The SEC’s 2017 DAO report found one token was a security, flagged its trading venues and left custody open
On July 25, 2017, the SEC found that tokens sold by The DAO were securities and that platforms trading them looked like exchanges. In our reading, it answered status, offering and trading questions, and said nothing about holding tokens for others.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On July 25, 2017, the SEC found that tokens sold by The DAO were securities and that platforms trading them looked like exchanges. In our reading, it answered status, offering and trading questions, and said nothing about holding tokens for others.
- The week On July 25, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission published a report of investigation under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
- Status: an old test applied to code The report did not invent a new test.
- Offering: an unincorporated organization as issuer The second part concerns who must register.
- Trading: platforms that looked like exchanges The third part concerns secondary markets.
- Custody: the question the report did not ask The fourth part is an absence.
- How the report reached different financial institutions The report was addressed to issuers and platforms.
- Objections, in order Our reading has reasonable critics.
- What a compliance officer could check The DAO report and its aftermath suggest questions for any financial institution that deals in, holds or banks crypto assets.
- With hindsight The DAO report’s method lasted.
The week
On July 25, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission published a report of investigation under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Its subject was The DAO, an unincorporated organization that existed as computer code on the Ethereum blockchain. [1] The Commission concluded that tokens The DAO had sold were securities under the federal securities laws. [1]
The Commission’s press release described the report as cautioning market participants that offers and sales of digital assets by virtual organizations are subject to the federal securities laws. It noted that such offers had been called Initial Coin Offerings or token sales. [2] Whether a transaction involves a security, the release said, depends on the facts and circumstances, including the economic realities of the transaction, regardless of the terminology or technology used. [2]
The report set out the facts. From April 30 through May 28, 2016, The DAO offered and sold about 1.15 billion DAO Tokens for about 12 million Ether, a virtual currency used on the Ethereum blockchain. At the close of the offering, the Ether raised was valued at about $150 million. [1]
The DAO had been created by a German company and its co-founders. It was meant to operate as a for-profit entity that would pool the Ether raised and fund projects. Token holders stood to share in the anticipated earnings from those projects. [1] Anyone could buy, the report said, with no limits on the number of tokens, the number of buyers or their sophistication. [1]
The report described a group called Curators, chosen by the creators, who reviewed proposals before token holders could vote on them. According to the report, the Curators had considerable power and maintained ultimate control over which proposals could be submitted, voted on and funded. [1]
It also described what went wrong. On June 17, 2016, an unknown attacker began diverting Ether from The DAO through a flaw in its code, moving about 3.6 million Ether, a third of the total raised. [1] The creators and others backed a change to the Ethereum protocol, called a hard fork, that took effect on July 20, 2016. It moved the funds to a recovery address where token holders could exchange tokens for Ether. [1]
Token holders could also resell DAO Tokens on several web-based platforms that supported secondary trading. [1] The report found that those platforms appeared to meet the functional test for an exchange in Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a), and did not appear to fall within its exclusions. [1]
The Commission did not bring an enforcement action. It said it had decided not to, based on the conduct and activities known to it at the time. The report stated that it was not an adjudication of any fact or issue and made no findings of violations by any person. [1]
Instead, the report was issued to advise those who would use a decentralized autonomous organization, or other distributed ledger or blockchain-enabled means of raising capital, to take appropriate steps to comply with the securities laws. [1] It restated two principles: offerings of securities must be registered or exempt, and any entity acting as an exchange must register or operate under an exemption. [1] [2]
The release added that those participating in unregistered offerings may also be liable for violations, and that securities exchanges providing for trading in these securities must register unless exempt. [2] It also carried the Chairman’s statement that the agency was studying distributed ledger technologies and encouraged market participants to engage with it. [2]
A token sale raises four questions at once: whether the token is a security, who must register its sale, where it can trade, and who may hold it for others. The SEC’s July 2017 report answered the first three for one token. It said nothing about the fourth. [1]
Our argument is that the DAO report addressed status, offering and trading questions by applying an old test to new facts. It left custody, the question that reaches banks and broker-dealers directly, to be answered later and by other means. [1] [4] [5] We take the report in four parts:
- Status: how the Commission applied the investment contract test to DAO Tokens.
- Offering: who the report treated as the issuer, and what registration it expected.
- Trading: what the report said about the platforms that listed the tokens.
- Custody: what the report left unsaid about holding tokens for others.
The first part concerns the instrument. The second concerns its sale. The third concerns its market. The fourth concerns its safekeeping. Together they cover a token from issue to holding. After the four parts, we look at how the report reached different financial institutions, answer objections, and list what a compliance officer could check.
A note on sources and our reading. We describe the report and the Commission’s release as published. We describe later developments from SEC staff bulletins, the GENIUS Act and the Commission’s 2026 interpretation. Statements about what the law required of a particular firm are our reading. Firms should confirm their obligations with counsel.
Status: an old test applied to code
The report did not invent a new test. It applied the definition of an investment contract from the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in the Howey case. That definition asks for an investment of money in a common enterprise, with a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others. [1]
Money need not be cash
The first question was whether buyers invested money. They paid in Ether, not dollars. The report cited cases holding that an investment of money need not take the form of cash, and found that paying Ether was a contribution of value that met the test. [1]
For a financial institution, this was an unsurprising step with large consequences. It meant that a crypto asset paid for a token could count as the investment. Every later token sale paid in Ether or Bitcoin would face the same analysis. [1]
Profits from a pooled enterprise
The report found that investors expected profits. Promotional materials described The DAO as a for-profit entity that would fund projects in exchange for a return. The Ether was pooled, and token holders stood to share in profits from funded projects. [1]
The report quoted the Supreme Court’s view that profits include dividends, other periodic payments or the increased value of the investment. [1] A reasonable investor, it concluded, would have been motivated at least in part by the prospect of profits. [1]
A common enterprise
The report treated the pooling of Ether as part of the analysis. All Ether raised, and any future profits, were to be pooled and held at The DAO’s blockchain address, and investors invested in a common enterprise when they sent Ether to it. [1]
The common enterprise element later drew attention of its own. The Commission’s 2026 interpretation said that, in light of court decisions, the common enterprise element must be satisfied, and clarified earlier statements that suggested otherwise. [7] For DAO Tokens the point was easy, because the pool was explicit. For tokens without a pool, the 2026 clarification made the element a real question. [1] [7]
Whose efforts mattered
The decisive question was whose efforts would produce those profits. The report found that investors relied on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of the creators and the Curators. [1] The creators marketed The DAO, ran its website and forums, and stepped in when the attack happened. The Curators decided which proposals reached a vote. [1]
Token holders could vote, but the report found their voting rights were limited. They were widely dispersed and pseudonymous, and they could vote only on proposals the Curators had approved. [1] In the report’s analysis, the efforts of the creators and Curators were the undeniably significant ones, essential to the enterprise’s success. [1]
Control that existed on paper
The report’s treatment of voting is worth a careful read, because decentralized structures rely on it. It found the voting rights did not give token holders meaningful control. Their vote on contracts was largely perfunctory, and they were widely dispersed and limited in their ability to communicate with one another. [1]
The report pointed to the attack as evidence. Token holders, it said, were unable to address the attack effectively without the help of the creators and others. [1] In our reading, this is the report’s practical test of control: who actually acted when something went wrong.
For a firm assessing a token in later years, that test is usable. Governance documents describe who should control a system. The record of who acted in a crisis shows who did. The report treated the second as stronger evidence. [1]
Automation did not change the answer
The report addressed the technology directly. It said the automation of functions through smart contracts or computer code does not remove conduct from the purview of the federal securities laws. [1] The press release said the same in plainer terms: the analysis applies regardless of the terminology or technology used. [2]
In our reading, this was the report’s main contribution. It told the market that code is not an exemption. A governance structure that ran on a blockchain would be analyzed by what people actually did and relied on, not by how the structure described itself. [1]
Facts and circumstances
The report also limited itself. It said whether a particular transaction involves a security depends on the facts and circumstances, including the economic realities of the transaction. [1] [2] It declined to say all tokens are securities; it found these tokens were, on these facts. [1]
That limit was principled. It also left every other token sale to its own analysis. For a bank or broker-dealer asked to deal in a different token, the report offered a method, not an answer. [1]
What a product committee would take from it
A bank or broker-dealer product committee in 2017 could take a working method from the report. Start from the economic reality of the token. Ask who the buyers depend on for returns. Ask whether the token holders can actually control the enterprise. Document the answers. [1]
The committee could not take a list. The report named no tokens other than DAO Tokens and gave no safe harbor. [1] In our reading, any firm that treated the report as clearing a different token was reading more into it than it said.
Offering: an unincorporated organization as issuer
The second part concerns who must register. The DAO was not a company in the usual sense. It was code on a blockchain, created by a company and its founders. [1]
The issuer definition stretched to fit
The report applied the Securities Act’s definition of issuer, which covers every person who issues or proposes to issue a security, and defines person to include any unincorporated organization. [1] It concluded that The DAO was an issuer and that its offer and sale of tokens had to be registered unless an exemption applied. [1]
The report also looked at exemptions. It noted, for example, that The DAO would not have met the requirements of the crowdfunding exemption, because it was not a registered broker-dealer or funding portal. [1] The structure that made the offering easy to reach also made it hard to exempt.
An issuer without a company
The report’s issuer analysis raises a practical point it did not need to resolve. A registration statement is signed and filed by someone. The DAO was code, created by a company that described it as a new form of organization. [1] The report concluded that The DAO was the issuer, while describing the efforts of its creators and Curators as essential to it. [1]
In our reading, that left later projects with a question of who would carry the issuer’s duties: the organization in code, the company that wrote it, or the people who controlled it. A financial institution doing diligence on a token project would want to know who, in fact, could answer for the disclosure.
Participants share exposure
The press release went further than the report’s conclusions about The DAO. It said those participating in unregistered offerings also may be liable for violations of the securities laws. [2] In our reading, that sentence was aimed at everyone around a token sale: promoters, platforms and any intermediary that helped buyers participate. [2]
For a financial institution, this widened the diligence question. A bank providing accounts to a token issuer, or a broker-dealer facilitating purchases, had to ask whether the offering itself was registered or exempt. The answer could affect the institution’s own exposure. [2]
Buyers no one identified
The report described an offering open to anyone who paid Ether. There were no limits on the number of buyers or their sophistication, and purchases were made pseudonymously, with each buyer known only by a blockchain address. [1]
For a regulated institution, that description reads as a list of missing controls. A registered offering through a broker-dealer would have identified customers, assessed suitability where required and kept records. In our reading, the report’s registration point and an institution’s anti-money laundering obligations meet here: the same features that made the sale a securities problem made it a know-your-customer problem. [1]
Disclosure that never existed
The press release explained what registration is for: making sure investors receive proper disclosures and that the investments are subject to regulatory scrutiny. [2] The DAO offered a white paper and a website, according to the report, not a registration statement. [1]
The report’s account of the attack shows what disclosure might have covered. Concerns about vulnerabilities in the code surfaced in late May 2016, before the sale closed, and the creators proposed security updates and a moratorium on proposals in late May and early June. [1] A registered offering would have had to address known risks of that kind in its disclosure. The token sale had no such requirement.
No enforcement, and a warning
The Commission chose not to bring an action, based on what it knew. [1] It used the report instead to put the market on notice. The report said it was published on the SEC website so all market participants had concurrent and equal access to its contents. [1]
In our reading, a section 21(a) report works as a precedent without a case. It tells the market how the Commission reads the law, without a court decision or a penalty. Its force comes from the expectation that the next case will follow it. [1]
Trading: platforms that looked like exchanges
The third part concerns secondary markets. DAO Tokens traded on web-based platforms after the sale. The report treated those platforms as part of the analysis. [1]
A functional test
Under Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a), a system is an exchange if it brings together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers. It must also use established, non-discretionary methods under which those orders interact and the parties agree to terms. [1] The report found the platforms appeared to meet this test. [1]
The test looks at function. A platform that matched buy and sell orders for tokens that were securities was, on the report’s analysis, doing what an exchange does. Calling itself something else would not change that. [1]
Registration or an exemption
A system meeting the test must register as a national securities exchange or operate under an exemption. [1] The report pointed to the exemption for alternative trading systems, which requires, among other things, registering as a broker-dealer and filing Form ATS. [1]
For a broker-dealer considering a crypto trading venue, the report mapped the route: broker-dealer registration, compliance with Regulation ATS and the obligations that come with both. In our reading, the report made clear that a trading platform for securities tokens would be a regulated business, with all the controls that entails. [1]
The alternative trading system route
The report described the main exemption a token platform could use. An alternative trading system that complies with Regulation ATS is exempt from the exchange definition. Regulation ATS requires, among other things, registering as a broker-dealer and filing Form ATS to give the Commission notice of the system’s operations. [1]
For a platform operator, that route converts a technology business into a regulated one. Broker-dealer registration brings capital, recordkeeping, supervision and customer protection obligations, which the report did not list but which follow from registration. In our reading, the report’s message to platforms was that the cost of compliance was a cost of the business, not an optional extra. [1]
For an incumbent broker-dealer, the same route looked like an opportunity. It already had the registration. The question was whether it could add tokens to an existing system and meet the same obligations for a new kind of asset. The custody gap made that harder than the trading analysis alone suggested. [1] [4]
Platforms carried the listing risk
The report did not name enforcement against platforms. But by saying they appeared to be unregistered exchanges, it put every platform listing tokens on notice. [1] A platform could not know which tokens were securities without its own analysis of each one. The facts-and-circumstances method meant that analysis could not be done once for all tokens. [1] [2]
In our reading, this was the operational burden the report created. Listing a token became a legal decision. Platforms needed a process to review each token’s facts before listing it, and to revisit that review as facts changed.
Trading was planned from the start
The report described secondary trading as part of the design. Before the sale, the creator solicited at least one U.S. web-based platform to trade DAO Tokens, and promotional materials said the tokens would be available for trading on several platforms after the sale. [1] The platforms themselves posted notices that they planned to support trading. [1]
In our reading, that sequence tied the offering and the trading together. Buyers could expect to exit through the platforms, which supported the expectation of profit. The platforms’ role was part of the investment’s economics, not a separate market that happened to form. [1]
Markets during an exploit
The report does not describe trading during the attack, and we do not guess at it. But its account raises a question every trading venue must answer: what happens to trading when the asset itself is being drained through a code flaw. [1]
A registered exchange or alternative trading system has rules for halts, surveillance and disorderly markets. An unregistered platform has whatever it chooses. In our reading, the report’s exchange analysis carried that operational implication: registration would bring the market-integrity controls that a token under attack would need. [1]
What changes over time
The report analyzed DAO Tokens as of their sale and trading in 2016. It did not discuss whether a token’s status could change, for example once the promised managerial efforts were complete or the enterprise ended. [1] That question would matter a great deal for platforms and custodians. SEC staff took it up in a 2019 framework, and the Commission itself addressed it directly in 2026, as we discuss below. [3] [7]
Custody: the question the report did not ask
The fourth part is an absence. The report did not discuss who held DAO Tokens or Ether for investors, or how. It analyzed the issuer, the investors and the platforms. It did not analyze custodians. [1]
Why custody was the next question
Investors in The DAO held tokens at blockchain addresses, pseudonymously. The report noted that buyers sent Ether from their own addresses. [1] Self-custody was the model. But once tokens are securities, institutions that hold them for customers face the rules that govern holding securities for others.
Those rules differ for broker-dealers, banks and investment advisers, and each set was written for traditional securities. The report touched none of them. In our reading, the omission was natural, since The DAO had no custodian, but it left a hard operational question for institutions unaddressed. [1]
The keys are the asset
A crypto asset’s control rests on cryptographic keys. Whoever holds the key can move the asset. The report’s account of the attack shows what that means: an attacker moved a third of the funds by exploiting code, and only a change to the whole network’s protocol reversed it. [1]
For a custodian, that is a different risk from holding a certificate or a book-entry position. Loss of a key can mean loss of the asset, and recovery may depend on actions outside any one institution’s control. The SEC staff later described these technological risks in its 2022 accounting bulletin on safeguarding crypto assets. [4]
Code risk is custody risk
The DAO’s funds were not taken from a wallet. They were drained through a flaw in The DAO’s own code, the smart contract that held the pooled Ether. [1] For a custodian, that means the asset’s safety depends on code it did not write and cannot change.
A custodian of traditional securities worries about its own systems and its sub-custodians. A custodian of tokens issued by smart contracts also carries the risk of the contract itself. In our reading, a custody policy for such tokens needs a review of the issuing contract, and a plan for what the custodian will do if it is exploited.
Forks and entitlements
The hard fork that reversed the attack changed the Ethereum protocol going forward, and moved The DAO’s funds to a recovery address. [1] A change of that kind raises a custody question with no counterpart in traditional markets: which version of the chain a customer’s holdings live on, and what the customer is owed on each.
The report did not address forks as a custody matter. In our reading, any institution holding crypto assets for others needs a written position on forks before one happens. It should say which chain it will support, how it will credit customers, and how it will tell them. [1]
Accounting followed, then reversed
In March 2022, SEC staff issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121. It said an entity safeguarding crypto assets for platform users, while holding the keys, should present a liability for that obligation on its balance sheet. Both the liability and a corresponding asset would be measured at fair value. [4]
The bulletin applied to entities filing with the SEC. It made custody visible on the balance sheet. In January 2025, staff issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 122, rescinding that guidance and directing entities to apply the existing accounting for loss contingencies instead. [5]
In our reading, the accounting swing shows how unsettled the custody question remained, years after the DAO report answered the status question for one token. The report’s silence on custody left a gap that staff guidance filled and then emptied. [1] [4] [5]
Staff guidance as a moving floor
Both accounting bulletins carried the same caveat. Staff accounting bulletins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission and are not published with its official approval; they state the staff’s views. [4] [5] Firms nonetheless built their reporting around them, because the staff reviews filings.
In our reading, that combination made custody policy fragile. A firm could follow staff views carefully and still face a reversal with no change in law. A custody program built to survive such changes would keep its risk controls independent of the accounting presentation that happens to apply.
Where custody was finally written into law
When a federal statute did set custody terms for a category of crypto asset, it was about stablecoins, not tokens like The DAO’s. Section 10 of the GENIUS Act limits who may hold a payment stablecoin issuer’s reserves, stablecoins used as collateral, or the private keys used to issue the stablecoins. [6]
The custodian must be supervised by a federal regulator named in the Act or by a state bank or credit union supervisor that shares information with the Federal Reserve Board. It must treat customers’ stablecoins, private keys and cash as the customers’ property, and protect them from its own creditors. [6]
In our reading, that section answers, for one category, the question the DAO report never asked. It names who may hold, and it treats keys as property to be segregated. It took a statute and a narrower asset class to get there. [1] [6]
How the report reached different financial institutions
The report was addressed to issuers and platforms. Its effects reached every kind of financial institution that might touch tokens.
Broker-dealers
Broker-dealers were the natural route for any regulated trading in securities tokens, since the alternative trading system exemption requires broker-dealer registration. [1] The report thus pointed toward broker-dealers as the gateway. It also exposed them to the facts-and-circumstances problem for every token they might handle.
Banks
Banks faced the report indirectly. A bank serving token issuers or platforms had to consider whether its customers were conducting unregistered offerings or operating unregistered exchanges. [1] [2] Banks interested in custody had no guidance from the report at all. Their path ran through banking regulators and, later, accounting guidance. [4] [5]
Investment advisers and funds
The report noted in a footnote that it did not analyze whether The DAO was an investment company, and said those using virtual organizations should consider the Investment Company Act. [1] Advisers considering token investments for clients had to apply the status analysis to each token and consider how to hold it.
Credit unions and community banks
Smaller institutions may not deal in tokens directly. Their exposure can come through members and customers who bought tokens, and through the payment flows to and from platforms. In our reading, the report gave them a reason to treat payments to unregistered platforms as a risk signal for their own monitoring. [1]
The later stablecoin law shows how far that exposure can travel. Section 10 of the GENIUS Act lets an institution supervised by a state bank or state credit union supervisor provide custody for stablecoin reserves and keys, if that supervisor shares information with the Federal Reserve Board and the custody requirements are met. [6] A question that seemed remote from a credit union in July 2017 had, by 2025, a statutory answer that named state credit union supervisors. [6]
Fintech companies
Fintech firms building on blockchains were the report’s main audience. The report told them that their structure’s description would not decide its regulatory status; its economic reality would. [1] [2] For a fintech seeking a bank partner, the report also shaped what the bank would ask before agreeing.
Boards and risk committees
For a financial institution’s board, the report changed the shape of a crypto proposal. Before it, a proposal could be framed as a technology choice. After it, any proposal touching tokens carried a securities law question that management had to answer token by token. [1] [2]
A risk committee could ask three things of such a proposal: which tokens, what status analysis supports each, and who holds the keys. The report gave the method for the second question and nothing for the third. In our reading, a proposal that answered only the second was incomplete. [1]
Anti-money laundering teams
The report was a securities document, but its facts spoke to financial crime teams. Pseudonymous buyers, open eligibility and trading on unregistered platforms are each relevant to transaction monitoring. [1] In our reading, an AML team could use the report’s description of an unregistered offering and unregistered trading as a typology for alerts on customer payments to token sales and platforms.
For a fintech, the report also changed fundraising. A token sale that would have been a quick route to capital now looked like a securities offering requiring registration or an exemption. [1] [2] The cost and time of that route were part of the report’s practical effect, even though the report itself imposed no penalty.
Objections, in order
Our reading has reasonable critics. We take the strongest objections in turn.
1. The report was about one failed project, not the market
The DAO was a single project with unusual features, including an attack and a hard fork. [1] But the press release spoke to all virtual organizations and token sales, and the report’s method applied to any token. [2] Its reach exceeded its facts.
2. The report gave no clear rule
That is true by design. The report said status depends on facts and circumstances. [1] [2] Our argument accepts this. It is why the report settled status for DAO Tokens and left every other token to its own analysis.
3. Custody was outside the SEC’s question
The report’s subject was the offering and trading of DAO Tokens. [1] We do not fault it for omitting custody. Our point is about what institutions needed next. The report gave them status analysis and gave them nothing on holding the assets, which is where their own rules applied.
4. Later guidance made the report obsolete
Later guidance changed the framework around it. [3] [7] But the Commission’s 2026 interpretation began by describing the DAO report and its application of the Howey test, and continued to apply that test. [7] The method held. What changed was the analysis of particular kinds of tokens and of how a token’s status can change.
5. Enforcement, not reports, shaped the market
The Commission’s 2026 interpretation itself noted that, after the DAO report, the Commission applied the Howey test to crypto assets mostly in enforcement actions, and that some described this approach as regulation by enforcement. [7] We agree the report was one input among many. It was the first, and its method framed what followed. [7]
6. Banks had no role, so the report did not concern them
Banks were not named in the report. [1] But the press release’s warning that participants in unregistered offerings may be liable reached anyone who helped such an offering happen. [2] And the custody question, which the report left open, was the one banks would face first if they entered the market.
7. The 2026 interpretation reversed the DAO report
In our reading, it did not. The 2026 release described the DAO report’s conclusion that DAO Tokens were offered and sold as investment contracts, and built on the same Howey test, which it said it did not supersede or replace. [7] What it expressly superseded was the 2019 staff framework. [3] [7] It changed how the Commission classifies whole categories of crypto assets, and how it views a token’s status after an issuer’s promises are fulfilled. It left the DAO report’s method in place.
What a compliance officer could check
The DAO report and its aftermath suggest questions for any financial institution that deals in, holds or banks crypto assets.
- For each token the firm handles, record the facts behind its status analysis and the date of that analysis.
- Revisit status analyses when the issuer’s role changes, since the 2026 interpretation addresses when a token separates from an investment contract.
- For any trading venue the firm operates or uses, confirm the registration or exemption it relies on.
- For custody, record who holds keys, how loss is prevented and how the firm accounts for the obligation after SAB 122.
- For stablecoins, confirm whether the issuer is a permitted payment stablecoin issuer under the GENIUS Act.
- For customers that issue or list tokens, document the diligence performed on their offerings and platforms.
Each question asks the firm to write down a judgment and its date. The DAO report showed why. Status depends on facts, facts change, and the framework around them changed several times. [1] [7] A firm that can show what it knew and decided at each point is in a far better position than one that can only show its current view.
The first three questions follow from the report directly. The last three follow from what the report left open. Firms should confirm their own obligations with counsel, because the framework changed several times after July 2017 and may change again.
With hindsight
The DAO report’s method lasted. The Commission went on to apply the Howey test to crypto assets, mostly in enforcement actions, according to its own later account. [7] In April 2019, SEC staff published a framework for analyzing whether a digital asset is an investment contract. The page now notes that it has been withdrawn and superseded. [3]
Custody guidance arrived in March 2022, when SEC staff issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121. It asked entities safeguarding crypto assets for platform users to record a safeguarding liability and a corresponding asset at fair value. [4] In January 2025, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 122 rescinded that guidance, effective January 30, 2025, and directed entities to the existing loss contingency standards. [5]
Congress acted on one category of token. The GENIUS Act, approved July 18, 2025, set a framework for payment stablecoins. [6] Among other things, it amended the securities laws so that the term security does not include a payment stablecoin issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer. [6] It takes effect on the earlier of 18 months after enactment or 120 days after the regulators issue final implementing rules. [6]
In March 2026, the SEC, with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, issued an interpretation of how the federal securities laws apply to certain crypto assets and transactions. It took effect March 23, 2026. [7] It opened by recalling the DAO report and its use of the Howey test, and it superseded the 2019 staff framework. [7] [3]
The interpretation sorted crypto assets into five categories: digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, stablecoins and digital securities. It said the first three are not themselves securities, though they can be sold subject to an investment contract, which is a security. [7] It named examples of digital commodities, including Bitcoin and Ether. [7]
It also addressed the question the DAO report did not: when a token stops being subject to an investment contract. In the interpretation’s analysis, a non-security crypto asset is no longer subject to the investment contract once the issuer has fulfilled its representations or promises to undertake essential managerial efforts. [7] It said whether that has happened depends on how the issuer described those efforts. [7]
What held up from July 2017? The method held: the Commission still applies Howey, and still says technology does not change the analysis. [1] [7] The treatment of the payment for The DAO’s tokens shows how far views moved. The report treated Ether as the money invested. The 2026 interpretation names Ether as a digital commodity that is not itself a security. [1] [7] Both statements can be true at once, since the DAO tokens, not Ether, were the securities.
What did not hold was any expectation that the report would settle the market. Its facts-and-circumstances approach left each token to separate analysis for years. The Commission’s own 2026 release acknowledged divergent views among market participants, regulators and courts in that period. [7]
For financial institutions, the custody gap closed slowly and unevenly. Accounting guidance arrived and was rescinded. [4] [5] Stablecoin law arrived for one category. [6] In our reading, a bank or broker-dealer that built its token policies on the DAO report alone in 2017 has since faced at least five changes to its framework: a staff framework, two staff accounting bulletins, a statute and a Commission interpretation.
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