Voya’s red flags program was written in 2009 and tested by phone in 2016

What the SEC called its first Identity Theft Red Flags case found four separate failures: a program never updated, red flags with no procedure, contractors outside the controls, and responders who misunderstood their own system. Fixing the help desk alone would have left three.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

What the SEC called its first Identity Theft Red Flags case found four separate failures: a program never updated, red flags with no procedure, contractors outside the controls, and responders who misunderstood their own system. Fixing the help desk alone would have left three.

  1. The week On Wednesday, September 26, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Voya Financial Advisors, a Des Moines-based broker-dealer and investment adviser, had agreed to pay $1 million to settle charges over its cybersecurity policies and procedures.
  2. Currency: a program written for 2009 Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID requires a financial institution or creditor that offers or maintains covered accounts to develop and implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program.
  3. Response: red flags that had no procedure The rule’s guidelines, in Appendix A to the subpart, list five categories of red flags a program should include as appropriate.
  4. Coverage: the workforce outside the controls The order’s most transferable finding concerns who the controls reached.
  5. Containment: a response built on a wrong belief The order’s containment findings are the most technical, and in some ways the most uncomfortable.
  6. Who owns each part inside a firm One reason the four failures can coexist is that each belongs to a different owner, and none of the owners sees the whole.
  7. Objections: old facts, a small firm’s problem, no money lost One objection is that the facts are from 2016 and that phone-based password resets with security questions are no longer common.
  8. What a compliance officer can test this quarter The four parts translate into checks that can be run without waiting for an exam or an incident.
  9. With hindsight The SEC returned to the identity theft rule in 2022, with three cases at once.

The week

On Wednesday, September 26, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Voya Financial Advisors, a Des Moines-based broker-dealer and investment adviser, had agreed to pay $1 million to settle charges over its cybersecurity policies and procedures. The SEC charged the firm with violating the Safeguards Rule, Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P, and the Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID. The SEC said it was the first enforcement action it had brought charging violations of the Identity Theft Red Flags Rule. Without admitting or denying the findings, the firm agreed to be censured, to pay the penalty and to retain an independent consultant to review its policies and procedures under both rules.

The order described an intrusion over six days in April 2016. One or more persons impersonating the firm’s independent contractor representatives called its technical support line and asked for password resets for three representatives’ accounts on the web portal they used to reach customer information. Two of the calls came from phone numbers that the firm’s parent company had previously identified as linked to fraud. Support staff reset the passwords and gave temporary passwords over the phone, and in two cases also gave out the representative’s username. The intruders used the credentials to reach personally identifiable information of at least 5,600 customers. They also used customer information to create new online customer profiles, which gave them access to information on two more customers. The order said there had been no known unauthorized transfers of funds or securities from customer accounts as a result.

Three hours after the first fraudulent reset, the targeted representative told a support employee that he had received an email confirming a password change he had not requested. According to the order, the steps the firm took next did not stop the intruders from impersonating two more representatives over the following days, and it did not terminate the intruders’ sessions. Security staff believed that resetting a password would end the user’s existing sessions. It did not.

The order set out why the SEC found the firm’s procedures deficient. The firm had no cybersecurity staff of its own and outsourced most of those functions to its parent. Its contractor representatives, who made up the largest part of its workforce, used their own computers and networks. Policies that required session timeouts, a ban on concurrent sessions and multi-factor authentication were applied to employees but were not reasonably designed to apply to the systems the contractors used. The contractors’ form of multi-factor authentication relied on security questions, which support staff reset during the intrusion.

On the identity theft rule, the order found that the firm adopted a written Identity Theft Prevention Program in 2009 to comply with the Federal Trade Commission’s rule then in force, and did not substantively update it afterward. Its board or a designated member of management did not administer and oversee the program, as the rule requires. The program did not include reasonable procedures to respond to red flags, such as those detected before and during the April 2016 intrusion. The SEC’s cyber unit chief said, in the agency’s announcement, that the case was a reminder that procedures must be reasonably designed to fit a firm’s specific business model and must be reviewed and updated to respond to changing risks.

The SEC described the Voya order as its first enforcement action charging violations of the Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, and it is easy to read it as a story about a help desk that gave passwords to strangers over the phone. That happened, and it matters. But the order’s findings go further than the help desk. They describe a written program that was adopted once and then left alone, red flags that people saw and had no procedure for, a large part of the workforce that the controls did not reach, and an incident response that rested on a wrong belief about how the firm’s own system worked.

The case also arrived at a useful moment for compliance officers. We do not know how other firms’ programs looked in 2018, and we do not claim the Voya program was typical. The order is useful because it shows, in detail, how each element of the rule can fail in a firm that had a written program, a set of security policies and an incident response procedure. On paper, the firm had most of what the rule required. The order is about the distance between paper and practice.

Our argument is that the order describes four separate compliance failures, and that each would have survived a fix to the others. A firm could have trained its help desk perfectly and still failed on the other three. We take them as four parts:

  • Currency: whether the written program reflects the risks and the business as they are now, and whether someone senior owns it.
  • Response: whether a red flag, once seen, leads to a defined action by a named person.
  • Coverage: whether the controls reach every person and system that touches customer information, including contractors on their own equipment.
  • Containment: whether the people responding to an incident know what their actions actually do to an intruder’s access.

The parts are distinct. Currency is about the document and its owner. Response is about what happens between detection and action. Coverage is about who the controls apply to. Containment is about whether the response works technically. After the four, we take the main objections and set out what a compliance officer can test this quarter. The analysis applies to broker-dealers and investment advisers under the SEC’s rule and, by parallel, to federal credit unions, which operate under the National Credit Union Administration’s version of the same requirements.

Currency: a program written for 2009

Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID requires a financial institution or creditor that offers or maintains covered accounts to develop and implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program. The rule requires the program to be appropriate to the size and complexity of the firm and the nature and scope of its activities. It must include reasonable policies and procedures to identify relevant red flags, detect them, respond appropriately and ensure the program is updated periodically to reflect changes in risks to customers.

The rule also sets out how the program is administered. The board of directors or an appropriate committee must approve the initial written program. The board, a committee or a designated senior manager must be involved in its oversight, development, implementation and administration. Staff must be trained as necessary, and the firm must exercise appropriate and effective oversight of service provider arrangements.

The order found failures on both counts. The firm adopted its program in 2009, before the Dodd-Frank Act transferred rulemaking and enforcement authority for these entities to the SEC, to comply with the Federal Trade Commission rule then in force. Despite significant changes in external cybersecurity risks and in the firm’s own risk profile, it did not substantively update the program after 2009. Neither the board nor a designated manager administered and oversaw it.

The training finding shows what a stale program looks like from the inside. According to the order, training sessions that touched on identity theft did so mainly in the insurance business context and did not focus on the program. Three employees attended the 2015 training and five attended the 2016 training. Two of the representatives whose passwords were fraudulently reset had not completed the 2016 compliance training.

Currency is a compliance failure in its own right, separate from any incident. A program can be well written for the business it described and still fail the rule once the business changes. After 2009, the order says, both external cybersecurity risks and the firm’s own risk profile changed significantly. The program did not.

The order supports its point about changing risk with the SEC’s own 2013 release adopting the identity theft rules, which observed that advancements in technology had led to increasing threats to the integrity and privacy of personal information. The firm’s 2009 program predated both that release and the SEC’s authority over it. A program adopted under one regulator’s rule and not substantively updated after the transfer of authority is a clear case of a document that no longer describes the obligation it was written to meet.

What an annual review needs to produce

The rule requires periodic updating; it does not say how often. Whatever the interval, a review that produces only a signature on the same document does not meet the purpose. In our reading of the rule and the order, a useful review produces three things. First, a list of what changed in the business since the last review: new account types, new channels, new groups of people with access to customer information, new service providers. Second, a list of what changed in the threat: the fraud the firm has seen, including attempts that failed. Third, the changes to the program that follow from both, or a recorded reason why none were needed.

The second list matters most here. The order says that between January and March 2016, before the intrusion, the firm had been subject to other fraudulent activity in which people impersonated its representatives, sometimes using the same phone numbers and techniques. A review that asked what fraud the firm had seen would have put those attempts in front of the program’s owner. Whether that would have changed the outcome is unknowable. It would have made the risk part of the program’s record.

Signs a program has gone stale

A compliance officer can spot a stale program without waiting for an incident. Four signs stand out in the Voya facts. The program was written for a regulator or rule that no longer governs the firm, as Voya’s was: adopted under the Federal Trade Commission’s rule before authority passed to the SEC. The program’s list of covered accounts and channels does not match the firm’s current products and access paths. The program names no red flags drawn from fraud the firm has actually experienced. And the training records show attendance too thin to say the program is known to the people who must run it.

No single sign proves a violation. Each is a prompt for the program’s owner to ask what has changed. The rule’s requirement that the program be appropriate to the size and complexity of the firm and the nature and scope of its activities means the program has to move when the firm does. A firm that adds a new channel, a new group of contractors or a new service provider has changed the scope of its activities, and the program should show it.

Response: red flags that had no procedure

The rule’s guidelines, in Appendix A to the subpart, list five categories of red flags a program should include as appropriate. They include alerts from consumer reporting agencies or service providers, suspicious documents, suspicious personal identifying information such as a suspicious address change, unusual use of or suspicious activity related to a covered account, and notice from customers, victims, law enforcement or others about possible identity theft. The guidelines also describe detection through authenticating customers, monitoring transactions and verifying the validity of change of address requests.

The Voya order is a catalog of red flags that were detected and then went nowhere. The parent company kept a monitoring list of phone numbers suspected of use in prior fraud. No written policy required the support centers to use it when handling password resets. An informal, unwritten procedure adopted in January 2016 provided for next-business-day review of calls from those numbers. That could not stop a fraudulent reset while the call was in progress, and the order says it was not consistently applied.

The firm had also, in January 2016, informally adopted a procedure to flag compromised representatives’ and customers’ accounts for extra security during support calls. Unknown to the security staff, those flags were periodically erased by unrelated automated system activity. A control that the people relying on it believe is working, and that is not, can be worse than no control, because it removes the reason to look.

The representative’s own report was a red flag in the rule’s fifth category: notice from a person about possible identity theft. It reached the support team three hours after the first reset. The manager formally notified the team the next morning and directed staff not to give out usernames and temporary passwords by phone. In between, the intruders reset a second representative’s password. On April 18, a support staff member gave a password to an intruder impersonating a third representative, despite the directive.

After the first report, the parent’s annuity customer service center received five calls from people impersonating one of that representative’s customers and three from people impersonating the representative. The calls came from four phone numbers, and several of the calls came from a number on the monitoring list. Only one support representative escalated a call as suspicious, and that representative was given approval to send the requested contract copy to the caller anyway. The callers changed the customer’s email address of record to a disposable address and had account documents sent there.

From red flag to action

Each of those failures has the same shape. Someone saw something the rule would call a red flag. No written procedure told them what to do, or the procedure that existed did not work at the moment it was needed. The rule asks for reasonable policies and procedures to respond appropriately to red flags that are detected. The order makes clear that responding means more than noticing and logging.

A practical test of the response element is to list each red flag the program names and write, beside it, the action, the person or role who takes it and how quickly. Where the action is “review later,” ask whether the harm can happen before the review. For a password reset requested by phone, it can. For a change of address followed by a request to send documents to a new email, it can. Those are the red flags that need an action at the moment of the call, not the next business day.

Support staff meet red flags in the moment, and the order shows they were poorly equipped to act on them. The technical support team’s procedure let a caller who gave two pieces of personal information receive a temporary password by phone. It did not explicitly prohibit giving out usernames. Personal information of that kind is what an identity thief has. A procedure that treats it as proof of identity turns the help desk into the easiest door. The order records that after the intrusion the firm revised its authentication policy to prohibit giving temporary passwords by phone and implemented effective multi-factor authentication for the portal.

Customer-facing call centers face the same problem from the other side. The order notes that the annuity contract numbers the intruders could copy were used by customer service as an identity factor during calls. A piece of data that an intruder can read in one system should not serve as proof of identity in another. Mapping which data elements each call center accepts for authentication, and where else those elements are visible, is a short exercise with a high yield.

Coverage: the workforce outside the controls

The order’s most transferable finding concerns who the controls reached. The firm had over 1,000 employees and about 3,800 other associated persons, including contractor representatives who worked from their own offices in about 1,200 locations. The contractor representatives made up the largest part of its workforce and regularly accessed customer information.

The parent company’s policies required manual account lockouts for users suspected of involvement in a security incident, a 15-minute inactivity timeout in web applications with customer information, a ban on concurrent sessions by a single user, multi-factor authentication for applications with customer information, annual and ad hoc policy review, and security awareness training. The firm implemented those policies for people it classified as employees, including when they worked remotely.

For contractor representatives, the same policies applied on paper but were not reasonably designed to reach the systems they used. The portal allowed concurrent sessions and had a 60-minute timeout, exempted from the 15-minute requirement without formal documentation. There was no procedure to terminate a single contractor’s remote session. Employees used token-based multi-factor authentication. Contractors used security questions, which applied when a new device connected, and support staff reset those questions when they reset passwords, which is what happened during the intrusion.

The contractors’ own computers were supposed to be scanned for antivirus software, encryption and certain updates. The scans were scheduled three times a year and depended on each representative clicking a link from a service provider. Some did not click it for extended periods, if at all. Among computers that were scanned, the failure rate in each of 2015 and 2016 was about 30 percent, with half of those showing critical failures such as missing encryption or antivirus. The firm did no follow-up on representatives who failed to scan or on the deficiencies the scans found.

The coverage failure is a classification problem with a security consequence. The firm drew its control boundary around employment status. The SEC drew it around access to customer information. Under the Safeguards Rule, the policies must be reasonably designed to protect customer records and information; the order cites the Commission’s consistent position that independent contractors who sell securities on a broker-dealer’s behalf are associated persons controlled by it. The people with access were the people the controls had to reach.

Building the access inventory

The first step toward closing a coverage gap is an inventory of people, not systems. For each group with access to customer information, the inventory records how they are engaged (employee, contractor, affiliate, outsourcer), what devices and networks they use, how they authenticate, what session controls apply and who is responsible for their compliance. Laid side by side, the rows show where the controls differ. Each difference then needs either a fix or a written reason why the different control is reasonably designed for that group.

The Voya order shows why the written reason matters. The portal’s 60-minute timeout was exempted from the 15-minute requirement without formal documentation. An undocumented exception is indistinguishable, after the fact, from an oversight. A documented one at least shows that someone weighed the risk.

The rule’s fourth administrative element, oversight of service provider arrangements, is part of coverage too. In the order, the parent company ran the firm’s cybersecurity, its support call centers and its incident response, and a third-party service provider ran the device scans. Each of those arrangements put a part of the program in someone else’s hands. The firm still owned the result. An inventory that lists service providers alongside workforce groups, with the controls each is responsible for and the evidence the firm receives, makes that ownership visible.

Credit unions and banks face the same boundary question

Regulation S-ID applies to SEC-registered firms such as broker-dealers and investment advisers. Other financial institutions answer to their own regulators’ rules. For federal credit unions, for example, 12 CFR 717.90 requires a written Identity Theft Prevention Program with the same structure: identify, detect and respond to red flags, update the program periodically, obtain board approval of the initial program, involve the board or a designated senior manager, train staff and oversee service provider arrangements.

The coverage question carries over directly. A credit union whose loan officers work through a third-party originator, or a bank whose call center is run by an outsourcer, has people with access to customer accounts who are not its employees and may not use its equipment. If the controls are written for employees on managed devices, the gap the Voya order described exists there too. Wealth managers that operate through affiliated independent advisers may face the same structure as the firm in the order.

Containment: a response built on a wrong belief

The order’s containment findings are the most technical, and in some ways the most uncomfortable. On the second day of the intrusion, the parent’s security staff identified IP addresses likely involved. They did not block them, and they did not freeze the compromised sessions while the malicious sessions were in progress. The order says that was in part because they believed resetting the compromised passwords would end those sessions. Resetting the passwords did not end existing sessions. The intruders kept access for most of the day on the first two days and for more than two hours on the last day, until they left on their own.

The order ties this to training: the security staff responsible for incidents were not given adequate training on how the portal operated. Incident response procedures required, in general terms, that potentially compromised accounts be disabled or applications shut down. The firm’s procedures were not reasonably designed to accomplish that. The incident procedures also failed to ensure that the support and customer-facing call center staff were told about the ongoing intrusion.

That last failure links containment back to response. An intrusion that runs through impersonation calls is contained partly at the network and partly at the phone. Blocking an address does nothing about the next call. Telling every support and customer service team, at once, that an intrusion is under way, which identities are being impersonated and which numbers are in use, is a containment step. In the Voya facts, the support team’s formal notice came the morning after the first report, and the customer-facing center went on taking impersonation calls.

The firm tried to scope the intrusion by contacting representatives whose passwords had been reset to ask whether they had requested it. According to the order, it tested only resets between April 1 and 14, which covered the first half of the intrusion. There was no testing of resets during April 15 to 18. Forty-one percent of the resets tested ended in an “unable to reach” finding, six of them during the intrusion, and there was no follow-up on those.

The scoping gap is a separate containment failure. Once a firm knows that some password resets were fraudulent, the question becomes which others were. The firm’s method, calling representatives whose passwords had been reset, was reasonable. Its execution left the back half of the intrusion untested and left more than two in five tested resets unresolved. A scoping exercise that cannot reach the people it needs to ask has not finished. The fallback is to treat every unresolved reset as compromised until proven otherwise: force a new reset through a verified channel, end all sessions and review the account’s recent activity.

Scoping also has a notification consequence. A firm that does not know which accounts were reached cannot tell the right customers. The order records that the firm issued breach notices to the affected customers with an offer of a year of credit monitoring. The quality of any notice depends on the quality of the scoping behind it.

Containment is distinct from the other three parts because it can fail even when the program is current, the red flags have procedures and the controls cover everyone. If the responders’ mental model of the system is wrong, their actions do not do what they think. The fix is knowledge, written down and tested: for each system that holds customer information, what actually ends an active session, what actually blocks an address, and who can do each at any hour.

Testing what a reset does

A simple exercise would have exposed the containment gap before the intrusion. Log in to the portal on one device, reset the password from another, and see whether the first session survives. Repeat for every application that holds customer data and for every way a session can be ended: password reset, account disable, token revocation, forced logout. Record the results in the incident playbook. It is a short exercise. In the Voya case, the order says, the wrong belief about resets was part of the reason staff did not block the addresses or freeze the sessions, and the intruders kept their access for most of the day on the first two days of the intrusion.

Who owns each part inside a firm

One reason the four failures can coexist is that each belongs to a different owner, and none of the owners sees the whole. The rule assigns oversight to the board or a designated senior manager. Below that level, the parts divide naturally.

Currency belongs to the program’s designated owner, a compliance role in a firm organized like the one in the order. That person needs inputs from the business on new products and channels, and from fraud operations on what attempts the firm has seen. Without both inputs, a review can only re-read the old document.

Response belongs to whoever runs the front line: technical support, customer service and the branch or field network. Those leaders write the scripts and the escalation paths. The compliance owner can say which red flags the program names; only the operational leaders can make the action happen during a call.

Coverage belongs jointly to the people who engage the workforce and the people who set security controls. In a firm like the one in the order, that means the field or supervision function that manages independent representatives, and the information security function, which in Voya’s case sat at the parent company. If neither owns the comparison between employee and contractor controls, it falls between them.

Containment belongs to the incident response team, but depends on the application owners who know how each system behaves. The order’s finding that security staff were not trained on how the portal worked is a finding about the handoff between those two groups.

The board’s designated manager is the only person positioned to see all four. That is why the rule’s requirement for senior involvement in oversight, development, implementation and administration is more than a formality. A designee who asks each owner for evidence once a year, and compares the answers, is doing what the rule describes.

Objections: old facts, a small firm’s problem, no money lost

One objection is that the facts are from 2016 and that phone-based password resets with security questions are no longer common. We cannot say how common they are, and the objection misses the structure of the case. The four failures, a stale program, red flags without procedures, controls that stop at the employment boundary and responders who misunderstand their systems, do not depend on any particular technology. Each can recur with newer tools.

A second objection is that the firm had no cybersecurity staff of its own and relied on its parent, so the case says more about that arrangement than about firms with their own teams. The order does describe that arrangement, and the rule requires oversight of service provider arrangements. But the failures the order lists were failures of design and response that a firm with its own staff could repeat.

A third objection is that no customer lost money. The order says there were no known unauthorized transfers. The rule does not require harm. It requires a program designed to detect, prevent and mitigate identity theft, and the Safeguards Rule requires procedures reasonably designed to protect customer information. The intruders had the ability, the order says, to reach a platform used to initiate distributions and execute trades, and they continued attempting to obtain distributions and information after leaving. The absence of a loss was not evidence that the controls worked.

A fourth objection is that a $1 million penalty for a firm of that size is small, so the case changed little. The penalty was one element. The order also required an independent consultant to review the policies and procedures under both rules, with recommendations the firm had to adopt or answer within set periods. For a compliance function, the undertakings are the more expensive part.

A fifth objection is that the four-part split is artificial, because a single control, strong multi-factor authentication for everyone, would have stopped the intrusion. Strong authentication would have helped, and the firm adopted it afterward. But the split still holds. Authentication is a coverage control. It does not update a stale program, it does not tell a call center agent what to do when a customer’s email address changes the same day as a document request, and it does not tell responders what ends an active session. A firm that fixes authentication and stops there has fixed one part of four.

What a compliance officer can test this quarter

The four parts translate into checks that can be run without waiting for an exam or an incident. For each, the evidence matters more than the policy text.

  • Currency: find the date the identity theft program was last substantively changed, as distinct from re-approved. List what changed in the business and in observed fraud since then, and check that the program reflects both.
  • Ownership: confirm who the board has designated to oversee the program, and look for evidence of that person’s involvement in the last year beyond a signature.
  • Response: for each red flag the program names, write the action, the role that takes it and the timing. Flag every action that waits until after the call or the next business day.
  • Watch lists and flags: test whether known-fraud phone numbers and account flags actually reach the staff handling calls, at the moment of the call, and whether any automated process can clear them.
  • Coverage: list every group with access to customer information, including contractors, affiliated advisers and outsourced call centers. For each, compare the authentication, session and device controls with those applied to employees.
  • Containment: for each system with customer data, test what ends an active session and record the results in the incident playbook.

The checks also produce the evidence an examiner will ask for. An examination of an identity theft program looks at the written program, but the Voya order shows the SEC also looked at training attendance, the handling of individual support calls, informal procedures, scan results and the firm’s understanding of its own systems. A compliance officer who can produce, for each of the four parts, a dated record of the last test and what it found is better placed than one who can produce only the approved program and its board minute.

Firms that run independent contractor networks should add one more check: whether the contract or affiliation agreement with each representative gives the firm the right to require the controls the program needs. If the firm cannot require a device scan, a timeout or an authentication method, its policy saying so is not reasonably designed for that group. That is a contracting fix as much as a security one.

Credit unions and banks can run the same checks against their own rules. The structure of the identity theft program requirements is shared, so the four parts, currency, response, coverage and containment, apply without translation. Only the names of the regulators and the rule citations change.

Each check produces a finding or a record that the control works. Either is better than a program that describes controls nobody has tested. The order’s lesson for compliance officers, as we read it, is that the program document is the start of the evidence, not the evidence itself.

With hindsight

The SEC returned to the identity theft rule in 2022, with three cases at once. On July 27, 2022, it charged J.P. Morgan Securities, UBS Financial Services and TradeStation Securities with violations of Regulation S-ID. According to the orders, from at least January 2017 to October 2019 the firms’ programs did not include reasonable policies and procedures to identify relevant red flags and incorporate them, to respond appropriately to detected red flags, or to ensure the programs were updated periodically. The individual findings repeated the Voya themes: inadequate oversight of service provider arrangements, failure to involve the board, failure to train staff and, at UBS, failure to periodically review new or existing account types. Without admitting or denying the findings, each firm agreed to be censured, to cease and desist from future violations and to pay a penalty: $1.2 million for J.P. Morgan Securities, $925,000 for UBS and $425,000 for TradeStation. The acting chief of the SEC enforcement unit that brought the cases said in the announcement that firms must design and operate programs tailored to their businesses and update them as identity theft threats change, which is close to what the Voya announcement had said.

The Safeguards Rule changed more. On May 16, 2024, the SEC adopted amendments to Regulation S-P, published in the Federal Register on June 3, 2024 and effective August 2, 2024. They require covered institutions, including broker-dealers, investment companies, registered investment advisers and transfer agents, to adopt written policies and procedures for an incident response program reasonably designed to detect, respond to and recover from unauthorized access to or use of customer information. The program must include notice to affected individuals as soon as practicable, and no later than 30 days after the institution becomes aware that unauthorized access has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred, with limited exceptions. Policies must be reasonably designed to ensure that service providers notify the institution as soon as possible, and no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of a breach affecting a customer information system they maintain. The SEC said the notice must include details about the incident, the breached data and how affected individuals can respond to protect themselves. It described the amendments as updating rules first adopted in 2000 to address the expanded use of technology and the risks that came with it. The rule gave larger entities 18 months after publication to comply and smaller entities 24 months.

Rule 201 itself, as it read in the eCFR on November 1, 2026, still carried the same elements the Voya order applied: a written program appropriate to the firm’s size and complexity, procedures to identify, detect and respond to red flags, periodic updating, board or senior management involvement, staff training and oversight of service providers. Rule 201 remained in place alongside the 2024 Regulation S-P amendments, which added an incident response and notification layer to the Safeguards Rule. In our reading, that layer addresses the containment and notification side of the Voya facts, while the currency, response and coverage findings still depend on how each firm runs its identity theft program.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.

  • Regulation S-ID
  • Regulation S-P
  • identity theft
  • SEC enforcement
  • broker-dealers
  • independent contractors