ONC’s 2015 report to Congress lacked vendor contracts; Cures later limited gag clauses in certified IT

ONC’s April 2015 report to Congress said it could not confirm the interference it was asked to count, lacking contracts, prices and authority. The Cures Act and later rules added a communications condition, penalties and provider disincentives; contract terms are in a pending proposal.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

ONC’s April 2015 report to Congress said it could not confirm the interference it was asked to count, lacking contracts, prices and authority. The Cures Act and later rules added a communications condition, penalties and provider disincentives; contract terms are in a pending proposal.

  1. The week The report answered a request from Congress.
  2. What ONC could see: complaints without the contracts behind them The report was candid about its sources.
  3. What certification could reach: the technology, not the conduct The report explained what that tool could do.
  4. What could be done about providers: no direct authority The 2015 report was explicit about providers.
  5. What the law prohibited: almost nothing specific The report’s fourth gap was legal.
  6. Where our reading is weakest The strongest objection is that we overstate the evidence problem.
  7. Checks for a health system’s technology, legal and procurement leaders These checks follow from the report’s four gaps and the rules that came later.
  8. With hindsight The Inspector General’s penalty rule followed.

The week

On April 10, 2015, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology said on its blog that it had delivered a new report to Congress that day. [2] The report is dated April 2015 and is titled “Report on Health Information Blocking.” [1] It runs to 39 pages, with two appendices. [1]

The report answered a request from Congress. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 was signed on December 16, 2014. [1] An explanatory statement accompanying it urged the office to certify only products that “do not block health information exchange.” [1] The same statement asked it to take steps to decertify products that proactively block sharing. [1]

The statement requested a detailed report within 90 days of enactment on the extent of the problem. [1] It asked for “an estimate of the number of vendors or eligible hospitals or providers who block information.” [1] It also asked for a comprehensive strategy. [1] The report was addressed to the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees for Labor, Health and Human Services and Education. [1]

The report set out a definition. The conduct occurs, it said, when persons or entities knowingly and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information. [1] It broke that into three criteria: interference, knowledge, and no reasonable justification. [1] It said conduct required to comply with federal or state privacy law would not be unreasonable. [1]

It described the evidence. The office said it received approximately 60 unsolicited reports of potential cases in 2014. [1] It said most complaints were directed at health IT developers. [1] Many alleged fees that made it cost-prohibitive to send, receive or export data, or to build interfaces. [1] Hospitals and health systems had also been accused, the report said, with a common charge that some restricted data to control referrals. [1]

It also described what the office could not see. The report said it lacked access to detailed price and cost data, contract language and technical documentation. [1] It said that without these it could not objectively determine whether conduct met its own definition. [1] It said it could not accurately estimate where and to what extent providers and developers were engaging in the practice. [1]

The report listed actions under way or proposed. They included stronger in-the-field surveillance of certified health IT and new transparency obligations for developers. [1] Both were in the 2015 Edition certification proposed rule, published on March 30, 2015. [1] Others included a governance framework for exchange, work with the HHS Office for Civil Rights on HIPAA, coordination with the Inspector General and CMS, and referrals to law enforcement. [1]

Its conclusion was blunt about authority. The report said many types of the conduct were beyond the reach of current federal law and programs. [1] It said successful strategies “will likely require congressional intervention.” [1] The blog post that announced it called the finding that most such conduct was beyond the current reach of any federal agency the report’s most definitive. [2]

The blog post added a point the report made in more detail. It said developers’ contractual restrictions kept customers from reporting or even discussing costs and restrictions, which made the problem hard to measure. [2] In our reading, that was the center of the report: the office was asked to count something its own sources were contractually barred from describing.

Read in 2026, ONC’s April 2015 report looks like an early chapter in a story everyone knows. Congress defined information blocking in the 21st Century Cures Act in December 2016. [3] ONC wrote rules; the Inspector General gained penalties; CMS gained disincentives. [5] [6] The report can seem like a preface to that machinery.

Our argument is narrower and more useful to a buyer of health IT. The report was a statement about evidence. Congress asked for a count of blockers. [1] ONC answered that it could not give one, and explained why in procurement terms. [1] It lacked the contracts, the prices and the technical documentation needed to judge any case. [1] Customers told it they could not talk about their contracts. [1]

That framing explains which tools came next. The Cures Act did more than prohibit a practice. It made a developer’s freedom to restrict customer communication a condition of certification. [3] It created a public reporting process, protected the identity of the people who report, and gave the Inspector General power to investigate. [3] In our reading, those pieces answer the report’s evidence problem as much as its authority problem.

For hospitals, ambulatory networks and their general counsel, the practical consequence sits in the contract file. The terms that once kept ONC blind now bear on a developer’s certification. [4] The same contracts can also carry evidence of a provider’s own conduct. [6] The 2015 report is the clearest statement of why contract terms became regulatory matter.

We take the report’s account of the problem in four parts, each a gap it named:

  1. What ONC could see: complaints without the contracts, prices and documents behind them.
  2. What certification could reach: the technology a developer sold, not how the developer did business.
  3. What could be done about providers: no direct authority over them at all.
  4. What the law prohibited: almost nothing specific to information blocking.

The four do not overlap. The first is about evidence, the second about developers, the third about providers and the fourth about legal prohibitions. Together they cover what the report said stood between a complaint and a remedy. After them we take the strongest objections to our reading, and end with checks for a health system’s technology, legal and procurement leaders.

What ONC could see: complaints without the contracts behind them

The report was candid about its sources. It drew on complaints, anecdotes, public records and testimony, industry analyses and news coverage. [1] ONC staff also held discussions with Regional Extension Centers, consumers, clinicians, developers, exchange organizations, researchers and officials. [1] The approximately 60 unsolicited reports in 2014 were one input among these. [1]

The report also explained why those inputs could not settle a case. Complaints, it said, were not balanced with the accused party’s side, including any reasonable justification. [1] ONC had no access to price and cost data, contract language or technical documentation. [1] Its ability to require disclosure of such information was “in many respects limited.” [1]

The definition needed facts that sat with the accused

The report’s own definition made the evidence problem sharper. Its third criterion asked whether conduct had a reasonable justification. [1] To answer that for a developer’s pricing, the report said, one needs the developer’s actual costs, prices, business model and design decisions. [1] Those facts are held by the party accused.

The report gave examples of conduct that raised concern. They included contract terms that restrict access or exchange, fees that make exchange cost prohibitive, non-standard implementations and designs that lock in users or data. [1] Each one turns on documents held by the parties. A per-transaction fee looks different once one knows the cost of serving the transaction.

Survey data did not fill the gap. The report said national surveys could show where exchange capability varied by developer, hospital size or market. [1] It said such data could not pinpoint actual cases or explain why a capable provider was not exchanging. [1] The surveys were self-reported and annual, and did not have perfect response rates. [1]

The customers who saw the terms could not share them

The report’s most specific finding about evidence concerned confidentiality clauses. It said customers “routinely report that they are prohibited from discussing contract terms.” [1] It attributed this to non-disclosure and confidentiality provisions in most developers’ contracts, as customers described them. [1] ONC staff, it said, had on occasion seen contract language barring discussion of price and non-price terms. [1]

The report said that language could also bar discussion of opinions about the performance of the developer’s product. [1] It cited the Institute of Medicine’s 2012 concern that such non-disclosure provisions were chilling discussion of health IT-related safety issues, which the Institute said contributed significantly to patient safety risks. [1] The report did not quantify how common the clauses were; it relied on what customers reported.

This is where the report connects to procurement. A hospital’s contract with an EHR developer was a document that could show a blocking practice. The same contract could forbid the hospital from showing it to anyone. In our reading, the report described a market in which the evidence and the gag sat in one document.

What a buyer could not compare

The report tied the evidence problem to purchasing. It said many providers and other purchasers lacked reliable information about the true costs and limitations of health IT. [1] It said switching costs then made it easier for developers to block without losing customers. [1] It pointed to installation, configuration, training, integration and workflow changes as costs beyond the license. [1]

ONC’s proposed fix had a limit it named. The 2015 Edition proposal would have required developers to disclose limitations and additional types of costs. [1] It would not have required actual prices or specific price terms. [1] The report said more detailed price disclosure was needed, at least for core exchange capabilities, but would be hard to enforce without access to contracts. [1]

It also noted a constraint on any price rule. Price transparency requirements would need safeguards for trade secrets and would need to avoid concerns about price coordination among competitors. [1] That tension is real for a buyer. Published prices help comparison; shared prices among sellers can help collusion. The report left the balance unresolved.

Why the gap was widest for small buyers

The report singled out smaller providers. It said they often lack the time, resources or expertise for extensive market research before buying. [1] It cited a case study describing small providers’ difficulty understanding complex vendor contracts. [1] It also cited the American Medical Association’s concern about a lack of transparency in EHR contracts, which may fail to itemize expenses. [1]

The difference matters for how each kind of buyer could respond. A large health system has a contracts office, outside counsel and bargaining power at renewal. An independent practice or a rural hospital may have a single administrator reading a developer’s standard paper. In our reading, the 2015 evidence gap was a market feature that fell hardest on the smallest buyers.

The report’s footnote on implementation costs explains why. Installation, configuration, training, legacy integration, interface development and workflow change are paid once the contract is signed. [1] A buyer that learns of a restrictive fee after those costs are sunk has little room to walk away. [1] The report linked that switching cost directly to the incentive to block. [1]

What this meant for the people holding the contracts

For a health system’s legal and supply chain teams, the report described their own files. The contracts that customers said they could not discuss were contracts those teams had signed. [1] The report did not say any particular buyer had agreed to a gag. It said customers routinely reported such terms. [1]

The practical question in 2015 was internal. Could the organization’s own clinicians, informaticists and executives describe a product’s limits outside the building? Could they tell a regulator about a fee that stopped a referral exchange? In our reading, the report invited buyers to read their confidentiality clauses with that question in mind, though it did not frame it as advice.

What certification could reach: the technology, not the conduct

Congress’s December 2014 statement pointed ONC to its certification program. [1] The program certifies that health IT conforms to standards and capabilities adopted by rule. [1] Certification bodies authorized by ONC conduct surveillance and can continue a certification under conditions, suspend it or terminate it. [1]

The report explained what that tool could do. If a developer’s contract or design restricted a certified capability, such as sending a care summary or exporting a basic data set, that could risk the product’s certification. [1] Such restrictions, if not corrected, could lead to suspension or termination. [1]

Why the tool could not reach most complaints

Most allegations, the report said, involved business practices rather than technical non-conformity. [1] The products could do what certification required; the developer’s terms, fees or refusals kept users from doing it. [1] The report said those practices were mostly beyond the program’s scope and might exceed certification bodies’ capacity to investigate. [1]

The report gave a legal reason. Under the existing program, requirements aimed at blocking had to be tied to compliance with certification criteria for the technology. [1] They could not be tied to the practices of the company that made it. [1] The report said that “significantly limits the potential reach” of such requirements. [1]

Why termination punished the wrong party

The report also explained why decertification was a poor remedy even where available. Terminating a certification would penalize the developer’s customers, including small practices. [1] Those customers could be unable to show meaningful use and could receive reduced program payments. [1] They could face the cost of replacing systems. [1]

The report called termination “a blunt instrument.” [1] It said the remedy reached only developers, not providers or others who might block. [1] In our reading, the report was telling Congress that its preferred lever would hit hospitals and practices first.

What the 2015 Edition proposal would have added

ONC did propose to sharpen the lever within its limits. The 2015 Edition proposal would have required certification bodies to conduct more extensive surveillance in the field. [1] That surveillance would rest on complaints and on randomized sampling. [1] The proposal also added corrective action procedures for certain non-conformities. [1]

The same proposal would have required developers to disclose limitations and additional types of costs that could interfere with certified capabilities. [1] Certification bodies would surveil those disclosures. [1] Developers would also publicly attest to giving the same information to anyone who requested it. [1]

The report explained why technical surveillance still mattered. Certified products were often conformant, it said, yet permissible variability in standards and in implementations created room for unnecessary barriers. [1] ONC planned to work with standards bodies to constrain optional parts of standards and improve testing tools. [1] It said testing in the field was especially important for data portability and exchange. [1]

For a buyer, the 2015 proposal offered disclosure, not price. A health system could expect to learn that a cost existed, not what it was. [1] In our reading, that left the comparison problem described above mostly in place until later rules reached developer conduct directly.

What changed in the certification lever

The Cures Act changed what a certification could depend on. It required the Secretary, through rulemaking, to make certain developer conduct a condition of certification and maintenance of certification. [3] The conditions included that the developer not engage in information blocking and provide assurances to the Secretary. [3] They also included the condition most relevant to the 2015 report.

That condition says the developer “does not prohibit or restrict communication” about six subjects. [3] They are usability, interoperability, security, users’ experiences, the developer’s business practices related to exchanging electronic health information, and the manner in which a user has used the technology. [3] Developers must attest to meeting the conditions. [3]

The statute also listed other conditions that bear on the 2015 complaints. A developer must publish application programming interfaces and allow health information to be accessed, exchanged and used “without special effort.” [3] It must have tested the real world use of the technology for interoperability in the setting where it would be marketed. [3] Each condition ties certification to how the product behaves for customers after the sale.

In our reading, this reversed the 2015 limit. The report said certification could not reach a developer’s practices. [1] The statute made one practice, restricting customer communication, a certification matter. [3] It aimed at the clauses the report said kept ONC from seeing evidence. [1] [3]

The current regulation spells it out. A developer may not prohibit or restrict communication on the six subjects except as the rule permits. [4] Some communications get what the rule calls “unqualified protection.” [4] They include disclosures required by law and reports to government agencies about information blocking and other unlawful practices. [4] They also include reports about cybersecurity threats and incidents, and about adverse events and unsafe conditions. [4]

Other restrictions are allowed within limits. A developer may restrict its own employees and contractors, communications about non-user-facing aspects of the product, and some uses of intellectual property. [4] It may set conditions on screenshots and video, and restrict what was learned only in pre-market testing. [4] An intellectual property restriction must be no broader than necessary. [4]

Contracts written before the rule

The regulation also deals with existing contracts. It bars a developer from establishing, renewing or enforcing a contract that contravenes the condition. [4] For contracts in existence as of June 30, 2020, the developer must amend them to remove or void the provision when the contract is next modified or renewed. [4] Until then, developers had to send customers an annual written notice, beginning in calendar year 2021, saying such provisions would not be enforced. [4]

For a buyer, that creates a document trail worth keeping. The notice and the amended clause are evidence of what the developer may and may not enforce. [4] A contract renewed after the rule should not contain a clause the rule bars. [4] A health system’s contract team can check that, clause by clause.

The rule also matters for organizations that build their own tools. It says a self-developer must not restrict communications of users of its health IT who are also its employees or contractors. [4] A health system that certifies software it wrote cannot use employment terms to silence its own clinicians about that product’s usability or security. [4]

What could be done about providers: no direct authority

The 2015 report was explicit about providers. ONC, it said, could not take direct action against providers who block information. [1] Conditions of participation in federal health programs did not specifically prohibit information blocking. [1] ONC had no authority to require providers to produce relevant information, such as their contracts with developers. [1]

The report did not treat providers as blameless. It said a common charge was that some hospitals or health systems blocked information to control referrals and enhance market dominance. [1] It cited research finding larger hospital systems less likely to exchange externally with competitors and unaffiliated providers. [1] It said these findings lent some support to the anecdotes. [1]

Privacy as a stated reason

The report said the most common reason providers cited for constraining access was compliance with privacy and security requirements. [1] It said such constraints are not information blocking when consistent with federal and state law. [1] It also said privacy laws were reported to be cited where they did not in fact impose restrictions. [1]

It gave an example. Providers might cite the HIPAA Privacy Rule to deny exchange for treatment, when the rule specifically permits such disclosures. [1] The report planned work with the Office for Civil Rights to improve understanding of when the HIPAA Rules permit sharing. [1] It noted that state laws can be more protective and that the patchwork is hard for implementers to read. [1]

Coordination between developer and provider

The report described a form of blocking that needed both parties. A developer might be able to exchange Direct secure messages with a wide network of providers. [1] The developer and provider might then configure it so users could only pick recipients from a pre-populated list inside the provider’s network. [1] In that example, the product works as certified while its configuration limits who receives information.

For a health system, that example shows why contracts and configuration matter together. A decision to limit a drop-down list is a design choice recorded somewhere, in a statement of work, a configuration ticket or a governance minute. In 2015, ONC had no authority to compel it. [1]

Payment incentives as the report’s other lever

The report offered a second explanation for provider behavior. It said providers paid mainly on a fee-for-service basis have incentives not to exchange information outside their organizations. [1] Better coordination, it said, can reduce billable services, including duplicate and inappropriate ones. [1] Value-based payment, it argued, would strengthen the business case for exchange. [1]

It cited HHS’s January 2015 goals: tying 30 percent of Medicare fee-for-service payments to quality or value through alternative payment models by 2016, and 50 percent by 2018. [1] It treated payment reform as a broader strategy, separate from targeted actions against blocking. [1] In our reading, it expected payment to change provider incentives more than any enforcement tool could.

That expectation has a procurement consequence. A health system entering a shared-savings arrangement needs data from providers it does not own. Its contracts with developers then need to support exchange with outside parties as well as internal sharing. The report’s account of walled gardens describes the conflict a buyer faced in choosing a product. [1]

Who would investigate

The report suggested where authority might sit. It said investigating and confirming cases might be better suited to an agency with enforcement expertise and compulsory processes for obtaining evidence. [1] That is a description of an inspector general, though the report did not say which agency it meant.

The Cures Act gave the HHS Inspector General authority to investigate claims that a provider engaged in information blocking. [3] It did not give the Inspector General penalties against providers. Instead, a provider found to have blocked is referred to the appropriate agency for “appropriate disincentives,” as the Secretary sets through rulemaking. [3]

The statute also set a different knowledge standard for providers. For a provider, information blocking requires that the provider “knows that such practice is unreasonable” and likely to interfere with access, exchange or use. [3] For developers, exchanges and networks, the standard is that they know, or should know, the practice is likely to interfere. [3] In our reading, the provider standard kept the 2015 report’s focus on unreasonableness, while the developer standard moved it into exceptions defined by rule. [1] [3]

What a provider’s file now has to show

A provider’s exposure now depends on what it knew. The statute’s provider standard turns on knowledge that a practice is unreasonable. [3] A provider’s own records, such as policies, configuration decisions and the reasons given for them, are where that knowledge would show. In our reading, the 2015 report’s evidence problem moved inside the provider’s own files.

That is a different posture from 2015. Then, a provider’s contracts could not be compelled. [1] After Cures, an Inspector General investigation could reach provider claims, and HHS later set the disincentives. [3] [6] A health system that documents why it limits a disclosure is building the record an investigator would read.

What the law prohibited: almost nothing specific

The report’s fourth gap was legal. Even in egregious cases, it said, “most information blocking does not violate any current provision of law.” [1] Some conduct could be illegal under federal or state laws in specific and limited circumstances. [1] Those laws, it said, were not enacted to address most information blocking, so enforcement was largely incidental. [1]

The laws that did apply at the edges

The report named several. Restricting an individual’s access to their own electronic health information could violate federal or state law. [1] The HIPAA Rules give individuals a right of access, which the report said providers sometimes failed to honor. [1] The Office for Civil Rights could investigate practices that violated those rules. [1]

Fraud and abuse laws applied to some arrangements. The report described the anti-kickback safe harbor and the self-referral exception for donated EHR technology. [1] One condition of both required that the donor not limit the interoperability of donated items. [1] Blocking could take a donation outside that protection, the report said. [1]

Competition and consumer protection laws were a third route. ONC coordinated with the Federal Trade Commission’s competition and consumer protection bureaus to monitor health IT business practices. [1] It said it would help the Justice Department and state attorneys general where relevant. [1] Each route required conduct to fit a law written for another purpose.

The governance route the report preferred

Short of new law, the report put weight on governance. ONC intended to specify a governance framework for nationwide exchange, with common rules of the road and a way to recognize entities that comply. [1] Two principles addressed the most common complaints ONC received. [1]

The first, which the report called sharing protected health information, discouraged unnecessary policy, business, operational or technical barriers to sharing for care. [1] The second, open exchange, expected neutrality from developers, HISPs and exchange organizations. [1] Under it, a developer would not block use of competitors’ exchange applications. [1]

The report said developers adhering to these principles could not impose fees making exchange with competing products cost-prohibitive. [1] It also said that holding entities accountable might require additional authorities. [1] In our reading, the governance route was voluntary in 2015, and the report knew it. Its own list of gaps included the need for an effective governance mechanism. [1]

What Cures made unlawful, and what it cost

The Cures Act supplied a definition with penalties attached. Information blocking became a practice that is likely to interfere with, prevent or materially discourage access, exchange or use of electronic health information, with the knowledge standards described above. [3] The Secretary had to identify, by rulemaking, reasonable and necessary activities that are not information blocking. [3]

The statute gave the Inspector General power to investigate developers of certified health IT, exchanges and networks. [3] Those found to have committed information blocking face a civil monetary penalty that “may not exceed $1,000,000 per violation.” [3] The amount takes into account factors such as the number of patients and providers affected and how long the blocking persisted. [3]

The statute listed practices that may be information blocking. They include practices that restrict authorized exchange, including transitions between certified technologies. [3] They include nonstandard implementation that substantially increases burden, and implementation that restricts exporting complete information sets. [3] In our reading, those track the 2015 report’s examples closely. [1] [3]

The evidence provisions in the statute

Several provisions speak to the 2015 evidence problem. The National Coordinator must implement a standardized process for the public to submit reports of information blocking. [3] That process is to collect details such as originating and terminating institutions, systems and versions, timestamps and failure notices. [3]

Information that could identify the source of a claim is protected. It may not be disclosed by the National Coordinator except as needed, and is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. [3] In our reading, that responds to the 2015 picture of customers who feared speaking. [1] [3]

The statute also let the National Coordinator share claim information with the Federal Trade Commission and required sharing with the Inspector General as required by law. [3] It authorized $10,000,000 for the Inspector General to carry out the section. [3] Each provision addresses a gap the report named: reports, sources, investigators and money.

Where our reading is weakest

The strongest objection is that we overstate the evidence problem. The report did not say it lacked evidence that blocking occurred. It said there was little doubt that it was occurring. [1] Its conclusion said some providers and developers were knowingly interfering with exchange. [1] On that reading, the report’s message was about authority, and evidence was secondary.

We accept the report said both. Our point is about what the authority gap meant in operation. ONC could not compel contracts, could not confirm individual cases and could not estimate prevalence. [1] Those are evidence failures that flow from the absence of authority. [1] The Cures Act’s design treated them together. [3]

A second objection is that the communications condition reaches only developers of certified health IT. [3] [4] A developer outside the certification program, or a provider’s own policy, is not covered by it. [4] That is correct. The condition does not make every confidentiality clause in health care unenforceable. It applies to the regulated developer and the six listed subjects. [4]

A third objection is that the condition permits several restrictions. A developer may still restrict communications about non-user-facing aspects, some intellectual property, and pre-market testing. [4] It may set conditions on screenshots and video. [4] A buyer who assumes all restrictions are gone would be wrong. The rule protects some communications without qualification and allows others to be restricted within limits. [4]

A fourth objection concerns timing. The 2015 report’s evidence gaps did not close at once. The statute was approved in December 2016, and the communications rule took its codified form in 2020. [3] [4] The Inspector General’s penalties began only for conduct on or after September 1, 2023. [5] Provider disincentives took effect in July 2024. [6] Through those years, the 2015 picture held in large part.

A last objection is that blocking in 2026 may look different from blocking in 2015. The report focused on fees, interfaces and Direct messaging. [1] Later debates concern application programming interfaces, automated access and the exceptions in the rules. [7] We agree. The contract remains the common thread. The December 2025 proposal turns again to contract terms. [7]

One more objection deserves an answer. Some will say transparency rules cannot fix a market where buyers lack bargaining power. A buyer that can now describe a fee may still have to pay it. The 2015 report partly agreed. It said transparency would make developers more responsive and help ameliorate market distortions, and that its own actions alone would not provide a complete solution. [1] The later penalties and disincentives exist because disclosure alone was not expected to suffice. [3]

These checks follow from the report’s four gaps and the rules that came later. Organizations should confirm with counsel how the rules apply to them, since provider and developer obligations differ. [3] [4]

Contracts with developers of certified health IT

  • List each contract with a developer of certified health IT and find every confidentiality or non-disclosure clause.
  • Check whether any clause restricts communication on the six subjects in the communications condition, and whether it was amended at renewal. [4]
  • Keep the developer’s annual notices, if any were received, with the contract file. [4]
  • Record whether each clause falls under a permitted restriction, such as intellectual property or pre-market testing. [4]

Fees and exchange terms

  • Identify every fee charged for exchange, export, interfaces or queries, and the cost basis the developer gave.
  • Note which fees apply to transitions between systems or to exporting complete data sets, practices the statute names. [3]
  • Keep the record of how each fee was negotiated, since the 2015 report said pricing evidence sat with the parties. [1]

Provider-side decisions

  • Document the legal basis for each decision to withhold or limit electronic health information, especially where privacy law is cited. [1]
  • Review configurations that limit recipients, such as pre-populated directories, and record why they exist. [1]
  • Know which disincentive programs reach the organization, such as Promoting Interoperability or the Shared Savings Program. [6]

Reporting channels

  • Tell clinicians and informaticists that the rule protects reports to government agencies about information blocking. [4]
  • Keep a route for staff to raise exchange failures internally before they become external claims.
  • Track the December 2025 proposals on contracts and exceptions, which remained pending as checked on November 16, 2026. [7] [8]

With hindsight

Congress acted in the 21st Century Cures Act, approved on December 13, 2016. [3] Section 4002 added the conditions of certification, including the bar on restricting communication about six subjects. [3] It directed the Secretary to issue them through notice and comment rulemaking, on the statute’s timetable: “Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment.” [3] Section 4004 added the information blocking provisions. [3]

The statutory definition differed from the report’s. The report’s test was knowing and unreasonable interference. [1] The statute used “likely to interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage” access, exchange or use. [3] It gave developers, exchanges and networks a “knows, or should know” standard and providers a standard requiring knowledge that the practice is unreasonable. [3] It left the reasonable activities to rulemaking as exceptions. [3]

ONC codified the communications condition at 45 CFR 170.403. [4] The eCFR lists its source as 85 FR 25945, May 1, 2020, as amended later that year. [4] The rule bars a developer from establishing, renewing or enforcing a contract that contravenes the condition. [4] It sets the notice and amendment duties for contracts in existence as of June 30, 2020. [4]

The Inspector General’s penalty rule followed. HHS-OIG published its final rule on July 3, 2023. [5] It was effective August 2, 2023, except for the information blocking penalty sections, effective September 1, 2023. [5] The rule said OIG would not impose a penalty on information blocking conduct occurring before its effective date. [5]

The OIG rule set the maximum at $1,000,000 per violation. [5] It restated anticipated priorities: conduct that caused or could cause patient harm, significantly affected a provider’s ability to care for patients, was of long duration, caused financial loss, or was performed with actual knowledge. [5] It said it would evaluate claims received by ONC through the standardized public process. [5] It said the definition includes an element of intent. [5]

Provider disincentives came in a separate rule. It was published on July 1, 2024 and effective July 31, 2024. [6] It applied to certain health care providers that are also Medicare-enrolled providers or suppliers. [6] An eligible hospital referred by OIG would not be a meaningful EHR user for the reporting period. [6] The rule said such a hospital could not earn the three quarters of the annual market basket increase tied to that status. [6]

The same rule reduced a critical access hospital’s payment to 100 percent of reasonable costs, from the 101 percent it might otherwise have earned. [6] It set disincentives for MIPS eligible clinicians through the Promoting Interoperability performance category, and for the Medicare Shared Savings Program. [6] It also provided for posting on ONC’s website the names of actors OIG determined had committed information blocking. [6] For providers, that posting includes the practice and the disincentive applied. [6]

The rule acknowledged it did not establish disincentives for all health care providers in the regulatory definition. [6] It had requested information on how to reach others. [6] In our reading, the 2015 report’s provider gap narrowed through Medicare programs rather than closing for every provider type.

On December 29, 2025, HHS proposed deregulatory changes that included information blocking revisions. [7] The proposal said it sought to address reported misuse and abuse of the definitions and exceptions. [7] It would revise the “access” and “use” definitions to include automated means, including autonomous AI systems. [7] It would remove a condition of the Infeasibility Exception it said was susceptible to misuse. [7]

The proposal returned to contracts. It would revise the Manner Exception so that it “cannot be met with contracts that are not market rate, are contracts of adhesion, or are contracts containing unconscionable terms.” [7] It would remove the TEFCA Manner Exception. [7] Comments were due February 27, 2026. [7]

A final rule from that proposal was published on October 28, 2026, effective December 28, 2026, with some instructions effective January 1, 2027. [8] It said it responded to a narrowed set of proposals. [8] It said comments on proposals not discussed in it remained under review and might appear in subsequent final rules or revised proposals. [8] Its summary describes changes to certification criteria and programs, not to the information blocking regulations. [8]

As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR text of the communications condition was unchanged from its 2020 form as amended that year. [4] The information blocking proposals of December 2025 had not been finalized in the October 2026 rule. [7] [8] Status should be confirmed before relying on either.

What held up from 2015 is the diagnosis that contracts were both the evidence and the barrier. [1] Congress put customer communication into certification, created a reporting channel, and gave investigators penalties. [3] What did not hold up was the hope, in the report’s targeted actions, that certification and governance alone could address the problem. [1] The report itself had said they could not. [1]

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  • information blocking
  • ONC
  • EHR contracts
  • 21st Century Cures Act
  • health IT certification