MACRA’s 2015 card rule removed Social Security numbers from view, not from Medicare’s systems
The April 2015 law barred Social Security numbers from Medicare cards and told HHS to consider an identifier convertible back to them internally. The new number reached cards and claims; the old one stayed in the enrollment database, some reports and appeals.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The April 2015 law barred Social Security numbers from Medicare cards and told HHS to consider an identifier convertible back to them internally. The new number reached cards and claims; the old one stayed in the enrollment database, some reports and appeals.
- The week The section then set out how to implement it.
- On the card: a display rule by design The statute’s main clause is narrow on purpose.
- At the front desk: providers and plans in the middle The Social Security-based number was a working tool for providers.
- Inside the systems: the crosswalk and the partners The statute’s Railroad Retirement Board model points to the central design choice.
- In the records: what a new number exposed Assigning a new identifier to every beneficiary is a data quality test.
- Where the argument is weakest The strongest objection is that the statute did what it set out to do.
- Checks for program directors and provider operations leaders These checks follow the four parts.
- With hindsight CMS finished the mailing before the deadline the Inspector General identified.
The week
On April 16, 2015, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 was approved. [1] Its first title repealed the sustainable growth rate formula for Medicare physician payment and set up a new payment system. [1] The title was headed “SGR Repeal and Medicare Provider Payment Modernization.” [1]
Title V of the same law, headed “Miscellaneous,” began with a subtitle called “Protecting the Integrity of Medicare.” [1] Its first section was titled “Prohibition of inclusion of Social Security account numbers on Medicare cards.” [1] It amended the Social Security Act with a new clause. [1]
The clause told the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Commissioner of Social Security, to “establish cost-effective procedures.” [1] Those procedures were to ensure that a Social Security account number “(or derivative thereof) is not displayed, coded, or embedded on the Medicare card.” [1] Any other identifier displayed on the card could not be identifiable as a Social Security account number or derivative. [1]
The section then set out how to implement it. The Secretary was to establish a process with “the least amount of disruption” to beneficiaries and providers, with necessary assistance. [1] The law gave examples: a toll-free telephone number for beneficiaries and outreach to providers. [1]
It also told the Secretary to consider a model drawn from the Railroad Retirement Board. [1] Under it, a Medicare beneficiary identifier that is not a Social Security number would be used outside HHS. [1] That identifier would be “convertible over” to a Social Security number for use inside HHS and the Social Security Administration. [1]
The law funded the work from the Medicare trust funds. CMS’s program management account was to receive $65,000,000 for fiscal year 2015, $53,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and $48,000,000 for fiscal year 2018. [1] The Social Security Administration was to receive $27,000,000, $22,000,000 for each of the two middle years, and $27,000,000. [1] The Railroad Retirement Board was to receive $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2015. [1]
The deadlines were written as periods. The new clause applied to cards issued on and after an effective date the Secretary would set. [1] That date could be no “later than the date that is four years after the date of the enactment of this Act.” [1] Reissued cards were due “not later than four years after the effective date.” [1]
The section had a history. In September 2013, the Government Accountability Office reported that CMS had not taken the steps needed to select and implement a technical solution for removing the numbers. [2] It said CMS had studied the question and reported to Congress in October 2006, November 2011 and May 2013. [2] The 2013 study estimated about $255 million for one approach and about $317 million for another. [2]
The same title of the 2015 law did other things for beneficiaries. Section 503 asked the Secretary to consider electronic beneficiary and provider cards, such as smart cards, where cost effective and technologically viable. [1] Section 508 gave beneficiaries an option to receive the Medicare Summary Notice electronically, for statements furnished for periods in 2016 or later. [1]
The card section of the April 2015 law reads like a finished job. It prohibited Social Security numbers on Medicare cards, funded the work and set outer limits for when it had to be done. [1] The HHS Inspector General later reported that CMS mailed more than 65 million new cards. [3]
Our argument is that the statute solved a display problem and left a records problem. The law’s operative clause was about what is “displayed, coded, or embedded on the Medicare card.” [1] Its implementation section told HHS to consider an identifier used externally and “convertible over” to a Social Security number internally. [1] The design contemplated keeping the old number inside the program.
For beneficiaries, that design was good service. It reduced the exposure of a number they carried in a wallet and showed at every visit. [2] [3] For providers, plans, state agencies and CMS’s own contractors, the change was a new key layered on old keys. The old number stayed in the enrollment database and in some reports and appeals, and a later breach notice listed it among data in contractor file transfers. [3] [4] [5]
That matters to anyone running a public program or a provider’s front office. A number removed from a card is still a number held in other files. Every place it remains is a place it can leak or drift out of step with the new one. In our reading, the 2015 law moved the risk from the wallet to the data center.
We take the change in four parts, by where the Social Security-based identifier lived:
- On the card: what the statute required, and why it was written as a display rule.
- At the front desk: how providers and plans used the number in transactions.
- Inside the systems: the crosswalk between old and new identifiers, and the partners who share them.
- In the records: what assigning a new number exposed about the enrollment data underneath.
The parts do not overlap. The first is the beneficiary’s document, the second the transactions providers and plans send, the third the agency’s systems and partners, and the fourth the records that tie a person to a number. Together they cover where the identifier lived. After them we take the strongest objections, and end with checks for program directors and provider operations leaders.
On the card: a display rule by design
The statute’s main clause is narrow on purpose. It addresses the card issued to a person entitled to Part A or enrolled in Part B. [1] It says the Social Security number may not be displayed, coded or embedded on that card. [1] It says any other identifier displayed there may not be identifiable as a Social Security number. [1]
The three verbs matter. “Displayed” covers the printed number. “Coded” and “embedded” reach a number stored in a bar code, magnetic stripe or chip. [1] In our reading, Congress was writing against the approach other agencies had taken earlier.
What other agencies had done
The 2013 GAO report described them. The Defense Department had completed, in June 2011, the replacement of almost 10 million military identification cards that printed the number. [2] The new cards stored the number in bar codes. [2] The Department of Veterans Affairs had completed, in November 2004, the replacement of almost 8 million cards that printed the number, embedding it in magnetic stripes instead. [2]
GAO reported that both departments continued to use the number as an identifier. [2] Both were working to remove the embedded numbers, and VA cited the risk from electronic readers on devices such as smartphones. [2] A Medicare rule that banned only printed numbers would have allowed the approach those departments were then working to undo. The statute’s “coded, or embedded” language closed that path. [1]
Why the card mattered more for Medicare
GAO explained why the Medicare card was a sharper problem. About 50 million cards in use displayed Social Security numbers as part of the claim number. [2] The number on the card is the Health Insurance Claim Number, built from a Social Security number and a beneficiary identification code. [2]
GAO reported that about 14 percent of the cards contained the Social Security number of the family member whose work history provided eligibility. [2] A spouse’s card could show the worker’s number. [2] In our reading, a lost card in those cases exposed a person who might never have seen it.
Beneficiaries also had to show the card at the point of care. GAO said beneficiaries present printed cards at the point of care, and providers use the number on them to check eligibility and file claims. [2] It cited its own earlier finding that numbers on cards that must be carried and disclosed are at risk from loss, theft or visual exposure. [2]
The service the statute required
The implementation section adds a service standard. The process was to involve “the least amount of disruption” for beneficiaries and providers, with “necessary assistance.” [1] It named a toll-free number and outreach to providers as examples. [1] It did not set a format for the new identifier or tell CMS how to mail cards. [1]
The law also funded the Social Security Administration and the Railroad Retirement Board alongside CMS. [1] Those agencies handle eligibility and replacement cards for beneficiaries. [2] A person who loses a card and calls the wrong agency still needs an answer. The statute’s examples, a toll-free number and provider outreach, both assume people will need help to use the new card. [1] In our reading, the funding lines show Congress understood the change as a multi-agency service, not a CMS print job.
What the card rule did not cover
The clause applies to the Medicare card. [1] It does not, by its terms, govern Medicare Summary Notices, letters, claims files or data shared with partners. [1] Those are where the identifier also travels. [2] A beneficiary whose card no longer shows the number might still find it in other documents or files held by others.
That scope was a reasonable choice. Congress acted on the document beneficiaries carry and show at the point of care. [1] [2] It also defines the boundary of the protection. The parts below follow the number past the card.
At the front desk: providers and plans in the middle
The Social Security-based number was a working tool for providers. GAO described how providers query CMS’s HIPAA Eligibility Transaction System using the number printed on the card, with other demographic data. [2] The system returns real-time eligibility for specific services. [2] Providers are required to use the number to submit claims. [2]
A new identifier therefore changed provider workflows before it changed any CMS system. Registration screens, practice management systems, clearinghouse edits and eligibility checks all had to accept the new format. [2] Each provider’s vendors had to make those changes in step with CMS.
The transition window
The Inspector General’s 2020 report described the timeline. CMS began assigning the new Medicare Beneficiary Identifiers in May 2017. [3] It began mailing new cards in April 2018. [3] In January 2019, according to the report, CMS announced it had completed the mailing. [3]
The report said that until January 1, 2020, CMS would accept either the old claim number or the new identifier for claim processing. [3] It said providers could take extra steps for a patient without a new card, such as getting the identifier through a secure lookup tool on Medicare contractors’ websites. [3]
For a front office, the window was both relief and complexity. Claims could flow while patients brought old or new cards. Staff had to handle two formats and know which one a payer system expected. A practice with weak registration controls could carry both numbers in one patient record without knowing which was current.
The new number’s format
CMS describes the identifier on its current page. It is 11 characters, made only of numbers and uppercase letters. [4] It does not use the letters S, L, O, I, B and Z, to avoid confusion between some letters and numbers. [4] CMS describes the characters as “non-intelligent,” meaning they carry no hidden meaning. [4]
Those design choices serve the front desk. A random identifier cannot be guessed from a birth date or a family member’s number. [4] Excluding confusing letters reduces keying errors at registration. [4] In our reading, the format was built for people reading it aloud and typing it, which is a customer experience decision.
The confidentiality instruction
CMS also tells partners how to treat the number. Its page says the identifier “is confidential like the SSN and should be protected as Personally Identifiable Information.” [4] That instruction moves a burden to every provider and plan that holds it.
A provider whose privacy program protects Social Security numbers has a template to follow. The new identifier needs the same treatment in scanned cards, registration screens, printed face sheets and call scripts. [4] The statute removed one sensitive number from the card. [1] CMS’s guidance means partners now hold two numbers to protect. [4]
Plans and the exceptions
Medicare Advantage and drug plans have their own cards. CMS tells beneficiaries in those plans to keep using the plan cards when they get services or fill prescriptions. [4] They still need their Medicare identifier when they change plans or are admitted to the hospital. [4]
For plans, CMS lists exceptions where the old number still works. Plans may use the old claim number “indefinitely” for some systems, including drug data processing, risk adjustment processing and encounter data. [4] CMS says it is using the old number on certain reports, incoming and outgoing, “until further notice.” [4] Plans may use it for retrospective reporting on older contract years. [4]
How the change differs by type of organization
The same change landed differently across the provider world. A hospital may register patients through a central access team, with an eligibility check built into its registration system. A small physician practice may rely on a front-desk employee and a practice management vendor. A home health agency or equipment supplier may never see the patient at a desk at all.
CMS’s exceptions reflect some of those differences. Some inpatient hospital, home health and religious non-medical health care institution claims that began before the end of the transition could use the old number. [4] Those are services with spans of dates, where a single episode crossed the cutover. [4]
For a hypothetical regional health system, the practical questions were about systems it did not write. Did the registration vendor accept both formats during the window? Did the clearinghouse reject the old format after it? Did the patient portal display the new identifier, and to whom? Each answer sat in a vendor’s release notes and a contract.
For a state Medicaid agency, the change touched people eligible for both programs. GAO described how states use the Medicare number to identify dual eligibles and pay premiums. [2] A state’s eligibility system, its premium payment files and its coordination-of-benefits matching all keyed on the Medicare number. [2] In our reading, a state could do everything right and still depend on CMS’s files arriving in the new format on time.
Inside the systems: the crosswalk and the partners
The statute’s Railroad Retirement Board model points to the central design choice. An identifier used outside HHS would be “convertible over” to a Social Security number inside HHS and the Social Security Administration. [1] That conversion is a crosswalk: a table or service that maps one key to the other.
GAO had described that crosswalk in 2013. CMS officials told GAO that a planned shared service could translate the existing claim number to the new identifier, and the reverse. [2] GAO wrote that this “would enable internal systems to receive information containing the new identifier and continue to process data based on the existing number.” [2]
Why a crosswalk was the cheaper path
GAO’s account of CMS’s systems explains the appeal. CMS depended on more than 200 information technology systems to administer Medicare. [2] Many were developed decades ago and were hard to modify or integrate. [2] Advisory reviews had described a “stove-piped” environment where sharing data across systems was costly, risky and time-consuming. [2]
The claim number ran through those systems. GAO described contractor systems, three shared claims systems and the Common Working File, which verifies eligibility and checks deductibles. [2] Each used the number to retrieve data. [2] In our reading, changing the key in every system at once would have been a much larger project than translating at the edge.
CMS’s 2013 cost estimates reflect that. GAO reported IT-related costs of about $26 million for one approach and about $64 million for the other. [2] The rest of each estimate was for business processes such as printing and mailing cards and training staff. [2] In our reading, the costs were weighted toward the card and the people, not the core systems.
What GAO had asked CMS to do
GAO’s 2013 criticism was about project discipline. It said CMS had not designated a business owner, established a business case, issued a project charter or presented an IT project for architecture review. [2] Those steps came from CMS’s own life-cycle guidance for IT projects. [2] Without them, GAO said, the agency was not positioned to pick or implement a solution. [2]
GAO recommended that CMS start an IT project for removal and fold it into its modernization plans. [2] HHS agreed if certain constraints were addressed, according to the report. [2] GAO said its recommendations were warranted as stated. [2] It also noted that CMS’s modernization plan aimed at shared services, which could host the crosswalk. [2]
The 2013 estimates rested on a schedule assumption. According to GAO, the May 2013 report assumed the effort would span 18 months, from October 2013 to April 2015. [2] CMS officials told GAO the figures were high-level and did not fully reflect a specific IT solution. [2] The statute arrived in the month that schedule had assumed the work would end. [1] [2]
For any agency, that history is familiar. Three studies, reported to Congress in 2006, 2011 and 2013, produced estimates rather than a project. [2] A statute with funding and a deadline produced one. [1] In our reading, the 2015 law’s practical contribution was to turn a recurring study into a funded program with an owner.
The partners who share the number
The identifier also crosses agency lines. GAO said CMS shares data containing the claim number with the Social Security Administration when eligibility changes, and SSA refers to it when beneficiaries ask for replacement cards. [2] CMS shares it with the Railroad Retirement Board for railroad retirees. [2]
States are partners too. GAO said CMS and the 56 state and territorial Medicaid programs share data based on the claim number. [2] The states use it to identify people eligible for both programs and to pay premiums for some beneficiaries. [2] CMS sends data back for coordination of benefits and drug coverage. [2]
GAO spoke with Medicaid officials from eight states during its review. [2] It chose them by the level of effort the states had estimated their own systems changes would need. [2] For a state Medicaid agency, the 2015 law created work it did not control: systems changes timed to a federal transition.
Notices and mail
Cards are one kind of mail. GAO said CMS’s and contractors’ systems also use the old claim number to issue Medicare Summary Notices and to run printing and mailing operations. [2] Those notices go to beneficiaries’ homes, and each one carries identifying details.
The 2015 law addressed notices in a different section. Section 508 gave beneficiaries an option to receive the Medicare Summary Notice electronically, for statements furnished for periods in 2016 or later. [1] It required a clear notification of that option, beginning January 1, 2017. [1] It let the Secretary extend the electronic option to other statements and notifications. [1]
Section 508 is framed as convenience. In our reading, it also changes where an identifier appears. A paper notice can be stolen from a mailbox; an electronic one depends on account security. Neither section said which identifier a notice must carry. [1] The card rule and the notice option were written as separate fixes.
The cost of carrying two keys
A crosswalk is not free to run. Every system that receives the new identifier and processes on the old one must call the translation correctly. A failed lookup can misroute a claim or attach data to the wrong record. GAO’s account of claims flowing through contractors, shared systems and the Common Working File shows how many hand-offs that is. [2]
Analytics and research files face the same problem. A data warehouse that joins claims across years must link records keyed on the old number with records keyed on the new one. [4] CMS lists exceptions for retrospective reporting and risk adjustment. [4] In our reading, those exceptions reflect older data still keyed the old way, and any analyst joining Medicare data across the 2018 to 2020 transition is relying on the crosswalk, whether they see it or not.
Security teams inherit a different cost. The old number is sensitive because it embeds a Social Security number. [2] The new one is sensitive because CMS says to treat it like one. [4] A file holding both is more sensitive than a file holding either. The breach notice listed the new identifier or the old claim number among the data that may have been involved in contractor transfers. [5]
What the crosswalk preserved
A crosswalk keeps the old key alive by design. The Inspector General’s 2020 report said the old claim numbers “remain an integral part of CMS’s systems.” [3] It said they continue to be used in the enrollment database for current and new beneficiaries. [3]
CMS’s current page lists where the old number still works. Fee-for-service providers may use either number for appeals and for audits. [4] Plans may use the old number indefinitely in some systems. [4] In our reading, these exceptions are the visible edge of the crosswalk. They show the old identifier was retired from the card and front-line claims, not from the program.
Contractor files carry both
The point is concrete in a later incident. CMS posted a notice of a data breach at a Medicare contractor, Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corporation. [5] The notice said the contractor handles Medicare Part A and Part B claims and related services. [5] It said a vulnerability in file transfer software allowed access, between May 27 and 31, 2023, to personal information transferred with it. [5]
The notice listed the information that may have been involved. It included names, Social Security numbers or taxpayer identification numbers and dates of birth. [5] It included the “Medicare Beneficiary Identifier (MBI) or Health Insurance Claim Number (HICN).” [5] In our reading, that list shows claims files moving among contractors in 2023 could still carry the old number, alongside the Social Security number itself.
In the records: what a new number exposed
Assigning a new identifier to every beneficiary is a data quality test. Each person should get one number. Any duplicate enrollment record gets its own. The Inspector General examined how that test went. [3]
CMS assigned about 150 million identifiers in May 2017, to living and deceased beneficiaries. [3] It assigned them to deceased beneficiaries for uniformity in the enrollment database. [3] The Inspector General found the controls “generally effective” and identified problems in a small percentage of cases. [3]
Duplicate records became duplicate identities
The report found 22,662 beneficiaries assigned two or more identifiers. [3] Each had multiple enrollment records with the same Social Security number and date of birth. [3] The report said CMS’s controls did not always identify and merge such records before assigning identifiers. [3] It said these represented 0.02 percent of identifiers assigned. [3]
The duplicates had consequences. CMS identified 18,299 beneficiaries who were mailed multiple new cards with different identifiers. [3] The report called that a potentially inappropriate release of personally identifiable information. [3] It said multiple cards mailed to the same person may be susceptible to loss or theft. [3]
Money was affected too. The report found 620 beneficiaries who received services under multiple identifiers. [3] Because CMS systems treat each enrollment record as a distinct beneficiary, each record carried its own deductible. [3] Beneficiaries were held responsible for $150,730 in unnecessary deductibles, according to the report. [3]
The report gave another example of the risk. A beneficiary limited to one annual wellness visit could receive two if he or she had two enrollment records. [3] That would be a claim processing error. [3] In our reading, the old number’s flaws in the records were easy to miss until a new key was assigned to each record.
Why the duplicates were there
The report explained the control that missed them. CMS screened new enrollment records for conflicts with existing records when certain identifiers matched, such as name and date of birth. [3] Those controls did not always catch a new record whose Social Security number and date of birth matched an existing record. [3] Had CMS merged them, the extra records would have been made unusable. [3]
GAO’s description of the old number explains why that is subtle. The claim number combined a Social Security number with a code for the type of beneficiary. [2] The same Social Security number could appear on a worker’s record and, with a different code, on a spouse’s. [2] A matching rule had to tell legitimate shared numbers from true duplicates.
For any agency planning a similar change, the lesson for the plan is concrete. Assigning a new identifier means deciding, record by record, whether two records are one person. That decision is easier before the new numbers go out than after cards are in the mail. [3]
What the audit did not test
The Inspector General’s audit had a defined scope. It assessed controls over assigning identifiers and mailing cards, and payments for deceased beneficiaries. [3] It did not set out to test every system’s handling of the crosswalk. [3] Its findings describe the enrollment records and the mailing process, not the full chain of claims systems and partners.
Cards for people who had died
The report found 58,420 cards mailed after the beneficiaries’ dates of death. [3] Of those, 2,222 were mailed after the enrollment database already held the date of death. [3] The report said CMS’s controls did not always check date-of-death information in time before mailing data went to the print contractor. [3]
It described the timing gap. CMS generated card mailing data and then sent it to the contractor, and the database could be updated in between. [3] Cards sent to deceased people may end up in other people’s possession, the report said. [3] It recommended checking date-of-death data as close as reasonably possible to the hand-off. [3]
What CMS changed
CMS strengthened controls on March 21, 2019, according to the report. [3] From then, it withheld new cards for beneficiaries its systems flagged as potentially having existing enrollment records, until a decision on merging. [3] CMS told the Inspector General it had merged 15,130 beneficiaries’ multiple records as of September 9, 2019. [3]
The report recommended that contractors review deductibles that may have been wrongly collected. [3] It recommended review of $2,263,465 in improper payments for claims with service dates after death, and recoupment where appropriate. [3] CMS concurred with the recommendations. [3]
A new number can be replaced
The new design added an option the old one lacked. The report said CMS may replace a beneficiary’s identifier, for instance when it has been compromised or the beneficiary is a victim of identity theft. [3] A Social Security-based claim number could not be changed without changing the person’s Social Security number.
CMS’s notice about the 2023 breach shows the option offered. It told people who believed their Medicare number may have been affected that they could ask whether the number could be changed. [5] In our reading, replaceability is the strongest service gain of the 2015 law. It turns a permanent exposure into a recoverable one, for the identifier at least.
Where the argument is weakest
The strongest objection is that the statute did what it set out to do. Its title prohibited Social Security numbers on Medicare cards. [1] CMS removed them and mailed new cards. [3] The Inspector General said the transition provided better protection for beneficiaries against identity theft. [3] Faulting a card law for not cleaning up every system asks it to be something else.
We agree the law did its job. Our point is about what an operator should take from it. A display rule protects the person holding the document. It does not reduce the number of systems holding the sensitive value. [1] [3] An agency planning a similar change should budget for both, and know which one it is buying.
A second objection is that keeping the old number internally was prudent. GAO’s account of more than 200 aging systems makes a full replacement look risky. [2] A crosswalk let CMS change the edge without breaking claims payment. [2] We accept that. The exceptions CMS still lists show the cost of that prudence, which is a long tail of old-number use. [4]
A third objection is that the breach notice proves little. The incident came from a software vulnerability at a contractor, not from the card change. [5] The notice listed Social Security numbers too, so removing the old claim number would not have kept those out of the files. [5] That is fair. We cite it only to show where both identifiers still travel, not to blame the 2015 law for the breach.
A last objection concerns the Inspector General’s numbers. The problems it found were small percentages of a very large effort. [3] Its headline was that controls were generally effective. [3] We do not argue the rollout failed. We argue that a new identifier is a census of enrollment records, and the census found duplicates and timing gaps worth planning for. [3]
Some will argue a smart card would have solved the internal problem as well. The same law asked the Secretary to consider electronic beneficiary and provider cards where cost effective and technologically viable. [1] A chip does not change what the back-end systems use as their key. In our reading, the internal problem is about databases and partner files, which a different card would not have touched.
Checks for program directors and provider operations leaders
These checks follow the four parts. They apply in different ways to a state Medicaid agency, a federal program office, a health system’s revenue cycle team and a plan. Organizations should confirm requirements with counsel and with CMS’s current guidance. [4]
Documents people carry
- List every card, letter and statement your program issues and record which identifiers each one displays, codes or embeds. [1]
- Treat bar codes, magnetic stripes and chips as display, as the 2015 law did. [1]
- Name the phone line and staff who answer questions about a changed number. [1]
Transactions
- Confirm registration, eligibility and billing systems store the current Medicare identifier and flag any old claim numbers. [4]
- Keep the old number only where CMS’s exceptions allow, such as appeals and audits, and record why. [4]
- Protect the Medicare identifier as personally identifiable information in scans, screens and printouts. [4]
Systems and partners
- Map every system that holds the old claim number, the new identifier and the crosswalk between them. [2] [3]
- List partners that send or receive files containing either number, including contractors and state agencies. [2] [5]
- Include file transfer tools in that map, since a 2023 contractor breach involved one. [5]
Records
- Before any identifier change, search for duplicate records that share a Social Security number and date of birth. [3]
- Check date-of-death data as close as possible to any mailing hand-off. [3]
- Know how a beneficiary or customer can get a compromised identifier replaced, and how long systems take to accept it. [3] [5]
Customer contact
- Script call center answers for people who present an old card, a new card or no card, using the lookup routes payers provide. [3]
- Tell callers which agency handles which question, since eligibility, replacement cards and claims sit with different bodies. [1] [2]
- Track complaints about duplicate cards or unexpected deductibles as signs of duplicate records. [3]
With hindsight
CMS finished the mailing before the deadline the Inspector General identified. The Inspector General’s January 2020 report said the law required reissued cards by April 2019, in its reading of the statute. [3] CMS began assigning the new identifiers in May 2017 and mailing cards in April 2018. [3] In January 2019, the report said, CMS announced completion of the mailing. [3]
The scale was large. The report described the work as the Social Security Number Removal Initiative. [3] It said the effort required coordination among federal, state and private-sector stakeholders, extensive outreach and education, and mailing of more than 65 million new cards. [3] It said CMS initially assigned approximately 150 million identifiers. [3]
The audit covered payments from January 2018 through March 2019. [3] Its findings, as above, were small in percentage terms and real for the people affected. [3] Duplicate records produced multiple identifiers, extra cards and unnecessary deductibles. [3] Cards went to some people who had died. [3] CMS concurred and described planned actions. [3]
The dual-number window closed for most claims. The report said CMS would accept either number until January 1, 2020. [3] CMS’s page now says providers “MUST submit claims using MBIs, no matter what date you performed the service, with a few exceptions.” [4]
The exceptions are durable. CMS’s page, last modified on September 10, 2024, lists appeals and audits as places where fee-for-service providers may use either number. [4] It lists claim status queries for claims with a date of service before January 1, 2020. [4] It lists some inpatient, home health and religious non-medical institution claims that began before the end of the transition. [4]
For plans, the page lists systems where the old number may be used indefinitely, and reports where CMS uses it until further notice. [4] It says CMS will accept the old number on some incoming premium payments. [4] As checked on November 16, 2026, the page carried the same exceptions.
The Inspector General’s report also stated the background plainly. Old claim numbers “remain an integral part of CMS’s systems,” it said, in the enrollment database for current and new beneficiaries. [3] In our reading, that sentence is the 2015 law’s design working as intended. The card changed; the core key stayed.
Later events showed both identifiers in motion. CMS posted a notice of a breach at Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corporation, a contractor handling Part A and Part B claims. [5] It said the contractor determined on July 8, 2024, that some copied files contained personal information. [5] It said the files had been accessible between May 27 and 31, 2023, through a vulnerability in MOVEit file transfer software. [5]
The notice listed the new identifier or the old claim number among the information involved. [5] It said the contractor was offering 12 months of credit monitoring. [5] It told people they could continue to use their existing card, and could ask whether their number could be changed. [5] It said CMS was continuing to investigate with the contractor. [5]
The smart card idea in the same law did not appear in the later record we reviewed. Section 503 asked only that the Secretary consider electronic cards where cost effective and technologically viable. [1] The new cards CMS mailed carried randomly derived identifiers, as the Inspector General described them. [3]
What held up from 2015 is the choice of a random, replaceable identifier and a service-first rollout. [1] [3] [4] What did not happen is retirement of the Social Security-based number from Medicare’s own systems and partner files. [3] [4] [5] The statute did not ask for that, and the sources we reviewed, through CMS’s page as checked on November 16, 2026, do not show that it has occurred.
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