CMS’s 2015 ACO rule kept an upside-only renewal to hold participants; its 2018 rule ended that track

Medicare’s June 9, 2015 ACO rule let ACOs renew without downside risk at a 50 percent sharing rate. It called participation in that second term a key driver of projected savings. In 2018 CMS ended it, saying one-sided ACOs had increased spending relative to benchmarks.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

Medicare’s June 9, 2015 ACO rule let ACOs renew without downside risk at a 50 percent sharing rate. It called participation in that second term a key driver of projected savings. In 2018 CMS ended it, saying one-sided ACOs had increased spending relative to benchmarks.

  1. The week The rule put numbers on its choices.
  2. The price of entry: what CMS estimated an ACO spends The rule’s regulatory impact analysis set out per-ACO assumptions.
  3. The return: what each track let an ACO earn or lose CMS did not describe this as a permanent home.
  4. The inputs: what CMS supplied that changed the ACO’s costs The rule changed what data an ACO received and when.
  5. The term: how long the deal lasted and how the next was priced CMS listed the factors it would weigh.
  6. How the rule played out for different organizations The rule said about half of participating ACOs had fewer than 10,000 assigned beneficiaries. [1] For them, CMS’s cost assumptions mattered most, because fixed costs were spread over fewer people.
  7. Objections, and where the argument stops The strongest objection is that CMS had little choice.
  8. Checks for leaders weighing a value-based contract These are our own suggestions, not program requirements.
  9. With hindsight The 2018 rule explained why.

The week

On June 9, 2015, the Federal Register published a final rule from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services revising the Medicare Shared Savings Program. [1] The rule, CMS-1461-F, appeared at 80 FR 32692 and amended 42 CFR Part 425. [1] Most of its provisions took effect on August 3, 2015. [1] Changes to three sections on beneficiary notification and claims data sharing took effect later: two on November 1, 2015, and one on January 1, 2016. [1]

The program it revised was created by section 3022 of the Affordable Care Act. [1] Under it, doctors, hospitals and other providers that join an accountable care organization keep receiving ordinary Medicare fee-for-service payments. [1] The organization may also receive a share of savings if it meets quality and savings requirements. [1] The rule said more than 400 organizations were participating. [1] It said most had chosen Track 1, the one-sided model, with only 5 ACOs participating under Track 2 as a starting option. [1] About half, it said, were small, each with fewer than 10,000 assigned beneficiaries. [1]

Before the rule, the regulations required an ACO in Track 1 to move to Track 2, with shared losses, for its second agreement period. [1] The proposal had described that transition as possibly too steep for some organizations. [1]

The rule finished a process that began with a proposal on December 8, 2014, at 79 FR 72760. [1] CMS said it received 275 timely comments. [1] The proposal had offered ACOs a second agreement period under the one-sided model, but at a maximum sharing rate of 40 percent instead of 50. [1] Commenters, the rule recorded, warned that a reduction would discourage ACOs from staying in or joining the program. [1] They pointed to up-front investments and operating costs for infrastructure “(such as IT solutions)”, staffing, care coordination and quality reporting. [1]

CMS did not finalize the reduction. [1] The final rule let ACOs renew for an additional agreement period under one-sided risk at the same 50 percent sharing rate. [1] It modified Track 2 to give ACOs a choice of symmetrical minimum savings and loss rates. [1] It created Track 3, a two-sided model with a sharing rate of up to 75 percent, prospective assignment of beneficiaries and an option to apply for a waiver of the skilled nursing facility 3-day rule. [1]

The rule also changed how benchmarks reset in a second agreement period, weighting each benchmark year equally and adding back part of an ACO’s earlier savings. [1] It expanded beneficiary-identifiable data made available to ACOs. [1] It simplified how beneficiaries could decline claims data sharing, moving the process to 1-800-MEDICARE. [1]

The rule put numbers on its choices. Its summary estimated median net federal savings of $780 million for calendar years 2016 through 2018, against $540 million at baseline without the changes. [1] It called improved participation in a second agreement period “a key driver” of that increase. [1] It estimated that at least 90 percent of eligible ACOs would renew, mainly under Track 1. [1] It estimated ACO start-up and operating costs of $822 million over those three years, against median shared savings payments of $1,130 million. [1]

Medicare’s 2015 accountable care rule is remembered for creating Track 3, the two-sided option that later became the program’s ENHANCED track. [2] For the finance and strategy leaders of health systems and physician groups, its more consequential decision was elsewhere. The rule let ACOs stay in the program for a second three-year term without any downside risk, at the same 50 percent sharing rate. [1]

CMS had proposed to cut that rate to 40 percent. [1] It changed course after commenters described what running an ACO cost. [1] The rule’s own economic analysis then depended on that choice. It projected that keeping ACOs in the program would raise federal savings and produce a net private benefit for participants. [1]

Our argument is that the 2015 rule made the program’s economics a bet on retention, priced by CMS’s own estimates of what ACOs spend. In our reading, it treated the cost of infrastructure as the main barrier. The rule itself said that keeping the 50 percent rate could produce payments that ACOs could use to prepare their infrastructure and financial reserves for moving to risk. [1] In our reading, CMS’s 2018 rule concluded the bet had not paid off. It said one-sided ACOs had increased Medicare spending relative to their benchmarks, and it discontinued Track 1. [2]

We take the rule in four parts:

  1. The price of entry: what CMS estimated an ACO spends to start and run.
  2. The return: what each track let an ACO earn or lose.
  3. The inputs: what CMS supplied, chiefly data and assignment, that changed the ACO’s own costs.
  4. The term: how long the deal lasted and how the next one was priced.

The parts do not overlap. The first is cost, the second revenue and liability, the third the inputs CMS provided and the fourth duration and renewal. After them we look at how the rule played out for different kinds of organizations, take the objections, and end with checks a finance or procurement leader could run.

The price of entry: what CMS estimated an ACO spends

CMS’s cost assumptions

The rule’s regulatory impact analysis set out per-ACO assumptions. CMS kept its 2011 assumption of an average of $0.58 million for start-up investment costs. [1] It revised its assumption for average ongoing annual operating costs to $0.86 million, down from $1.27 million in the 2011 rule. [1]

CMS explained the revision. It said the change related to the lower average number of beneficiaries assigned to existing ACOs. [1] The earlier figure had been based on the larger organizations in the Physician Group Practice Demonstration. [1] CMS also said the rule’s streamlining of administrative requirements would help lower costs further. [1]

In our reading, those two sentences carry an assumption about scale. Operating costs were expected to fall with fewer beneficiaries. That makes sense for some costs, such as care coordinators. Other costs, such as a data platform or quality reporting, have a floor that does not shrink with the population.

Aggregate costs at two participation levels

CMS translated these assumptions into totals for calendar years 2016 through 2018. It estimated aggregate start-up investment and ongoing operating costs of $129 million for 50 ACOs at baseline, without the rule’s changes. [1] Under the rule’s policies, it estimated $822 million for 300 ACOs. [1] It cautioned that actual costs for individual ACOs were likely to vary and that totals could be significantly lower or higher. [1]

For 2016 alone, CMS assumed roughly one-quarter of ACOs would incur start-up costs. [1] It put aggregate start-up costs that year at $12 million at baseline and $58 million under the rule’s policies. [1] It estimated aggregate ongoing operating costs from $43 million at baseline to $258 million under the policies. [1]

Tasks CMS named, and the burden it cut

The analysis named the work that drove these costs. CMS said ACOs bear costs in building the organizational, financial and legal infrastructure needed to participate. [1] It named tasks such as quality reporting, conducting patient surveys and investing in infrastructure for care coordination. [1]

CMS also listed the changes it made to reduce that burden. They included a simpler application and renewal process for certain ACOs with experience in the Pioneer ACO Model or the program itself. [1] They also included streamlined beneficiary data sharing and an exemption from marketing review for changes to the public reporting template. [1] In our reading, each of these was a small reduction in administrative labor, not in the clinical or technology investment.

What commenters said the money bought

The rule’s summary of comments gives a list of what the costs covered. Commenters described up-front investments for ACO formation and ongoing costs for infrastructure, which they illustrated with IT solutions. [1] They also named process development, staffing, population management, care coordination, quality reporting and patient education. [1] Some said the 50 percent sharing rate was already too low, and a reduction would cut the potential for a return on investment. [1]

Commenters also pointed to the program’s first-year results. The rule recorded their view that few ACOs had shared in savings, so it was too soon to reduce the rate. [1] It also recorded their concern that the minimum savings rate was an added hurdle before a Track 1 ACO could share in anything. [1]

What the cost part meant for a buyer

For a chief financial officer, the cost part framed the purchase. An ACO needed analytics, care management tools, quality reporting and staff before it could earn anything. CMS’s assumptions put a number on that spend. [1] They did not say which costs were fixed and which scaled with membership.

In our reading, a buyer in 2015 had to separate those categories. Fixed costs pushed toward larger ACOs or shared services. Variable costs could be matched to assigned beneficiaries. Contracts that priced every component per member converted fixed costs into variable ones, at a premium.

Build, buy or share

The cost part also posed a sourcing question. An ACO could build its analytics and care management capability, buy it from a vendor, or draw on a parent health system’s shared services. The rule did not favor any of these. [1] Its cost assumptions were averages across all of them. [1]

In our reading, each route carried a different risk. Building put fixed cost on the ACO’s own books before any savings arrived. Buying converted some of it into fees, but tied the ACO to a vendor’s contract term and data formats. Sharing a parent system’s capability lowered cash cost but made the ACO dependent on priorities set elsewhere. The right answer depended on size, which the rule said varied widely. [1]

The return: what each track let an ACO earn or lose

Track 1 after the rule

Under the rule, a Track 1 ACO in a second agreement period kept a 50 percent maximum sharing rate. [1] CMS said it believed that decreasing the rate would provide little if any incentive for ACOs to move to risk and could leave them “languishing under the one-sided model.” [1] Track 1 ACOs still had to meet a minimum savings rate before sharing in savings, as commenters had noted. [1]

CMS did not describe this as a permanent home. The rule kept its position that one three-year period under Track 1 was sufficient for many organizations to progress toward risk. [1] It then gave them a second one anyway. In our reading, that combination signaled that CMS valued participation above pace.

The minimum savings rate and size

The minimum savings rate decided how much an ACO had to save before it shared anything. For Track 1 it varied with the number of assigned beneficiaries. [1] The rule cited the 2011 rule’s table, under which a Track 1 ACO with 5,000 assigned beneficiaries had a minimum savings rate of 3.9. [1] In comments on Track 2’s thresholds, several commenters said small and rural ACOs were disadvantaged by being held to a 3.9 percent rate when larger ACOs had 2.0 percent. [1] They said such entities would need almost twice the savings of larger ACOs to receive a bonus, which discouraged them from moving into Track 2. [1]

In our reading, this made size an economic variable in its own right. A small ACO paid fixed costs over fewer beneficiaries and faced a higher bar before any return. The second upside-only term gave it more time, but did not lower the bar.

Track 2 after the rule

Before the rule, a Track 2 ACO could receive up to 60 percent of savings, capped at 15 percent of its updated benchmark. [1] It was accountable for 40 to 60 percent of losses, depending on quality, subject to a cap of 5 percent of its benchmark in the first performance year, 7.5 percent in the second and 10 percent in the third and later years. [1] The rule said only 5 ACOs had chosen Track 2 as a starting option. [1]

The rule kept Track 2’s other features but changed its thresholds. [1] For agreement periods beginning in January 2016 or later, a Track 2 ACO could choose among three options. [1] It could take a 0 percent minimum savings and loss rate, or a symmetrical rate between 0.5 and 2.0 percent in 0.5 percent steps. [1] Or it could take a rate that varied with its number of beneficiaries. [1]

Track 3

Track 3 raised both sides of the bet. The rule applied a shared savings rate of up to 75 percent with risk for up to 75 percent of losses, depending on quality. [1] High quality could not reduce the loss share below 40 percent. [1] Savings could not exceed 20 percent of the ACO’s updated benchmark, and losses were capped at 15 percent. [1] Track 3 ACOs could choose among the same minimum savings and loss rate options as Track 2. [1]

Commenters warned about the downside. The rule recorded one commenter’s concern that Track 3’s loss rate of up to 75 percent and 15 percent cap would be counterproductive, given low participation in Track 2. [1] CMS kept the parameters it had proposed. [1]

Why the baseline looked so poor

The rule’s comparison rested on an assumption about what ACOs would do without the changes. Under the old rules, renewing ACOs had to move to Track 2. [1] CMS estimated that fewer than 15 percent of ACOs would opt to continue under downside risk in Track 2. [1] It said it had revised that estimate down from 25 percent in the proposal, based on emerging program experience. [1]

CMS also estimated that up to half of those re-enrolling ACOs would drop out by 2018 to avoid future shared loss liability. [1] The proposal had estimated baseline median net savings of $730 million; the final rule said the decrease to $540 million was directly related to the revised estimate. [1] In our reading, the baseline was a forecast of exits. The rule’s higher savings estimate was a forecast that ACOs would stay.

CMS’s view of the aggregate return

The rule’s analysis compared two scenarios for 2016 through 2018. At baseline, it estimated median shared savings payments of $160 million, $50 million in shared losses and $129 million in costs, for a net private cost of $19 million. [1] Under the rule’s policies, it estimated median payments of $1,130 million, $30 million in losses and $822 million in costs, for a net private benefit of $278 million. [1]

CMS gave a range for payments. Its 10th and 90th percentile estimates were $960 million and $1,310 million. [1] For costs it gave averages, and it said actual costs for individual ACOs were likely to vary and that total costs could be significantly lower or greater than its estimates. [1] In our reading, the net private benefit was therefore sensitive to the cost side.

What the return part meant for a buyer

The aggregate estimate was for the program, not for any one ACO. For a single organization, the return depended on whether it beat its benchmark by more than its minimum savings rate, and by how much. The rule’s structure meant that most of the investment came first and the return, if any, came after a performance year was settled.

In our reading, an ACO evaluating Track 1 in 2015 was buying an option. It paid fixed costs for the chance of a share of savings, with no liability for losses. Track 3 was a different instrument: a larger share of savings in exchange for real liability, and so a need for a repayment mechanism. [1]

The inputs: what CMS supplied that changed the ACO’s costs

Claims data from the start

The rule changed what data an ACO received and when. CMS finalized sharing beneficiary-identifiable claims data with Track 1 and 2 ACOs at the start of an agreement period. [1] The data covered beneficiaries on their preliminary prospective lists, or who had received a primary care service from an ACO participant in the most recent 12 months. [1] Track 3 ACOs could receive claims data on their prospectively assigned beneficiaries. [1] These changes took effect January 1, 2016. [1]

CMS gave a reason for the date. It said ACOs might need to improve their ability to accept larger amounts of claims data. [1] In our reading, that sentence is a procurement note. More data from CMS meant less data an ACO had to build or buy elsewhere, but more capacity to receive, store and analyze it.

A simpler opt-out

The rule moved the process for beneficiaries to decline claims data sharing to 1-800-MEDICARE. [1] Commenters said the old process was cumbersome. ACOs had to track opt-out preferences and exchange monthly files of them with CMS. [1] CMS said beneficiaries were used to contacting 1-800-MEDICARE and that it was staffed with customer service representatives. [1]

ACO participants had to use CMS-approved template language to notify beneficiaries about participation and the opportunity to decline data sharing. [1] CMS tied the timing to the 2016 Medicare & You Handbook, which would tell beneficiaries about the 1-800-MEDICARE option. [1] In our reading, this removed an operating cost from the ACO and placed the record of consent with CMS.

Prospective assignment in Track 3

Track 3 used prospective assignment. [1] CMS finalized assigning beneficiaries to a Track 3 ACO at the start of the year, based on a 12-month assignment window before the performance year. [1] Once assigned, a beneficiary could not be assigned to a different ACO for that year. [1] CMS also agreed to perform exclusions quarterly and include them in reports to Track 3 ACOs. [1]

For an ACO’s operations, prospective assignment changes the work. Care managers know their population at the start of the year. Analytics can be built around a fixed list. In our reading, this was one of Track 3’s most practical attractions, separate from its sharing rate.

Who counts as assigned

Assignment decides which beneficiaries’ spending counts against an ACO’s benchmark. The rule changed the codes that count as primary care services, adding transitional care management codes 99495 and 99496 and the chronic care management code 99490. [1] It changed how services by certain specialists, nurse practitioners, physician assistants and clinical nurse specialists were treated in the assignment steps. [1] It also clarified how services in federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics were counted. [1]

For an ACO’s economics, these are not technical details. They change which patients are assigned, and so which costs the ACO is measured on. In our reading, a finance team in 2015 needed to rerun its population and benchmark models under the new rules before deciding whether to renew.

The SNF waiver

The rule adopted a waiver of the skilled nursing facility 3-day rule for Track 3 ACOs. [1] It allowed Medicare payment for covered skilled nursing services for prospectively assigned beneficiaries without a prior 3-day inpatient stay. [1] CMS deferred implementation to no earlier than the 2017 performance year, citing the waiver’s operational complexity. [1]

Data the ACO still had to supply

The inputs ran in both directions. CMS supplied claims data and assignment lists. [1] The ACO still had to supply quality reporting, and the rule named conducting patient surveys among the tasks required of an ACO. [1] Participant agreements had to bind participants to the quality reporting requirements and, at exit, to furnish the data needed for the annual quality assessment. [1]

In our reading, this split defined the ACO’s data platform. Inbound claims data was standardized and arrived from one source. Outbound quality data had to be collected from many participants, each with its own records system. The second flow was where an ACO’s integration costs were likely to sit, and where the rule’s cost relief did least.

What the inputs part meant for a buyer

Each input CMS supplied lowered a cost the ACO would otherwise carry, or changed what it had to buy. Earlier claims data reduced dependence on participants’ own records. The opt-out change removed a tracking process. Prospective assignment simplified population management. In our reading, a buyer in 2015 should have priced vendor contracts against these inputs, not against the old process.

The term: how long the deal lasted and how the next was priced

Renewal

The rule added a formal renewal process. [1] An ACO could request renewal before its agreement expired, in a form and by a deadline CMS would set in guidance. [1] An executive with authority to bind the ACO had to certify the request as accurate, complete and truthful. [1]

CMS listed the factors it would weigh. They included whether the ACO met the criteria for its chosen risk model, its history of compliance with program requirements and its ability to repay losses where applicable. [1] They also included whether it met quality performance standards in at least one of the first two years of its previous agreement. [1]

Rebased benchmarks

The rule changed how the next term’s target was set. In resetting the historical benchmark for a second or later agreement, CMS would weight each benchmark year equally. [1] For ACOs entering a second agreement period, CMS would add an adjustment reflecting the average per capita savings the ACO earned in its first period. [1] If an ACO had not generated net savings in its first period, there would be no such adjustment. [1]

CMS also said it intended to propose a rebasing approach that would account for regional costs and trends, in a proposed rule later that summer. [1] For an ACO’s finance team, that announcement meant the next benchmark method was not settled.

Contracts with participants

The rule also set terms for the contracts inside an ACO. The rule required each ACO to have an agreement with each ACO participant that met listed criteria, and gave ACOs until the 2017 performance year to bring agreements with existing participants into line. [1] The only parties could be the ACO and the participant, and each had to be signed by someone authorized to bind it. [1] The participant had to agree, and ensure its billing clinicians agreed, to comply with program requirements. [1]

The agreement had to set out the participant’s rights and obligations, including quality reporting and beneficiary notification. [1] It had to describe how the opportunity to share in savings would encourage the participant to follow the ACO’s quality and evidence-based medicine guidelines. [1] It had to let the ACO take remedial action, including corrective action plans, denial of incentive payments and termination. [1]

Two terms bear directly on the investment case. The agreement had to run for at least one performance year and set out consequences for early termination. [1] It also had to require a close-out process in which a departing participant furnished the data needed for the ACO’s annual quality assessment. [1] CMS said it expected the requirements to reduce turnover among ACO participants. [1]

Participant lists

The rule set how an ACO’s membership changed. An ACO had to ask CMS to add a new entity, and CMS had to approve it before the addition took effect on January 1 of the next performance year. [1] An ACO had to notify CMS “no later than 30 days after the termination of an ACO participant agreement.” [1] CMS did not finalize a proposal to treat a 50 percent change in participants as a significant change, but said it would monitor the issue. [1]

In our reading, these rules made participant turnover an economic risk with a calendar. A participant that left mid-year took its patients’ future, but its exit and its data obligations were now defined. A participant that wanted to join waited for the next year.

Why the term mattered to the investment

The renewal and rebasing rules decided how long an ACO had to recover its start-up costs. A three-year term with a benchmark that could be reset against the ACO’s own success limits how much of an improvement it can keep. In our reading, the second upside-only term and the savings adjustment were the rule’s answers to that problem. They gave ACOs more time and kept part of their gains in the next target.

Matching vendor terms to agreement terms

The agreement period was three years. [1] Contracts for the technology and services an ACO bought did not have to match. In our reading, a mismatch in either direction carried cost. A five-year platform contract outlived an ACO that left after one term. A one-year contract left an ACO renegotiating in the middle of a performance year.

The rule’s renewal factors added a further variable. Renewal was not automatic; CMS would weigh compliance history and quality performance. [1] A procurement lead in 2015 had reason to seek exit terms tied to program participation, so that a non-renewal did not leave the ACO paying for systems it could no longer use.

Repayment mechanisms

For two-sided ACOs, the term also set the duration of a financial guarantee. The rule required an ACO entering a two-sided model to establish a repayment mechanism once at the beginning of a three-year agreement period. [1] In our reading, that turned a choice of track into a treasury decision as well as a clinical and operational one.

How the rule played out for different organizations

Small physician-led ACOs

The rule said about half of participating ACOs had fewer than 10,000 assigned beneficiaries. [1] For them, CMS’s cost assumptions mattered most, because fixed costs were spread over fewer people. The second upside-only term gave them time without downside exposure. In our reading, Track 3’s loss cap of 15 percent of the benchmark was a large exposure for an organization of that size.

CMS later reported a different pattern among organizations of this kind. Its 2018 rule said low revenue ACOs, which it said are “typically physician-led,” performed better than high revenue ACOs. [2] It said 41 percent of low revenue ACOs shared savings in performance year 2016, compared with 23 percent of high revenue ACOs. [2]

Hospital-led and integrated systems

For hospital-led ACOs, the economics were different. In our reading, reducing admissions can reduce the hospital’s own fee-for-service revenue. The rule did not address that internal conflict; it addressed the ACO’s share of savings. [1] In our reading, a health system choosing a track had to model both the ACO’s settlement and the effect on its hospitals’ income.

The 2018 rule later said high revenue ACOs, which it said “often include hospitals,” performed less well than low revenue ACOs. [2] We do not read that as a finding about any particular system.

Rural providers and health centers

The 2015 rule clarified how primary care services in federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics counted in assignment. [1] For those organizations, assignment rules decided whether they could form or join an ACO at all. In our reading, the rule’s technical assignment changes were an economic decision for them, because they set the population on which any savings would be counted.

Pioneer ACOs

The rule gave organizations from the Pioneer ACO Model a condensed application to join the program. [1] The applicant had to be the same legal entity as the Pioneer ACO. [1] All taxpayer identification numbers on its participant list had to have appeared on its confirmed list for its last full Pioneer performance year. [1] In our reading, this lowered switching costs for organizations already carrying risk, and so supported the two-sided tracks.

Vendors and service partners

The rule did not regulate vendors. Its changes still reached them. More claims data from CMS, simpler opt-out handling and prospective assignment changed the products ACOs needed. In our reading, any contract priced on the old data flows, such as monthly opt-out file exchanges, was worth renegotiating once those flows changed.

Objections, and where the argument stops

“Retention was the right call”

The strongest objection is that CMS had little choice. The rule recorded commenters’ warnings that a lower sharing rate would push ACOs out. [1] A program that loses its participants cannot learn anything. The rule’s analysis showed the baseline scenario with only 50 ACOs. [1]

The argument here does not say retention was wrong in 2015. It says the rule priced the program’s success on retention, and CMS later judged the result. Its 2018 rule said that for performance years 2012 through 2016, one-sided ACOs “actually increased Medicare spending relative to their benchmarks.” [2] It described that as “even more concerning” than the slow move to risk. [2]

“The 2018 finding was about methodology, not behavior”

A second objection is that spending relative to a benchmark depends on how the benchmark is set. The 2018 rule itself phrased its finding as relative to benchmarks under the program’s financial methodology. [2] The 2015 rule had changed that methodology and promised further changes. [1] We accept the point. The argument does not depend on whether one-sided ACOs saved money in some other measure. It depends on CMS’s own conclusion, which drove its later rules. [2]

“Costs were never the barrier”

A third objection is that costs were less important than benchmarks or risk appetite. The 2015 rule’s comment summary supports the cost account, but that is commenters’ view as CMS recorded it. [1] We do not claim costs were the only barrier. In our reading, the rule treated them as a central one, and its estimates show how much weight they carried.

“Track 3 was the real story”

A fourth objection is that the rule’s main legacy was Track 3, not the Track 1 renewal. Track 3 did survive, as the ENHANCED track, with the same sharing and loss parameters. [2] We agree it lasted longer. The 2018 rule counted 38 ACOs in Track 3 on January 1, 2018, against 460 in Track 1. [2] On the 2015 rule’s own estimates, the program’s economics through 2018 rested on renewals mainly under Track 1. [1]

“Two-sided risk was not for small ACOs”

A fifth objection is that small ACOs could never carry downside risk, so a second upside-only term was the only way to keep them. The December 2014 proposal itself said that the smaller an ACO’s assigned population, the greater the chance that shared losses could result from normal variation. [1] That is a real constraint.

CMS’s later rules responded to it with lower risk levels for some ACOs, not with indefinite upside-only participation. The 2018 rule’s BASIC track capped losses at small percentages of revenue and benchmark at its lower levels. [2] In our reading, the 2015 rule treated time as the remedy for small size. The later rules treated the size of the downside as the remedy.

Where the argument stops

We do not assess whether the program saved money overall in any year. We do not use outside studies of ACO performance. We rely on CMS’s own rules for what it estimated in 2015 and what it concluded in 2018, 2025 and 2026. [1] [2] [3] [4]

Checks for leaders weighing a value-based contract

These are our own suggestions, not program requirements.

On cost

  • Split the ACO’s costs into fixed and variable items, and test the business case at a smaller population.
  • Ask each vendor whether its pricing is per member or fixed, and what happens to price if membership falls.
  • Keep a record of which costs the payer’s own inputs, such as claims data, already cover.

On return and term

  • Model the return over the full agreement period, including the minimum savings rate and how the next benchmark will be reset.
  • For two-sided options, size the repayment guarantee against the treasury’s own limits before choosing a track.
  • For hospital-led arrangements, model the effect on the hospitals’ own revenue alongside the ACO’s settlement.

On policy risk

  • Read participant agreements for term, early-termination consequences and close-out data duties before counting on a participant’s patients. [1]
  • Treat any upside-only period as temporary, and plan the move to risk before the payer requires it.
  • Track the payer’s stated rationale in each rule, since the 2015 rationale was reversed in 2018. [1] [2]

With hindsight

CMS returned to the program’s design in a final rule published on December 31, 2018, at 83 FR 67816. [2] It called the rule “Pathways to Success.” [2] The rule discontinued Track 1 and Track 2 for ACOs applying in 2019, kept Track 3 and renamed it the ENHANCED track, and created a BASIC track with a glide path toward risk. [2] It replaced the three-year agreement with one of at least five years. [2]

The 2018 rule explained why. It said 82 percent of ACOs had chosen the one-sided model in 2018. [2] It said 43 percent of those, 196 of 460, were in a second Track 1 agreement period. [2] Of the 561 ACOs participating on January 1, 2018, it counted 460 in Track 1, 55 in the Track 1+ Model, 8 in Track 2 and 38 in Track 3. [2] It said 194 Track 1 ACOs had renewed for a second Track 1 period, including 127 that started in 2012 or 2013 and renewed for 2016. [2]

Its central finding was about spending. The rule said that for performance years 2012 through 2016, one-sided model ACOs “actually increased Medicare spending relative to their benchmarks under the program’s financial methodology.” [2] It said an upside-only track may be encouraging consolidation in the marketplace. [2] It also said ACOs in two-sided models performed better over time than one-sided ACOs. [2] The same passage also said that the longer ACOs are in the program, the better they do at lowering growth in expenditures and improving quality. [2] In our reading, that finding cuts partly in favor of the 2015 rule’s retention bet.

The rule gave an example. In performance year 2016, it said, about 68 percent of ACOs in two-sided models, 15 of 22, shared savings, compared with 29 percent of Track 1 ACOs. [2] It recounted the 2014 proposal to cut the second-period Track 1 rate to 40 percent, which the 2015 rule had not finalized. [2]

The ENHANCED track kept the economics the 2015 rule set for Track 3. The 2018 rule set a maximum sharing rate of 75 percent, capped at 20 percent of the benchmark, and a loss rate between 40 and 75 percent, capped at 15 percent. [2] The BASIC track’s one-sided Levels A and B carried a maximum sharing rate of 40 percent. [2] That was the rate the 2014 proposal had sought for a second Track 1 term. [1] [2]

The direction continued. In its final rule for calendar year 2026, published November 5, 2025, CMS limited one-sided participation further. [3] For agreement periods beginning on or after January 1, 2027, an ACO inexperienced with performance-based risk may participate under a one-sided model for up to 5 performance years in its first agreement period. [3] CMS said this modified the earlier maximum of 7 performance years across two agreement periods. [3] Such ACOs must move to Level E of the BASIC track or the ENHANCED track in their second agreement period. [3]

CMS still said the one-sided start mattered. The 2025 rule said a one-sided first agreement remained an important option for ACOs that may need to invest in infrastructure and redesigned care processes before taking on risk. [3] CMS’s final rule for calendar year 2027, published on November 9, 2026, recounted the 5-year limit on one-sided participation among the program changes finalized the year before. [4]

What held up from 2015 is the view that the cost of building an ACO is real and that a new entrant needs time. CMS still says so. [3] What did not hold up is the assumption that a second upside-only term would lead ACOs toward risk. CMS’s own later rules ended that option, then shortened the one-sided path again. [2] [3]

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  • Medicare Shared Savings Program
  • ACOs
  • value-based care
  • CMS
  • shared savings
  • Track 3