Section 889 defined banned equipment by maker, role and purpose
The defense bill signed on August 13, 2018 barred agencies from buying, and later from contracting with firms using, certain Chinese telecom and video gear. Its tests of maker, role and purpose could only be answered from an inventory of each network’s architecture.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The defense bill signed on August 13, 2018 barred agencies from buying, and later from contracting with firms using, certain Chinese telecom and video gear. Its tests of maker, role and purpose could only be answered from an inventory of each network’s architecture.
- The week On Monday, August 13, 2018, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 became law as Public Law 115-232.
- The maker test: named producers and a list that could grow The first test asked who produced the equipment or provided the service.
- The role test: when equipment counted The second test asked what part the equipment played.
- The purpose test: when use decided coverage The third test applied to the second group of named companies.
- The reach: who was bound, when, and how to get time The fourth part concerns scope.
- Objections, and where the argument is weakest The argument here is that section 889 made compliance a matter of network architecture, because its tests could be answered only from an inventory of what equipment sat where and what it did.
- With hindsight The implementing rules came as a series of interim rules.
The week
On Monday, August 13, 2018, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 became law as Public Law 115-232. The conference report reconciling the House and Senate versions had been ordered printed on July 25, 2018. The act authorized appropriations for military activities, military construction and defense activities of the Department of Energy, and it carried several measures reaching well outside the Pentagon, including the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Section 889 of the act, titled “Prohibition on certain telecommunications and video surveillance services or equipment,” addressed federal buying. Subsection (a) set two prohibitions on the head of an executive agency. The first barred procuring or obtaining, or extending or renewing a contract to procure or obtain, any equipment, system or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system. The second barred entering into, extending or renewing a contract with an entity that uses any equipment, system or service that uses covered equipment or services in the same way.
Subsection (a)(2) set two limits on those prohibitions. They did not bar an agency from procuring with an entity to provide a service that connects to the facilities of a third party, such as backhaul, roaming or interconnection arrangements. And they did not cover telecommunications equipment that cannot route or redirect user data traffic or permit visibility into any user data or packets it transmits or otherwise handles.
Subsection (b) applied the same restrictions to loan and grant funds: the head of an executive agency could not obligate or expend loan or grant funds to procure or obtain the covered equipment, services or systems. It directed agencies running loan, grant or subsidy programs, naming the Federal Communications Commission and the Departments of Agriculture, Homeland Security and Commerce and the Small Business Administration, to prioritize funding and technical support to help affected businesses, institutions and organizations transition away from covered equipment and services.
The effective dates were staggered. The prohibition on procuring covered equipment took effect one year after enactment. The prohibition on contracting with entities that use it, and the loan and grant prohibition, took effect two years after enactment. Subsection (d) allowed the head of an executive agency to grant an entity a one-time waiver for up to two years after the effective dates, if the entity gave a compelling justification and submitted a full and complete laydown of covered equipment and services in its supply chain and a phase-out plan. The Director of National Intelligence could grant a waiver if it was in the national security interest. As enacted, the section ran from subsection (d) to subsection (f) with no subsection (e).
Subsection (f) defined covered telecommunications equipment or services in four parts: telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation or their subsidiaries or affiliates; for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure and other national security purposes, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company or Dahua Technology Company or their subsidiaries or affiliates; telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by such entities or using such equipment; and equipment or services from an entity that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the FBI Director, reasonably believes to be owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of a covered foreign country. The covered foreign country was the People’s Republic of China.
Section 889 is remembered as a ban on Chinese telecommunications equipment in the federal government. That description is accurate and leaves out the part that made it hard to comply with. The statute did not define a banned product by a list of part numbers. It defined covered equipment through several tests at once: who made it, what role it played in a system, and, for video surveillance, what it was used for. It then applied those tests to three groups, agencies buying, contractors using and recipients of federal loans and grants, on two different dates.
This article argues that section 889 turned a procurement ban into a question about each organization’s network architecture, because the tests could only be answered by knowing what equipment sat where and what it did. The analysis falls into four parts. The first is the maker test: which producers were named and how the list could grow. The second is the role test: what it meant for equipment to be a substantial or essential component or critical technology, and what the statute excluded. The third is the purpose test: the clause that made coverage of certain video and radio equipment depend on its use. The fourth is the reach: who the statute bound, from when, and with what escape routes. A final section takes the objections.
The parts do not overlap. The maker, role and purpose tests together decide whether a piece of equipment is covered. The reach decides whose covered equipment matters to whom and when. An organization can clear one test and fail another, and its compliance can fail on any of them.
The audience is broad. Federal agencies were the direct subjects of the statute. Contractors were reached through their contracts, and that group includes health systems, banks, payment processors, technology firms and others that sell services to the government. State and local agencies and other recipients of federal loans and grants were reached through subsection (b). Each should read what follows as an explanation of the statute’s design, and check with counsel how it and its implementing rules apply to their own contracts and awards.
The maker test: named producers and a list that could grow
The first test asked who produced the equipment or provided the service. It is the part of section 889 that drew public attention, and it is less simple than it looks.
Five named companies, in two groups
The statute named five companies but treated them in two groups. Telecommunications equipment from Huawei and ZTE was covered without qualification. Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment from Hytera, Hikvision and Dahua was covered only for listed purposes, which the third part of this article examines. A compliance team that treated all five names the same way would either over-remove equipment or miss the purpose question altogether.
Subsidiaries and affiliates
Each name came with its subsidiaries and affiliates. That phrase moves the maker test from a brand to a corporate family. Equipment sold under another brand, or produced by a company within one of the named groups, could be covered even if the label on the device did not show it. Identifying such equipment required knowing the ownership of manufacturers, which is information a network team does not keep and procurement teams may not either.
Services as well as equipment
The definition also covered telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by the named entities or using their equipment. That clause reached beyond hardware the organization owned. A carrier, a managed video service or a hosted communications provider whose own network used covered equipment could bring the organization within the definition through the services it bought. The maker test therefore extended into the supply chains of the organization’s service providers.
A list that could grow
The fourth category allowed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the FBI Director, to add equipment or services from entities reasonably believed to be owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of China. The list in the statute was therefore a starting point. An organization that built its controls around five names would need to update them whenever the list grew, and would need a way to learn that it had.
Resellers and other labels
Equipment does not always reach an organization under its maker’s name. Resellers, integrators and original equipment arrangements can put one company’s hardware inside another company’s product or under another brand. A security integrator that installs a camera system may supply devices whose producer the customer never sees. The maker test reaches the producer, so the organization needs the producer’s identity, not the seller’s. That information has to come from the supply chain, through purchase records, integrator documentation and, where those fall short, questions to the seller in writing.
Carriers and their networks
The services clause brought carriers into view. An organization buys voice, data and mobile service from carriers whose networks it does not see. If a carrier used covered equipment to provide the service, the service itself could fall within the definition, subject to the exclusion for connections to third-party facilities. Separating the service an organization buys from the third-party connections its traffic passes through is a question each carrier can answer better than the customer. A carrier contract that asked the question in writing, and required notice of change, gave the customer something to rely on.
Learning that the list changed
A list that can grow needs a way to watch it. The statute gave the designation power to the Secretary of Defense, and an organization’s compliance depended on learning of any designation promptly. That is a monitoring task: someone must be responsible for checking for changes, assessing whether newly covered producers appear in the inventory, and starting replacement where they do. An organization that treated the statutory list as fixed would discover a change only when a contracting officer or an auditor raised it.
What the maker test asked of an inventory
Answering the maker test requires an inventory that records the producer of each relevant device, the corporate family of that producer, and the providers of telecommunications and video services together with what they use. Network inventories are built for operations: model, location, firmware, support contract. They do not record corporate ownership of the producer. Closing that gap meant adding a data field that someone must research and maintain, and agreeing on who does it.
The role test: when equipment counted
The second test asked what part the equipment played. The prohibitions applied to equipment, systems or services that use covered equipment as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system. The statute also excluded two situations.
Substantial or essential
The statute did not define a substantial or essential component. The 2019 implementing rule, discussed in the hindsight section, later defined it as any component necessary for the proper function or performance of a piece of equipment, system or service. In August 2018 an organization had only the statutory words. The plain reading was broad: a component a system needs to work. A router at the edge of an office network, a camera in a monitored building, or a radio in a dispatch system would each be essential to the system it served.
Critical technology
The second phrase, critical technology, carried its own meaning. The same act’s foreign investment provisions defined critical technologies to include defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List and items on the Commerce Control List, and the 2019 implementing rule later defined it by reference to items such as those on the U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Control List. Equipment that served as critical technology in a system was covered even if it was not essential to the system’s function. For a commercial organization without controlled programs this phrase mattered less than the first, but contractors working on such programs had to consider it.
The two exclusions
Subsection (a)(2) excluded services that connect to the facilities of a third party, such as backhaul, roaming or interconnection arrangements. An organization did not have to ensure that every carrier its traffic passed through was free of covered equipment. It also excluded telecommunications equipment that cannot route or redirect user data traffic or permit visibility into user data or packets. Equipment that could not see or steer traffic was outside the prohibition.
Both exclusions turn on technical facts. Whether a service merely connects to a third party’s facilities, or whether a device can see or redirect traffic, depends on architecture and configuration. A device’s capability, not its brand, decides the second exclusion. An organization relying on either exclusion would need its network engineers to document why it applied, device by device or service by service.
Showing that a device cannot see traffic
The exclusion for equipment that cannot route or redirect user data or permit visibility into it is a technical claim, and technical claims need evidence. Some devices, such as simple passive components, plainly cannot see traffic. Others, such as managed switches, wireless access points and network cameras, run software that could, depending on configuration and firmware. An organization relying on the exclusion for a given device would want a written assessment of its capabilities, based on the manufacturer’s documentation and its own testing, and a review whenever firmware changes. Without that, the exclusion is an assumption.
Cloud and managed services
The role test applies to services as well as owned equipment. When an organization buys hosted communications, cloud services or managed network services, the provider’s equipment carries the organization’s traffic and data. If that equipment includes covered components in a role the statute reaches, the service may be covered. The organization cannot inspect a cloud provider’s data centers. It can ask the provider, in the contract, to represent that its services do not use covered equipment in the defined roles and to notify the organization if that changes. The third-party connection exclusion may apply to some of a provider’s arrangements and not to others, which is another question to put to the provider in writing.
Modules in building and medical systems
Communications modules sit inside equipment that does not look like network gear: building management controllers, badge readers, vending and kiosk systems, connected medical devices and vehicle telematics. Each may contain a cellular or wireless module made by a supplier other than the device’s brand. If a module came from a covered producer and was essential to the device’s function, the device could be within the role test. An inventory limited to switches, routers and cameras would miss these devices entirely. A health system with connected clinical equipment, or an agency with a fleet, had a wider search than its network team might expect.
Why the role test pointed to architecture
The role test made network design part of compliance. The same device could be covered in one place and excluded in another, depending on whether it handled user traffic and whether the system needed it. A compliance answer therefore required a view of where each device sat in the architecture, what traffic passed through it, and what depended on it. Procurement records alone could not answer that. The network diagram, kept current, became a compliance record.
Components inside other products
The role test also reached inside products. Equipment that uses covered equipment as a component was within the first prohibition. A device from an uncovered brand that contained a covered module, such as a communications chip, could itself be covered if the module was essential to its function. Finding such components requires information from manufacturers about what is inside their products. That information may not be published, and obtaining it is a contract question as much as a technical one.
The purpose test: when use decided coverage
The third test applied to the second group of named companies. Their video surveillance and telecommunications equipment was covered for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.
A clause that turned on use
The purpose clause meant that a camera or radio from Hikvision, Dahua or Hytera was not covered by its maker alone. Coverage followed when it was used for one of the listed purposes. The same camera could be covered at a power substation and arguably not covered in a setting that served none of those purposes. A ban that attaches to the product alone is simpler to apply. This one attached, for these makers, to the product in a role.
Undefined terms
The statute did not define public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure or other national security purposes. Critical infrastructure in particular can be defined in more than one way; the same act’s foreign investment provisions, for example, carry their own definition. An organization trying to decide whether its cameras served one of these purposes in August 2018 had to choose an interpretation and document why. The hindsight section shows the FCC still revising its definition of critical infrastructure for its own use of this clause in 2026.
What the purpose test asked of an inventory
To apply the purpose test, an inventory needs a field the other tests do not: what each device is used for. A camera’s purpose is not recorded in a network management system. Facilities, security or operations staff know it, and it can change when a camera is moved or repurposed. An organization that wanted to rely on the purpose clause to keep equipment in service would need that field filled in, reviewed and kept current, with the reasoning written down.
Purpose can change
A purpose determination is not permanent. A camera installed to watch a loading dock for inventory reasons may later be used for building security. A radio system used for maintenance crews may be pressed into emergency response. Each change of use can change coverage under the purpose clause. An organization relying on the clause needs a process that catches changes of use, such as a review when devices are moved, when security plans change, or when a building’s function changes. The inventory field for purpose is only as good as the process that keeps it current.
Records that support a purpose judgment
An organization that keeps equipment in service on the strength of the purpose clause should be able to show its reasoning. That record would describe the device, its location, what it monitors or carries, why that use falls outside the listed purposes under the organization’s reading of the terms, who made the judgment and when, and when it will be reviewed. Counsel should review the reading of the undefined terms. The record turns a judgment into evidence that can be examined, and it shows good faith if the judgment is later questioned.
The cautious reading
An organization could reasonably decide not to rely on the purpose clause at all, and to treat all equipment from the named video and radio makers as covered. That choice costs more in replacement and less in analysis and risk. It also avoids having to defend a judgment about purpose that a contracting officer, an auditor or an inspector general might read differently. The choice is a risk decision for each organization, and the statute permitted either approach.
Radios in public safety
The purpose clause named public safety first, and it named a radio maker among the three companies it covered. For state and local agencies, that combination was direct. A police, fire or emergency medical radio system bought with federal grant money, or used by a contractor serving a federal agency, was squarely within the listed purposes. There was no argument about purpose to be had. The questions were which radios came from the named producer or its affiliates, which grant awards were involved, and how the agency would fund replacement in a system that responders rely on every day.
Physical security as a technology question
The purpose test brought physical security systems into a discussion otherwise held about networks. Cameras, access control systems and radios can be managed by facilities or security teams, bought under separate budgets and connected to the network with less oversight than other devices. Section 889 put those systems in front of the chief information officer and the chief information security officer, and asked for the camera estate to be known by maker.
The reach: who was bound, when, and how to get time
The fourth part concerns scope. The three tests decided what was covered. The reach decided whose covered equipment mattered, from what date, and what relief was available.
Agencies buying: the first prohibition
The first prohibition, effective one year after enactment, barred agencies from procuring or obtaining equipment, systems or services that use covered equipment in the defined roles. It acted on what the agency bought. Its compliance burden fell on the agency’s acquisition process and on vendors offering products, who would be asked whether their offerings contained covered equipment.
What the first prohibition did not do
The first prohibition restricted what agencies could procure, obtain, extend or renew. On its face it did not require agencies to remove covered equipment they already had. An agency with installed covered equipment was barred from buying more and from renewing contracts for it, which would push replacement over time, but the statute set no removal date for installed equipment. That gap matters for planning. An agency that wanted to remove covered equipment faster than renewals would force had to decide to do so and fund it. An agency that waited would carry the equipment until each contract came up.
Contractors using: the second prohibition
The second prohibition, effective two years after enactment, barred agencies from contracting with an entity that uses covered equipment in the defined roles. It acted on the contractor’s own operations. The statute did not limit it to equipment used on federal work. Read plainly, a contractor’s use anywhere in its systems could matter. That was the provision that turned section 889 into an architecture question for every company with a federal contract.
For a health system with federal contracts, or a bank or payment firm providing services to agencies, the second prohibition meant reviewing its own networks, buildings and service providers against the three tests. The scope of that review depended on how the implementing rules would read “uses,” which in August 2018 was not yet known. A prudent contractor began the inventory before the rules arrived, because the inventory would be needed under any plausible reading.
Loan and grant recipients
Subsection (b) applied the prohibitions to loan and grant funds, effective two years after enactment. Agencies could not spend loan or grant money to procure the covered equipment or services or to contract for them. That reached state and local governments, hospitals, universities, utilities and others that buy equipment with federal grants. It also directed agencies with loan, grant or subsidy programs to prioritize support for those who had to transition away from covered equipment, an acknowledgment that replacement would cost money.
Grant money that passes through
Federal grant funds do not always go directly from an agency to the organization that spends them. States and other recipients can pass funds on to local governments, hospitals or nonprofits. Subsection (b) was written as a limit on the agency’s obligation or expenditure of loan or grant funds, and how it reaches each later recipient depends on the terms of each award and the rules each agency adopts. A county or a hospital receiving pass-through funds needed to read its award terms and ask its funding agency how the restriction applied. Organizations should confirm the position with counsel and the awarding agency before buying equipment with grant money.
Representations as statements of fact
Contractors would be asked to represent to the government whether they use or offer covered equipment. A representation to the government is a statement of fact with legal consequences if it is wrong. That raises the stakes of the inventory. A representation built on an incomplete inventory is a risk in itself. The safer course is to make representations only from a documented inquiry, to record what the inquiry covered and what it did not, and to update the representation when new information appears. Counsel should review the process behind any representation.
The staggered dates
The one-year and two-year dates gave different groups different time. Agencies had a year before their own purchases were restricted. Contractors and grant recipients had two years before their use and their grant-funded purchases mattered. In August 2018 those periods looked generous. For an organization that had never inventoried its equipment by maker, role and purpose, they were short.
Waivers as a planning tool
The waiver provision offered time, not exemption. An agency head could grant an entity a one-time waiver for up to two years after the effective dates. The entity had to provide a compelling justification and submit a full and complete laydown of covered equipment and services in its supply chain and a phase-out plan, which the agency would send to congressional committees within 30 days. The laydown requirement meant that seeking a waiver required the same inventory as compliance. An entity could not use a waiver to avoid finding out what it had.
The Director of National Intelligence could grant a waiver later than the effective dates if it was in the national security interest. That waiver turned on the government’s judgment rather than the entity’s request. An organization could not plan on it.
Renewals and extensions
The prohibitions applied to extending or renewing contracts as well as entering new ones. A contract signed before the effective dates was not immune. When it came up for extension, option exercise or renewal, the prohibition applied. For agencies, that meant contracts already in place would meet the statute at their next renewal. For contractors, it meant that a long-running contract could be put at risk by covered equipment found in their operations before the renewal date. Contract calendars, already tracked for business reasons, became compliance calendars as well.
Acquisitions bring equipment with them
When a contractor acquires a company, it acquires that company’s networks, buildings and service contracts. Covered equipment in the acquired business could become equipment the contractor uses. Due diligence for a contractor with federal business therefore needed a section 889 review of the target: its equipment by maker, role and purpose, and its service providers. Integration plans needed a date by which any covered equipment would be removed or the acquired business separated. Counsel should advise on how the implementing rules treat affiliates and acquired entities in each case.
Paying for replacement
Replacing covered equipment costs money, and the statute recognized as much in directing loan, grant and subsidy programs to prioritize transition support. For an organization, replacement competes with other capital needs. Equipment that is still working and under support has no operational reason to be replaced. A budget that funds replacement only at end of life will not meet a date set by statute. The decision belongs with the executive who owns the compliance risk, with finance, and it should be made with the inventory in hand so that the cost is known rather than guessed.
Who in the organization owned it
Section 889 did not fit one department. Procurement owned representations to the government. The network team knew the equipment. Facilities and security knew the cameras and radios and what they were used for. Vendor management knew the service providers. Legal had to read the undefined terms. Finance had to fund replacement. An organization that assigned the statute to one of these teams alone would find the others holding the facts it needed. A named executive owner, with a cross-functional team and a single inventory, was the structure the statute’s tests implied.
Objections, and where the argument is weakest
The argument here is that section 889 made compliance a matter of network architecture, because its tests could be answered only from an inventory of what equipment sat where and what it did. There are fair objections.
The objection that this was a simple ban
One could say the statute was simple: stop buying from five companies. For agencies’ own purchases of finished products, it was close to that. For the use prohibition, the component reach and the purpose clause, it was not. The difficulty lay in equipment already installed, in components inside other products, and in services bought from providers whose own networks were invisible to the customer.
The objection that the rules would settle the details
In August 2018 an organization could wait for implementing rules before acting. The rules did arrive, as the hindsight section shows, and they did settle some terms. Waiting had a cost. The rules arrived close to the effective dates, and the inventory they required took time to build. An organization that started in 2018 with the statutory tests had the core of what the rules would ask for.
The objection that the purpose clause was a loophole
The purpose clause could be read as an opening to keep equipment from the named video makers in service by arguing it served no listed purpose. That reading is possible, and the clause did narrow coverage. Relying on it required documented judgments about undefined terms. The cautious reading discussed above avoided that risk at a cost. The clause was less a loophole than a choice between paying for analysis and paying for replacement.
The objection that contractors could not be expected to know
Contractors could argue that they cannot see inside every product or every provider’s network. That is a fair concern about the limits of knowledge. The statute did not ask for omniscience, and later rules described what inquiry was expected. The concern argues for clear contract terms with suppliers and providers, not for ignoring the question.
The objection that security matters more than sourcing
One could argue that a device’s security depends on its configuration, patching and isolation, not on who made it, and that a sourcing ban is a blunt tool. That is a serious technical argument. Section 889 rests on a different judgment: that some producers present a risk which configuration cannot fully address, because of their relationship with a foreign government. The argument here does not depend on which judgment is right. Whatever one thinks of the policy, the statute made sourcing the test, and compliance required knowing the sourcing. Good configuration remains necessary for every device, covered or not.
The objection that the burden fell on those least able to bear it
Small contractors, rural carriers and local governments may have the least capacity to inventory their equipment and the least money to replace it. That concern is real, and the statute itself acknowledged it by directing agencies with loan, grant and subsidy programs to prioritize support for affected organizations. The concern argues for funding and phased replacement. It does not change the design analyzed here. The tests apply to a small organization in the same way as a large one, and a small organization needs the same inventory, scaled to its size.
What we would tell a chief information officer today
Keep one inventory that records, for each relevant device and service, its producer and corporate family, its role in the system, and, for video and radio equipment, its purpose. Bring facilities and physical security systems into that inventory. Require suppliers and service providers to disclose covered components and covered equipment in their own networks, and to notify you of changes. Name one executive owner. And when a covered device is found, decide quickly whether to replace it, document why if you keep it, and record the decision where an auditor can see it.
With hindsight
The implementing rules came as a series of interim rules. On August 13, 2019, the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration and NASA published an interim rule amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation to implement section 889(a)(1)(A), effective that day. The FAR Council determined that it was in the government’s interest to apply the rule to purchases at or below the simplified acquisition threshold and to commercial items. The rule defined a substantial or essential component as any component necessary for the proper function or performance of a piece of equipment, system or service, and defined critical technology by reference to items such as those on the U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Control List.
A further interim rule followed on December 13, 2019, according to the next rule. On July 14, 2020, the same agencies published an interim rule implementing section 889(a)(1)(B), effective August 13, 2020. It said the prohibition applies to the use of covered telecommunications equipment or services regardless of whether that use is in performance of work under a federal contract, and that it applies at the prime contract level and does not flow down to subcontractors because the agency contracts only with the prime. It defined reasonable inquiry as an inquiry designed to uncover any information in the entity’s possession about the identity of the producer or provider of covered equipment or services used by the entity, excluding the need for an internal or third-party audit. It described the contract clause’s requirement to report covered equipment or services discovered during contract performance within one business day. It said the System for Award Management was being updated to allow an annual representation after a reasonable inquiry, through a later rulemaking. The FAR Council said it was considering extending the prohibition and representation to an offeror’s domestic affiliates, parents and subsidiaries. As checked on November 15, 2026, a Federal Register search for FAR Case 2019-009 returned the 2020 interim rules, related notices, regulatory agenda entries and a June 2026 proposed rule, and no final rule. That proposed rule, part of the FAR Council’s overhaul of the regulation, lists four section 889 interim rules from 2019 and 2020, including a second one for this case on August 27, 2020. It proposes to consolidate them and update their definitions, including one that would define critical technology as a technology in whose absence a system cannot adequately operate or function.
The purpose clause proved durable as a source of argument. On September 11, 2026, the Federal Communications Commission published a rule on its equipment authorization program, effective October 13, 2026. Responding to a partial remand from the D.C. Circuit, the Commission adopted a revised definition of critical infrastructure for purposes of implementing section 889(f)(3), as incorporated into its Covered List, defining it by reference to 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) and to systems and assets in the 16 critical infrastructure sectors that provide any of the 55 National Critical Functions. The same rule prohibited authorization of devices incorporating logic-bearing hardware components produced by Covered List entities where the device would itself be barred had the entity produced the whole device.
What held up was the structure. The maker, role and purpose tests are still the ones the FAR rules and the 2026 FCC rule work from, and the 2020 rule confirmed that the use prohibition reaches a contractor’s operations beyond its federal work. What changed was precision. The rules supplied definitions the statute lacked, and in 2026 the FCC was still refining what critical infrastructure means for its own use of the purpose clause. The FAR Council proposed that year to revise the FAR definitions again. In our reading, organizations that built a single inventory by maker, role and purpose in 2018 were better placed for each of these later steps.
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