EO 13772 ordered a report, not rules; the bank items on its list moved only when Congress or regulators acted
The February 3, 2017 order set principles and asked Treasury for a report. Treasury’s June 2017 bank report sorted each fix by who could make it. Congress acted in 2018 and two bank regulators in 2026; the order was revoked in 2021.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The February 3, 2017 order set principles and asked Treasury for a report. Treasury’s June 2017 bank report sorted each fix by who could make it. Congress acted in 2018 and two bank regulators in 2026; the order was revoked in 2021.
- The week Section 1 stated a policy.
- Items for Congress: thresholds and exemptions in statute The fiduciary memorandum signed the same day shows what a direct instruction looked like.
- Items for regulators by rule: capital, stress testing and liquidity A second group needed only the regulators.
- Items for supervisors by practice: examinations, reporting and findings A third group dealt with supervision, not rules.
- Items with no single owner: coordination, including cybersecurity The report addressed cybersecurity as a problem of regulatory overlap.
- How the list landed on different institutions Several statutory items were aimed at community banks.
- Objections, in order It does not, and we do not claim it.
- What compliance and risk leaders could check The checks below follow the four groups.
- With hindsight Executive Order 13772 itself did not last.
The week
On Friday, February 3, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13772, Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System. [1] It was published in the Federal Register on February 8, 2017. [1] The order ran to three sections. [1]
Section 1 stated a policy. The administration would regulate the U.S. financial system consistent with seven principles, which the order called the Core Principles. [1] The first was to empower Americans to make independent financial decisions and informed choices, save for retirement and build individual wealth. [1] The second was to prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts. [1]
The third principle was to foster economic growth and vibrant markets through more rigorous regulatory impact analysis addressing systemic risk and market failures. [1] The order named moral hazard and information asymmetry as examples of such failures. [1] The fourth was to enable American companies to compete with foreign firms at home and abroad. [1]
The fifth was to advance American interests in international financial regulatory negotiations and meetings. [1] The sixth was to make regulation efficient, effective and appropriately tailored. [1] The seventh was to restore public accountability within federal financial regulatory agencies and rationalize the federal regulatory framework. [1]
Section 2 gave the only instruction. The Secretary of the Treasury was to consult the heads of the member agencies of the Financial Stability Oversight Council. [1] The Secretary was to report to the President within 120 days, and periodically after that. [1] The report was to cover how far existing laws, treaties, regulations, guidance, reporting and recordkeeping requirements and other policies promoted the Core Principles. [1]
The report also had to identify those that inhibited federal regulation of the financial system in a manner consistent with the principles. [1] It was to describe the actions taken, and being taken, to promote the principles. [1]
Section 3 contained the standard limits. Nothing in the order impaired authority granted by law to an agency or its head. [1] The order was to be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to appropriations. [1] It created no enforceable right or benefit. [1]
The same day, the President signed a memorandum to the Secretary of Labor on the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule. [2] The memorandum described the rule, published at 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 on April 8, 2016, as one that may significantly alter how Americans receive financial advice. [2] It said the rule may not be consistent with the administration’s policies. [2]
The memorandum directed the Secretary to examine whether the rule may harm access to retirement information and advice, and to prepare an updated economic and legal analysis. [2] The analysis was to consider harm to investors from reduced access to offerings or advice, dislocations in the retirement services industry, and increases in litigation and prices. [2]
If the Secretary made an affirmative finding on any of those, or concluded the rule was inconsistent with the stated priority, the Department was to propose rescinding or revising the rule. [2] So the two documents differed in kind. The memorandum pointed at one rule and set a process to change it. [2] The executive order pointed at the whole financial regulatory system and asked for a report. [1]
Executive Order 13772 is easy to read as a deregulatory order. Its text did not deregulate anything. It stated principles and asked the Treasury for a report. [1] What changed for banks and credit unions came later, from Congress and the regulators, on their own authority. [1] [5] [8]
Our argument is that the order’s lasting product was a sorted list. Treasury’s first report, on banks and credit unions, assigned each recommendation to Congress, to regulators or to both. [4] That column predicted which items could move and through whom. For a compliance leader, the list was a forecast of where rule changes would come from, not a change in itself.
Treasury itself hedged the allocation. A note in its table said each policy responsibility was a preliminary assessment and did not indicate whether other authorities might exist. [4] We use the column as Treasury’s forecast, with that caveat, not as a legal finding about who could act.
We take the bank and credit union recommendations in four groups, by who had to act:
- Items for Congress: thresholds and exemptions written into statute.
- Items for regulators by rule: capital, stress testing and liquidity rules.
- Items for supervisors by practice: examinations, reporting and supervisory findings.
- Items with no single owner: coordination across agencies, including cybersecurity.
The groups follow the report’s own allocation and together cover its recommendations for depository institutions. After them we look at how the list landed on different institutions, take the objections in order, and end with checks a compliance or risk leader could run.
Items for Congress: thresholds and exemptions in statute
What the order could and could not do
The order had three working parts: a policy statement, a reporting instruction and standard limits. [1] It contained no instruction to any regulator to change a rule. [1] It also said it did not impair any agency’s legal authority, which left the independent regulators’ rulemaking where the statutes put it. [1]
The fiduciary memorandum signed the same day shows what a direct instruction looked like. It named one rule, set the questions the Labor Department had to answer and said what to do if the answers were affirmative: propose rescinding or revising the rule. [2] In our reading, because the Labor Department is an executive department, the President could direct its Secretary. [2] Executive Order 13772 had no comparable instruction for the banking agencies. [1]
How the report sorted them
Treasury delivered its first report on June 12, 2017. [3] It covered the depository system: banks, savings associations and credit unions of all sizes and charters. [4] Treasury said it consulted the FSOC member agencies, including the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the CFPB, the SEC, the FDIC, the CFTC, the FHFA and the NCUA. [4]
The report’s Appendix B listed every recommendation with the recommended action, the method of implementation and the Core Principles it served. [4] The method column named Congress, a regulator or both. [4] Treasury’s release said it would work with Congress, regulators, industry and trade groups to implement the recommendations through statutes, regulations and supervisory guidance. [3]
The statutory items
Several major items needed Congress. Treasury recommended raising the threshold in section 165 of Dodd-Frank for enhanced prudential standards, then set at $50 billion, to better tailor it to complexity. [4] [5] It assigned that to Congress, with the Federal Reserve to align its capital planning threshold. [4]
Treasury recommended exempting banking entities with $10 billion or less in assets from the Volcker Rule. [4] It recommended that Congress consider raising the asset threshold for banks eligible for an 18-month examination cycle. [4] It recommended raising the threshold of the Federal Reserve’s Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement to $2 billion from $1 billion, assigning it to Congress and the Federal Reserve. [4]
What Congress enacted
Congress acted on May 24, 2018, in the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 115-174. [5] Section 401 struck $50,000,000,000 from section 165 and inserted $250,000,000,000. [5] The Board kept authority to apply prudential standards, by order or rule, to holding companies with $100 billion or more in assets on financial stability or safety and soundness grounds. [5]
Section 203 took out of the Volcker Rule an institution that does not have, and is not controlled by a company that has, more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets and trading assets and liabilities above 5 percent of those assets. [5] Section 210 raised the examination cycle threshold from $1 billion to $3 billion. [5] Section 207 directed the Board to raise the Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement threshold from $1 billion to $3 billion for qualifying companies. [5]
Section 205 directed the banking agencies to allow reduced reporting in the first and third quarterly reports of condition for insured institutions with less than $5 billion in assets. [5] That matched the report’s general recommendation to streamline reporting for community institutions, though the report assigned that item to the regulators. [4] [5]
Matching is not causation
The statute did not cite Treasury’s report, and we do not claim the report caused it. [5] The point is narrower. Items the report assigned to Congress moved when Congress acted, and some moved further than the report proposed. The Small Bank Holding Company threshold rose to $3 billion where Treasury had suggested $2 billion. [4] [5]
For compliance teams, the statutory route had one property that executive actions lack. Once enacted, the new thresholds did not depend on any order remaining in force. [5] They changed which rules applied to which institutions, and they required the agencies to follow through. [5]
What moved with the thresholds
A threshold in statute decides which rules an institution must build programs for. Raising it does not delete the programs institutions above the old line had built. [5] It changes their status from required to optional for some institutions, and a compliance team then has to decide which to keep.
Capital showed the same mechanism. Treasury had asked Congress to consider an off-ramp from capital and liquidity requirements, most enhanced prudential standards and the Volcker Rule. [4] It would be open to institutions electing to hold high capital, such as 10 percent of assets on a non-risk-weighted basis. [4] It also asked regulators to explore exempting community banks from the Basel III risk-based capital regime. [4]
The 2018 law took a narrower path. Section 201 told the banking agencies to set a simple capital ratio for qualifying community banks under $10 billion: tangible equity to average total consolidated assets. [5] The level had to be not less than 8 percent and not more than 10 percent. [5] A qualifying bank above it would be considered to meet the generally applicable capital requirements. [5] The agencies could exclude banks based on risk profile. [5]
So Congress set a frame and left the number and procedures to rulemaking. [5] An item that began in the report’s Congress column ended in the regulators’ hands, which is why the column is a forecast rather than a map. [4] [5]
The Volcker change shows the pattern. Treasury had also recommended that the enhanced Volcker compliance program apply only to banking entities with at least $10 billion in trading assets and liabilities, instead of all those over $50 billion in total assets. [4] It said all banks should be able to tailor compliance programs to their activities and risk profile. [4] Those were regulator items, separate from the statutory exemption Congress later enacted for smaller institutions. [4] [5]
So one subject, the Volcker Rule, appeared in two groups at once. The exemption for small institutions was a statutory item. [4] [5] The scope of the compliance program for larger ones was a regulatory item. [4] A bank tracking the subject had to watch two venues.
The statutory exemption also created a line to monitor. The test counts trading assets and liabilities as reported on the institution’s most recent applicable regulatory filing. [5] An institution near 5 percent of total assets has to check each filing, because crossing the line brings the rule back. [5] A threshold that removes a rule becomes a control that must be watched.
Items for regulators by rule: capital, stress testing and liquidity
What the report asked
A second group needed only the regulators. Treasury recommended eliminating the mid-year cycle of company-run stress tests and cutting supervisory scenarios from three to two. [4] It recommended that banks have leeway on the number of models used, matched to their scale and complexity. [4]
It recommended that the qualitative element of the Federal Reserve’s capital planning review no longer be the sole basis for objecting to a capital plan for any bank. [4] It noted the Federal Reserve had already moved non-complex banks under $250 billion to a horizontal review. [4] It recommended narrowing the liquidity coverage ratio to internationally active banks. [4]
Some items asked regulators to wait. Treasury recommended delaying adoption of the Net Stable Funding Ratio and the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book until U.S. regulators could assess and calibrate them. [4] It asked prudential regulators to review the effect of the CECL accounting standard on bank capital and harmonize its application with supervision. [4]
Other capital items were also for regulators. Treasury recommended keeping the standardized approaches for risk-weighted assets while reducing reliance on the advanced approaches. [4] It recommended deductions from the denominator of the supplementary ratio, known as the SLR, for central bank deposits, U.S. Treasury securities and initial margin for centrally cleared derivatives. [4]
For community banks, it recommended simplifying capital for mortgage servicing assets and clarifying the definition of high volatility commercial real estate loans. [4] For CDFI banks and minority depository institutions, it suggested more flexibility in using subordinated debt or capital, including program-related investments. [4] It asked the FDIC to streamline deposit insurance applications for new banks. [4]
Credit unions
For credit unions, the report assigned items to the NCUA. Treasury recommended raising the threshold for credit union stress testing to $50 billion in assets from $10 billion. [4] It supported allowing credit unions to rely in part on appropriately designed supplemental capital. [4] It also recommended easing NCUA rules on credit union capital. [4]
Those items needed no act of Congress in Treasury’s allocation. [4] They depended on the NCUA board deciding to act. A credit union compliance officer reading the report in 2017 could see that the NCUA, not Congress, would decide.
International standards
One item concerned bodies outside U.S. control. Treasury recommended that the United States lead efforts to narrow the scope of international standard-setting bodies’ initiatives and remove overlapping objectives. [4] It asked for more transparency and accountability in those bodies and for U.S. members to shape standards in line with domestic objectives. [4]
That item followed the order’s fifth principle, on advancing American interests in international negotiations. [1] Its effect on a given bank would come only after an international standard changed and U.S. regulators adopted the change by rule. Two steps had to happen before any compliance program moved.
Cost-benefit analysis
One regulator item was procedural. Treasury recommended that financial regulators perform, and publish for comment, a cost-benefit analysis for at least all economically significant proposed rules, as Executive Order 12866 uses the term. [4] It said the analysis should be in the final rule’s administrative record. [4]
That item echoed the order’s third principle, which called for more rigorous regulatory impact analysis. [1] It was addressed to the agencies, and nothing in the order could compel independent regulators to adopt it. [1] [4] In our reading, it was the clearest example of the order working through persuasion rather than direction.
Consumer protection items
The report’s consumer protection items were split across groups. Structural changes to the CFPB, such as its leadership and funding, were assigned to Congress. [4] Others were assigned to the CFPB itself. [4]
Treasury recommended that the CFPB issue rules or guidance through notice and comment before bringing enforcement actions where guidance was lacking or its position departed from historical interpretation. [4] It recommended regulations delineating the CFPB’s interpretation of the UDAAP standard, with monetary sanctions only where a party had reasonable notice its conduct was unlawful. [4]
It also recommended easing the CFPB’s no-action letter policy. Its proposals included extending the policy beyond new products, requiring a consumer benefit but not a substantial one, and revisiting requirements that applicants share proprietary data the agency might not adequately safeguard. [4] That last point is a data security argument inside a regulatory reform recommendation. [4]
For a bank compliance officer, these items mattered as a forecast of where consumer protection obligations would be clarified, and by whom. The report could not decide them. [1] [4]
Items for supervisors by practice: examinations, reporting and findings
Examination overlap
A third group dealt with supervision, not rules. Treasury recommended that all regulators expand efforts to coordinate and rationalize their examination and data collection procedures. [4] It recommended that the NCUA extend examination cycles for smaller credit unions in parallel with any change for banks. [4]
It recommended that regulators continue to streamline reporting for community financial institutions and focus on whether each line item applies. [4] It recommended an interagency review of the collective requirements imposed on boards, to restore balance among regulators, boards and management. [4]
The examination cycle item shows how one subject could sit in two groups. The asset threshold for the longer cycle was in statute, so changing it needed Congress, which acted in 2018. [5] How examiners coordinate and share data across agencies was practice, so it stayed with the supervisors. [4] A bank that moved to a longer cycle still faced the same examiners, at longer intervals, with the same requests.
Supervisory findings
The item with the longest tail concerned supervisory findings. Treasury recommended an interagency reassessment of the volume and nature of matters requiring attention, matters requiring immediate attention and consent orders. [4] The aim was to evaluate impact, consistency and overlap and to set consistent interagency standards. [4]
It also recommended that regulators and banks develop an improved approach to addressing and clearing regulatory actions. [4] Both items were assigned to interagency regulators. [4] They concern the documents that drive compliance work inside banks: a matter requiring attention sets a remediation project, an owner and a deadline.
The report’s narrative explained the concern. It said some rebalancing of the volume of regulatory actions, based on materiality and the nature of required remediation, may be warranted. [4] It suggested an approach focused more on coordination, guidance and recommendations, in lieu of overly prescriptive actions such as matters requiring immediate attention. [4]
It also recorded a complaint from banks. Treasury said banking organizations reported multi-year delays in even receiving a plan to clear regulatory actions, which clouded their business activities. [4] It said this was reported to be acute where rules and rulemaking lacked transparency in enforcement-led compliance regimes. [4] Those are reports Treasury relayed, not findings it measured. [4]
Boards and management
The report tied findings to governance. It said regulators’ expectations of boards may crowd out functions boards should play, blur responsibilities between board and management and impose a one-size-fits-all approach. [4] It said that last problem burdened mid-sized and community institutions in particular. [4]
Treasury also said boards should be held to the highest standards in developing and implementing compliance procedures, and should hold management to the same standards. [4] That involves boards engaging with regulators and reviewing significant regulatory actions and complaints. [4] The recommendation was to retune what regulators ask of boards, not to remove board oversight. [4]
For a chief compliance officer, the practical question is what reaches the board. A finding addressed to the board, with board-level remediation tracking, consumes board time. Treasury’s recommendation was that regulators review that collective burden together. [4]
Ratings with long tails
The report gave one example of a supervisory outcome with long effects. It said a Community Reinvestment Act rating below satisfactory would restrict mergers, acquisitions, branch openings and some business arrangements until the next examination. [4] It recommended improving the CRA’s supervisory and regulatory framework and said Treasury would assess how. [4]
It also said regulators should give careful and equal weight to supporters and opponents when assessing how an acquisition or merger would serve a community’s needs. [4] That item concerned how supervisors weigh public comment, a matter of supervisory practice. [4]
What a supervisory change needs
Supervisory items are the hardest to verify from outside. A change in examiner practice can be real and still leave no public record. The report itself relied on what banks reported about delays, not on data it published. [4]
For that reason, a compliance team should not assume a supervisory recommendation has taken effect until an agency issues something it can cite: a rule, a policy statement or examination guidance. In the bank group, one such document came from the OCC and the FDIC in 2026. [8]
Why supervision is a separate group
Supervisory practice can change without a rule. Examiners can change what they write and how they escalate. But practice that is not written down can also change back. The report’s supervisory items therefore had a weaker hold than its statutory or regulatory items, until an agency chose to codify them. [4]
That choice came for the OCC and FDIC in 2026, as the hindsight section describes. [8] Until then, a bank could see shifts in examiner practice but had no rule to point to.
Items with no single owner: coordination, including cybersecurity
The cybersecurity recommendation
The report addressed cybersecurity as a problem of regulatory overlap. It said technology plays an integral role in financial institutions’ operations and that cyber incidents could cause operational disruption in the sector. [4] It said better coordination on cybersecurity regulation was needed. [4]
Treasury recommended that federal and state financial regulators establish processes for coordinating regulatory tools and examinations across sub-sectors. [4] It recommended harmonizing regulations, including through a common lexicon, and harmonizing interpretation and implementation of specific rules and guidance. [4]
The report gave its reason. Some financial regulators had each finalized differing cybersecurity requirements affecting the same institutions, it said, creating a risk of overlap. [4] It pointed to the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee as the forum for continuing work. [4] It assigned the item to federal and state regulators together. [4]
The report’s description of overlap went beyond cyber. It said state and federal regulators, including the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, share oversight of state-chartered banks’ safety and soundness. [4] It said the FDIC, as administrator of the Deposit Insurance Fund, has backup supervisory authority over all insured banks and thrifts. [4] For credit unions, it described overlap among the NCUA, the CFPB and state regulators. [4]
It said those overlaps can create confusion and increased costs for supervised entities. [4] It described existing coordination through bodies such as the FSOC and the FBIIC, and said improved coordination and streamlining were still necessary. [4]
Why ownership matters
An item assigned to many agencies, including state regulators, has no single body able to complete it. No federal order binds state regulators, and Executive Order 13772 did not try. [1] The recommendation depended on voluntary alignment. [4]
For a CISO at a bank with a state charter, a holding company and a broker-dealer affiliate, the practical result is that several regulators may examine overlapping controls. The report described that problem. [4] It did not, and could not, assign anyone the power to fix it. [1] [4]
A CISO can still act on the report’s diagnosis without waiting for harmonization. One approach is a single control library mapped to each regulator’s requirements, so one test produces evidence for several examiners. Another is a common set of terms for incidents, assets and risk ratings across the group’s entities, which is the internal version of the common lexicon Treasury recommended. [4] Both are practices a group can adopt on its own.
Neither practice reduces the number of examinations. They reduce the cost of each by reusing evidence. Treasury’s own recommendation pointed at efficiencies in staffing and resources related to compliance and oversight. [4]
Structure and accountability
The same pattern applied to structural items. Treasury recommended that Congress act to reduce fragmentation, overlap and duplication, which could include consolidating regulators with similar missions. [4] It recommended broadening FSOC’s mandate so it could name a lead regulator where jurisdictions overlap. [4] It recommended making the Office of Financial Research part of Treasury. [4]
The lead regulator idea was aimed at the overlap problem. Treasury said the new authority would let FSOC play a larger role in coordinating regulatory and supervisory policies. [4] It also said FSOC should be reformed to improve information sharing and coordination on rulemaking, examinations, reporting and enforcement. [4] Both needed Congress. [4]
It also recommended that agencies keep Volcker Rule guidance and enforcement consistent and coordinated. [4] Coordination items like these sit at the edge of every agency’s authority. In our reading, they were the group least likely to move on their own, because no single body could finish them. [4]
How the list landed on different institutions
Community banks
Several statutory items were aimed at community banks. Banks under $3 billion that qualified became eligible for the longer examination cycle, subject to the statute’s conditions. [5] Institutions under $5 billion became eligible for reduced reporting in two quarterly reports. [5] Smaller institutions with limited trading left the Volcker Rule. [5]
Each of those changes moved compliance effort rather than ending it. A bank on a longer examination cycle still needs evidence ready for the examination that comes. A bank outside the Volcker Rule still needs to show that it stays under the trading threshold. [5]
Regional banks between the old and new thresholds
Holding companies between $50 billion and $250 billion saw a large statutory change. The enhanced prudential standards threshold moved above them. [5] The Board kept authority to apply standards by order or rule to those with $100 billion or more in assets, if warranted. [5] For their risk and compliance teams, the change meant reassessing which programs were required by rule and which were kept by choice.
Credit unions
Credit unions depended on the NCUA for the items Treasury assigned to it. [4] A credit union’s planning had to follow the NCUA’s own rulemaking calendar.
The report noted that the Community Reinvestment Act does not apply to credit unions. [4] Its CRA items therefore concerned banks only. Its examination items asked the NCUA to extend cycles for smaller credit unions in parallel with banks. [4]
A new bank
For organizers of a new bank, the report recommended a critical review of capital requirements for de novo banks and a significantly streamlined deposit insurance application. [4] It said Treasury supported the FDIC’s efforts to encourage de novo charters. [4] Those were FDIC items in Treasury’s allocation. [4] An applicant could read the report as a signal, but the application standards were the FDIC’s to change.
The largest banks
For the largest banks, the relevant items were regulatory: capital planning, stress test scenarios, liquidity scope and the international standards Treasury asked regulators to delay or recalibrate. [4] None of those depended on Congress in Treasury’s allocation. [4] They depended on the Federal Reserve, the OCC and the FDIC. [4]
One item went to the method behind the largest banks’ stress tests. Treasury recommended that the Federal Reserve subject its stress testing and capital planning frameworks to public notice and comment, including models, scenarios and other material parameters. [4] For a bank’s model risk and capital teams, that would turn a supervisory black box into a published rule. It was a Federal Reserve item alone. [4]
An institution with open findings
For a bank carrying open matters requiring attention or a consent order in 2017, the report described a problem and proposed review. [4] It changed nothing about the findings themselves. Remediation plans, deadlines and board reporting continued as written, because no rule had changed. [4]
The 2026 OCC and FDIC rule changed the standard for issuing such findings for those agencies’ banks. [8] It did not change findings issued by the Federal Reserve, which was not a party to it. [8] An institution supervised by more than one agency faces different standards from each until the others act.
Objections, in order
1. The order drove deregulation, so its revocation should have reversed it
The order directed a report. [1] The changes that followed came through statutes and rules, which stand on their own authority. [5] [8] Revoking an order that asked for a report does not repeal a statute enacted by Congress or a rule adopted by an agency. [5] [6]
2. Matching recommendations to later laws proves influence
It does not, and we do not claim it. The 2018 law does not cite the report. [5] Some of its changes went further than Treasury proposed, and some of Treasury’s items do not appear in it. [4] [5] The report is useful as a map of who could act, not as proof of who moved whom.
3. Independent regulators were never bound by the order
That is correct, and the order did not claim otherwise. It said nothing in it impaired authority granted by law to an agency. [1] The report’s allocation recognized that only the agencies could act on regulatory and supervisory items. [4]
4. Cybersecurity harmonization was a side issue
It was a short section in a long report. [4] But it named a problem compliance teams live with: differing cyber requirements from regulators of the same institution. [4] The report could only recommend coordination, which shows the limits of an order addressed to Treasury alone. [1] [4]
5. Supervisory practice cannot be regulated
The OCC and FDIC did regulate part of it in 2026, defining when a matter requiring attention may be issued. [8] Examiners still exercise judgment within that definition. [8] The rule shows supervisory practice can be bounded in regulation, though it does not show every practice can be.
6. Principles without enforcement are words
The Core Principles had no enforcement mechanism. [1] Their force came through the report they framed. Treasury keyed every recommendation to one or more principles. [4] That gave later proposals a ready vocabulary. Whether that vocabulary changed outcomes is not something the documents can show.
7. The report reflected the views of the industry it reviewed
Treasury said it consulted trade groups and firms, and also consumer and other advocacy groups, academics, experts, utilities, rating agencies and investors. [4] It listed participants in an appendix. [4] The breadth of consultation does not settle whose views prevailed. Readers can judge each recommendation on its own terms, as the later laws and rules did.
What compliance and risk leaders could check
The checks below follow the four groups. They describe good practice, not legal requirements.
- For each recommendation affecting your institution in the 2017 report, record whether Congress, a regulator or a supervisor had to act, and whether it did. [4]
- List every program your institution runs because of a size threshold, and confirm the current threshold in statute or rule. [5]
- Mark which programs are kept by choice after a threshold moved, and record why. [5]
- Map cybersecurity requirements from each regulator of each entity in the group, and note overlaps. [4]
- Review open matters requiring attention against the OCC and FDIC definition that took effect on November 2, 2026, if those agencies supervise you. [8]
A further check concerns planning. An executive action that asks for a report gives notice of what might change. It does not change obligations. [1] Compliance roadmaps can track such reports as forecasts and update only when a statute or rule is final. [5] [8]
A last check concerns findings. For each open matter requiring attention, record which agency issued it, the standard it rests on and the remediation milestones. [8] Where one agency’s standard has changed and another’s has not, the institution can expect findings on the same control to be framed differently. [8]
For cybersecurity findings, the 2026 rule gives a specific test. The agencies said a cyber weakness can meet the rule’s definition of an unsafe or unsound practice where it is likely to cause material financial harm, with compensating controls considered. [8] A CISO can document, for each open cyber finding, the financial harm path and the compensating controls, so the discussion with examiners starts from the rule’s terms. [8]
With hindsight
Executive Order 13772 itself did not last. On February 24, 2021, Executive Order 14018 revoked it, along with other presidential actions. [6] The 2021 order was in turn revoked on January 20, 2025, by Executive Order 14148, which named it in a long list of revoked actions. [7]
Executive Order 14148 did not restate the 2017 order’s text. [7] In our reading, revoking the 2021 revocation did not by its own words reissue Executive Order 13772. As checked on November 15, 2026, the Federal Register’s record for Executive Order 13772 shows it as revoked by Executive Order 14018. [6]
The statute did last. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of May 24, 2018 changed the section 165 threshold, the Volcker Rule’s reach, the examination cycle threshold and reporting for smaller banks. [5] None of those changes depended on the order remaining in force. [5]
The supervisory item took longest. On October 30, 2025, the OCC and the FDIC published a proposed rule to define “unsafe or unsound practice” and set standards for issuing matters requiring attention. [8] They adopted a final rule published on September 1, 2026, effective November 2, 2026. [8]
Under the OCC’s text, an unsafe or unsound practice is one contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation. [8] It must also be likely, if continued, to materially harm the institution’s financial condition or present a material risk of loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund. [8] A practice that has materially harmed the institution’s financial condition also qualifies. [8]
A matter requiring attention may be issued for a practice that could reasonably be expected to cause such harm under current or reasonably foreseeable conditions. [8] It may also be issued for an actual violation of a banking or banking-related law or regulation. [8] The rule defines harm to financial condition by reference to capital, asset quality, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk. [8]
The agencies addressed cybersecurity directly. They said a significant risk of disruption through IT systems may in some cases be likely to cause material financial harm. [8] They said whether a cyber vulnerability meets the definition depends on the severity and likelihood of material harm, with compensating controls considered. [8] They gave unsupported operating systems and patch management weaknesses as examples that may not be readily mitigated by other controls. [8]
The rule left room for other findings. Examiners may still make supervisory observations on weaknesses in policies and procedures. [8] Enforcement grounds other than unsafe or unsound practice, such as a violation of law, were not affected by the definition. [8] The rule also requires the OCC to tailor its actions to an institution’s capital structure, complexity, activities and size, with a lower materiality threshold as risk rises. [8] The final rule does not cite Treasury’s 2017 report. Its subject is the one Treasury had flagged for interagency reassessment. [4] [8]
What held up is the sorting. Items for Congress moved in 2018. [5] An item for supervisors moved in 2026, for two agencies, by rule. [8] The order that asked for the list was revoked in 2021 without undoing either. [6]
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