Stage 3 counted on patients’ apps reaching EHR APIs that ONC certified without naming a standard
Rules filed October 6, 2015 required providers to offer record access through apps configured to each certified product’s interface, naming no standard. A standard came by rule in 2020; in October 2026 the last two 2015 API criteria were scheduled for removal.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
Rules filed October 6, 2015 required providers to offer record access through apps configured to each certified product’s interface, naming no standard. A standard came by rule in 2020; in October 2026 the last two 2015 API criteria were scheduled for removal.
- The week On October 6, 2015, two final rules from the Department of Health and Human Services were filed for public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register.
- The promise: access through any app configured to the API The Stage 3 patient electronic access measure had two halves joined by “and”.
- The interface: three functional criteria and a documentation duty ONC split the API into three certification criteria.
- The trust model: a security floor and no app vetting ONC gave its reason directly.
- The clock: optional in 2017, required in 2018 Stage 3 was optional in 2017 and required for all participants from 2018. [1] Certified technology for 2018 and later meant the 2015 Edition. [1] ONC’s 2015 Edition rule took effect on January 14, 2016. [2] Between those dates, developers had to build, test and certify the API criteria, and providers had to deploy what was certified.
- How the rules reached different providers and developers A large health system ran its EHR alongside other clinical systems.
- Objections, in order This is ONC’s own reasoning, and it has force.
- Checks a CIO or CISO could run These checks are our suggestions for any organization that exposes patient data through an API to apps patients choose.
- With hindsight The standard ONC deferred in 2015 came with its rule implementing the 21st Century Cures Act.
The week
On October 6, 2015, two final rules from the Department of Health and Human Services were filed for public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register. Each rule’s Federal Register printing records the filing as October 6, 2015, at 4:15 pm. [1] [2] Both were published on October 16, 2015. [1] [2]
The first came from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Its title was Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017. It was a final rule with comment period, published at 80 FR 62762 and signed on September 23 and September 25, 2015. [1] It set out what eligible professionals, eligible hospitals and critical access hospitals had to meet to qualify for Medicare and Medicaid incentive payments and to avoid downward Medicare payment adjustments. [1]
Its summary named, among other changes, four that matter here. It changed the 2015 reporting period to a 90-day period aligned with the calendar year. [1] It removed measures that had become redundant, duplicative or topped out. [1] It made Stage 3 optional in 2017 and required for all participants from 2018. [1] It said it established requirements to move the program to a single stage. [1] The rule was effective December 15, 2015, and comments on specified sections were due by 5 p.m. on the same date. [1]
The second rule came from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, which runs the certification program. It adopted the 2015 Edition health IT certification criteria, a 2015 Edition Base EHR definition and changes to the ONC Health IT Certification Program. [2] It was published at 80 FR 62602, dated September 25, 2015, and took effect on January 14, 2016, with two provisions effective April 1, 2016. [2] Its summary said the 2015 Edition set the capabilities that certified technology would need to support meaningful use when that edition became required. [2]
The two rules connected through one definition. CMS defined certified EHR technology for 2018 and later years as technology meeting the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition and certified to the 2015 Edition criteria needed to be a meaningful EHR user. [1] The capabilities a hospital had to use for Stage 3 were the capabilities ONC certified.
Stage 3 had eight objectives. They were protecting patient health information, electronic prescribing, clinical decision support, computerized provider order entry, patient electronic access, coordination of care through patient engagement, health information exchange, and public health and clinical data registry reporting. [1]
The electronic access objective carried the change that matters here. Its first measure required that more than 80 percent of unique individuals seen or discharged be given timely access to view online, download and transmit their health information. [1] The provider also had to ensure the information was available through any application of the individual’s choice. The application had to be configured to meet the technical specifications of the interface in the provider’s certified technology. [1] The rule said information had to be available within 48 hours of its availability to the provider for an eligible professional and 36 hours for a hospital. [1]
A second objective counted people who actually used that access. For coordination of care through patient engagement, its first measure counted people who viewed, downloaded or transmitted their information, or reached it through an interface used by applications they chose. [1] The threshold was more than 5 percent for 2017 and more than 10 percent for 2018 and later. [1]
The modifications for the earlier years went the other way. For 2015 and 2016, the rule required that at least 1 person seen or discharged during the reporting period view, download or transmit health information to a third party. [1]
The coordinator’s rule supplied the technical side. It adopted three certification criteria, at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7), (g)(8) and (g)(9), covering selection of the individual, data category requests and all-data requests. [2] It removed the interface function it had proposed to embed in the view, download and transmit criterion. [2] Each of the three carried documentation and terms-of-use requirements. [2] None named a technical standard for the interface itself. [2]
The October 2015 rules are remembered as the last stage of meaningful use. Read together, they did something more specific. CMS required hospitals and clinicians to make each patient’s record available to apps the patient chose. [1] ONC certified the APIs those apps would use without naming a standard. [2]
Our argument is that the 2015 pair counted on patients’ apps reaching certified EHR APIs while leaving the interface itself to each EHR developer’s published documentation. The CMS measure was written against the API in the provider’s certified technology, whatever that API was. [1] ONC’s criteria defined what the API had to do and what its documentation had to say, not what it had to look like. [2] In our reading, the result was a requirement for openness implemented as separate interfaces, one per certified product.
That matters to health system technology leaders because the architecture they bought in 2016 and 2017 was shaped by it. The API in a hospital’s EHR was the vendor’s, documented on the vendor’s terms. [2] The app on the patient’s phone had to adapt to it. [1] Whether one app build could reach hospitals on different EHRs depended on whether vendors converged, which the rules encouraged and did not require. [2]
We take the arrangement in four parts:
- The promise: what CMS required providers to offer patients.
- The interface: what ONC certified, and what it left open.
- The trust model: how the rules handled the security of app connections.
- The clock: when each requirement bit, and how the dates interacted.
The parts do not overlap. The first is the obligation, the second the technology, the third the security design and the fourth the timing. After them we look at how the rules reached different kinds of provider and developer, take the objections in order and end with checks a CIO or CISO could run.
The promise: access through any app configured to the API
The wording of the measure
The Stage 3 patient electronic access measure had two halves joined by “and”. The patient had to have timely access to view online, download and transmit. [1] The provider also had to ensure the information was available for access using any application of the patient’s choice configured to the technical specifications of the API in the provider’s certified technology. [1]
The second half was a new kind of obligation. It did not ask the provider to build an app or to vet one. It asked the provider to make data available through an interface, and it measured success by the share of patients for whom that was true. [1] The threshold was more than 80 percent of unique patients. [1]
The patient’s right behind the measure
CMS tied the API to an existing legal right. In its proposal, it sought comment on what requirements might be needed so the API would support a specific patient right. That was the right to have protected health information sent directly to a third party the patient designated, consistent with 45 CFR 164.524(c) of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. [1] It also asked how to ensure patients would have at least the same access through the API as through view, download and transmit. [1]
That framing matters for how a health system reads the obligation. The API was presented as a channel for a right patients already had, not as a new privilege a provider could grant or withhold. In our reading, it placed the API closer to records access than to an optional digital service. A hospital’s privacy office, which handles access requests, had a stake in it alongside the IT department.
The alternative CMS did not adopt
The proposal had offered another path. Under it, a provider would show that at least one application using the API was available, preferably at no cost to the patient. It would also show that more than 80 percent of unique patients had been given instructions on access. Such a provider would not need to create, purchase or implement redundant view, download and transmit software. [1]
CMS chose instead to require all four functions. [1] The rejected path would have let an API, plus at least one app, stand in for the portal. The adopted path kept both. In our reading, CMS was unwilling to let access depend on the existence of apps it did not control, which is consistent with the uncertainty about app ecosystems discussed below.
All four functions, not a choice among them
CMS had considered alternatives. The rule said it was finalizing the alternative that required providers to offer all four functions: view, download, transmit and access through an API. [1] It explained that it saw patient portals and APIs as compatible and complementary and did not want providers who had invested in portals to abandon them. [1]
In architecture terms, that meant two channels to the same data. The portal served patients who used the provider’s interface. The API served patients who used someone else’s. Each had its own authentication, logging and failure modes. A hospital could not satisfy the measure by retiring one in favor of the other.
Timeliness as a technical requirement
The rule required information to be available within 48 hours of its availability to an eligible professional, and 36 hours for a hospital. [1] A deadline measured in hours is an integration requirement. Lab results, discharge summaries and medication lists had to reach the store behind the API on that schedule.
For a health system, the work was less in the API than behind it. Data that arrived in an interface engine, sat in a departmental system or waited for manual reconciliation would miss the window. In our reading, the timeliness clause turned the API measure into a test of internal data flow as much as of external access.
Counting use as well as availability
The patient engagement objective added a second kind of count. It measured the share of patients who actively engaged, either through view, download and transmit, or through an API used by applications they chose. [1] The threshold was more than 5 percent for 2017 and more than 10 percent from 2018. [1] Providers had to attest to all three measures in that objective and meet the thresholds for at least two. [1]
A use-based measure put part of the outcome outside the provider’s control. A hospital could make the API available to every patient and still miss a use threshold if patients did not adopt apps. The rule accepted that tension. In our reading, it also gave providers a reason to care which apps existed for their vendor’s API, because apps were how patients would register as engaged.
Relief for the earlier years
The same rule eased patient-action measures for 2015 and 2016. It required that at least 1 patient view, download or transmit information to a third party during the reporting period. [1] It also aligned the 2015 reporting period to a 90-day period within the calendar year. [1]
The contrast is the design. The near years were relaxed while the requirements for 2018 were raised and tied to a new edition of certified technology. [1] Providers got room in the short term and a harder target later, with the interface for that target still to be built.
The interface: three functional criteria and a documentation duty
What the criteria required the API to do
ONC split the API into three certification criteria. The patient selection criterion required technology to receive a request with enough information to identify a patient uniquely and return an ID or token an application could use for later requests. [2] The data category criterion covered requests for specific categories of data. [2] The all-data criterion covered a request for all the data at once. [2]
Splitting the API this way, ONC said, gave developers flexibility to change and recertify one function without the others. [2] It also meant three separate certifications for what an app developer would experience as one interface. For testing, the rule said a developer would demonstrate the output for each data category request and for the all request, with the output according to the C-CDA in the CCD document template. [2]
What the documentation had to say
Each criterion required accompanying documentation. At a minimum it had to include the API syntax, function names, required and optional parameters and their data types, return variables and their types or structures, and exceptions and exception handling methods. [2] It also had to include the software components and configurations an application would need to interact with the API and process its responses, and terms of use. [2]
The proposed rule had described terms of use as including the API’s developer policies and required developer agreements, so app developers could assess them before building. [2] ONC also proposed that developers submit a hyperlink to their documentation and terms of use for listing on the Certified Health IT Product List, so any interested party could view them. [2]
Documentation was the mechanism of openness. An app developer did not need a vendor’s permission to read the specification. In our reading, the documentation duty made each vendor’s API public without making any two of them the same.
A public listing as the registry
The hyperlink to API documentation was to appear on the Certified Health IT Product List. [2] That made the federal product list the place an app developer could find, for any certified product, where its API was described. The list already recorded what each product was certified to do. With the API link, it also pointed to how to connect.
For a hospital, the listing was a procurement tool as much as a developer resource. Before choosing or renewing an EHR, a buyer could read the documentation its patients’ app developers would rely on. A thin or vague specification on the listing was an early sign of friction to come.
The standard ONC did not name
Commenters split on standards. The rule recorded that some asked ONC to name FHIR, others said FHIR was not mature enough for regulation, and several supported encouraging APIs without locking in a standard. [2] ONC kept its functional approach. [2]
It explained the choice in two parts. It believed the criteria were at an appropriate level of specificity given ongoing development of API standards in health care. [2] And it said it intended to adopt a standards-based approach in the next appropriate rulemaking, noting promising work such as Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources. [2] It added that many health IT modules already had APIs and that flexibility would let them certify those APIs. [2]
That last point explains the outcome. A functional criterion lets existing interfaces pass. It does not make them converge. An app that wanted to work across hospitals running different EHRs would, under the 2015 criteria, read a different specification for each.
A contrast in what an app developer faced
Consider, as an illustration, an app developer serving patients of three hospitals on three different certified EHRs in 2018. Under the 2015 criteria, each EHR’s API had to identify a patient and return a token, answer data category requests and answer an all-data request. [2] Each had documentation describing its syntax, parameters, return structures and exception handling. [2]
The developer would read three specifications, accept three sets of terms of use and write three integrations. The functions were the same. The interfaces need not have been. Had a single standard been named, the same developer could, in principle, write one integration and configure it three times. That difference is the cost the functional approach placed on the app side, and it scaled with the number of distinct certified products in use.
The terms of use added a second layer. The proposal described them as including developer policies and required developer agreements. [2] Different terms across vendors meant different legal reviews for the app developer, separate from the technical work.
How CMS described the opportunity
CMS’s response to comments framed APIs as an opportunity. It noted a commenter’s reference to the JASON report and the Argonaut Project and described APIs as supporting the free flow of information in a dynamic and secure manner. [1] It also recorded commenters’ skepticism about the maturity and security of API technology and their note that ONC’s API certification process was not yet fully functional. [1]
The two agencies were aligned on direction and candid about readiness. CMS set the measure. ONC set the floor for the technology. Neither required the convergence that a patient’s app would need to reach every hospital the patient used.
The trust model: a security floor and no app vetting
What ONC dropped from its proposal
ONC had proposed that the API include a means for establishing a trusted connection with the requesting application. [2] That would have included a way for the application to register with the data source, be authorized to request data and have its interactions logged. [2] The final criteria dropped the proposed requirement for registration of third-party applications. [2]
ONC gave its reason directly. It said it intended to encourage dynamic registration and believed registration should not be used to block information sharing through APIs. [2] It said applications should not be required to pre-register, or be approved in advance, with the provider or its developer before being allowed to access the API. [2]
The floor that remained
Security moved to the 2015 Edition privacy and security certification framework. For the API criteria, a certified module had to be capable of ensuring four things. Valid user credentials had to be presented, and the provider had to be able to authorize the user to view the patient’s data. The application had to connect through a trusted connection, and access had to be audited. [2] ONC clarified that a trusted connection meant the link was encrypted and integrity protected under its existing standards. [2]
ONC called these controls a floor, not a ceiling. [2] It encouraged organizations to follow security best practices such as penetration testing, encryption, audits and monitoring, following their security risk assessment, without adversely affecting patients’ access. [2] It said it expected developers to document how to deploy their APIs securely. [2]
Apps outside the perimeter
The rule was explicit about where certification stopped. It said regulation of third-party applications was outside the scope of certification unless they sought certification as health IT modules. [2] It said consumer apps may fall under the authority of the Federal Trade Commission. Apps offered on behalf of a HIPAA covered entity or business associate would be governed by the HIPAA rules as applicable. [2]
That division put the provider in a narrow position. The provider controlled the API and its authentication. It could not, under ONC’s stated policy, use advance approval of apps to limit access. [2] It did not control what the patient’s chosen app did with data once received. In our reading, the 2015 design made the API boundary the place where a health system’s security responsibility for patient-directed access ended.
What dynamic registration asks of a security team
ONC’s preference for dynamic registration, and its statement that apps should not have to be approved in advance, changed the security team’s tools. [2] A conventional enterprise integration starts with an agreement and a known counterparty. A patient-directed app connection starts with a patient’s authorization and an app the hospital may never have seen.
That shifts the controls from the front of the connection to its middle and end. The hospital cannot screen the app, under ONC’s stated policy. It can authenticate the patient, authorize the scope of access, encrypt the connection and log what happens. [2] Monitoring becomes the main tool: unusual volumes, unusual hours, a cluster of patients authorizing the same new app in a short span. The 2015 criteria required the capability to audit and left the rest to the organization. [2]
The design is coherent from a patient-rights perspective. It prevents a provider from using security review as a reason to refuse an app. It also leaves the security team responsible for detecting misuse it was not allowed to prevent at the door. In our reading, the 2015 rules settled that trade-off in favor of access and left the detective controls to each organization’s risk analysis.
How CMS handled security in Stage 3
CMS kept security as the first Stage 3 objective. The measure required providers to conduct or review a security risk analysis under 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1), including the security of data created or maintained by certified technology. Providers also had to implement updates as necessary and correct identified deficiencies. [1] The rule repeated that the analysis for this measure applied only to data created or maintained by certified technology. [1]
CMS also declined to make the measure a HIPAA compliance tool. It said meaningful use was not the appropriate regulatory tool to ensure compliance with the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. [1] When commenters asked about identity proofing, authentication, authorization and encryption, CMS referred them to the HHS Office for Civil Rights. [1] The API was new attack surface, and the incentive program’s security measure covered it only as data in certified technology.
The clock: optional in 2017, required in 2018
Dates that depended on each other
Stage 3 was optional in 2017 and required for all participants from 2018. [1] Certified technology for 2018 and later meant the 2015 Edition. [1] ONC’s 2015 Edition rule took effect on January 14, 2016. [2] Between those dates, developers had to build, test and certify the API criteria, and providers had to deploy what was certified.
CMS spelled out a consequence for early adopters. Providers choosing to attest to Stage 3 in 2017 would need technology certified to the three API criteria, because the 2014 Edition offered no API criteria. [1] An early mover depended on its vendor’s certification timetable.
Comments on a final rule
The CMS rule was a final rule with comment period, and it invited comment on named sections through December 15, 2015. [1] That form signaled that parts of the program were still open. For a technology leader planning a multi-year roadmap, it meant building to rules that could still be adjusted.
Certification before deployment
The sequence ran in one direction. A developer had to build to the criteria, have the product certified and release it. A hospital then had to schedule the upgrade, test it and switch on the API. Only then could patients connect apps and the measure begin to count. [1] [2]
Each step took time the rules did not allocate. A hospital whose vendor certified late had less time to deploy. One that deployed late had less time to see patients adopt apps before the use thresholds applied. In our reading, the 2018 date compressed the last steps of that chain for organizations at the end of a vendor’s release schedule.
A single stage as the end state
The rule said it established requirements to transition the program to a single stage. [1] Earlier stages had let providers move through progressively demanding sets of objectives. A single stage meant every participant would eventually meet the same objectives, including the API measure.
For planning, a single stage removed one variable. A health system no longer had to track which stage each affiliated hospital or clinician group was in. It added another: every part of the organization, however small or newly acquired, would have to meet the same API requirement on the same certified technology. Acquisitions of practices on other EHRs became API questions as well as integration questions.
What the clock meant for architecture
Hospitals planning for 2018 had to decide in 2016 and 2017 how far to rely on their vendor’s API and how far to build around it. The rules made the vendor’s certified API the interface CMS would count. [1] [2] In our reading, they gave hospitals little reason to build a separate API layer of their own, because only the certified API satisfied the measure.
That concentrated the interface in the EHR vendor’s product. It also concentrated the risk. A defect, outage or change in the vendor’s API reached every hospital using it, on the vendor’s schedule.
How the rules reached different providers and developers
Large health systems
A large health system ran its EHR alongside other clinical systems. The Stage 3 timeliness clause required data from those systems to reach the store behind the API within the stated hours. [1] For such a system, the integration work behind the API was likely the larger task.
Large systems also had the staff to read vendor API documentation and decide how to expose it. They could test apps patients brought, publish instructions and watch logs. ONC’s audit requirement gave them the raw material. [2] Using it well was their choice.
Small practices and eligible professionals
An eligible professional in a small practice relied almost entirely on the vendor. The practice was unlikely to have engineers to evaluate an API. The measure’s 80 percent threshold applied to it as it did to a hospital. [1] Its realistic role was to confirm that its product was certified to the API criteria and that the API was switched on.
The use-based threshold was harder for a small practice. It had no control over whether apps existed for its vendor’s API. If the vendor’s API had a small app ecosystem, its patients had little to engage with. In our reading, the absence of a standard fell hardest on providers whose vendors had small market shares.
Critical access hospitals
Critical access hospitals were held to the same objectives as other eligible hospitals. [1] They faced the 36-hour timeliness window and the API measure with fewer resources. Their dependence on a single vendor’s certified product was, if anything, greater than a large system’s.
EHR developers
Developers carried the certification. They had to implement the three API criteria, document them to the required level, publish terms of use and meet the privacy and security framework. [2] They also chose the underlying technology. ONC’s rule observed that developers could certify existing APIs. [2]
A developer that chose an emerging standard bet on convergence. One that certified a proprietary interface met the criteria at lower immediate cost. The rule left the choice to the market. As the hindsight section shows, ONC later said many developers implemented the API criterion using the standard it eventually named. [3]
Health systems that build their own patient apps
Some health systems publish their own patient-facing apps. Under the 2015 design, those apps sat on the same side of the boundary as any other only if they used the certified API the measure counted. [1] A system that built its app on private back-end connections, outside the certified API, would have a working app that the API measure did not see.
The point is practical as well as regulatory. A health system’s own app is one its patients may try early, and its support desk hears about failures from it. If that app runs on a private path, the certified API gets little real traffic, and its defects surface only when an outside developer reports them. Routing the system’s own app through the certified API makes the hospital its own first tester.
The rules gave such systems a reason to route their own apps through the certified API. Doing so tested the API with real traffic, exposed gaps in documentation and data latency, and made the system’s own app one of the apps of patients’ choice. In our reading, that is a design choice the rules rewarded without requiring.
App developers
App developers were outside both rules’ direct reach. [2] They gained public documentation and a measure that gave providers a reason to want apps. They faced as many interfaces as there were certified products. The economics of building one app for several hospitals depended on how far vendors converged.
Objections, in order
“Naming a standard in 2015 would have frozen an immature one”
This is ONC’s own reasoning, and it has force. The rule recorded commenters’ concern that FHIR was not mature enough for regulation. [2] A standard named too early can lock in a version that the field outgrows.
The argument here does not depend on ONC being wrong to wait. It is that waiting had a cost, and the cost fell on interoperability across vendors during the years Stage 3 counted API access. The 2020 rule, which named the standard, said many developers had already used it. [3] That suggests, in our reading, that convergence was happening in the market, and that the rules counted access before they required it.
“Documentation made the APIs open enough”
Public documentation did remove a barrier. Any developer could read what each API did. [2] Openness in that sense is not the same as interchangeability. An app built against one documented API does not work against another without new code. The patient’s right to choose an app was real. The app’s reach was limited by the number of interfaces it supported.
“Security was handled elsewhere”
Both rules pointed elsewhere for parts of security: CMS to the HIPAA rules and the Office for Civil Rights, ONC to the FTC and HIPAA for apps. [1] [2] That allocation is defensible as law. For a health system, it meant the API’s security floor was set by certification, the app’s security by whoever regulated the app, and the gap between them by the hospital’s own risk analysis. [1] [2]
“Hospitals cannot answer for their vendors’ choices”
The measure attached to providers, and the API was the vendor’s. [1] [2] A hospital could fairly say it did not choose its vendor’s interface design. The objection is accurate about control and misses where accountability lands. The attestation was the provider’s. [1] A hospital that selected or renewed an EHR after October 2015 was, in effect, selecting the API its patients’ apps would have to use.
That turns procurement into architecture. Questions about API documentation quality, terms of use and change notice belonged in vendor selection and renewal. The rules did not say so. In our reading, they made it so by measuring providers on an interface their vendors defined.
“The use thresholds were modest”
More than 5 percent and more than 10 percent are low thresholds. [1] They were still thresholds providers could miss for reasons outside their control. In our reading, their modesty reflected the agencies’ awareness that the app market for each vendor’s API was uncertain.
Checks a CIO or CISO could run
These checks are our suggestions for any organization that exposes patient data through an API to apps patients choose. They are not requirements of the 2015 rules, and organizations should confirm current obligations with counsel.
- Data latency behind the API: how long after a result or note exists does it become available through the API, and who is alerted when it is late?
- Documentation currency: does the published API documentation match what is deployed in production, version for version?
- Authorization records: can the organization show, for any app connection, which patient authorized it, when and with what scope?
- Audit use: are API access logs reviewed for unusual volume or patterns as well as retained?
- Vendor dependency: does the contract give notice of API changes and outages, and set expectations for restoring service?
- Own apps on the public path: do the organization’s own patient apps use the same certified API that outside apps use, so that its defects are found first?
- Patient instructions: are the instructions patients receive for connecting an app accurate for the current API and authorization flow?
- Risk analysis scope: does the security risk analysis cover the API, its authentication path and its logs explicitly?
The 2015 rules made a hospital’s vendor API the public face of its records for patient-chosen apps. [1] [2] The checks above treat it that way: as a production service with its own data flows, records and owners.
One more test ties the checks together. Ask who in the organization would notice first if the API stopped returning new results for a day. If the answer is a patient or an outside app developer, the API is being run as a compliance artifact. If the answer is an internal monitor with a named owner, it is being run as the service the 2015 rules assumed it would be.
With hindsight
The standard ONC deferred in 2015 came with its rule implementing the 21st Century Cures Act. That rule was published on May 1, 2020, at 85 FR 25642, and took effect on June 30, 2020. [3] It described a Cures Act condition of certification requiring developers to publish APIs that allow health information to be accessed, exchanged and used “without special effort.” [3]
The 2020 rule adopted a new standardized API criterion at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(10). [3] It made the 2015 data category criterion, (g)(8), a time-limited certification, with developers given “24 months from the date of publication” to update their technology. [3] It said the 2015 Edition had adopted the API criterion in (g)(8), which many developers implemented using the underlying standard the 2020 rule adopted for (g)(10), and that this common use affected its decision. [3]
As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR text of 45 CFR 170.315, up to date as of November 12, 2026, shows paragraph (g)(8) as reserved. [4] The same text keeps the patient selection criterion at (g)(7) and the all-data criterion at (g)(9), and sets out the standardized API criterion at (g)(10). [4] The (g)(10) criterion requires responses according to the standards and implementation specifications adopted in 45 CFR 170.215. [4]
The eCFR text of 45 CFR 170.215, as checked the same day, names HL7 FHIR Release 4.0.1 as the API base standard. [5] It lists the US Core Implementation Guide STU 3.1.1, whose adoption it says expires on January 1, 2026, and STU 6.1.0. [5] It lists the SMART Application Launch Framework Release 1.0.0, also marked as expiring on January 1, 2026, and SMART App Launch Release 2.0.0. [5] It names OpenID Connect Core 1.0 for API authentication. [5]
The certification framework has kept moving. On October 28, 2026, ONC published a final rule titled Health Data, Technology, and Interoperability: ONC Deregulatory Actions To Unleash Prosperity, effective December 28, 2026, with some amendments effective January 1, 2027. [6] It finalized the removal of the patient selection criterion at (g)(7) and the all-data criterion at (g)(9), each with an effective date of January 1, 2027. [6]
ONC gave its reason for removing (g)(7). It said modules certified to the standardized API criterion in (g)(10) must support the functional requirement of (g)(7)(i) according to the SMART App Launch guide. [6] It recorded commenters’ concern that removing (g)(7) could create misalignment with requirements CMS maintains in the Medicare Promoting Interoperability Program and the MIPS Promoting Interoperability performance category. [6] ONC responded that it did not expect the removal to lead to regulatory misalignment with CMS program requirements and said it would coordinate with CMS. [6] The eCFR page for 170.215 links to that amendment. [5]
Read against October 2015, the arc is clear. The three API criteria of the 2015 Edition were the vehicle for Stage 3’s promise that patients could use apps of their choice. [1] [2] One was made time-limited in 2020 and is now reserved, and the other two are scheduled for removal on January 1, 2027. [3] [4] [6] The functions they described survive inside the standardized criterion that replaced them. [4] [6]
What held up is the obligation CMS created: that a patient’s chosen app could reach the record through the provider’s certified API. [1] What did not hold up is the 2015 bet that functional criteria and public documentation would be enough. ONC itself moved to a named standard, and the 2020 rule credited developers’ convergence on it. [3]
In our view, the lesson for a health system’s architects is about the cost of an unnamed interface. An obligation written against “the API in the provider’s certified technology” was only as portable as that API. [1] The work of making it portable was done later, by rule, and is still being adjusted as of November 2026. [5] [6]
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