Payments fraud and scam reimbursement in the US: outlook to 2027

The bank regulators are answering their 2025 request for information with data sharing and guidance, Congress is moving a task force bill, and Nacha and the RTP network are writing the scam rules that reach banks' and credit unions' fraud systems first.

The question and the evidence

When a customer is tricked into sending money, who carries the loss: the customer, the bank that sent the payment, or the bank that received it? This outlook reads where US regulators, Congress and the payment networks stand on that question, and what their moves ask of the fraud systems of banks and credit unions. It uses only primary sources: the Federal Register, the eCFR, agency statements and supervisory letters, Library of Congress bill status records, and the operating rules and announcements of Nacha, The Clearing House and the Federal Reserve Banks. Every status below is as checked on November 16, 2026.

Federal actions, bills and network rules on payments fraud and scam liability, status as checked on November 16, 2026
ItemWhat it doesStatus as checked on November 16, 2026
Joint request for information on payments fraud (OCC, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC)Asks how the agencies could act on check, ACH, wire and instant payments fraud, scams included [1]Comments closed September 18, 2025; a working group is reviewing them [2]; more than 250 comments reviewed, guidance and resources under evaluation [3]
FinCEN section 314(b) fact sheet, highlighted in SR 26-3 [4]Clarifies when institutions may share information on suspected fraud under the safe harbor [4]Issued June 12, 2026; SR 26-3 dated July 9, 2026 [4]
CFPB v. Early Warning Services and three banks (Zelle)Alleged unfair practices and violations of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E [7]Filed December 20, 2024; dismissed with prejudice March 5, 2025 [7]
CFPB proposed interpretive rule on emerging payment mechanismsWould have explained how Regulation E applies to newer payment methods [8]Withdrawn May 15, 2025, with no further action planned [8]
CFPB larger participant rule for digital payment appsWould have brought large payment app providers under CFPB supervision [9]Disapproved by joint resolution, Public Law 119-11, signed May 9, 2025 [9]
TRAPS Act, H.R. 4936 [24]Treasury-led task force on payment scams, report within a year of being set up [25]Ordered reported, amended, by 49 to 0 on September 16, 2026; no floor vote recorded [24]
TRAPS Act, S. 2019 [26]Senate version of the task force bill [26]Referred to the Banking Committee June 10, 2025; no later action recorded [26]
STOP Payments Fraud Act of 2026, H.R. 9331 [27]Lets banks hold checks and wires they reasonably suspect are fraudulent [27]Reported, amended (H. Rept. 119-792), and placed on the Union Calendar September 1, 2026 [27]
Nacha fraud monitoring rulesRisk-based monitoring for unauthorized entries and entries authorized under false pretenses [12]Phase 1 in effect March 20, 2026 [11]; Phase 2, covering all RDFIs, effective June 19, 2026, in practice June 22 [13]
RTP fraud reporting rulesReport unauthorized and fraudulently induced payments with set reason codes [15]Fraudulently induced code required from March 31, 2026; two-business-day deadline from March 1, 2027 [14]

Where Regulation E draws the line

Regulation E defines an unauthorized electronic fund transfer as one initiated by a person other than the consumer without actual authority and from which the consumer receives no benefit, and it excludes transfers initiated with fraudulent intent by the consumer or by someone furnished the access device by the consumer [5]. For unauthorized transfers, the consumer's liability is capped at $50 with notice within two business days of learning of a lost or stolen access device, and generally at $500 after that, with a 60-day window to report transfers on a periodic statement [6].

Moraph's view

In Moraph's reading, a payment the customer sends personally, after being deceived about who is on the other end, sits outside that definition. That is why the US debate is about changing the statute or the rule, not about enforcing the one in place. Account takeover, where a criminal sends the payment, stays inside it.

The last federal attempt to push that line through enforcement ended in 2025. The CFPB sued Early Warning Services, the operator of Zelle, and three large banks on December 20, 2024, alleging unfair practices and violations of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E; after the CFPB filed a notice of dismissal, the court dismissed the case with prejudice on March 5, 2025 [7]. The CFPB withdrew its proposed interpretive rule on emerging payment mechanisms on May 15, 2025 and said it would take no further action on it [8], and Congress disapproved its rule on larger digital payment app providers in Public Law 119-11, signed May 9, 2025 [9]. On October 30, 2026 the CFPB asked to extend its Regulation E information collection as an extension of a currently approved collection, with comments due December 29, 2026 [10].

A bill to move the line was introduced in the last Congress. The Protecting Consumers From Payment Scams Act would have amended the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to treat fraudulently induced transfers the same way as unauthorized ones [36]. The Senate and House versions were introduced on August 1 and August 2, 2024, and their records show nothing after referral to committee [28] [29].

The bank regulators: data, sharing and supervision

The June 2025 request for information from the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC defines payments fraud to include scams, and notes that no single federal agency has authority over all aspects of payments fraud [1]. It cites FTC data showing losses reported for noncard payments fraud up 271 percent from 2020 to 2024, and FinCEN data showing suspicious activity reports on check, ACH and wire fraud up 489 percent from 2014 to 2024 [1]. It also says payments fraud data are collected in an incomplete, non-standardized and fragmented way, and that not every institution collects data on authorized payments that are part of a scam [1].

The follow-up so far is a review and one piece of guidance. In February 2026 the FDIC told the Senate Banking Committee that the agencies had set up a working group to review the comments and consider next steps [2]. In a May 5, 2026 speech the Federal Reserve's Vice Chair for Supervision said the Board had reviewed more than 250 comments, that the Board was evaluating a range of responses, including enhanced guidance and resources for banks, and that a public-private roundtable with the Treasury Secretary and the FCC Chair would follow [3]. The same speech said bank transfers and payments were the mechanism for almost 40 percent of aggregate reported fraud losses in 2024 [3]. The one concrete output so far is information sharing: on July 9, 2026 the Board highlighted FinCEN guidance of June 12, 2026 that clarifies when institutions can share information on suspected fraud under section 314(b), and said it reflects industry feedback to the request for information [4].

Supervisors' recent publications address controls. The OCC's Fall 2026 Semiannual Risk Perspective says sophisticated models of what it calls super intelligence let threat actors carry out social engineering, account takeover and impersonation with greater speed and scale, and gives as examples of layered controls human review, out-of-band confirmation or video verification, and monitoring the speed or volume of logins, password resets and transactions [34]. The interagency statement on elder financial exploitation, first issued in December 2024, was revised on June 2, 2026 to remove references to reputational risk, and it imposes no new regulatory requirements [33].

The White House's executive order addresses scams through law enforcement and victim recovery. Executive Order 14390 of March 6, 2026 asks for an action plan against transnational criminal organizations running scam centers within 120 days and a recommendation within 90 days on a Victims Restoration Program funded from money clawed back, forfeited or seized from those organizations [31]. FinCEN reported on September 3, 2026 that 33,904 BSA reports filed between September 8, 2023 and December 31, 2025 described about $12.7 billion in activity tied to suspected digital asset investment scams [32].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: none of the three bank regulators has signaled a liability rule, and the CFPB, which writes Regulation E, has withdrawn payments work since early 2025 rather than added to it. The federal direction is better data, freer information sharing among institutions, supervisory expectations on controls, and recovery through law enforcement. We expect guidance, not a rule, from the request for information.

Congress: a task force and check holds

The task force bill studies the problem rather than assigning the loss. As introduced, the TRAPS Act would have the Treasury set up a task force within 90 days of enactment, with the CFPB, FCC, FTC, Justice Department, OCC, Federal Reserve Board, NCUA, FDIC and FinCEN alongside bank, credit union, payment network, consumer and victim representatives [25]. Its duties include assessing how other countries have tried to prevent payment scams and determining whether more federal legislation would help, with a public report due one year after the task force is established [25]. The House Financial Services Committee ordered the House version reported, as amended, by 49 to 0 on September 16, 2026, and the record lists 57 cosponsors [24]; the Senate version has seen no action since referral on June 10, 2025 [26].

The other bill to clear committee gives banks room to stop money rather than return it. The STOP Payments Fraud Act of 2026 would amend the Expedited Funds Availability Act so a receiving bank may hold checks and wire transfers it reasonably suspects are fraudulent, for an initial hold of up to 10 days and an extended hold of up to 45 days, with implementing rules due within a year of enactment [27]. The committee reported it on September 1, 2026 [27]. A March 5, 2026 subcommittee hearing on fraud listed further discussion drafts on transaction risk analytics and bank fraud technology [30].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the House is building a record that favors detection and holds over reimbursement. A task force that reports a year after it is set up is unlikely to shape law before 2028, so a federal reimbursement duty is unlikely to arrive in this Congress or early in the next.

The networks write the operating rules

While the statute stands still, the private rulebooks have moved. Nacha's 2026 risk management rules require originators, third-party service providers, ODFIs and RDFIs to have risk-based processes to identify entries suspected of being unauthorized or authorized under false pretenses [12]. False pretenses covers a payment induced by someone misrepresenting their identity, their authority to act for another person or the ownership of the account being credited, which includes business email compromise but not scams over fake or poor-quality goods [13]. Phase 1 took effect on March 20, 2026 for all ODFIs and for RDFIs that received 10 million or more ACH entries in 2023 [11]. Phase 2 reached every other RDFI and smaller originators from June 19, 2026, in practice June 22, and the processes must be reviewed at least once a year [13]. The rules do not require monitoring before posting [12] [13].

The RTP network now asks for a fraud label on scams. Since March 31, 2026, a sending participant that determines a customer was fraudulently induced to send an RTP payment under false pretenses must report it with the UAPA reason code, separate from the FRAD code for unauthorized payments [14] [15]. From March 1, 2027 those reports are due no later than two business days after the determination, and participants that send payments on behalf of others must also report fraud affecting those payers [14] [15]. Participants must act on The Clearing House's fraud alerts [15], and since June 2026 the operator has reminded senders that the debtor name field must carry the sender's legal name, not nicknames or codes [17]. The return rules stay voluntary: a receiving participant has no obligation to return funds in answer to a request for return of funds, even when the sender offers an indemnity, and may take longer than ten banking days to answer a request coded as claimed fraud (FRAD) or a Request for Payment warranty breach (UPAY) while it investigates [16].

The Federal Reserve Banks are adding checks before money moves. Payee Name Verification lets an institution with a FedLine Direct or FedLine Command connection verify a payee's name against routing and account numbers before issuing a payment, initially using 12 months of historical transaction data, and works across payment rails [18]. On April 23, 2026 the operator announced that a network intelligence API giving senders receiver account-level data observed over FedNow would launch for early adopters on April 28, and said it was exploring how to enable Payee Name Verification for real-time needs [19]. FedNow participants can also set velocity and value thresholds by customer segment and keep their own negative lists [20].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the de facto US standard for 2027 is being set in these rulebooks, not in Regulation E. Their common thread is classification. Nacha's false pretenses and RTP's UAPA code both require an institution to decide, case by case, that a customer authorized a payment because of deception, and to record it that way. That is a data problem before it is a liability problem.

How big the problem is in official data

Consumers filed 3 million fraud reports with the FTC in 2025 and reported $15.9 billion in losses, against 2.6 million reports and over $12 billion the year before [22]. Investment scams accounted for $7.9 billion and imposter scams for more than $3.5 billion [22]. Bank payments carried the highest aggregate losses of any payment method in 2025, followed by cryptocurrency [23]. In 2024 the FBI's Recovery Asset Team initiated its Financial Fraud Kill Chain for 2,651 incidents and, with banks, froze $469 million of $651.5 million in reported losses [23].

Institutions see the same trend. In the Federal Reserve Banks' survey of more than 400 risk professionals, conducted in the fourth quarter of 2025, 41 percent of institutions saw increases in account holder scams in ACH, and wire fraud was reported to include account holder scams, business email compromise and money mule transfers [21].

The UK offers a contrast. Under its mandatory reimbursement requirement, 88 percent (£316 million) of money lost to authorized push payment scams was reimbursed in the 18 months from October 7, 2024 to March 31, 2026, against the 61 percent rate UK Finance reported for 2024, a comparison the regulator calls indicative, and 82 percent of claims were closed within five business days [35]. The TRAPS Act would task its US task force with assessing such international approaches [25].

What it means for fraud systems

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: four pieces of work follow, whatever happens to liability. First, case management needs a scam category that maps to Nacha's false pretenses and RTP's UAPA code, with the determination date captured, because the RTP two-business-day clock starts there. Second, inbound credit monitoring is now an RDFI duty for every credit union and community bank on ACH, so mule detection on receiving accounts belongs in the fraud stack as well as in AML. Third, pre-transaction friction is where supervisors and operators are pointing: payee name checks, network risk signals, out-of-band confirmation and velocity rules, placed before a customer presses send. Fourth, data sharing under section 314(b) is now explicitly encouraged for fraud, so legal, fraud and BSA teams need one process for it. An institution that builds these will be ready if a reimbursement rule ever arrives, because it will know which losses were scams.

What would change this outlook

Four markers would move the outlook toward a liability shift: a bill amending the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to cover fraudulently induced transfers getting a committee vote [36]; a CFPB proposal to amend 12 CFR part 1005 [5]; the bank agencies turning the request for information into a proposed rule rather than guidance [3]; or a network rule that obliges a receiving participant to return funds once fraud is reported, which the RTP rules do not do today [16].

What this means for you

  • Banks: Build a scam category into fraud case management that maps to Nacha false pretenses [12] and the RTP UAPA code, and record the date of each determination; from March 1, 2027 RTP reports are due within two business days of it [15]. Expect supervisors to ask about out-of-band confirmation and velocity controls [34].
  • Credit unions and community banks: Confirm that inbound ACH credit monitoring is in place and reviewed at least yearly, since Phase 2 brought every RDFI under the rule in June 2026 [13]. Ask the core processor how it flags suspected mule accounts receiving credits, and whether it can use Payee Name Verification or FedNow thresholds and negative lists [18] [20].
  • Fraud and BSA leaders: Set one process for fraud-related information sharing under section 314(b), now that the Federal Reserve has highlighted FinCEN guidance encouraging it [4], and build the red flags in FinCEN's September 2026 alert on scam centers into monitoring and suspicious activity reporting [32].
  • Core and payment processors: Make sure payment messages carry the sender's legal name, as RTP now stresses [17], and expose pre-transaction risk signals such as payee name checks and the FedNow network intelligence API inside the payment flow [18] [19].
  • Compliance and policy teams: Track H.R. 4936, H.R. 9331 and any bill amending the Electronic Fund Transfer Act [24] [27] [36], and the bank agencies' response to the request for information [3]. Treat the UK reimbursement data as the reference point Congress may use [35].

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 85% Open

    No federal law is enacted and no federal final rule is published that requires banks or credit unions to reimburse consumers for electronic fund transfers the consumer initiated after being fraudulently induced.

    How we will check: Search the Public Laws of the 119th and 120th Congresses and Federal Register final rules amending 12 CFR part 1005 through December 31, 2027. Right if none extends reimbursement or liability limits to fraudulently induced, consumer-initiated transfers.

    Basis: Regulation E covers unauthorized transfers only [5] [6]; the 2024 bills that would have changed that got no action after referral [28] [29]; the reported House bills create a task force and allow holds rather than reimbursement [24] [27]; and the CFPB withdrew payments guidance and sought only to extend its Regulation E collection [8] [10].

  2. P2 By Confidence 65% Open

    The House of Representatives passes the TRAPS Act (H.R. 4936) or a successor bill that establishes a federal task force on payment scams.

    How we will check: The Library of Congress bill status record for H.R. 4936, or for a successor task force bill, shows passage by the House on or before December 31, 2027.

    Basis: The Financial Services Committee ordered H.R. 4936 reported by 49 to 0 on September 16, 2026, and it has 57 cosponsors [24]; no floor vote was recorded as checked on November 16, 2026 [24], and the 119th Congress ends in January 2027, so a successor bill may be needed.

  3. P3 By Confidence 60% Open

    The OCC, the Federal Reserve Board or the FDIC issues guidance, a statement or a proposed rule on payments fraud that cites the June 2025 request for information, other than SR 26-3 and the FinCEN section 314(b) material it highlights.

    How we will check: A bulletin, SR or CA letter, financial institution letter, interagency statement or Federal Register document from any of the three agencies, dated after November 16, 2026 and on or before December 31, 2027, that addresses payments fraud and refers to the June 2025 request for information (90 FR 26293).

    Basis: The Board said in May 2026 that it was evaluating enhanced guidance and resources after reviewing more than 250 comments [3], a working group is assessing next steps [2], and SR 26-3 already tied one output to the request [4].

  4. P4 By Confidence 80% Open

    The RTP rule requiring fraud reports within two business days of a fraud determination takes effect on March 1, 2027 as scheduled, without postponement.

    How we will check: The Clearing House's RTP rules interpretation on fraud reporting, or a compliance bulletin, available on March 31, 2027 shows the two-business-day timing requirement in effect from March 1, 2027, with no published deferral.

    Basis: The February 2026 bulletin and the September 14, 2026 interpretation both set March 1, 2027 for the timing requirement [14] [15], and the earlier UAPA reporting requirement took effect on its March 31, 2026 date [15].

  5. P5 By Confidence 80% Open

    Total fraud losses reported to the FTC for calendar year 2026 exceed $15.9 billion.

    How we will check: The FTC's annual Consumer Sentinel figures for 2026, as published on or before April 30, 2027, report total fraud losses above $15.9 billion. If they are not published by then, score when they are.

    Basis: Reported losses rose from over $12 billion in 2024 to $15.9 billion in 2025 [22], and the FTC says reported losses have risen year over year for six years [23].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

  • authorized push payment fraud
  • scams
  • Regulation E
  • payments fraud
  • Nacha
  • RTP
  • FedNow
  • TRAPS Act
  • credit unions
  • section 314(b)