Volcker’s 2019 rewrite traded reports to examiners for records

The August 2019 Volcker revisions were billed as simplification. For compliance and technology teams they shifted the burden from reporting to proof on request: tier calculations, limit breach records and quarterly XML metrics a bank must produce and defend.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

The August 2019 Volcker revisions were billed as simplification. For compliance and technology teams they shifted the burden from reporting to proof on request: tier calculations, limit breach records and quarterly XML metrics a bank must produce and defend.

  1. The week On August 20, 2019, two of the five agencies responsible for the Volcker Rule announced their approval of a rewrite of its implementing rule.
  2. Proving which tier you are in Under the revised rule, a banking entity’s obligations depend on its trading assets and liabilities, averaged over the previous four quarters.
  3. Proving that trading stayed within its limits Market making and underwriting are permitted activities, but only to the extent they are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near-term demands of clients, customers or counterparties.
  4. Proving that the metrics are right The 2013 rule required banks with $50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities to report metrics within 10 days of the end of each month.
  5. Proving the program is owned at the right level The 2013 rule required a six-pillar compliance program for banking entities with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets that engaged in covered activities, and enhanced minimum standards in its Appendix B for the largest.
  6. Where the argument is weakest The strongest objection is in the agencies’ own numbers.
  7. How it differs by kind of banking entity Firms with significant trading assets and liabilities keep the fullest obligations: the six-pillar program, the attestation, quarterly metrics and covered fund documentation.
  8. With hindsight The compliance date arrived on January 1, 2021, as set.

The week

On August 20, 2019, two of the five agencies responsible for the Volcker Rule announced their approval of a rewrite of its implementing rule. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency announced that the Comptroller had signed a final rule to tailor and simplify the rule while keeping protections core to the safety and soundness of the federal banking system. Later the same day, the board of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation approved the same interagency final rule.

The Volcker Rule implements section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act, added by section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act. It generally prohibits banking entities from proprietary trading and from owning or controlling hedge funds or private equity funds. Five agencies share the job of implementing it: the OCC, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Their joint implementing rule dated from 2013.

The agencies proposed amendments in July 2018. In its release, the FDIC’s chairman said that telling proprietary trading apart from permitted activity had proven extremely difficult. She added that banks doing relatively little trading faced substantial compliance exercises to show that traditional banking activities did not breach the rule.

The FDIC listed what the final rule would do. It would tailor compliance requirements to the size of a firm’s trading assets and liabilities, with the strictest requirements for the firms that trade the most. It would keep the short-term intent prong of the trading account definition only for banking entities not subject to, and not electing, the market risk capital rule prong. It would replace the presumption that instruments held for fewer than 60 days are covered with a presumption that instruments held for 60 days or longer are not. And it would clarify that trading within internal risk limits set under the rule’s conditions counts as permitted market making or underwriting.

The rule text, published later, filled in the details. Banking entities fall into three compliance tiers by trading assets and liabilities. The threshold for “significant” rose from the proposed $10 billion to $20 billion. Firms below $1 billion have “limited” trading assets and liabilities, and those in between “moderate.” The enhanced compliance standards of the 2013 rule’s Appendix B were eliminated. The chief executive attestation would apply only to firms with significant trading. Banks trading within internal limits would keep records of limit breaches and increases, available on request, instead of promptly reporting them. Metrics would be filed quarterly in an XML format.

The approvals did not finish the job. The OCC said the rule would be published once all participating agencies had approved it. The signature dates printed in the final rule show the SEC acting on September 18, the Federal Reserve Board on October 9 and the CFTC on October 11, 2019. The rule appeared in the Federal Register on November 14, 2019, effective January 1, 2020 (January 13, 2020 for the SEC’s amendments), with compliance required by January 1, 2021.

It followed a separate change. On July 22, 2019, the agencies had adopted a rule implementing section 203 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The final rule describes the general result of that law as excluding community banks and their affiliates and subsidiaries from the Volcker Rule’s scope.

The agencies presented the August 2019 approvals as simplification, and for many banks they brought relief. Compliance tiers, fewer metrics and a narrower chief executive attestation all reduced work. The agencies’ own paperwork estimates in the final rule showed large cuts in annual burden hours.

For the people who run a bank’s compliance and data systems, the change had a second character. The rule moved much of the burden from telling the agencies things to being able to show them things. Limit breaches would no longer be reported promptly; they would be recorded and produced on request. Tier status would rest on a calculation the bank performs and the agency can test. Metrics would arrive less often but in a fixed machine-readable format, with less room for explanation. The relief was real, and it came with an obligation to keep proof.

Our argument is that the 2019 Volcker revisions made evidence on demand the core compliance control. A bank that treated the rule as a reduction in work, and cut the systems that produced its records, would be exposed at its next examination. A bank that treated it as a change in what has to be provable could do less reporting and be safer for it.

The rule asks a banking entity to be able to prove four things, which do not overlap and together cover its obligations. First, which compliance tier it belongs in. Second, that its trading stayed within its limits. Third, that the metrics it files are correct. Fourth, that its program is owned at the right level, including who attests to it. We take each in turn. A fifth section tests the argument against the strongest objections, and the last looks at how it plays out for different kinds of banking entity.

The sector is financial services, and the rule applies to banking entities as the statute and regulation define them: insured depository institutions, their holding companies, their affiliates, and certain foreign banks with U.S. operations. Broker-dealer affiliates come under it through those relationships. Firms should confirm with counsel how each provision applies to their structure, especially where several of the five agencies share jurisdiction.

Proving which tier you are in

A calculation, not a label

Under the revised rule, a banking entity’s obligations depend on its trading assets and liabilities, averaged over the previous four quarters. At $20 billion or more, it has significant trading assets and liabilities and carries the full program. Below $1 billion, it has limited trading assets and liabilities and the lightest touch. In between, it is moderate.

The number cannot be read straight off a balance sheet. The final rule excludes certain instruments that banking entities may trade without limit under the statute, such as obligations of the United States, from the calculation. For foreign banking entities, both thresholds rest on the trading assets and liabilities of their combined U.S. operations. Each choice in the calculation is a place where two analysts could reach different answers.

What an examiner would ask to see

A bank’s tier is a conclusion an examiner can test. The evidence is the calculation itself: the quarterly figures, the source of each figure in regulatory reports or the general ledger, the exclusions applied and the reason for each. A bank close to a threshold should be able to show the trend and its plan if it crosses.

This is a data lineage problem. The trading assets and liabilities figure has to be traceable from the regulatory report back to positions, and the exclusions have to be applied consistently quarter to quarter. A bank that computes it in a spreadsheet maintained by one person has a key-person risk in its compliance program. A bank that computes it from the same data warehouse that feeds its call report or FR Y-9C has a defensible answer.

Crossing a threshold

Because the tier rests on a four-quarter average, it moves slowly. A bank growing its trading business will see the average approach a threshold over several quarters. That lag is an advantage if the bank uses it. A firm heading toward $20 billion has time to build the six-pillar program, the metrics pipeline and the attestation process before it needs them.

The mistake is to treat crossing as a future problem. Building a metrics pipeline that meets a published XML schema, with lineage and reconciliation, takes longer than a quarter. A bank should set an internal trigger well below the threshold that starts the build. Moving down a tier deserves the same planning in reverse. A firm that drops below a threshold can simplify, but it should keep enough history to show when and why its obligations changed.

Who signs off on the tier

The tier calculation should have a named preparer and a named reviewer outside the business that benefits from a lower tier. Finance or regulatory reporting is a natural home, with compliance reviewing. The sign-off belongs in the quarterly close, so that the tier is fixed at the same time as the figures it rests on. A change in method, such as a new exclusion, should need compliance approval and a note explaining it.

The agencies kept a lever

The rule lets an agency treat a firm in a lower tier as if it were in a higher one, where the size or complexity of its activities, or the risk of evasion, warrants it. That reservation of authority means the tier calculation is necessary but not sufficient. A bank that sits low in its tier but runs complex desks should expect questions about whether its program matches its activity as well as its size.

The practical response is to document the reasoning as well as the arithmetic. A short annual memo explaining why the bank’s program fits its activities, signed by the compliance owner, gives an examiner a starting point. It also forces the bank to look at its desks, beyond its totals.

Proving that trading stayed within its limits

The presumption and its conditions

Market making and underwriting are permitted activities, but only to the extent they are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near-term demands of clients, customers or counterparties. The final rule adopts a presumption of compliance for that requirement, as the agencies had proposed in 2018: trading within internal limits set under the rule’s conditions is presumed to meet it.

A presumption is only as strong as the evidence behind it. To rely on it, a bank has to set internal limits for each trading desk, subject to conditions in the rule. It has to implement, maintain and enforce those limits. And it has to follow internal escalation and approval procedures when a limit is breached or increased.

Limits that mean something

A limit set far above what a desk ever uses would make the presumption hollow. It would never be breached, and it would say nothing about customer demand. An examiner reviewing a desk whose limits are never approached may reasonably ask how they were calibrated. The presumption is rebuttable, and loose limits invite the challenge.

The defensible approach ties each limit to evidence: the desk’s history of customer activity, the instruments it trades, the market conditions it expects. The calibration should be written down and reviewed on a schedule. When limits are raised, the record should show why demand justified it. That calibration file is as much a part of the evidence as the breach log.

From prompt reports to records on request

The proposal would have required banks to report limit breaches and increases to their agencies promptly. The final rule dropped that. Instead, banks must keep records of breaches and increases and make them available on request, and follow internal escalation and approval procedures to stay within the presumption.

That change shifts work rather than eliminating it. A prompt report is an event: something happens, a message goes out, the agency knows. A record on request is a standing obligation: every breach and increase must be captured, with its reason, its approver and its resolution, in a form the bank can retrieve and explain months later. The test comes when the examiner asks for a desk’s full history over a period, and the bank must produce it complete and consistent.

Escalation that leaves a trail

The rule conditions the presumption on following internal escalation and approval procedures. That makes the procedure itself evidence. Each breach should show who was notified, within what time, who approved a temporary increase or required the position to be cut, and when the desk returned within its limit. An escalation carried out by phone and never recorded did happen, but it cannot be shown. Under a records regime, an escalation that cannot be shown carries little weight.

The system behind the records

For a technology leader, the limit record is a small system with demanding properties. Each limit needs a definition tied to a named trading desk, a value, an effective date and an owner. Each breach needs a timestamp, the size of the breach, the escalation path followed and the approval or remediation. Each increase needs the justification and the approver. All of it must be retained and retrievable by desk and by period.

Banks may already hold much of this in risk management platforms built for other purposes. The question is whether those platforms record what the Volcker presumption needs, in a way that survives system changes. A limit history scattered across emails, chat messages and spreadsheet versions will not hold up. A history in a controlled system, with change logs, will.

Retention and retrieval

The six-pillar program’s records element, as the rule describes it, requires records sufficient to demonstrate compliance, provided promptly on request and kept for at least five years. Five years of limit histories, calibration files and approvals is a substantial archive. Its value depends on retrieval. A record that exists but takes weeks to assemble fails the purpose of a records-on-request regime.

Retrieval should be designed in from the start. Records should be searchable by desk, by period and by event type. Archived records should survive system migrations with their links to desk definitions intact. Legal holds should be possible without freezing the live system. These are ordinary records management requirements, and the revised rule raises their importance for trading compliance.

Hedging leaves records too

Risk-mitigating hedging is another permitted activity with its own documentation. The FDIC’s 2026 description of its information collection still lists recordkeeping for hedging documentation among the obligations of the banks it supervises. Hedges that span desks or legal entities are where documentation can fragment. A bank should keep hedge documentation in the same controlled environment as its limit records, keyed to the same desk list, so that a reviewer can follow a position from the desk that took it to the hedge that offsets it.

The trading desk definition underneath

Everything here hangs on the trading desk. Limits are set per desk; metrics are reported per desk; the presumption is earned per desk. The final rule revised the definition of a trading desk so that banks could align it with desks defined in other programs. That alignment is useful only if the desk list is itself controlled. A desk that is reorganized, merged or renamed changes the unit of evidence, and the records have to follow it.

Proving that the metrics are right

Fewer filings, stricter format

The 2013 rule required banks with $50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities to report metrics within 10 days of the end of each month. Under the final rule, metrics filers report quarterly, within 30 days after the end of each quarter. The agencies said supervisory experience showed the change would reduce errors and improve data quality.

The format tightened at the same time. The 2013 rule did not specify a format. The final rule requires reporting in XML, following a schema each agency publishes on its website. A bank may not use an outdated version of the schema. The agencies planned a test run of the new format, and a bank wishing to switch early had to test successfully first.

Different metrics, more granular data

The final rule also changed what is reported. It replaced the Inventory Turnover metric with a Positions measurement and the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio with a Transaction Volumes measurement. Banks provide the underlying data for each trading day rather than calculated ratios. The agencies noted that positions data was already a component banks calculated to produce inventory turnover.

The rule added qualitative information to the filing: Trading Desk Information describing each desk’s instruments, activities and the legal entities into which it books trades, and Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information. The proposal’s required Narrative Statement was not adopted. Banks may still include a narrative, voluntarily, to explain material events or changes.

Daily data, quarterly deadline

The new measures are built from data for each trading day. A quarterly deadline does not make the underlying collection quarterly. A day of missing positions discovered in the tenth week of the quarter may be hard to reconstruct. The capture should run daily, with completeness checks that flag gaps within days, even though the file goes out once a quarter.

Who owns the filing

A quarterly regulatory filing needs a single accountable owner. Where the data comes from trading technology, the calculations from market risk and the submission from regulatory reporting, ownership can blur. Each group can do its part well and the filing can still fail, because nobody owns the whole. The owner should sign off on each submission, hold the schema version log and chair the reconciliation before filing.

Testing before the deadline

The agencies built a test into the transition. A bank that wanted to adopt the revised metrics before January 1, 2021 had to test a submission in the new XML format successfully first. That requirement is a useful model for every later schema change. Each new version should go through a test submission, or at least validation against the published schema, before the quarter in which it is needed.

When a filing is wrong

Errors will happen. A position mapped to the wrong desk, a schema field populated from the wrong source, a day missed in the daily data. The bank needs a process for discovering, assessing and correcting them: who decides whether a correction is material, how it is communicated to the agency, and how the root cause is fixed. Each error and its handling becomes part of the evidence that the pipeline is under control.

What the change means for the reporting pipeline

Less frequent reporting with a stricter format changes where errors show up. A monthly report with a free-form explanation lets a bank correct course quickly and explain anomalies in prose. A quarterly XML filing validated against a published schema either passes or fails, and its contents must reconcile with the bank’s other records.

The pipeline that produces it deserves the controls of any regulatory report. Source data for positions and transactions must be traceable to the trading systems. The mapping from internal desk identifiers to reported desks must be controlled. Each schema version change needs a test before the filing deadline. Reconciliations against the tier calculation and the limit records should run before submission, so that the three kinds of evidence tell one story.

Dropping the required narrative removes a safety valve. Under a narrative regime, a bank could explain a spike in its prose. Without one, unexplained anomalies invite questions through the supervisory process. A bank that keeps its own internal explanations, ready to provide, is better placed than one that relies on the filing to speak for itself.

Proving the program is owned at the right level

Three programs instead of one

The 2013 rule required a six-pillar compliance program for banking entities with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets that engaged in covered activities, and enhanced minimum standards in its Appendix B for the largest. The six pillars are written policies and procedures, internal controls, a management framework, independent testing, training, and records sufficient to demonstrate compliance, kept for at least five years and provided promptly on request. The revised rule eliminated Appendix B and tailored the program to the tiers.

Firms with significant trading assets and liabilities keep the six-pillar program, the metrics reporting, the covered fund documentation and the chief executive attestation. Firms with moderate trading assets and liabilities follow a simplified program. Firms with limited trading assets and liabilities have a rebuttable presumption of compliance.

What the board should see

Whatever the tier, the board or its risk committee should see a short, regular account of the Volcker program. The current tier and its trend. Any limit breaches and increases above a set significance, with their resolution. The results of independent testing, including any failures to produce records. Material errors in metrics filings. That account gives directors a basis for oversight without asking them to read the evidence itself.

Independent testing as the check on records

One of the six pillars is independent testing of the program by qualified staff or an outside party. Under a records-on-request regime, that testing should include the request itself. A tester can act as an examiner would: ask for a desk’s limit history for a quarter, the tier calculation for a year, or the source data behind a reported Positions figure. The test measures whether the bank can produce complete, consistent evidence in a reasonable time.

Findings from such a test are more useful than a policy review. They show where records are missing, where systems disagree and where retrieval depends on one person’s memory. Those are the weaknesses an examination would find, discovered first by the bank.

The attestation narrowed

The proposal would have required a chief executive attestation from both significant and moderate firms. The final rule applies it only to firms with significant trading assets and liabilities. For moderate firms, that removed an annual personal sign-off by the most senior executive.

Removing the attestation does not remove accountability. A moderate firm still needs someone senior to own the program, approve its policies and receive its testing results. The difference is that the ownership is set by the firm’s governance rather than by a regulatory signature. A firm should decide, in writing, who that owner is and what reporting the board receives. Otherwise the narrowing of the attestation can drift into an absence of ownership.

Covered fund documentation

Firms with significant trading assets and liabilities also keep documentation for their covered fund activities. The fund side of the rule turns on definitions: which vehicles are covered funds, which exclusions apply, which relationships are permitted. The evidence is an inventory of fund relationships with the analysis for each. That inventory has to be maintained as funds are launched, restructured or wound down, and it has to agree with the legal entity records the bank keeps for other purposes.

What a limited-tier presumption still requires

A firm with limited trading assets and liabilities is presumed compliant. It is not exempt. The presumption rests on the firm staying below the threshold and not engaging in prohibited activity. The firm needs enough monitoring to know if either changes: a quarterly check of the tier calculation and a way to spot new trading or fund activity that the rule covers.

Such a firm might reasonably keep its Volcker program to a page of policy, a quarterly calculation and a list of fund relationships reviewed against the covered fund definitions. That is a small program. It still has to exist, be owned and leave a record.

Where the argument is weakest

The burden really did fall

The strongest objection is in the agencies’ own numbers. In the final rule’s paperwork analysis, the Federal Reserve estimated its information collection would fall by about 169,000 hours a year across 255 respondents. The OCC estimated a reduction of about 3,500 hours across 39 respondents, and the FDIC about 15,000 hours across 13. Calling this a shift rather than a reduction understates real relief.

We accept the relief. The point is about composition. The hours that disappeared were mostly in producing reports and enhanced program documentation. The records that remain must be more reliable, because they are the bank’s defense on request. A bank can capture the savings and still invest in the systems that keep its evidence sound. The two are compatible, and the savings fund the investment.

Examiners can always ask

A second objection is that examiners could always ask for records, so nothing changed. That is partly right. Under any regime, a bank must produce what an examiner requests.

What changed is the default flow of information. When breaches were reported promptly, the agency held its own record and could compare it with the bank’s. When they are kept on request, the bank’s record is the only record. Its completeness becomes the issue, and there is no outside copy against which to check it. That raises the stakes on the bank’s recordkeeping.

Critics called it weakening, not reorganizing

The rule was contested. Two CFTC commissioners voted against it, and dissenting statements printed with the rule argued that it weakened the Volcker Rule and its enforceability. On that view, presumptions of compliance would be nearly impossible to overcome, and fewer reporting requirements would make the rule harder to enforce.

That debate is about policy, and this article does not settle it. Our argument holds on either side. If the rule weakened oversight, the bank’s own evidence matters more, because it is the main remaining check. If it only removed waste, the bank’s evidence still carries the presumptions. Either way, the record is where compliance now lives.

Presumptions shift the burden to supervisors

A related objection is that presumptions of compliance shift the burden of proof from banks to supervisors, so a bank need do little until challenged. In legal terms there is something to this. In operational terms it misleads. A supervisor who suspects a problem will begin by asking for the bank’s records. A bank that cannot produce them loses the practical benefit of the presumption, whatever its legal weight.

Records cost money too

Another objection is that keeping records to a high standard costs as much as the reports it replaced, so the relief is illusory. That overstates the case. The final rule itself noted that positions data was already a component banks calculated for the old metrics, and other records may likewise exist inside risk and trading systems. The work is to make them complete, controlled and retrievable, which is a smaller project than producing monthly reports with ten-day deadlines.

The cost is real where records were never kept well. A bank that met the old reporting deadlines through manual effort, rather than sound underlying data, will find the new regime exposes that. Paying to fix it is a cost of the rule as revised, and a bank should budget for it rather than count the full savings at once.

Smaller firms are mostly out

Community banks were generally removed from the rule’s scope by the July 2019 change under the 2018 law. For them, this article may seem beside the point. It is, for those fully outside the rule’s scope. For banks just above the community bank line, and for affiliates of larger groups, the tier and presumption logic still applies, and the evidence still has to exist.

The objection also misses a timing point. The community bank change came by statute and was implemented in July 2019, before the August approvals. A bank that relied on it should still keep the analysis showing why it qualifies, because qualification depends on conditions that can change as the bank grows. The exclusion is itself something to evidence.

How it differs by kind of banking entity

Large dealer banks

Firms with significant trading assets and liabilities keep the fullest obligations: the six-pillar program, the attestation, quarterly metrics and covered fund documentation. Their task is to rebuild the metrics pipeline for the new format and measures, integrate limit records into a controlled system and reconcile across all three. Where trading desks are numerous, the desk list itself becomes a governed record. Every reorganization of the trading business has to flow through to limits, metrics and hedging documentation on the same date. They had until January 1, 2021, with the option to comply earlier after a successful test of the new XML format.

Regional banks with moderate trading

For banks in the moderate tier, the attestation went away and a simplified program applied. The risk is that a lighter program becomes an undocumented one. Their trading may be concentrated in a few desks serving customer needs, such as interest rate hedges for commercial borrowers. These banks should keep the tier calculation tight, maintain limit records for any desk relying on the presumption, and name the senior owner of the program.

A moderate-tier bank also has less margin for error in its systems than its size suggests. Its compliance team may be small, and the knowledge of how the tier is computed or where limit records live may rest with a few people. Writing down the procedures, and testing that someone else can follow them, protects the bank when those people move on. That is cheap insurance against an examination request arriving during a staff change.

Banks with limited trading

For banks below $1 billion, the presumption of compliance does most of the work. Their task is monitoring: knowing their tier each quarter, knowing their fund relationships, and having a way to notice if either changes. A short, owned program with a quarterly record meets that need.

Banks near the community bank line

Banks that sit just outside the community bank exclusion, or that might move across it as they grow, face a choice between two regimes. Their monitoring should cover both: the conditions for exclusion and the tier calculation that would apply if they fall outside it. Knowing in advance which side of the line the bank will be on next year avoids a rushed program build.

Foreign banking organizations

Foreign banks with U.S. operations gained from basing both thresholds on their combined U.S. trading assets and liabilities, and from changes to the exemption for trading solely outside the United States. Their evidence problem is boundary-drawing: showing which activity counts as U.S. and which does not, with records that hold up across jurisdictions and group systems.

The data for the U.S. calculation may live in systems run from the home country, under different retention rules and data models. The U.S. compliance owner needs a documented feed of the U.S. figures, a reconciliation to U.S. regulatory reports and the right to retrieve underlying records when a U.S. agency asks. Agreements inside the group should say so, because a records request does not wait for a parent bank’s internal approvals.

Groups with several agencies

A banking group may answer to several of the five agencies at once: the Federal Reserve for the holding company, the OCC or FDIC for the bank, the SEC for a broker-dealer and the CFTC for a swap dealer. Each can request records. The group’s advantage lies in keeping one evidence base, with one desk list, one tier calculation and one limit system, from which each agency’s request is served. Separate records for each regulator multiply the chance that two answers to the same question disagree.

Broker-dealer affiliates

Broker-dealers affiliated with banks come under the rule through their banking group, with the SEC as their agency. Their trading desks may be where the market making and underwriting activity sits. They should check that their desk definitions, limit records and metrics feeds align with the group’s, so that the group’s evidence is consistent across legal entities and regulators.

With hindsight

The compliance date arrived on January 1, 2021, as set. The covered fund amendments took effect on October 1, 2020, so banks implemented the two sets of changes in the same window. Before then the agencies completed the second half of the project. On July 31, 2020, they published amendments to the covered fund provisions, effective October 1, 2020. That rule added four exclusions from the definition of covered fund, for credit funds, venture capital funds, family wealth management vehicles and customer facilitation vehicles. It also permitted codified categories of limited, low-risk transactions between a banking entity and a related fund.

The transition machinery worked as written. Until the compliance date, the 2013 rule remained in force in temporary appendices that the final rule made effective through December 31, 2020, and banks could opt in early to the new requirements. Neither rule changed the August 2019 structure for proprietary trading. Tiers, the limit presumption and the quarterly XML metrics carried through unchanged into the compliance date. After that, the rule held still. A Federal Register search on November 14, 2026, for documents amending the Federal Reserve’s Volcker regulation, 12 CFR part 248, found one after the 2020 covered fund rule: a technical correction to that rule, published in September 2020. A 2024 CFTC rule on commodity pools also listed the CFTC’s Volcker part, 17 CFR part 75, among the parts it amended. As of that check, the 2019 and 2020 rules remain the agencies’ last joint amendments.

The records obligation outlived the policy argument. In July 2026, and again in October 2026, the FDIC published notices proposing to renew its Volcker Rule information collection, OMB number 3064-0184, without change. The October notice said no comments had been received on the first. Its burden table still lists recordkeeping for trading desk documentation, hedging documentation and limit breaches and increases, alongside quarterly metrics reporting for banks with significant trading assets and liabilities. The FDIC estimated that two of the banks it supervises file those quarterly metrics.

Those numbers make a point about where the rule’s weight ended up. For the FDIC’s population, the quarterly metrics filing touched very few banks, while the recordkeeping rows ran across more of them. In that population, most of the listed obligations are records to keep and produce, not reports to send.

The renewal also listed recordkeeping for the simplified compliance programs of banks with moderate trading assets and liabilities and of banks with no trading assets or liabilities. The tiered design the agencies approved in August 2019 is visible line by line in a 2026 paperwork notice. What held up is the structure the 2019 rule set: tiers based on trading assets and liabilities, presumptions earned by documented limits, and quarterly metrics in a fixed format. What did not hold is any expectation that the rule would keep changing. Banks that treated 2019 and 2020 as the settled version, and built durable evidence systems around it, have had years of use from them. Banks that waited for a further rewrite did not get one, as of our November 2026 check.

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  • Volcker Rule
  • proprietary trading
  • regulatory reporting
  • recordkeeping
  • OCC
  • FDIC