Executive Order 13694 made sanctions a cyber tool, and every agency incident a possible case file
The April 1, 2015 order let Treasury block the assets of foreign cyber actors. For public agencies it tied incident response to a federal process: their evidence could support designations, their payments could breach sanctions, and their own defenses still carried the load.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The April 1, 2015 order let Treasury block the assets of foreign cyber actors. For public agencies it tied incident response to a federal process: their evidence could support designations, their payments could breach sanctions, and their own defenses still carried the load.
- The week On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, President Obama signed Executive Order 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities.
- The agency as a source of evidence A sanctions designation is an administrative decision.
- The agency as a payer The order’s core mechanism was blocking.
- The agency as a defender Sanctions act on people and money outside the United States.
- The agency as part of the federal machinery For federal agencies, the order created work beyond their own networks.
- The strongest objections, and where they hold The argument that the order changed how agencies should prepare for incidents faces four serious objections.
- What an agency should do with the order today The order has been amended several times since 2015, and the threats have changed.
- With hindsight The order’s first prominent use came at the end of December 2016.
The week
On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, President Obama signed Executive Order 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities. It was published in the Federal Register the next day [1]. The order declared a national emergency over malicious cyber-enabled activity originating from, or directed by, persons located in whole or in substantial part outside the United States.
The order gave the Secretary of the Treasury power to block the property of people and entities found responsible for, or complicit in, certain cyber-enabled activities. Treasury would act in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. Blocked property in U.S. jurisdiction could not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in. U.S. persons were generally barred from dealing with blocked persons [1].
The activities had to meet a threshold. They had to be reasonably likely to result in, or to have materially contributed to, a significant threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability. The order then listed four kinds of harm [1]:
- harming or significantly compromising the services of a computer or network that supports an entity in a critical infrastructure sector;
- significantly compromising the provision of services by a critical infrastructure entity;
- causing a significant disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers;
- causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain.
A separate prong reached anyone responsible for or complicit in the receipt or use, outside the United States, of trade secrets misappropriated through cyber-enabled means, knowing they had been misappropriated. The order also reached those who materially assisted or sponsored covered activity, those owned or controlled by blocked persons, and those who attempted covered activity [1].
Section 7 addressed notice. Because funds and other assets could be moved instantaneously, the order found that prior notice of a listing would make the measures ineffective. It provided that there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination [1].
The White House fact sheet described the order as a targeted tool to add to existing authorities, especially for actors beyond the reach of other means. It said the government would continue to use all available means, including diplomatic and law enforcement mechanisms, and would use the new authority in a targeted manner. It gave distributed denial-of-service attacks as an example of significant disruption, and mentioned a corporation knowingly profiting from stolen trade secrets as an example of the receipt prong [2].
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which administers U.S. sanctions, posted the order the same day with a statement from Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and a set of frequently asked questions [3].
The order came three months after the United States imposed additional sanctions on North Korea in January 2015. Those followed the destructive attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, which the FBI had attributed to the North Korean government. That action used country-specific authority. Executive Order 13694 created a program aimed at the conduct itself, wherever outside the United States the actor was located.
The order named no one. As law firm commentary noted at the end of 2015, when OFAC issued implementing regulations, no person had yet been designated under it. For public agencies, the week brought a new authority whose use was still to be seen, and a set of questions about how their own incidents would relate to it.
Most commentary on Executive Order 13694 asked whether sanctions would deter foreign hackers. That question mattered, and the honest answer was uncertain from the start. A different question mattered more to the people who run public agencies. What did a new federal sanctions program change about how an agency should prepare for and respond to a serious cyber incident?
Our answer is that the order linked an agency’s incident response to a federal economic process. An agency’s forensic records could become part of the evidence behind a designation. An agency’s payments, to attackers or to those who launder for them, could fall under sanctions law. And none of the deterrence the order promised would replace the agency’s own defenses. Each of those links has a practical consequence, and each looked different in 2026 than it did in 2015.
We take the order in four parts. Each describes one relationship between a public agency and the sanctions program:
- The agency as a source of evidence: how incident records feed attribution and designation, and what that asks of forensics and reporting.
- The agency as a payer: how sanctions law reaches ransom payments and other transactions with attackers and their facilitators.
- The agency as a defender: what the order could not do, and why resilience remained the agency’s own job.
- The agency as part of the federal machinery: how Treasury, State, Justice and the intelligence community had to work together for the order to work at all.
The first three apply to every public agency, from a federal department to a county. The fourth applies mainly to federal agencies with roles in attribution and policy. After the four parts, we test the argument against its strongest objections and set out what an agency should do with it today.
The agency as a source of evidence
A sanctions designation is an administrative decision. Treasury must have a reasoned basis for concluding that a person meets the order’s criteria. That record can be challenged, and courts review it. For cyber-related designations, much of the underlying evidence comes from incidents: what was taken, how, from whom, and with what effect.
Why victim evidence matters
The order required a significant threat to national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability [1]. Showing significance required facts about harm. A disrupted 911 system, a stolen database of personal identifiers or a crippled agency network are the kinds of harm that make the case. Those facts come from victims.
Attribution needs victim evidence too. Indicators of compromise, malware samples, infrastructure used in the attack and the timing of activity all help investigators link an incident to a group and a group to people. An agency that preserves that evidence well gives investigators more to work with. An agency that wipes and rebuilds systems quickly, without preserving images and logs, may recover faster but leaves less for anyone to act on.
What it asks of forensics
For an agency, that creates a trade-off in the first hours of an incident. The operational goal is to restore services. The evidentiary goal is to preserve what happened. The two can be reconciled with planning. That means capturing memory and disk images of affected systems before rebuilding, and preserving logs centrally with adequate retention. It also means keeping a chain of custody for evidence that may go to federal partners.
Most of that is standard incident response practice. Many agencies in 2015 did not do it consistently. Log retention was often short, because storage cost money and no one had asked for longer. Endpoint visibility was limited. Small agencies relied on vendors whose contracts said nothing about evidence preservation.
Contracts matter here. An agency that hires an incident response firm should have terms that cover evidence handling, sharing with law enforcement, and ownership of the forensic record. An agency that relies on a managed service provider for its network should know whether that provider keeps logs long enough to support an investigation, and whether it will hand them over.
What it asks of reporting
Evidence only helps if it reaches the people building a case. In 2015, federal agencies reported incidents to US-CERT under existing requirements. State and local agencies reported voluntarily, often to the FBI or to the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Many incidents were never reported outside the victim agency, because reporting took time and brought no obvious benefit.
The order created a possible benefit: reported incidents could contribute to consequences for the attackers. That was a weak incentive for any single agency, but a real one in aggregate. Designations against groups that attacked many victims, as later happened with ransomware operators, depended on evidence from many incidents. An agency that reported contributed to a pattern that one incident alone could not show.
What investigators can use
Not all incident evidence is equally useful for attribution. The most valuable items tend to be specific and time-stamped. They include the ransom note or extortion message, any communication with the attackers, digital currency addresses provided for payment, malware samples, and the network infrastructure the attackers used. Records of which accounts were compromised and when complete the picture.
Agencies often hold that material without realizing its value. A help desk ticket from the first user who reported a strange message can fill a gap. So can an email gateway log showing the phishing message that started it, or a firewall log showing connections to an unfamiliar address. An incident response plan that lists those artifacts, and assigns someone to collect them, makes the agency’s evidence usable.
Shared services and cloud providers
Many agencies no longer run their own infrastructure. A state may provide shared network and email services to dozens of agencies. A county may run on a cloud provider’s platform, with logs held by the provider. In those arrangements, the evidence an investigator needs may sit with a provider that the affected agency does not control.
Shared service agreements and cloud contracts therefore need provisions on incident evidence. They should say what logs the provider keeps, for how long, how quickly the agency can obtain them, and whether the provider will work directly with law enforcement. Agencies that discover these gaps during an incident usually find that the logs have already rolled over.
Differences by type of agency
A federal civilian agency had reporting obligations and access to federal incident response support. Its evidence was likely to reach investigators. A large state agency often had a state security operations center and relationships with the FBI. A county or city might have one or two security staff, no forensic capability and a vendor that wanted to restore service fast. The evidence from local incidents was the most likely to be lost, even though local agencies were frequent targets.
For local agencies, the practical steps were modest. They could keep logs from key systems for at least several months, with copies outside the main network. They could name an incident response provider in advance, with evidence preservation in the contract. They could know whom to call at the FBI field office and at the MS-ISAC before an incident. Those steps also improved recovery, which made them easier to justify in a budget.
Sensitive data in the evidence
Sharing incident evidence raised its own questions for agencies. Forensic images can contain personal information about residents, criminal justice information or tax data. Sharing them with federal partners needed a legal basis and appropriate handling. Criminal justice information, for example, comes with its own security policy for agencies that access it. Agencies should check with counsel and with the owners of regulated data before sharing raw images. Sharing indicators and analysis rather than full images often meets the need.
The agency as a payer
The order’s core mechanism was blocking. Once a person was designated, U.S. persons were generally prohibited from dealing with them. Public agencies are U.S. persons for this purpose. In 2015 that seemed remote from agency operations. Agencies did not knowingly do business with foreign hackers. The connection appeared later, when ransomware turned agencies into payers.
How ransom payments meet sanctions law
A ransom payment is a transaction with the attacker or the attacker’s intermediaries. If the attacker, or a wallet or exchange used to receive or launder the payment, is designated, the payment may violate sanctions law. OFAC’s civil enforcement operates on strict liability: a violation can occur even if the payer did not know the recipient was designated.
That framework was built on the 2015 order. Designations tied to ransomware, such as those of the SamSam facilitators in 2018, were made under Executive Order 13694, as amended. So were designations of cybercrime groups and of exchanges that processed ransom payments, as the hindsight section describes. Each designation added names and digital currency addresses to the list that a payer would need to check.
What it meant for a public agency
For a city or county hit by ransomware, the question of whether to pay was already hard. It involved the cost of recovery, the availability of backups, the needs of residents, and political judgment about rewarding criminals. Sanctions added a legal question: could the payment be lawfully made at all, and who would be responsible if it could not?
Several parties were usually involved. The agency decided. An insurer, if the agency had cyber coverage, might reimburse. An incident response firm or a specialized negotiator might handle the communication with the attackers and the transfer. Each of those parties had its own exposure. Each would want sanctions screening performed and documented before any payment.
Screening in practice
Screening a ransom payment is harder than screening an ordinary vendor. The attacker rarely identifies itself by legal name. Attribution in the first days of an incident is uncertain. Digital currency addresses can be checked against OFAC’s list when they are listed, but attackers rotate addresses. A clean screening result does not prove the recipient is not designated.
That uncertainty is why later Treasury guidance emphasized reporting to law enforcement and cooperation as factors in any enforcement decision. An agency facing a ransom demand needed to involve federal law enforcement early, document its decision process, and get legal advice specific to the situation. Counsel familiar with sanctions law, alongside general counsel, was the right adviser.
Insurers and negotiators as intermediaries
When an agency carries cyber insurance, the insurer often shapes the response. Policies may require use of approved incident response firms, legal counsel and negotiators. Some insurers in the years after 2015 reimbursed ransom payments where the policy allowed. Each intermediary that touches a payment adds a party that must be confident the payment is lawful.
For the agency, that means reading the policy before an incident. It should know whether the policy covers ransom payments at all, what conditions apply, which firms it must use and how quickly the insurer must be notified. It should also know whether the insurer or its vendors will perform sanctions screening, and how that screening will be documented. An agency that relies on an intermediary’s assurance still carries its own exposure.
Procurement and vendor screening
The payer question also reached ordinary procurement. Agencies buy software, services and hardware from global supply chains. A designation under the order could fall on a company that supplied an agency, or on its owner. Agencies that screened vendors against sanctions lists at onboarding, and periodically after, would catch such cases. Many agencies screened federal debarment lists but not OFAC lists, because sanctions had seemed irrelevant to domestic purchasing.
The trade-secret prong added a different procurement risk. A foreign company knowingly using stolen trade secrets could be designated. If that company sold products in the United States, its customers, including agencies, would face an abrupt need to stop dealing with it. A contract with exit provisions, and an understanding of which systems depended on the vendor, made that kind of disruption manageable.
When the vendor is the victim
Some of the hardest payment questions arise when the attack hits a vendor rather than the agency. A managed service provider, a software host or a records management vendor serving many agencies may be encrypted or extorted. The agency’s services stop, but the decision to pay sits with the vendor. The agency may not even learn whether a payment was made.
Contracts can reduce that uncertainty. They can require the vendor to notify the agency promptly of incidents affecting its data or services, to consult before any payment that concerns the agency’s data, and to comply with sanctions law. They can give the agency the right to receive the vendor’s incident report. Without such terms, an agency’s exposure depends on decisions made by a company it cannot direct.
Documenting the decision
Whatever an agency decides about a ransom demand, the record of the decision protects it. A complete file shows when the demand arrived, who was consulted, what recovery options were assessed and at what cost, and what sanctions screening was done and with what result. It records when law enforcement was contacted and what it advised, and who made the final decision under what authority. If the agency did not pay, the file shows why. If it did, the file shows the basis for believing the payment was lawful.
Public agencies are subject to audits, public records requests and legislative oversight. A ransom decision will be reviewed later by people who were not in the room. A file prepared during the incident is far more persuasive than one reconstructed afterward.
Differences by type of agency
Federal agencies were less likely to pay ransoms, and federal policy discouraged it. State and local governments were the public bodies most exposed to the payer question. Utilities owned by municipalities, public hospitals and school districts faced the same issue. Their governing bodies often had to approve unusual payments, which created a public record and political scrutiny that private companies did not face. That scrutiny cut both ways: it made an unannounced payment harder, and it made a documented, lawful decision process more important.
The agency as a defender
Sanctions act on people and money outside the United States. They do not patch a server, train a clerk to spot phishing or restore a backup. The fact sheet was candid that the order was one tool among many [2]. For agencies, that meant the order changed little about the work of defense.
What sanctions could and could not deter
Deterrence through sanctions works best on actors with assets or interests in the U.S. financial system. A company that wants to sell in the United States, a bank that wants dollar access, or an official who wants to travel and hold assets abroad can be deterred. A criminal operating from a country that will not extradite, holding funds in digital currency and with no plans to travel, is harder to deter.
State-sponsored actors present a mixed case. Designating an intelligence agency has symbolic and diplomatic weight but little direct financial effect. Designating companies that support it can impose real costs. Either way, the decision to attack an agency’s network is made by actors who weigh many factors, and sanctions are one of them at most.
Why resilience stayed local
The practical consequence for an agency was that its defenses had to assume attacks would continue. A sanctions program might raise costs for some attackers over time. It would not stop the next phishing email. The controls that mattered in 2015 still mattered after April 1: asset inventory, patching, strong authentication for remote access and administrators, network segmentation, offline backups, and tested recovery plans.
Those controls are unglamorous and compete for budget with services residents can see. The order did not change that competition. If anything, it risked making it harder, by suggesting that the federal government was taking care of the threat. Agency leaders who heard about new sanctions authority needed to understand that it addressed the attacker’s incentives, not the agency’s exposure.
Punishment and denial
Security strategists distinguish two kinds of deterrence. Deterrence by punishment threatens consequences after an attack. Deterrence by denial makes the attack less likely to succeed, so it is not worth attempting. Sanctions are a form of punishment, applied by the federal government. Almost everything an agency can do on its own is denial.
The two work at different scales. Punishment, where it works, affects the behavior of a group across all its targets. Denial affects whether this agency, today, is a profitable target. Many attackers, especially ransomware operators, choose targets by opportunity. An agency with exposed remote access and no multi-factor authentication is attractive whatever sanctions exist. An agency that has closed those gaps pushes opportunistic attackers elsewhere. For agency leaders, denial is the form of deterrence within their control.
Continuity of services
For public agencies, resilience meant continuing essential services during and after an attack. Emergency dispatch, benefits payments, courts, permitting and public health reporting all have residents depending on them. An agency that could run critical services on manual procedures, or switch to backup systems, could resist the pressure to pay a ransom and recover on its own terms.
Continuity planning required decisions made in advance: which services were essential, how long each could be down, what manual workarounds existed, and who had authority to activate them. Those decisions belonged to program leaders as much as to IT.
Agencies that run critical infrastructure
The order’s first two harms concerned critical infrastructure [1]. Many critical infrastructure services are run by public agencies: water and wastewater systems, emergency communications, transit, ports and public power. Attacks on those systems were among the most likely to meet the order’s significance threshold. They were also among the most likely to affect public safety directly.
For those agencies, the defensive work extended to operational technology, which often ran on older systems that could not be patched easily and were connected to business networks in undocumented ways. Separating those networks, controlling remote access by vendors and maintaining manual operating capability were the main protections. A sanctions designation after an attack on a water system would not restore treatment capacity. The utility’s own engineers would.
Election systems followed a related path. In January 2017, the Department of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector. That came days after the amendment of Executive Order 13694 to cover election interference, which the hindsight section describes. State and local election officials became, in effect, operators of critical infrastructure with a federal sanctions program linked to attacks on their systems.
Exercising the whole decision
Tabletop exercises in many agencies focus on the technical response. A more useful exercise brings in the people who would make the hard decisions: the agency head, legal counsel, finance, communications and the program leaders who run essential services. It walks through a ransom demand, the screening question, contact with federal partners and the choice between paying and rebuilding. Running that exercise once a year shows where authority is unclear, where contracts are silent and where the continuity plans assume systems that would be down.
Measuring readiness
An agency could measure its defensive readiness in terms that mattered more than any sanctions program. Useful measures included the share of systems with current patches, the share of remote and administrative access protected by multi-factor authentication, and the time since the last successful restoration test of critical systems. Others were log retention for key systems and the number of essential services with tested manual procedures. Those measures showed whether the agency could withstand and recover from an attack, whatever happened to the attackers afterward.
The agency as part of the federal machinery
For federal agencies, the order created work beyond their own networks. Treasury made designations in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State [1]. In practice, that meant evidence from the FBI, analysis from the intelligence community, policy judgment from State and the National Security Council, and legal review across all of them.
Attribution that could be used
Much cyber attribution relies on intelligence sources and methods that agencies cannot disclose. A designation needs a record that can be defended if challenged, and that often has to include some unclassified basis. Agencies had to decide how much of their analysis they could release or summarize without exposing sources. That tension slowed designations and shaped which cases were chosen.
Criminal cases offered one route around it. An indictment based on evidence that would be presented in court could support a designation of the same people. The pattern of parallel indictments and designations, announced on the same day, became common in later years. It depended on investigators, prosecutors and sanctions officials working the same case together.
Public attribution as a choice
Designations come with public statements that name the actor and describe the activity. Those statements often draw on victim incidents, sometimes naming them. For a victim agency, being named in a federal attribution can be welcome, as confirmation that the attack came from a capable adversary. It can also be unwelcome, if it revives attention to an incident the agency had moved past or reveals details it had not disclosed.
Federal agencies building a designation should consult victims about how their incidents will be described. Victim agencies should expect that evidence they share may eventually appear, in summarized form, in public documents. Agreeing on that in advance avoids surprises.
The no-notice provision and due process
The order’s provision that no prior notice was needed reflected how quickly assets could move [1]. It also meant that a designated person learned of the designation after the fact and could then seek reconsideration. Agencies supporting designations had to maintain records that could support that review. That is standard for sanctions programs, but new for cyber investigators who were used to building criminal cases or intelligence assessments.
Coordination costs
Every designation required coordination across several departments and agencies, each with its own priorities. Law enforcement might prefer to keep investigating rather than reveal what it knew. Intelligence agencies might resist exposure of sources. Diplomats might weigh relations with the country where the actor was based. Treasury had to assemble a record. Those costs help explain why the order, signed in April 2015, produced no designations that year.
For federal program directors, the lesson was that their agencies’ incident data and analysis were potential inputs to a whole-of-government process. Sharing them promptly and in usable form, within legal limits, was part of the job. An agency that kept its incident analysis to itself weakened the process for everyone.
What the private sector brings
Much public attribution of cyber activity in 2015 came from private security firms, which published reports linking campaigns to groups and sometimes to governments. Federal agencies drew on that work and on information shared through sector organizations. For sanctions, private analysis could inform investigators but could not by itself support a designation. Government agencies still had to build their own record.
For agencies that used private incident response firms, that created a question of what the firm could share. Firms working for an agency produced reports that belonged to the client. Whether those reports reached federal investigators depended on the agency’s consent and the contract. Agencies that wanted their incidents to count toward consequences for attackers needed to arrange that sharing.
Allies and partners
Sanctions work better when allies impose similar measures. In 2015 the United States acted alone on cyber sanctions. The European Union adopted its own cyber sanctions framework in 2019, and later joint designations with the United Kingdom and Australia became common for ransomware actors. For federal agencies, that meant attribution increasingly had to be coordinated with foreign partners as well as domestic ones.
The strongest objections, and where they hold
The argument that the order changed how agencies should prepare for incidents faces four serious objections.
Sanctions were symbolic
The first objection is that cyber sanctions mostly named people who would never travel to the United States or hold assets in it. The designations were symbolic, and agencies gained nothing from contributing to them.
That objection holds in part. Many designated cyber actors have continued to operate. The effect on the payer side is not symbolic, though. Once a designation exists, payments to that person or address carry legal risk for victims. Designations of exchanges and launderers, which do depend on access to the financial system, have more practical bite. An agency that ignores the program does so at its own legal risk, whatever the deterrent effect.
Local agencies have no role
The second objection is that state and local agencies are victims, not participants. Federal agencies run sanctions. A county clerk’s office has no part in it.
That is true of the decision, not of the inputs or the consequences. Local incidents provide evidence, and local payments face the same law as any other U.S. person’s. The agency’s role is limited but real: preserve evidence, report, and screen before paying.
Evidence preservation slows recovery
The third objection is practical. Preserving forensic evidence takes time, and every hour of downtime hurts residents. An agency should restore services first and leave attribution to others.
That objection is strongest for small agencies with no forensic capability. The answer is preparation, not choice in the moment. Central logging, routine backups and a retained incident response provider make preservation fast. An agency that has to choose between evidence and recovery during an incident has usually not prepared for either.
Sanctions risk discourages reporting
A fourth objection runs against the argument from another direction. If paying a ransom can violate sanctions law, victims who pay have a reason to hide it. Sanctions risk could reduce reporting and so reduce the evidence that designations depend on.
That risk is real, and Treasury’s later guidance addressed it by treating prompt reporting and cooperation with law enforcement as factors in any enforcement decision. For a public agency, hiding a payment is rarely possible in any case. Payments need approval and leave records subject to public records laws and audits. The safer path for an agency is to report early and document its decisions, which serves both its legal position and the evidence base.
What an agency should do with the order today
The order has been amended several times since 2015, and the threats have changed. The four relationships still describe how a public agency connects to the federal sanctions program.
As a source of evidence
Keep logs from critical systems long enough to support an investigation, with copies outside the production network. Put evidence preservation and sharing terms into incident response and managed service contracts. Know the reporting routes to federal partners before an incident, and use them.
As a payer
Write the ransom decision process down in advance, including who decides, who must be consulted, and the requirement for sanctions screening and law enforcement contact. Check the cyber insurance policy for its requirements on payments and on approved vendors. Screen suppliers against OFAC lists as well as debarment lists.
As a defender
Budget for the controls that reduce exposure, and report readiness measures to agency leadership. Treat federal sanctions and indictments as useful for deterrence over time, not as protection for this year.
For a small agency, in order
A small town or special district cannot do everything at once. A reasonable order starts with multi-factor authentication on remote and administrative access and with offline, tested backups, because those reduce the chance of an incident and its damage. Next comes log retention outside the main network, which supports both recovery and investigation. Then a retained incident response provider with evidence terms, and a written ransom decision process. Supplier screening against sanctions lists can be added to existing purchasing checks at little cost.
As part of the federal machinery
For federal agencies, share incident analysis promptly and in forms that can support legal processes. Build working relationships between security teams, law enforcement partners and legal staff before a case requires them.
The April 2015 order did not change the basic work of defending public networks. It connected that work to consequences outside the agency, and those connections have grown. Agencies that prepared for both the defense and the connection have been better placed to use the program, and to avoid its traps.
With hindsight
The order’s first prominent use came at the end of December 2016. The President issued Executive Order 13757, which amended Executive Order 13694 to cover tampering with or misappropriating information to interfere with election processes or institutions. OFAC designated five entities, including Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and Federal Security Service (FSB), along with four GRU officers named in the amended order. It also designated two individuals, Evgeniy Bogachev and Aleksey Belan, under the order’s original provisions [4].
Congress later codified the order in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, as Treasury noted in subsequent designations [6]. In September 2022 OFAC reissued its Cyber-Related Sanctions Regulations in full, replacing the version first issued at the end of 2015.
The link to public agencies became concrete in November 2018. On November 28, Treasury designated two Iran-based men who had helped exchange bitcoin ransom payments into Iranian rial for the actors behind the SamSam ransomware. Treasury said SamSam had more than 200 known victims, including hospitals, universities and government agencies. For the first time, OFAC publicly listed digital currency addresses linked to designated people [5]. The Justice Department unsealed an indictment the same day against two other Iranians accused of developing and deploying SamSam. Public victims named in the case included the City of Atlanta, the City of Newark, the Port of San Diego and the Colorado Department of Transportation.
In December 2019 Treasury designated the Russia-based group Evil Corp, its leader Maksim Yakubets and other members and facilitators under the order: 17 individuals and seven entities in all. Treasury said the group’s theft using its Dridex malware had caused more than $100 million in losses. It said that as of 2017 Yakubets was working for the FSB [6]. The Justice Department announced charges and the State Department offered a reward on the same day.
OFAC then turned the designations into guidance for victims. In October 2020 it issued an advisory on the sanctions risks of facilitating ransomware payments. On September 21, 2021 it issued an updated advisory, which described steps that OFAC would consider mitigating factors in any enforcement action. The same day it designated the virtual currency exchange SUEX for its role in ransomware payments [7]. Law firm summaries noted that the updated advisory said the government strongly discouraged ransom payments, and that license applications for such payments would be reviewed case by case with a presumption of denial.
Some states moved further. By 2022, North Carolina and Florida had enacted laws restricting state agencies and local governments from paying ransoms. Other states considered similar measures. Those laws turned the payer question from a sanctions risk into a direct prohibition for some public bodies.
The order continued to evolve. On June 6, 2025, Executive Order 14306 amended two provisions of Executive Order 13694 so that they applied to any foreign person rather than any person [8]. The program remains in force and continues to be used against ransomware groups, launderers and state-linked actors, often in coordination with allies.
What held up from the April 2015 reading is that sanctions changed the context of agency incidents more than their content. Agencies still had to defend and recover on their own. Their evidence fed designations, and designations created obligations for them as potential payers. What did not hold up is any expectation that sanctions alone would reduce attacks on public agencies. Ransomware against cities, counties, schools and public hospitals grew sharply in the years after 2015, despite the designations. The order proved more useful as a way to disrupt the money than as a deterrent to the attack.
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