EO 13777 built regulatory review into agency posts and plans; a 2021 order named those posts for abolition
On February 24, 2017, Executive Order 13777 gave every covered agency a Regulatory Reform Officer, a task force, six tests and performance indicators. In 2021 an order revoked it; in 2025 new orders rebuilt review around OIRA and DOGE Team Leads.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On February 24, 2017, Executive Order 13777 gave every covered agency a Regulatory Reform Officer, a task force, six tests and performance indicators. In 2021 an order revoked it; in 2025 new orders rebuilt review around OIRA and DOGE Team Leads.
- The week The order built on one signed weeks earlier.
- The people: a review function with names attached Before the order, retrospective review already existed.
- The tests: six ways a rule could be flagged The order listed six categories for each task force to attempt to identify. [1] They differ in kind.
- The measures: counting reform in performance plans The memorandum listed the agencies the requirements section applied to.
- The voices: input from the regulated and the governed The list was broad.
- How the order reached different organizations The order applied to executive agencies, but its effects spread to the organizations those agencies regulate and fund.
- Objections, in order The order changed no rule directly.
- What agency and compliance leaders could check For leaders in regulated organizations, the same records serve a second purpose.
- With hindsight OMB issued the guidance the order called for on April 28, 2017, as memorandum M-17-23. [3] It set five performance indicators for the fiscal year 2019 annual performance plans of 17 agencies.
The week
On February 24, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13777, titled “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda.” [1] Its stated policy was to alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens placed on the American people. [1] The order was filed with the Office of the Federal Register on February 28 and published in the Federal Register on March 1. [1]
The order built on one signed weeks earlier. Executive Order 13771, dated January 30, 2017, was titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.” [2] It said that for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior regulations should be identified for elimination. [2]
Executive Order 13771 also set a cost cap. For fiscal year 2017, the total incremental cost of all new regulations, including repealed regulations, was to be no greater than zero. [2] The exceptions were where law required otherwise or where the Director of the Office of Management and Budget advised otherwise in writing. [2]
For later years, the earlier order tied regulation to the budget process. The OMB Director would identify a total amount of incremental costs allowed for each agency, and no regulations exceeding that allowance would be permitted unless required by law or approved in writing. [2] It defined “regulation” to exclude military, national security and foreign affairs functions, and matters of agency organization, management or personnel. [2]
Executive Order 13777 turned those policies into an organizational structure. Within 60 days, the head of each agency, except agencies receiving waivers, was to designate a Regulatory Reform Officer. [1] Each officer would oversee implementation of regulatory reform initiatives and policies, and report periodically to the agency head. [1]
The order listed the initiatives each officer would oversee. They were Executive Order 13771, Executive Order 12866 on regulatory planning and review, and section 6 of Executive Order 13563 on retrospective review. [1] The fourth was the termination of programs that derived from rescinded executive orders, guidance documents and similar documents. [1]
Each agency was also to establish a Regulatory Reform Task Force. Its members were the officer, the agency’s Regulatory Policy Officer, a representative from the agency’s central policy office, and, for larger agencies, at least three additional senior officials. [1] The larger agencies were those listed in section 901(b)(1) of title 31 of the U.S. Code. [1]
The task forces had a defined job. Each was to evaluate existing regulations and recommend their repeal, replacement or modification to the agency head, consistent with applicable law. [1] At a minimum, each was to attempt to identify regulations in six categories. [1]
The six categories were regulations that eliminate jobs or inhibit job creation; are outdated, unnecessary or ineffective; or impose costs that exceed benefits. [1] They also included regulations that create a serious inconsistency with reform initiatives, or that derive from executive orders later rescinded or substantially modified. [1]
The remaining category, fifth in the order’s list, concerned evidence. It covered regulations inconsistent with the Information Quality Act provision or its guidance. The order singled out regulations that rely in whole or in part on data, information or methods that are not publicly available or are insufficiently transparent to meet the standard for reproducibility. [1]
The task forces were to seek input from entities significantly affected by federal regulations. The order named state, local and tribal governments, small businesses, consumers, non-governmental organizations and trade associations. [1] Within 90 days, each task force was to report to its agency head on progress toward two goals: improving implementation of reform policies and identifying regulations for repeal, replacement or modification. [1]
The order also built in measurement. Agencies listed in section 901(b)(1) of title 31 were to include performance indicators in their annual performance plans measuring progress toward the two goals. [1] OMB was to issue guidance on those indicators within 60 days. [1] Agency heads were to consider that progress in assessing the task force and the people responsible for developing regulations. [1]
Finally, the OMB Director could waive compliance for an agency that generally issues very few or no regulations, and could revoke a waiver at any time. The Director was to publish a list of agencies with current waivers at least once every three months. [1]
Executive Order 13777 is easy to read as one more statement of deregulatory policy. We read it as an organizational design. It did not change any rule by itself. It created posts, committees, criteria, reporting lines and performance measures inside agencies, and it pointed them at the agencies’ own rulebooks. [1]
Our argument is that the order made regulatory review a standing job, and that its design shaped its fate. Because the machinery lived in executive structures, an executive order could dismantle it. In January 2021, an order revoked it and called for its officer positions and task forces to be abolished. [4] What outlasted the posts was the record each agency had built about its own rules.
For agency leaders, the lesson concerns which parts of a review program are durable. For regulated organizations in finance, health and government, it concerns which parts of the regulatory record they can influence. We take the order in four parts, each a separate design choice:
- The people: who was assigned to do the review, and where they sat.
- The tests: the six categories a task force was to look for.
- The measures: how progress was to be counted, reported and rewarded.
- The voices: whose input the task forces were to seek.
The four parts do not overlap. The first is staffing, the second is criteria, the third is accountability, and the fourth is evidence from outside the agency. Each can be judged on its own, and each had a different afterlife.
The people: a review function with names attached
The order required each agency head to designate a Regulatory Reform Officer within 60 days. [1] It required each agency to form a task force that included the officer, the Regulatory Policy Officer under Executive Order 12866, and a central policy representative. [1] Larger agencies were to add at least three senior officials. [1]
Why naming people mattered
Before the order, retrospective review already existed. Executive Order 13563, which the order cited, had a section on it. [1] What the 2017 order added was a person accountable for the reform agenda as a whole, and a committee with a mandate to look at existing rules.
A named officer changes how work moves. Questions about a rule’s burden have someone to go to. Program offices know who will ask them about their regulations. The agency head has a single report on progress, on a schedule the order set. [1]
Where the officer sat
The order left the choice of official to the agency head. It required the officer to report periodically to the agency head and consult regularly with agency leadership. [1] The placement decided how much weight the function carried with program offices.
An officer inside the general counsel’s office would bring legal analysis but might struggle to reach program data. An officer in a policy office would see across programs but might lack legal depth. The order did not prescribe the answer. Each agency’s choice shaped what its task force could see.
Joint task forces
The order also reached entities staffed by several agencies, such as the Chief Acquisition Officers Council. Those bodies were to form joint task forces with members from each constituent agency’s task force. [1] That provision recognized that some rules belong to no single agency. The order’s example was the Chief Acquisition Officers Council. [1]
The cost of the staffing
The order said it would be implemented subject to the availability of appropriations. [1] It did not provide new money. The officer and task force members were existing officials taking on a new function. Time spent on review was time not spent elsewhere.
Two officers, one docket
The order put the new officer beside an existing one. The Regulatory Policy Officer under Executive Order 12866 was already responsible for an agency’s regulatory planning, and the order made that official a task force member. [1]
The two roles could pull in different directions. One managed new rules through review. The other led an effort to remove or modify existing ones. An agency that let the two work separately could find its new rules and its repeals inconsistent. An agency that joined them gave one group sight of the whole docket.
Continuity when people change
A function built around named officials depends on those officials staying. Political appointees change, and career staff move. The order required designation within 60 days, but said nothing about succession. [1]
The durable part of the function was its paperwork: the task force’s evaluations, its recommendations and its reports to the agency head. When an officer left, those records let a successor continue. When the records were thin, the function restarted with each new person.
Where the task force met the budget
Executive Order 13771 tied regulation to the budget process. The OMB Director would set a total incremental cost allowance for each agency, and no regulations exceeding it would be permitted unless required by law or approved in writing. [2]
That allowance gave the task force a practical role. Every new rule an agency wanted needed offsets, and the task force’s list of rules to repeal or modify was where offsets came from. Executive Order 13777 said agency heads should prioritize, to the extent permitted by law, rules the task force had found outdated, unnecessary or ineffective when choosing offsets. [1]
The link made the task force a supplier to the agency’s own agenda. A program office that wanted a new rule had a reason to help the task force find old ones.
For a large department, the added committee work was a small share of senior time. For a small agency, it could be a large share. The waiver provision existed partly for that reason, for agencies that issued very few or no regulations. [1]
What a structure can and cannot hold
A structure created by executive order exists at the President’s direction. The order itself said it did not impair authority granted by law to an agency or its head. [1] The posts held no statutory power of their own. They organized how existing authority was used.
That is why the structure could be removed so cleanly later. When the 2021 revocation came, it named the regulatory reform officer positions and task forces created by sections 2 and 3 and called for their abolition, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. [4]
The tests: six ways a rule could be flagged
The order listed six categories for each task force to attempt to identify. [1] They differ in kind. Some ask about effects, some about consistency with policy, and one asks about the quality of the evidence behind a rule.
Effect tests
Three categories concern effects: regulations that eliminate jobs or inhibit job creation; regulations that are outdated, unnecessary or ineffective; and regulations whose costs exceed their benefits. [1] Each requires evidence about how a rule performs after adoption.
That evidence is not always kept. A rule’s preamble estimates costs and benefits before it takes effect. A rule may not come with any plan for measuring what actually happened. A task force asked whether a rule is ineffective needs data the agency may never have collected.
For the agency, the practical lesson is to build measurement into a rule when it is adopted. A rule that comes with its own performance data can answer an effect test. A rule without it is defended by argument alone.
Consistency tests
Two categories concern consistency. One covers regulations that create a serious inconsistency or interfere with reform initiatives. The other covers regulations that derive from executive orders or other presidential directives later rescinded or substantially modified. [1]
These tests are about lineage. A task force applying them needs to know where each rule came from, including the directive that prompted it and the policy memo that shaped it. Agencies that keep that lineage can answer quickly. Agencies that do not must reconstruct it from old dockets.
The evidence test
The fifth category in the order’s list stands apart from the others. It covered regulations inconsistent with the Information Quality Act provision or its guidance. [1] In particular, it named those relying on data, information or methods that are not publicly available or not transparent enough to meet the standard for reproducibility. [1]
On our reading, this test turned a rule’s evidence base into a ground for review. A rule supported by data the public could not see became a candidate for repeal or modification on that basis alone. The rule’s policy merits were a separate question.
That test could reach health and environmental rules that rest on confidential data, such as individual medical records or proprietary business data. It could also reach financial rules built on supervisory data that cannot be released. The order did not resolve how to weigh confidentiality against reproducibility. It made the tension a review criterion.
What the tests left to judgment
Each category required judgment: what makes a rule outdated, when an inconsistency is serious, and how much transparency is enough. The order gave the categories and left their application to each task force, consistent with applicable law. [1]
That design gave agencies room. It also meant the same rule could be flagged at one agency and left alone at another with a similar rule. The task force’s reasoning, written down, was the only way to show the test had been applied rather than assumed.
Tests and the Administrative Procedure Act
The order did not change how a rule is repealed. A task force recommendation was a recommendation to the agency head. [1] Executive Order 13771 said any agency eliminating costs associated with prior regulations shall do so in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable law. [2]
So a flagged rule still needed a rulemaking to change. The rulemaking would need its own record, and that record would face judicial review. A test applied loosely at the task force stage could produce a repeal that failed in court. The tests were the start of a process, not its end.
A decision not to flag is also a decision
A task force that examined a rule and found no reason to change it had produced a result. That result was as useful as a recommendation to repeal, if it was written down. It told the agency head, and any later reviewer, that the rule had been tested.
Agencies that recorded only their recommendations kept half the record. The other half, the rules examined and kept, showed the scope of the review. Without it, an outsider could not tell whether a rule was kept on purpose or never looked at.
Applying the tests to guidance
The tests were written for regulations as defined in Executive Order 13771. [1] That definition was broad: an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy. [2]
Interpretive documents, such as program manuals and frequently asked questions, can fit that description. For program offices that govern through guidance, the tests reached their working documents as well as the rules in the Code of Federal Regulations. On our reading, an agency’s guidance inventory belonged in the review.
The tests in the sectors we cover
For financial services, the tests reached rules issued by executive departments such as Treasury, while independent regulators were outside the order, according to OMB. [3] A bank could therefore face a reviewed Treasury rule beside an unreviewed rule from its prudential regulator on the same subject.
For health care, HHS was in the requirements list, so its payment, privacy and program rules were in scope. [3] For state and local governments, the reach ran through the federal programs they administer, whose rules sat with the departments that fund them.
In each sector, the evidence test asked the same question about different data. A financial rule may rest on supervisory data. A health rule may rest on patient records. A program rule may rest on state administrative data. Each kind raises its own confidentiality limits on what can be published.
The measures: counting reform in performance plans
The order required agencies listed in section 901(b)(1) of title 31 to include performance indicators in their annual performance plans measuring progress on the task force goals. [1] It also required agency heads to consider progress in assessing the task force and the people responsible for developing regulations. [1]
What OMB asked agencies to count
OMB issued the guidance on April 28, 2017, as memorandum M-17-23. [3] Beginning with the fiscal year 2019 annual performance plan, covered agencies had to include at least five indicators. [3]
The five indicators were the number of evaluations that included public input or peer review; the number of deregulatory actions the task force recommended; and the number issued that addressed those recommendations. [3] They also included the number of regulatory and, separately, deregulatory actions issued, and the total incremental cost of both. [3]
The memorandum listed the agencies the requirements section applied to. They were the 15 executive departments plus the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. [3] Other agencies subject to the order were strongly encouraged to comply with that section. [3]
Why counting shapes behavior
A performance indicator tells staff what the organization values. Counts of deregulatory actions reward producing them. Counts of evaluations with public input reward a particular kind of process. [3]
Counts also have limits. They measure activity, not quality. A task force could meet a numeric goal by recommending small technical repeals while leaving significant rules unexamined. The memorandum asked agencies, in addition, to establish other meaningful indicators for evaluating the net benefits of their regulatory programs. [3]
Net benefits as a measure
The memorandum said that effort would likely require measuring the costs and benefits of regulatory programs and setting goals for improving their net benefits. [3] That is a harder and more useful measure than a count. It asks whether a set of rules achieves its objective at reasonable cost.
It also requires data agencies may not have. Measuring a regulatory program’s net benefits means knowing outcomes, compliance costs and counterfactuals. The memorandum pointed agencies to their existing strategic and performance planning processes as the place for that work. [3]
Guidance counted too
A footnote in the memorandum carried a detail with long reach. It referred to OMB’s guidance implementing Executive Order 13771. [3] That guidance defined a regulatory action under the order to include a significant guidance document reviewed by OIRA that had been finalized and imposed total costs greater than zero. [3]
Guidance documents usually do not go through the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment process. Treating costly guidance as a regulatory action brought it inside the budget. Program offices that issued interpretations and frequently asked questions now had those documents counted alongside rules.
Waivers as a measure of scope
The memorandum set out what an agency requesting a waiver should provide. The list included an overview of existing regulations and their benefits and costs, counts of significant actions on its agenda, and information about its significant guidance documents. [3] A waiver request was itself a small regulatory inventory.
That inventory was useful whether or not the waiver was granted. An agency that compiled it knew its regulatory footprint. The same list could support any later review, under any order.
Reports to the agency head
The order required each task force to report within 90 days, and then on a schedule the agency head set. [1] The reports covered progress on implementing reform policies and on identifying regulations for change. [1]
Those reports were internal documents. Their value depended on what they contained. A report that listed recommendations with reasons, data and expected effects gave the agency head something to decide. A report that listed counts gave the agency head a number.
Evidence behind each indicator
M-17-23 required agencies, beginning with their fiscal year 2018 annual performance reports, to report data for each indicator and identify each action evaluated, recommended or issued. [3] The result was an itemized list as well as a total.
An itemized list is evidence anyone can check. It lets a later reader trace each count to a docket. Agencies that kept their lists in a consistent form could reuse them for later reviews. Agencies that rebuilt them each year spent the effort again.
What the indicators could not see
The five indicators counted evaluations, recommendations, actions and costs. [3] They did not count benefits lost when a rule was removed, or compliance work organizations had already done for a rule that changed.
Those effects fall on the regulated and the public, outside the agency’s books. A regulated organization that had built systems to meet a rule bore the cost of building them, and then, if the rule changed, the cost of changing them again. Those costs did not appear in an agency’s incremental cost total, which measured the rule’s estimated burden going forward.
The voices: input from the regulated and the governed
The order told each task force to seek input and other assistance, as permitted by law, from entities significantly affected by federal regulations. [1] It named state, local and tribal governments, small businesses, consumers, non-governmental organizations and trade associations. [1]
Who could take part
The list was broad. It reached the governments that implement federal programs and the businesses that comply with federal rules. It also reached consumers and non-governmental organizations, who may support the rules others want removed. [1]
The phrase “as permitted by law” mattered. On our reading, agencies collecting input still had to respect rules on advisory committees, information collection and ex parte contacts. A task force could not hold private meetings that shaped a later rulemaking without considering those constraints.
What good input looked like
For a regulated organization, input to a task force was an opportunity and a test. A general complaint about burden gave a task force little to use. A specific account of a rule’s cost, with evidence, gave it something to weigh against the rule’s benefits.
The evidence test made specificity more valuable. A commenter who could show that a rule rested on data the public could not see had a ground the order itself named. [1] A commenter defending a rule had the mirror task: showing that its evidence was available and reproducible.
State, local and tribal governments
State and local governments sit on both sides of federal rules. They comply with some and administer others, such as health and benefit programs. The order named them first among the entities to consult. [1]
For a state agency administering a federal program, the task force was a channel for reporting rules that added cost without effect. It was also a channel for defending rules the state relied on. Either way, the state needed its own data on how the rules worked in operation.
Public input as a performance measure
The first indicator in M-17-23 counted evaluations that included opportunity for public input or peer review. [3] The voices part of the order was therefore also counted. An agency that held reviews without outside input would score lower on that indicator.
That link between process and measurement is unusual. It made openness part of performance rather than a courtesy. Whether that produced better reviews depended on what the agencies did with the input, which a count could not show.
Records of the input received
Input to a task force is useful later only if it is kept. A record of who submitted what, and how the task force responded, shows that the order’s consultation step happened. [1] It also helps a later rulemaking, because the same arguments can return in comments.
The record also protects the agency. If a repeal is challenged, the agency may need to show what it considered. Input received outside a formal docket, and not recorded, cannot help with that.
Balance among voices
The order’s list put regulated parties and beneficiaries side by side: small businesses and trade associations, but also consumers and non-governmental organizations. [1] Which of them actually took part depended on outreach. A trade association can assign staff to respond. An individual consumer may have no one.
A task force that wanted balanced input had to seek it. For agencies serving the public directly, such as those running health and benefit programs, the people affected by a rule may be the least able to write a comment. The order named them; reaching them was the agency’s task.
Input from inside government
The order’s list of entities was external. Agency staff who enforce and administer rules also know where rules fail. Inspectors, examiners and grant officers see the gap between a rule’s text and its operation every day.
A task force that drew on its own field staff gained evidence that outside commenters could not supply. That input needed the same discipline as outside input: a record of what was said and how it was weighed.
How the order reached different organizations
The order applied to executive agencies, but its effects spread to the organizations those agencies regulate and fund. We take the main types in turn.
Executive departments
The 15 departments were in the memorandum’s requirements list and carried the full structure: officer, task force with senior members, performance indicators and reports. [1] [3] For their regulatory policy staff, the order added a recurring workload of evaluation, reporting and coordination with OMB.
Smaller agencies
Agencies that issued very few or no regulations could seek a waiver. [1] The memorandum listed what a request should contain. [3] For a small agency, the choice was between compiling an inventory for a waiver and staffing a task force. Both required knowing its own rules.
Independent regulatory agencies
M-17-23 said independent regulatory agencies were not subject to the order, though they were encouraged to comply. [3] That mattered for financial services. The Federal Reserve Board, for one, is among the independent regulatory agencies a 2025 order later addressed, discussed in the hindsight section. [7]
Banks, credit unions and broker-dealers therefore saw the order mainly through other agencies. Treasury’s rules and those of other departments were inside it. Rules of independent agencies were outside it, unless those agencies chose to follow it.
Health systems and health companies
HHS was one of the departments in the requirements list. [3] Its rules on health programs, privacy and payment were within its task force’s remit. Health systems that wanted a rule changed, or kept, had a defined channel and a defined set of tests.
The evidence test had particular force for health rules built on clinical or claims data that cannot be released. A health organization defending such a rule needed to explain why the data was confidential and how the analysis could still be checked.
State, local and tribal governments
The order named these governments among the entities task forces were to consult. [1] Governments that administer federal programs had a stake on both sides. A rule repealed at the federal level could leave a state program with no federal standard to follow.
Contractors and grantees
Acquisition rules were reached through joint task forces such as the one for the Chief Acquisition Officers Council. [1] Contractors that sell to agencies, including technology and health care companies, had a stake in which acquisition rules the joint task force flagged.
Grant recipients and nonprofits
Organizations that receive federal grants follow rules on how funds are managed and reported. Where an executive agency issued such rules, they fell within the order’s definition of regulation, subject to its exclusions. [1] [2] The definition left out matters of agency organization, management and personnel, but on our reading, grant terms that bind outside recipients fall outside that exclusion. [2]
Health clinics, community organizations and local governments that live on grants had a stake in which reporting rules a task force flagged. Their input carried weight when it showed the cost of a requirement in staff hours and the use, or absence of use, of the data it produced.
Program offices inside agencies
The people who write and run rules work in program offices, not in the regulatory policy shop. The order’s accountability section reached them directly. Agency heads were to consider task force progress in assessing the people responsible for developing and issuing regulations. [1]
That provision turned reform into a performance matter for rule writers. A program office that could explain its rules with data was better placed than one that defended them by habit. The incentive pointed toward evidence, whatever the outcome.
Objections, in order
1. The order changed no rules, so it changed nothing
The order changed no rule directly. It said it did not impair agencies’ legal authority. [1] It did change who looked at rules, against which tests, with what incentives. Those are the inputs that decide which rules reach a rulemaking docket.
2. Retrospective review already existed under Executive Order 13563
It did, and the order cited it. [1] The new elements were the named officer, the task force, the six categories and the performance indicators. Retrospective review became a function with staff and measures rather than a section of an earlier order.
3. Counting deregulatory actions rewards trivial repeals
Counts can reward volume. M-17-23 recognized the limit by asking agencies to develop indicators of net benefits as well. [3] The objection is fair against the counts alone. It is weaker against the program as a whole.
4. The evidence test was aimed at specific scientific rules
The order’s text applied the test to all regulations, without naming subject areas. [1] Whatever motivated it, the test applied wherever a rule relied on data the public could not see. That reach is what made it significant for health and financial rules.
5. Revocation in 2021 proved the effort was wasted
Revocation ended the posts and the task forces. [4] It did not erase what agencies had learned about their own rules. Inventories, evaluations and evidence files stayed in agency records. A later review, under any order, could draw on them.
6. Executive orders are too fragile to matter
They are fragile in the sense that the next President can revoke them. The 2017, 2021 and 2025 orders show that pattern. [1] [4] [5] They still govern how agencies work while in force. Organizations that plan for the current order, and keep records that serve any order, are covered either way.
7. The task forces duplicated OIRA’s role
OIRA reviews significant rules under Executive Order 12866, which the order listed among the initiatives the officer would oversee. [1] The task forces looked at the existing stock of rules as well as new ones. The two functions overlapped at the edges, but the task force’s mandate covered a backlog that review of new rules never reached.
What agency and compliance leaders could check
The four parts give a set of checks that hold regardless of which order is in force:
- Keep an inventory of the agency’s rules and significant guidance, with the directive or statute behind each.
- Record, for each significant rule, the data and methods it relies on and whether the public can see them.
- Build performance measures into new rules when they are adopted, so effect tests can be answered later.
- Name the official accountable for regulatory review, whatever the current order calls the role.
- For regulated organizations, keep evidence of the cost and effect of the rules that weigh on you, ready for any review.
- Record the rules a review examined and kept, as well as the ones it recommended changing.
- Keep a dated record of outside input and of the reasons it was accepted or not.
- Keep the itemized lists behind any performance count, so each number can be traced to a docket.
For leaders in regulated organizations, the same records serve a second purpose. When a rule that matters to them comes up for review, under any order, the organization that can show the rule’s cost and effect in its own operations has strong input to offer. An organization that relies on general statements about burden or benefit gives the reviewer little to weigh.
These checks treat review as permanent work, not as a response to one order. The posts created in 2017 were abolished in 2021, and new structures appeared in 2025. [4] [6] The records an agency keeps about its own rules have no such expiry.
With hindsight
OMB issued the guidance the order called for on April 28, 2017, as memorandum M-17-23. [3] It set five performance indicators for the fiscal year 2019 annual performance plans of 17 agencies. It said independent regulatory agencies were not subject to the order, though they were encouraged to comply. [3]
On January 20, 2021, Executive Order 13992 revoked Executive Orders 13771 and 13777, along with four other executive orders issued in 2019. [4] It directed OMB and agency heads to promptly rescind orders, rules, guidelines and policies implementing the revoked orders, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. [4]
Executive Order 13992 went further for the structures. It said personnel positions, committees, task forces and other entities established under the revoked orders shall be abolished, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. [4] It named the regulatory reform officer positions and regulatory reform task forces established by sections 2 and 3 of Executive Order 13777. [4]
The policy turned again in 2025. On January 31, 2025, Executive Order 14192, titled “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” required that for each new regulation, at least 10 existing regulations be identified for repeal. [5] For fiscal year 2025, the total incremental cost of new regulations was to be significantly less than zero, as determined by the OMB Director. [5]
Executive Order 14192 also widened the definition of regulation. It included memoranda, administrative orders, guidance documents, policy statements and interagency agreements, whether or not issued through Administrative Procedure Act processes. [5] That made explicit what M-17-23’s footnote had done for costly guidance in 2017. [3] [5]
The 2025 order directed the OMB Director to revoke Circular A-4 of November 9, 2023, on regulatory analysis, and to reinstate the version issued on September 17, 2003. [5] As checked on November 15, 2026, the Federal Register’s record for Executive Order 14192 listed related orders but no revocation. [8]
On February 19, 2025, Executive Order 14219 directed agency heads, in coordination with their DOGE Team Leads and the OMB Director, to review all regulations under their jurisdiction for consistency with law and Administration policy. [6] Within 60 days, agencies were to identify seven classes of regulations and send the list to the OIRA Administrator. [6]
The seven classes echoed the 2017 tests in part. They included regulations whose significant costs are not outweighed by public benefits, and regulations that impose undue burdens on small business. [6] They also added constitutional and statutory tests, such as regulations based on anything other than the best reading of the underlying statute. [6]
The 2025 structure placed review differently. Instead of an agency officer and task force, Executive Order 14219 paired agency heads with DOGE Team Leads and OIRA. [6] On our reading, the function the 2017 order had housed in each agency was now coordinated from the center.
The reach also changed. On February 18, 2025, Executive Order 14215 required all agencies, including independent regulatory agencies, to submit significant regulatory actions to OIRA before publication. [7] It excluded the Federal Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy, but applied to the Board’s supervision and regulation of financial institutions. [7]
That change matters for banks in a way the 2017 order did not. In 2017, OMB said independent regulatory agencies were outside Executive Order 13777. [3] In 2025, their significant rules came under OIRA review, with the stated exception for monetary policy. [7]
What held up from 2017 was the logic of the tests and the value of an agency’s record about its own rules. The structures did not. The 2017 posts were ordered abolished in 2021, and the 2025 orders built review around different actors. [4] [6] An agency that kept inventories, lineage and evidence files had material for every one of these turns.
Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.