one with a 3-day window [1]. The catalog gives one due date per entry; agencies apply the directive's table to their own assets, and the pages cited here do not say how CISA chooses the catalog date for a given entry.

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the federal clock for exploited flaws went from three weeks to three days for most new entries within 2026. Few banks, health systems or agencies outside the federal civilian scope can patch internet-facing systems in three days today, and many do not yet tag which assets are publicly exposed, which the new table needs. Organizations that use the catalog as a benchmark should expect auditors, insurers and boards to start asking why their own deadline is still 15 or 30 days for an exposed system.

What the catalog does not show

The feed has no date of first exploitation, so it cannot measure the gap between disclosure and attack; the year in a CVE ID is a rough proxy, since IDs can be reserved before a flaw is public. It lists only flaws with a CVE ID and a clear remediation, so it misses exploitation of misconfigurations and unpatched zero-days [4]. Vendor counts reflect how widely a product is deployed and how closely it is watched as well as how weak it is, which is why this report does not rank vendors on security. The due dates bind federal civilian agencies only [4]; whether those agencies met them is not in the feed.

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: for regulated private organizations the useful reading is the shape of the list, not the federal deadline itself. New entries are increasingly recent, spread across more vendors and concentrated on systems that face the internet. A program that ingests the feed daily, maps entries to an asset inventory with an exposure tag, and tracks time to fix against a short internal deadline will be ready for the direction CISA has set.

What this means for you

  • Vulnerability management leads: Ingest the KEV JSON feed daily and match entries to an asset inventory that records whether each asset is publicly exposed, the first factor in BOD 26-04's timeline table [3]. Without the exposure tag, the 3-day and 14-day split cannot be applied.
  • CISOs at banks and health systems: Set an internal deadline for KEV-listed flaws on internet-facing systems and report time to fix against it; the federal benchmark moved to 3 days for most new entries in 2026 [1], and the catalog page recommends every organization prioritize these flaws [4].
  • Network and infrastructure teams: Plan emergency change capacity for gateways, firewalls and network management systems: entries since January 2025 repeatedly name products such as Citrix NetScaler, Ivanti Connect Secure and SonicWall SMA appliances [1]. A forensic check after patching, as BOD 26-04 requires for the highest-risk cases [3], is worth rehearsing before it is needed.
  • Agencies and their contractors: BOD 26-04 applies to federal information systems, including those operated on an agency's behalf or hosted in third-party and FedRAMP environments, where the agency remains responsible for compliance; it does not apply to contractors directly, but agencies must review contracts for changes needed to comply [3]. Contractors running agency systems should expect those terms.

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 75% Open

    The KEV catalog passes 2,000 entries by September 30, 2027.

    How we will check: Open the KEV JSON feed on or after September 30, 2027 and count records with dateAdded on or before 2027-09-30 (or read the count field of the last catalog version released by that date). Right if 2,000 or more.

    Basis: The catalog held 1,781 entries at version 2026.11.13, and CISA added an average of 28 entries a month from January to October 2026, against 17 a month across 2023 to 2025 [1]. Reaching 2,000 needs about 21 a month from mid-November 2026.

  2. P2 By Confidence 65% Open

    CISA adds at least 300 entries to the KEV catalog with a dateAdded in calendar year 2027.

    How we will check: In the KEV JSON feed retrieved in January 2028, count records whose dateAdded falls between 2027-01-01 and 2027-12-31. Right if 300 or more.

    Basis: Additions rose from 186 in 2024 to 245 in 2025 and 297 in 2026 through November 13 [1]; BOD 26-04 directs CISA to update the catalog at the pace it identifies new exploited flaws [3].

  3. P3 By Confidence 75% Open

    Microsoft remains the vendor with the most KEV entries added in calendar year 2027.

    How we will check: In the KEV JSON feed retrieved in January 2028, group records with a 2027 dateAdded by vendorProject. Right if Microsoft has the highest count (a tie counts as wrong).

    Basis: Microsoft had the most additions in every year from 2021 to 2026, with 41 entries in 2026 against 21 for the next vendor, Cisco, though its share of new entries fell to 14% [1].

  4. P4 By Confidence 65% Open

    At least two-thirds of KEV entries added in calendar year 2027 carry a remediation window (dueDate minus dateAdded) of 3 days or less.

    How we will check: In the KEV JSON feed retrieved in January 2028, for records with a 2027 dateAdded, compute dueDate minus dateAdded in days. Right if 67% or more are 3 days or less.

    Basis: Of entries added from June 10 to November 13, 2026 under BOD 26-04, 78% had a 3-day window [1]; CISA must reassess the directive's timelines once per fiscal year, which could move them either way [3].

  5. P5 By Confidence 70% Open

    Fewer than 15% of KEV entries added in calendar year 2027 are flagged knownRansomwareCampaignUse "Known" in the catalog as published on January 31, 2028.

    How we will check: Retrieve the KEV JSON feed on or after January 31, 2028 (using the latest version released by that date), take records with a 2027 dateAdded, and divide those with knownRansomwareCampaignUse "Known" by the total. Right if under 15%.

    Basis: The share of new entries flagged Known was 23% to 27% each year from 2021 to 2024, then 13% for 2025 and 9% for 2026 as of version 2026.11.13 [1].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

  • CISA
  • KEV
  • vulnerability management
  • BOD 22-01
  • BOD 26-04
  • ransomware
  • patching