The CLOUD Act made the provider’s control, not the data center’s country, the reach of a US warrant
Signed on March 23, 2018, the CLOUD Act required providers to produce data in their possession, custody or control under US process, wherever it was stored. For regulated customers, a region clause stopped settling the question. Contract terms on notice, challenge and keys mattered more.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
Signed on March 23, 2018, the CLOUD Act required providers to produce data in their possession, custody or control under US process, wherever it was stored. For regulated customers, a region clause stopped settling the question. Contract terms on notice, challenge and keys mattered more.
- The week On Friday, March 23, 2018, Congress enacted and the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625.
- Reach: control decides, location does not Section 2713 is one sentence.
- Challenge: a narrow door for providers The second part governs resistance.
- Foreign orders: other governments at the provider’s door The third part reverses the direction.
- The customer’s levers: who is asked, who is told, and who holds keys The fourth part gives a buyer the widest room.
- How the parts differ for banks, health systems and agencies In our reading, a bank’s cloud provider is a third party whose services the bank is expected to oversee.
- The strongest objections One objection is that location remains decisive for other laws.
- With hindsight The Microsoft case ended within weeks of the act.
The week
On Friday, March 23, 2018, Congress enacted and the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625. Division V of that act was the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, known as the CLOUD Act. It changed the Stored Communications Act, the federal law under which US authorities require providers to disclose electronic communications and records.
The central change was a new section of title 18, section 2713. It says a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall comply with the chapter’s obligations to preserve, back up or disclose communications and records. The obligation covers material “within such provider’s possession, custody, or control.” It applies “regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.” The US Code notes the section was added on March 23, 2018.
The act opened with congressional findings. They said timely access to electronic data held by communications-service providers is an essential part of government efforts to protect public safety and combat serious crime, including terrorism. They said those efforts were being impeded by the inability to access data stored outside the United States that is in the custody, control or possession of providers subject to US jurisdiction. The findings also said foreign governments increasingly seek data held by providers in the United States, and that providers face potential conflicting legal obligations.
The act added a narrow procedure for providers to resist. A new subsection, 2703(h), lets a provider move to modify or quash legal process seeking the contents of communications. The provider must reasonably believe that the customer is not a United States person and does not reside in the United States. It must also believe that disclosure would create a material risk of violating the laws of a “qualifying foreign government.” The motion is due within 14 days of service, absent agreement or a court extension.
A qualifying foreign government is one with an executive agreement in force under a new section 2523, whose laws give providers similar opportunities to challenge orders. The court may modify or quash only on three findings. Disclosure would cause the provider to violate that government’s laws. The interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances, dictate that the process be modified or quashed. And the customer is not a US person and does not reside in the United States. The act listed comity factors for the court to weigh. A separate rule of construction said the section did not affect common-law comity standards for process outside the new procedure.
Section 2523 set conditions for those executive agreements. The Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, must certify to Congress that the foreign government’s law and practice meet listed privacy and civil liberties protections. Orders under an agreement may not intentionally target a United States person or a person in the United States. They must relate to serious crime, identify a specific person, account, address, device or other identifier, and be subject to independent review. Agreements may not require providers to be able to decrypt data, nor prevent them from doing so.
The act also gave Congress a role. A certified agreement enters into force no earlier than 180 days after notice to Congress, unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. The Attorney General must review and may renew a determination every five years. Conforming amendments let providers disclose data in response to orders from a foreign government covered by such an agreement without violating US law.
The act arrived in the middle of a pending Supreme Court case. In United States v. Microsoft Corporation, No. 17-2, the government sought, under a section 2703 warrant, emails that Microsoft had stored on a server in Ireland, as the department’s later white paper described the case. The Second Circuit had ruled for Microsoft on July 14, 2016. The Supreme Court heard argument on February 27, 2018.
On March 23, the Solicitor General wrote to the Clerk of the Court. The letter restated the question presented: whether a US email provider must comply with a probable-cause-based warrant by disclosing, in the United States, communications within its control, even if it had decided to store them abroad. It advised the Court that the CLOUD Act had been enacted and quoted section 2713. It said the government was determining whether, and to what extent, the act affected the case, and would file a supplemental filing promptly.
Cloud data location can look like an engineering choice or a privacy promise. We read the CLOUD Act as a procurement event. Before March 23, 2018, a regulated organization could believe that storing data in a particular country affected which governments could compel its provider to produce it. The Microsoft litigation gave that belief a legal argument. Section 2713 took the argument away for US process served on providers subject to US jurisdiction.
Our argument is that the act moved the useful part of a cloud contract. A region clause still determines where data sits for latency, resilience and other laws. It no longer settles who can reach the data through the provider. What a customer can still shape is what happens around a demand: who is asked first, who is told, who challenges, and whether the provider can read what it hands over.
We take the act in four parts, each governing a different actor and moment. Together they cover every path by which a government demand can reach a customer’s data held by a provider:
- Reach: which providers US process can compel, and how far.
- Challenge: when a provider can resist US process on grounds of foreign law.
- Foreign orders: when other governments can serve orders on US providers directly.
- The customer’s levers: what an enterprise customer can still decide, by contract and by design.
After the four parts we look at how the picture differs for banks, health systems and public agencies, at the strongest objections, and at what a buyer could put in a contract review.
Reach: control decides, location does not
Section 2713 is one sentence. Its operative test is possession, custody or control. Location is expressly irrelevant. A provider that controls data in a datacenter abroad must preserve, back up or disclose it in response to valid US process, as it would for data in the United States.
What the act did not change
The Department of Justice took pains to describe the change as a clarification. Its April 2019 white paper said the amendment did not give US law enforcement any new legal authority to acquire data. It said the CLOUD Act does not create any new form of warrant. In the department’s account, the amendment confirmed the scope of existing requirements for providers subject to US jurisdiction.
The white paper also said the act does not expand the jurisdiction of the United States. A US court must have jurisdiction over an entity with possession or control over data in order to require its disclosure. It added that the analysis remains the same regardless of corporate structure, and that whether a company exercises sufficient control over data held by a subsidiary is a fact-dependent inquiry.
Preservation and records as well as content
Section 2713 covers more than disclosure of content. Its text reaches the obligations to preserve, back up or disclose “the contents of a wire or electronic communication and any record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.” Records about an account, such as subscriber details and activity logs, are within its scope along with the messages themselves.
That breadth matters for a customer’s inventory. A region clause may cover primary storage of content. Backups, replicas, support tickets and service logs may sit elsewhere, under the same provider’s control. Each is a record the provider holds about the customer. A customer mapping its exposure should list those secondary stores, because the act draws no line between them and the primary copy.
Why that shifts the question to the provider
Read together, section 2713 and the white paper move the question from the data to the provider. A customer asking whether US process can reach its data should ask whether its provider, or an affiliate with control, is subject to US jurisdiction. The datacenter’s country does not answer that question.
This is the procurement consequence. A customer that chose a region in order to keep data beyond US process was buying a feature the law no longer supplied, if its provider was subject to US jurisdiction and controlled the data. A customer that wants a different answer has to look at the provider’s corporate structure and control, not its map of regions.
Support access and affiliates
Control can also run through people. A provider that operates globally may give support engineers in several countries the ability to access customer environments under defined procedures. Those engineers may work for affiliates of the contracting entity. The white paper’s statement that control over data held by a subsidiary is a fact-dependent inquiry applies in both directions: an affiliate’s access can be part of how control is exercised.
For a buyer, this turns support terms into part of the legal analysis. The buyer needs to know which entities’ staff can access the environment, from where and under what approval. It also needs to know whether the customer approves access case by case or the provider decides. A customer that approves each support session holds a record of who touched its data. That record is useful whatever the reason for a later question.
Control as a design property
Control is partly a legal question and partly a technical one. A provider that cannot access the plaintext of customer content holds data in its possession that it cannot read. The act does not address decryption, as the next parts show. Our reading is that the more a customer’s architecture limits what the provider can produce, the less the reach question matters for that data. Limiting access is a design choice, and it has costs.
Which providers the act covers
The act applies to providers of electronic communication service or remote computing service. The DOJ white paper quoted the definition of remote computing service in 18 U.S.C. 2711: the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system. The words “to the public” limit the category.
That definition raises a question for organizations that use managed service providers, resellers and hosting firms. A firm that runs systems for one customer under contract may stand in a different position from a public cloud. Which category a given vendor falls into is a legal question. Counsel should confirm it for significant vendors, because the answer determines which rules govern a demand served on them.
For the customer’s own systems the question also arises. An organization that runs its own email or file storage for its staff is not, by that fact, providing services to the public. Demands for data on its own systems come to it directly, under whatever process applies. The CLOUD Act’s location rule concerns providers; an organization’s own records follow the ordinary rules for compelled production.
Operational detail
For a buyer, the reach part produces a short set of facts to record for each significant cloud service. Which legal entity provides the service. Whether that entity or a parent is subject to US jurisdiction. Which affiliates operate the infrastructure and support. Whether the provider holds the keys to customer content. These facts belong in the third-party risk file, next to the data location and certifications already recorded there.
The facts change over time. Providers reorganize, acquire and divest. A service sold through a reseller may be operated by a different entity from the one named in the order form. The record needs an owner and a review date, like any other material vendor fact.
The same record helps with questions from the organization’s own customers. A bank’s commercial clients, a health system’s research partners or an agency’s oversight body may ask where data is held and who can reach it. An answer that names only the region is incomplete after March 2018. An answer that names the provider entity, its jurisdiction and the key arrangement is complete and can be kept current.
Challenge: a narrow door for providers
The second part governs resistance. The act gave providers a statutory way to challenge US process on grounds of conflict with foreign law. It made that way narrow on purpose.
Who may challenge, and when
Only the provider files the motion under section 2703(h)(2). It may do so only for process seeking the contents of communications. It must reasonably believe that the customer is not a US person and does not reside in the United States. It must also believe that disclosure would create a material risk of violating the laws of a qualifying foreign government. It has 14 days from service, absent agreement or extension.
The definition of qualifying foreign government is the key limit. It requires an executive agreement in force under section 2523 and reciprocal challenge rights in that government’s law. On March 23, 2018, no such agreement existed. The statutory challenge was therefore unavailable on the day the act was signed.
Fourteen days and the customer’s clock
The 14-day limit runs from service on the provider. The customer may learn of the demand only if the provider is permitted to tell it, and then only when the provider chooses to. A customer that wants its view considered in any challenge needs the provider to involve it early.
That argues for an escalation path in the contract. It would name a contact at the customer for legal demands, require the provider to use it where notice is permitted and set a target time for doing so. Such a term does not bind a court or override a protective order. It makes sure the customer’s legal team is not the last to know when notice is lawful.
What the court weighs
If a motion is filed, the court gives the government a chance to respond. It may modify or quash only if disclosure would cause the provider to violate the qualifying government’s laws, the interests of justice dictate relief and the customer is not a US person or resident. The comity factors include the interests of both governments, the penalties the provider faces, the customer’s location and nationality and connection to the United States, and the provider’s ties to the United States.
The factors also include the importance of the information to the investigation and the likelihood of timely access by means with less serious consequences. That last factor connects to the fourth part of this article. A route that asks the enterprise customer directly is one such means.
What remained outside the statute
The act preserved common-law comity for cases outside the new procedure. Its rule of construction says nothing in the section affects the common-law standards governing comity analysis for other types of process, or for process under section 2703 not covered by the new subsection. A provider facing a conflict with a country that lacks an agreement keeps whatever arguments common law allows.
During any challenge under the new subsection, the provider must preserve the information sought but need not produce it while the motion is pending, unless the court finds that immediate production is necessary to prevent an adverse result. That preserves the evidence while the court decides.
The customer’s position
The customer has no motion of its own under this subsection. Its interests reach the court only if the provider files and argues them. Here the procurement point returns. Whether a provider will consider a challenge, and on what basis, is a policy the provider sets. A customer can ask for it to be stated in the contract.
What a customer can and cannot ask for
There are limits on what a contract can secure here. A provider cannot promise to defeat lawful process, and a court decides any challenge on the statutory factors. A provider also cannot promise notice that a protective order forbids. A clause that purports to do either is unenforceable as written and can mislead the customer’s own risk reporting.
What a customer can ask for is process. The provider can commit to review each demand for legal sufficiency, to narrow overbroad demands where it has grounds, to consider a challenge where the statute or common law appears to allow one, and to keep the customer informed where it lawfully can. Those commitments describe behavior the provider controls.
Operational detail
A buyer can cover three points in due diligence. The first is whether the provider publishes a policy on challenging government demands, including on foreign-law grounds. The second is whether it will commit in the contract to consider a challenge where the statutory conditions or common-law grounds appear to apply. The third is whether it will tell the customer, where permitted, that it has filed one. The answers do not guarantee an outcome. They make the provider’s intended behavior a matter of record.
Foreign orders: other governments at the provider’s door
The third part reverses the direction. Section 2523 lets other governments serve orders on US providers directly, under an executive agreement, without the conflict that US law would otherwise create.
What the agreements change
The act’s findings said a foreign government could order production of data that US law may prohibit a provider from disclosing. The act added exceptions to resolve that conflict for agreement countries. Under the new provisions, a provider may intercept or disclose content in response to an order from a foreign government subject to an executive agreement that the Attorney General has certified. The provider is no longer caught between the foreign order and the US prohibition.
The DOJ white paper was careful about what this does not do. It said there is no requirement under US law that a provider comply with a foreign order, and the act creates none. Any enforcement must happen under the foreign country’s law. A provider can challenge the order under that law to the extent it allows. The agreements remove legal restrictions; they do not impose new obligations.
The protections built in
The statute’s conditions protect certain people and not others. Orders under an agreement may not intentionally target a US person or a person in the United States. They may not target a non-US person abroad in order to obtain information about a US person. A foreign government may not issue an order at the request of the US government or to obtain information for it or a third country.
Orders must be for serious crime, including terrorism, and must identify a specific person, account, address, device or other identifier. They must comply with the issuing country’s law and be subject to review by a court, judge, magistrate or other independent authority. The foreign government must agree to periodic US review of its compliance. The US government keeps the right to render an agreement inapplicable to a particular order.
Interception as well as stored data
The agreements reach further than stored data. The statute sets extra conditions for orders to intercept communications in real time. An interception order must be for a fixed, limited duration and may last no longer than reasonably necessary. It may be issued only if the same information could not reasonably be obtained by a less intrusive method.
For a customer, interception is a different risk from production of stored records. It concerns live communications on a provider’s service. The same protections for US persons apply. A multinational that runs communications for staff abroad on a US provider should know that the agreements contemplate interception under those conditions.
How agreements come into force
The statute gives Congress a window to object. An agreement certified by the Attorney General enters into force no earlier than 180 days after notice to Congress, unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. The Attorney General must review and may renew each determination every five years and report on renewals to the judiciary and foreign affairs committees.
Those steps produce public markers. A buyer tracking exposure can watch for notices of certified agreements, as well as signatures. The marker that matters for providers is entry into force, because only then does a foreign government become a qualifying foreign government for the challenge procedure and the conflict exceptions.
Who is exposed
For a US-based regulated organization, the protections cover its US employees and customers. They do not cover a non-US employee abroad, such as staff at a foreign branch or subsidiary, who is the subject of a foreign investigation. A provider serving that organization could receive an order from an agreement country about that employee’s account.
Our reading is that this exposure sits within the employer’s ordinary obligations under local law. The act did not create the investigation. It changed the channel by which the evidence could be obtained from a US provider. An organization with staff abroad should know which channel applies.
Notice under foreign orders
Notice is governed by the issuing country. The white paper said agreements do not create obligations or restrictions on providers. The issuing country’s law governs whether or how a provider may be prohibited from notifying an account holder. A customer that relies on its provider’s notice policy should know that foreign law may override it for orders under an agreement.
The act also allowed a provider to tell a qualifying foreign government about US process seeking content of that government’s nationals or residents. Section 2703(h)(5) says doing so does not violate a protective order under section 2705. The notice runs to the government, not to the customer.
Operational detail
For a multinational bank or health organization, the foreign-orders part produces a mapping task. List the countries where the organization has staff or customers whose accounts sit with US providers. Track which of those countries have agreements in force. Record the provider’s policy on responding to foreign orders under an agreement, and on notice to the enterprise customer. Revisit the list when new agreements are announced.
The customer’s levers: who is asked, who is told, and who holds keys
The fourth part gives a buyer the widest room. The act governs providers and governments. It leaves several decisions to the customer and its contract.
Being asked first
The DOJ white paper answered a question that enterprise customers had raised. It asked whether US law enforcement would go directly to service providers for an employee’s information when the enterprise is not otherwise suspected of a crime. The department said the CLOUD Act does not change US law or practice on enterprise customer data.
It then quoted public guidance from its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. The guidance says prosecutors “should seek data directly from the enterprise, if practical,” where doing so will not compromise the investigation. The guidance said that before seeking data from a provider, prosecutors and agents should determine whether the enterprise or the provider is the better source.
That is a policy, not a statutory right, and it has exceptions built in. It still matters for contracts. A provider that receives a demand for enterprise data can ask the requesting authority whether it has considered seeking the data from the customer. A contract can ask the provider to do so where lawful.
Being told
The white paper also addressed notice under US process. It said providers may notify account holders of searches under a US court order unless an independent judge has issued a protective order. Such orders issue when a judge finds reason to believe notification would cause listed harms, such as endangering a person or tampering with evidence. It said Justice Department policy generally limits such orders to one year.
For an enterprise, the account holder may be an employee, not the organization. A contract can ask the provider to notify the enterprise customer where it is permitted to, and to tell the customer when a protective order expires. The provider cannot promise notice that a court forbids.
Holding the keys
Encryption is the lever the act deliberately left alone. Section 2523 requires that agreements create no obligation that providers be able to decrypt data and no limitation preventing them from decrypting. The white paper called the agreements “encryption neutral.” It said the act does not create any new authority to compel providers to decrypt communications.
A customer that holds the keys to its content, so that the provider holds only ciphertext, changes what a provider can produce. Our reading is that this does not defeat lawful process. It sends a demand for readable content back to the party that can read it, which is the customer. The effect matches the department’s stated preference to seek enterprise data from the enterprise.
The trade-offs are concrete. Customer-held keys can limit provider features that need to process content. They place key management, availability and recovery on the customer. They require a decision about who inside the organization responds to a demand that reaches the customer directly. Each of those is a cost to weigh with the benefit.
Who answers a demand that arrives directly
Redirection and customer-held keys have the same consequence. More demands reach the customer itself. A bank or health system already receives subpoenas and court orders for its own records. A demand for data that the organization holds in the cloud, but controls through its own keys, joins that stream.
The response needs owners for distinct tasks. Legal confirms the demand is valid and scoped. The business owner of the data identifies what responds. Security retrieves and decrypts it under a recorded approval. Privacy decides whether notice to the affected person is permitted and appropriate. An organization that has never practiced that sequence will improvise it the first time.
Keeping a record of demands
A further lever is information. A customer can ask its provider to report, where permitted, the demands it has received concerning the customer’s data, with the authority, the date and the outcome. Some demands will come with orders that bar notice for a period. A record kept by the provider and disclosed when the bar lifts lets the customer reconstruct what happened.
That record has uses inside the customer as well. Third-party risk reviews can include it. Internal audit can test whether the contract’s notice terms were honored. Boards of regulated firms that receive reports on vendor risk can see whether government demands on their data are a theoretical or an observed exposure.
Operational detail
The levers turn into contract terms and design choices. A buyer can ask for a government demand clause covering redirection to the customer, notice where permitted, challenge consideration and a record of demands received. It can decide which data classes warrant customer-held keys. It can name an internal owner for legal demands that arrive directly. The procurement team, legal, security and the business owner each hold part of that package.
How the parts differ for banks, health systems and agencies
Banks and other financial institutions
In our reading, a bank’s cloud provider is a third party whose services the bank is expected to oversee. The CLOUD Act adds a legal-demand dimension to that oversight. Banks with foreign branches or subsidiaries have staff and customers outside the United States. The foreign-orders part applies to them directly.
Banks also receive legal process themselves, for customer records. A bank that holds its own keys may receive demands that would otherwise have gone to its provider. Its existing legal process unit is the natural owner. The contract with the provider should say how demands reaching the provider are routed back.
Health systems
A health system’s data in the cloud includes protected health information. In our reading, a cloud provider that maintains that information for the health system is generally in the position of a business associate. HIPAA has its own provisions on disclosures required by law, and counsel should map how a provider’s compelled disclosure fits within the business associate agreement. We do not offer a legal conclusion on that mapping.
The customer’s levers matter here for a further reason. A health system that is asked first can apply its own minimum-necessary and patient-notice practices to a demand. A demand served on the provider passes through the provider’s policy instead.
Public agencies
Public agencies sit on both sides. Some are requesters: state and federal investigative agencies use the Stored Communications Act to obtain evidence from providers. Others are cloud customers whose records include sensitive data on residents. An agency’s procurement office can include the same demand clauses as a private buyer. Its legal office may already handle records requests and subpoenas and can own demands that arrive directly.
For agencies that request data, the act had a different meaning. In our reading, investigators serving process under the Stored Communications Act no longer face the argument that data stored abroad is beyond a warrant, where the provider controls it. They still face the comity procedure where an agreement country’s law is engaged, and the 14-day window in which a provider may move to quash. An agency’s legal office that serves such process should expect those steps and plan its timelines around them.
Organizations outside the United States
Foreign subsidiaries of US organizations face the reverse question. Their local regulators may ask whether a US provider’s control exposes local data to US process. Section 2713 answers that it can. The white paper argued that the act affords respect to foreign law through agreements and comity. A subsidiary that relies on a region clause to answer its regulator should revisit the answer.
The strongest objections
That data location still matters
One objection is that location remains decisive for other laws. European transfer rules, sector rules on outsourcing and contractual commitments to customers all care about location. We agree. Our argument is narrower: location no longer decides the reach of US process served on a provider that controls the data. Other reasons to choose a region are unaffected.
That providers will resist regardless of contracts
A second objection is that large providers already challenge demands as a matter of policy, so contract terms add little. Whatever a provider’s current policy, a policy can change. A contract term records the commitment for the life of the agreement. It also tells the buyer’s own auditors what was promised.
That the act resolved conflicts with foreign law
A third objection is that the act settled the conflict between US process and foreign privacy law. It addressed the conflict only for qualifying foreign governments, through the challenge procedure and the agreements. For countries without an agreement in force, common-law comity remains the only route, and its outcome depends on the court. A customer subject to a foreign law that restricts disclosure to US authorities still has a potential conflict. The act gave its provider a narrower set of tools to raise it than some customers assumed.
That customer-held keys are impractical
A fourth objection is that holding keys breaks services and creates outage risk. It can. For that reason we frame it as a decision by data class, not a universal rule. Some data warrant the cost and some do not.
That the act weakened privacy
A fifth objection is that the act made it easier for governments to reach private data. The DOJ white paper argued the opposite. It said US warrant requirements for content are perhaps the toughest in the world, requiring a sworn showing of probable cause to an independent judge. It said agreements require foreign partners to meet privacy and civil liberties standards. Readers may weigh that account differently. For a buyer, the practical effect is the same: the channels exist, and the contract governs what can be shaped around them.
That demands on enterprise data are rare
A sixth objection is that demands for enterprise data are uncommon, so the effort is out of proportion. We do not know the frequency for any given organization, and we assert none. The contract terms we describe cost little to negotiate at signing and are hard to add later. The internal owner for legal demands is needed whether or not a CLOUD Act case ever arises.
What a buyer could put in a contract review
- Record the legal entity that provides each significant service, its exposure to US jurisdiction and whether it can read customer content.
- Ask for a government demand clause: redirect to the customer where lawful, notice where permitted, consideration of challenge and a log of demands received.
- Map the countries where the organization has staff or customers using US providers, and track which have agreements under section 2523.
- Decide by data class where customer-held keys are worth their cost, and name who responds when a demand arrives directly.
- Name an owner and a review date for these records, since providers and agreements change.
With hindsight
The Microsoft case ended within weeks of the act. On March 30, 2018, the United States moved to vacate the Second Circuit’s judgment and remand with directions to dismiss the case as moot. Microsoft filed a response on April 3. On April 17, 2018, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded in a per curiam opinion, according to its docket. The docket records that the judgment issued on May 21, 2018, and that the record was returned to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on August 29, 2018.
The Department of Justice set out its reading of the act in an April 2019 white paper. It said the act gave US law enforcement no new authority and created no new form of warrant. It said agreements are encryption neutral and that the act creates no authority to compel decryption. It restated the department’s guidance that prosecutors should seek data from the enterprise when practical and when doing so will not compromise the investigation.
Agreements followed. The United States and the United Kingdom signed their agreement on October 3, 2019, according to the department’s CLOUD Act resources page. On July 21, 2022, the two governments said they intended to bring it into force on October 3, 2022. They described it as the first agreement of its kind. The United States and Australia signed an agreement on December 15, 2021. The department’s page also lists the announced start of negotiations with Canada on March 22, 2022. It lists the resumption of US–EU negotiations on electronic evidence on March 3, 2023.
As captured on November 7, 2026, the resources page carried an “Updated October 24, 2023” date and listed no other signed agreements. We have not found a primary source for any later agreement and do not assert one. The page, as captured, also gave no count of orders served under the agreements in force, so we offer none.
Europe built its own system. On July 12, 2023, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence. It lets authorities in one member state order a service provider to produce data through the provider’s designated establishment or legal representative in another. The addressee must transmit requested data within 10 days, or within eight hours in emergency cases, subject to notification rules. The regulation applies from August 18, 2026. It set a later date for one part: the obligation to use a decentralized IT system for written communication applies one year after the Commission adopts implementing acts.
What held up from March 2018 was the shift from location to control. US process reaches data a provider controls, and the European regulation addresses providers through their EU establishments or representatives rather than where data is stored. What changed was the number of channels. A regulated organization using a global provider in 2026 faces US process, agreement-country orders and European orders. Each runs through the provider, under different notice and challenge rules. The contract terms on redirection, notice, challenge and keys are the parts a customer can still write.
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