Ransom payment rules: who restricts or requires reporting, outlook to 2027

Sanctions risk, suspicious activity reports, 24-hour payment notices and public-sector bans now shape whether and how a ransomware victim pays, and they differ sharply from one government to the next.

The question for 2027

No US federal law forbids a private company to pay a ransom. What exists instead is a stack of rules that make paying risky, reportable or, for some public bodies, unlawful, and the stack is growing unevenly from one government to the next. This outlook sets out which governments restrict ransom payments, which require them to be reported, where each rule stands as checked on November 16, 2026, and what is likely to change through 2027.

Three kinds of rule: discourage, report, forbid

The rules fall into three groups. Sanctions law discourages payment by making it risky: OFAC says the U.S. government strongly discourages paying ransom or extortion demands and that facilitating a payment may violate its regulations [1]. Reporting rules leave the decision with the victim but require it to tell a regulator quickly, as New York does for its financial companies [9] and Australia does for larger businesses [17]. Prohibitions remove the choice for named public bodies, as North Carolina, Florida and Tennessee have done for state agencies [10] [11] [12].

Moraph's view

Moraph's reading: the three groups are converging on one demand of the victim. Whether the rule discourages, requires a report or forbids, an organization that is attacked has to know within a day or two who holds authority to decide on payment, who checks the sanctions exposure and who files with which regulator. The legal outcome differs by jurisdiction; the evidence each regime asks for is much the same.

US federal: sanctions risk and suspicious activity reports

OFAC's Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments is dated September 21, 2021 and superseded its October 1, 2020 advisory [1]. It states that OFAC may impose civil penalties on a strict liability basis, so a person can be liable even without knowing a transaction was prohibited [1]. It also says that license applications involving ransomware payments are reviewed case by case with a presumption of denial [1]. The advisory describes itself as explanatory only and without the force of law [1]. What it offers is mitigation: OFAC will treat a self-initiated and complete report of the attack to law enforcement or other relevant agencies such as CISA, made as soon as possible after discovery, as a voluntary self-disclosure and a significant mitigating factor [1]. OFAC's cyber sanctions page still lists the September 21, 2021 version as the current advisory as checked on November 16, 2026 [2].

FinCEN's rules reach the banks, money services businesses and virtual currency exchanges that move a payment, not the victim as such. Its advisory FIN-2021-A004 of November 8, 2021 reminds financial institutions that a suspicious activity report is required for a suspicious transaction involving or aggregating to $5,000 or more, or $2,000 for money services businesses with one exception [3]. FinCEN and law enforcement treat suspicious transactions involving ransomware attacks as situations requiring immediate attention, and the advisory asks filers to use the key term "CYBER-FIN-2021-A004" [3].

Those reports are now a large dataset. FinCEN's December 4, 2025 trend analysis counted 7,395 Bank Secrecy Act reports related to 4,194 ransomware incidents from 2022 through 2024, totaling more than $2.1 billion in ransomware payments [4] [5]. Payments peaked at about $1.1 billion across 1,512 incidents in 2023 and were about $734 million across 1,476 incidents in 2024 [5]. The median single payment was $124,097 in 2022, $175,000 in 2023 and $155,257 in 2024 [5]. FinCEN notes that the counts include attempted as well as actual transactions and reflect institutions' identification and reporting [5].

CIRCIA: a federal payment report in statute but not yet in force

The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 requires a covered entity that makes a ransom payment after a ransomware attack to report it to CISA within 24 hours of the payment, even when the attack is not itself a covered cyber incident [6]. The duty waits on CISA's final rule: CISA says ransomware payment reporting under CIRCIA will not be required until the final rule goes into effect [7]. CISA published the proposed rule on April 4, 2024, and the 2026 Unified Agenda listed a final rule for September 2026 [8]. That date has passed without a final rule as checked on November 16, 2026. CISA held town hall meetings from June 15 to June 18, 2026 and says multiple funding lapses affected its rulemaking and that it continues to work on the final rule [7]. The agenda entry says many comments asked CISA to reduce the scope and burden of the proposal and to harmonize it with other federal reporting requirements [8].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the 24-hour ransom payment clock is fixed by statute, so the open questions for 2027 are when the rule lands and who counts as a covered entity, not how fast a payment must be reported. We put the chance of a final rule in the Federal Register by December 31, 2027 at a little better than even, the same call made in our incident reporting clocks trend report.

New York: a payment notice and a written explanation

New York's cybersecurity regulation already has the rule CIRCIA promises. Under section 500.17(c), a covered entity that makes an extortion payment in connection with a cybersecurity event must notify the superintendent within 24 hours of the payment [9]. Within 30 days it must give a written description of why the payment was necessary, the alternatives considered, the diligence performed to find alternatives and the diligence performed to comply with applicable rules, including OFAC's [9]. The written explanation turns the OFAC advisory's mitigating factors into a filing that DFS can read and test after the fact.

States that forbid public bodies to pay

States that forbid public bodies to pay
StateWho may not payOther dutySource
North CarolinaState agencies and local government entities, including cities, counties, local school administrative units and community colleges; they may not pay or otherwise communicate with the attacker [10]Consult the Department of Information Technology on a ransom request [10]G.S. 143-800 [10]
FloridaState agencies, counties and municipalities experiencing a ransomware incident may not pay or otherwise comply with a ransom demand [11]None in this section [11]s. 282.3186 [11]
TennesseeState entities, as the summary of the enacted bill describes them [12]Immediately notify and consult the technology and innovation division of the TBI [12]Public Chapter 534; the bill history records the Governor's signature and an effective date of March 7, 2024 [12]

The North Carolina and Florida bans reach local government as well as the state [10] [11]; the Tennessee bill as enacted is described as applying to state entities [12]. All three are written for public bodies; none names private companies [10] [11] [12]. Other states have considered similar bills; this outlook lists only bans we confirmed in statute or enacted bill text.

United Kingdom: a public-sector ban still at the policy stage

The Home Office consulted from January 14, 2025 to April 8, 2025 on three proposals: a targeted ban on ransomware payments by the public sector and owners and operators of regulated critical national infrastructure, a payment prevention regime that would make other victims report an intent to pay, and a mandatory incident reporting regime [14]. The proposed reporting regime would require an initial report within 72 hours of an attack and a fuller report within 28 days [14]. Nearly three quarters (72%) of respondents agreed with the targeted ban [14]. The government published its response on July 22, 2025 [13], and its announcement said public sector bodies and critical infrastructure operators, including the NHS, local councils and schools, would be banned from paying ransom demands under the measure [15].

As checked on November 16, 2026 we found no government bill carrying the ban. The response says the government will continue to develop the ban in collaboration with industry, and that support measures for the payment prevention regime would be explored in alignment with the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill [14]. The background briefing notes to the King's Speech of May 13, 2026 list a Cyber Security and Resilience Bill and a National Security Bill that would update the Computer Misuse Act 1990, but do not mention ransomware [21]. The only bill in Parliament's database with "ransomware" in its title is a private member's bill, the Cyber Extortion and Ransomware (Reporting) Bill, which had its first reading on October 21, 2025; its record lists only the session in which it was introduced and no second reading [16].

Australia: payment reporting in force

Australia has a general reporting duty in force. Part 3 of the Cyber Security Act 2024, assented to on November 29, 2024, requires a reporting business entity to report a ransomware payment to the designated Commonwealth body within 72 hours of making the payment or becoming aware it was made [17]. The report covers the incident and its impact, the demand, the payment and communications with the extorting entity [17]. The duty applies to businesses carrying on business in Australia above a turnover threshold, other than Commonwealth and State bodies, and to responsible entities for critical infrastructure assets to which Part 2B of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 applies [17]. The Department of Home Affairs says the Rules set the threshold at AUD $3 million of annual turnover in the last financial year, that reports go through the Australian Signals Directorate's form, and that no report is needed when a demand is made but nothing is paid [18]. Failing to report carries a civil penalty of 60 penalty units [17]. The Act's commencement table gives Part 3 a single day to be fixed by Proclamation or, failing that, the day after the end of six months beginning on the day of Royal Assent [17]; the Department of Home Affairs says the obligation commenced on May 30, 2025, with an education-first phase to December 31, 2025 and a more active regulatory focus from January 1, 2026 [18].

The Counter Ransomware Initiative

In a joint statement published on November 2, 2023, members of the Counter Ransomware Initiative, including Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, said they strongly discourage anyone from paying a ransomware demand [19]. They reached consensus that relevant institutions under the authority of their national governments should not pay ransomware extortion demands, in accordance with domestic laws and regulations [19]. The statement is a policy commitment, not law. A Home Office news story of October 24, 2025 says 67 members of the initiative endorsed supply chain guidance developed by the UK and Singapore at a global summit of the initiative [20].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the 2023 statement set the direction that national laws are now following at different speeds. Australia legislated reporting without a ban; the UK chose a ban for the public sector and critical infrastructure but has not legislated it; the United States relies on sanctions risk, SAR filings and a CIRCIA rule still in draft, while a few states ban payment by their own agencies. We expect 2027 to bring more reporting duties than bans, because reporting is easier to defend to the operators of hospitals and utilities who would carry the cost of a ban during an outage.

What to watch in 2027

  • A CIRCIA final rule in the Federal Register, and how it defines covered entities; CISA says it will publish updates at CISA.gov/CIRCIA [7].
  • Whether OFAC replaces its September 21, 2021 advisory, which its cyber sanctions page still lists [2].
  • Whether FinCEN publishes a ransomware trend analysis covering 2025 data; its most recent covers 2022 to 2024 [5].
  • A UK government bill carrying the public-sector ban, the payment prevention regime or mandatory reporting [14].
  • Australian enforcement now that the education-first phase has ended [18].

What this means for you

  • Banks and money services businesses: Keep ransomware SAR handling separate from routine monitoring: FinCEN treats ransomware-related suspicious transactions as requiring immediate attention and asks filers to use the advisory's key term [3]. New York-regulated institutions that pay a ransom themselves owe DFS a 24-hour notice and a 30-day explanation [9].
  • Health systems and other critical infrastructure operators: Plan for a 24-hour payment report to CISA: the statute fixes the clock for covered entities, and the final rule's timing and its definition of covered entities remain open [6] [7]. Australia's 72-hour payment report already applies to reporting business entities, including those above the turnover threshold [17] [18].
  • State and local agencies: Check whether a state ban applies before an incident, not during one: North Carolina and Florida reach local government [10] [11], while Tennessee's applies to state entities and requires notifying the TBI's technology and innovation division [12].
  • Cyber insurers and incident response firms: Document sanctions screening for every payment you facilitate: OFAC names insurers and incident response firms among those whose compliance programs should account for the risk that a payment involves a blocked person [1], and DFS asks covered entities to describe the OFAC diligence performed [9].

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 55% Open

    CISA will publish the CIRCIA final rule, including the ransom payment reporting requirement, in the Federal Register by December 31, 2027.

    How we will check: A final rule under RIN 1670-AA04 appears in the Federal Register on or before December 31, 2027 and includes a ransom payment reporting requirement.

    Basis: The statute requires 24-hour ransom payment reports once the rule is in effect [6]; the September 2026 target in the Unified Agenda passed [8] and CISA cites funding lapses but says it continues to work on the rule [7].

  2. P2 By Confidence 80% Open

    No UK Act banning ransomware payments by public sector bodies receives Royal Assent by December 31, 2027.

    How we will check: No Act of the UK Parliament containing a prohibition on ransomware payments by public sector bodies receives Royal Assent on or before December 31, 2027, as shown on legislation.gov.uk or the UK Parliament bills site.

    Basis: The government announced the ban in July 2025 [15] and said it would keep developing it with industry [14]; the King's Speech briefing notes of May 13, 2026 do not mention ransomware [21], and as checked on November 16, 2026 the only ransomware bill in Parliament's database is a private member's bill with no second reading recorded [16].

  3. P3 By Confidence 70% Open

    OFAC will not issue a new advisory superseding its September 21, 2021 ransomware payment advisory by December 31, 2027.

    How we will check: OFAC's cyber-related sanctions page or recent actions list shows no ransomware payment advisory dated after September 21, 2021 that supersedes it, as of December 31, 2027.

    Basis: The 2021 advisory superseded the 2020 version [1] and remains the version listed on OFAC's cyber sanctions page as checked on November 16, 2026 [2].

  4. P4 By Confidence 50% Open

    FinCEN will publish a ransomware Financial Trend Analysis covering Bank Secrecy Act data for incidents in 2025 by December 31, 2027.

    How we will check: A FinCEN Financial Trend Analysis on ransomware, dated on or before December 31, 2027, that reports ransomware incidents or payments for calendar 2025.

    Basis: FinCEN's ransomware page lists trend analyses dated October 15, 2021, November 1, 2022 and December 4, 2025 [4]; the latest covers incidents from 2022 through 2024 [5].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

  • ransomware
  • ransom payments
  • OFAC
  • FinCEN
  • CIRCIA
  • NYDFS Part 500
  • state ransomware bans
  • UK ransomware proposals
  • Australia Cyber Security Act 2024
  • Counter Ransomware Initiative