52 articles · 2015 · page 3 of 3
Articles
Week of March 23, 2015
An API instead of a portal: the 2015 meaningful use proposals drew health IT’s next architecture
The Stage 3 and 2015 Edition proposals, released March 20, 2015, were debated for their thresholds. Their lasting content was four architectural layers: API access, a common data set, exchange that incorporates, and certification that discloses. The layers outlived the program.
Week of March 16, 2015
Premera’s breach response was judged by what its call center told members
Premera disclosed its breach on March 17, 2015, then mailed millions of letters and staffed phones. Four years later, states cited what agents had told callers. After a breach, every promise made to members is evidence.
Week of March 9, 2015
Why CCAR 2015’s failures were priced in dividends and paid for in data
In March 2015 the Fed passed every large bank on the numbers yet stopped two from paying out, over how their plans were built. Capital planning turned into a spending decision on data, models and controls, bought under examiners’ deadlines.
Week of March 2, 2015
When the sender sorts the archive: records classification after the State Department email disclosure
The March 2015 disclosure that a former Secretary of State used a personal account for official email exposed one weakness above others: the person who created the messages decided which were records. NARA had already described role-based and automated alternatives.
Week of February 23, 2015
One label, four variables: what Title II reclassification taught regulated buyers about classification risk
The FCC’s February 2015 vote reclassified broadband as a telecommunications service. That label set who regulated providers, what they owed, how rules were enforced and how long they lasted. Each moved again, as vendor labels inside regulated institutions can.
Week of February 16, 2015
Superfish showed that whoever controls the root store decides what HTTPS means
Adware preloaded on Lenovo consumer laptops added a shared root certificate and broke HTTPS for anyone holding its key. For institutions that inspect their own traffic, the root store, signing key, upstream check and removal path are architecture to own.
Week of February 9, 2015
Washington built cyber sharing hubs in February 2015 and left the reading to understaffed recipients
In one week the White House announced a cyber intelligence center for policymakers and an order to multiply private sharing groups. Both moved information. Neither paid for the analysts at counties, small agencies and hospitals who had to act on it.
Week of February 2, 2015
Anthem’s data left through an administrator’s login, which made encryption the wrong debate
Anthem disclosed in February 2015 that attackers had taken records on up to 78.8 million people. They used valid database credentials, so the controls that mattered were privilege, retention and detection, not encryption at rest.
Week of January 26, 2015
HHS counted value-based payment in dollars, and providers paid for it in data
HHS’s January 2015 Medicare targets measured the share of spending inside alternative payment models. The money that varied with results was small next to what providers had to buy, build and staff to earn it.
Week of January 19, 2015
The franc floor’s three calm years were the most dangerous data in the risk system
When Switzerland dropped its euro floor and the ECB launched bond buying, models built on a managed price failed in four ways: the history, the number range, the price path and the client. Each was a data assumption, not bad luck.
Week of January 12, 2015
Congress bought the threat-sharing half of the 2015 cyber package and left breach notice to the states
In January 2015 the White House asked government to play four cyber roles: clearinghouse, breach referee, prosecutor and privacy guardian. Only the clearinghouse passed in anything like the proposed form, and agencies still work inside that split.
Week of January 5, 2015
Morgan Stanley’s insider leak was an entitlement failure that exit controls could not catch
The January 2015 disclosure read as a data-loss story. Later findings showed four stages where one adviser’s downloads could have been stopped, and the firm’s best-documented controls guarded only the last two.