Memorial’s $5.5 million HIPAA settlement reached access held by staff of affiliated physician offices

On February 16, 2017, HHS announced Memorial Healthcare System’s $5.5 million settlement. A former affiliate employee’s credentials were used daily from April 2011 to April 2012, and activity review was missing despite risk analyses that flagged it.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

On February 16, 2017, HHS announced Memorial Healthcare System’s $5.5 million settlement. A former affiliate employee’s credentials were used daily from April 2011 to April 2012, and activity review was missing despite risk analyses that flagged it.

  1. The week The release said MHS was affiliated with physician offices through an Organized Health Care Arrangement. [1] That arrangement is the center of the case.
  2. Granting: access extended to people the hospital did not employ A hospital’s identity system can learn about its own employees from human resources.
  3. Watching: a known risk with no review The Security Rule requires information system activity review.
  4. Ending: access that outlived the job The Security Rule includes termination procedures under the workforce security standard.
  5. Proving: what the corrective action plan asked MHS to show The corrective action plan ran for a compliance term of three years from its effective date, unless OCR found a breach of the plan. [2] Its obligations show what OCR considered sufficient evidence that the life cycle of access now worked.
  6. How the case reaches different organizations The Security Rule applies to covered entities and business associates. [4] The affiliate problem appears wherever one organization’s systems are opened to another organization’s staff.
  7. Objections, in order The agreement said some instances led to federal charges. [2] The settlement still addressed MHS’s own controls: activity review and access modification. [2] Criminal acts by individuals do not remove the organization’s duty to notice misuse of its systems.
  8. What privacy and security leaders could check Leaders can also ask for two numbers at each review: how many outside accounts exist, and how many have a named sponsor and a current review date.
  9. With hindsight That notice would be due as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours after the authorization is changed or terminated. [5] HHS asked for comment on whether a shorter period would be appropriate. [5] On our reading, this is the cross-boundary duty the MHS case lacked: the practice telling the hospital that someone has left.

The week

On February 16, 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that Memorial Healthcare System had paid $5.5 million to settle potential violations of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. [1] MHS also agreed to a corrective action plan. [1] The release described MHS as a nonprofit corporation operating six hospitals, an urgent care center, a nursing home and other facilities in South Florida. [1]

The release said MHS was affiliated with physician offices through an Organized Health Care Arrangement. [1] That arrangement is the center of the case. The access that went wrong belonged to staff of affiliated physician offices as well as to MHS’s own employees. [1]

MHS had reported to the HHS Office for Civil Rights that the protected health information of 115,143 individuals had been impermissibly accessed by its employees and impermissibly disclosed to affiliated physician office staff. [1] The information consisted of names, dates of birth and Social Security numbers. [1]

The release singled out one set of credentials. The login credentials of a former employee of an affiliated physician’s office had been used to access MHS’s electronic protected health information daily, without detection, from April 2011 to April 2012. [1] The release said this affected 80,000 individuals. [1]

The release set out two failures. MHS had workforce access policies and procedures, it said, but failed to implement procedures for reviewing, modifying or terminating users’ right of access. [1] MHS also failed to regularly review records of information system activity on applications holding electronic protected health information. [1] That failure covered activity by workforce users and by users at affiliated physician practices. [1]

The release added a detail that turns the case from an access story into a governance story. MHS had identified the risk of not reviewing activity in several risk analyses it conducted from 2007 to 2012. [1] The risk was known. The control was not in place.

The resolution agreement gave the sequence in more detail. On April 12, 2012, MHS submitted a breach report saying two MHS employees had inappropriately accessed patient information. [2] On July 11, 2012, it submitted an addendum. Its internal investigation had found impermissible access by 12 users at affiliated physician offices, potentially affecting another 105,646 individuals. [2]

The agreement said some of these instances led to federal charges relating to selling protected health information and filing fraudulent tax returns. [2] It also explained the counts. MHS had reported 111,650 affected individuals to OCR but notified 115,143 by letter, and MHS said the latter number was accurate. [2]

The agreement listed three items of covered conduct. First, MHS impermissibly disclosed the protected health information of 80,000 individuals by giving access to a former employee of an affiliated physician practice from April 1, 2011, to April 27, 2012. [2] A footnote said April 27, 2012 was the date suspicious activity ceased, according to an outside auditing firm MHS had hired. [2]

Second, from January 1, 2011, to June 1, 2012, MHS failed to implement procedures to regularly review records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports and security incident tracking reports. [2] Third, over the same dates, it failed to implement policies and procedures to establish, document, review and modify a user’s right of access. [2]

The agreement described MHS by its legal name, South Broward Hospital District, doing business as Memorial Healthcare System. It called MHS a non-profit corporation and an independent special tax district under Florida law. [2] The agreement stated that it was not an admission of liability by MHS. [2]

The week’s settlement followed guidance OCR had issued the month before. OCR’s January 2017 cybersecurity newsletter was titled “Understanding the Importance of Audit Controls.” [3] It said the Security Rule’s audit controls standard requires mechanisms that record and examine activity in systems containing electronic protected health information. [3]

The newsletter also said the Security Rule does not identify what information should be collected from an audit log or how often audit reports should be reviewed. [3] It said regulated entities must consider their risk analysis results and organizational factors when deciding. [3] The February release pointed readers to that newsletter. [1]

The Memorial settlement is easy to read as a story about one bad actor with an old password. We read it as a story about the edge of a workforce. The people whose access failed were, in large part, not MHS employees. They worked at affiliated physician offices that MHS connected to its systems. [1] [2]

Our argument is that the settlement exposed an identity process built around the payroll. MHS had access policies. On our reading, they did not reach the people who left an affiliate’s employment, and the documents describe no signal that would have told the hospital those people had left. [1] And the one control that could have caught the misuse anyway, regular review of system activity, was a risk MHS had already recorded and not addressed. [1]

We take the case in four parts. Each is a stage in the life of one person’s access, and each failed differently:

  1. Granting: who decided that affiliate staff should have access, and on what terms.
  2. Watching: whether anyone reviewed what users did with the access they had.
  3. Ending: how access stopped when a person’s job at an affiliate ended.
  4. Proving: what the corrective action plan required MHS to show afterward, and to whom.

The first three are the life cycle of access. The fourth is the evidence that the life cycle works. The rules involved are the HIPAA Security Rule’s administrative safeguards and its audit controls standard. [4] How those rules apply to a given arrangement is a question for counsel.

The case was resolved by agreement. The facts we use come from OCR’s release and the resolution agreement, and the agreement says it is not an admission of liability. [1] [2] The design lessons do not depend on fault. They come from the arrangement the documents describe.

Granting: access extended to people the hospital did not employ

The release said MHS was affiliated with physician offices through an Organized Health Care Arrangement, and that protected health information was impermissibly disclosed to affiliated physician office staff. [1] The resolution agreement counted 12 users at affiliated physician offices in MHS’s July 2012 addendum. [2]

The Security Rule’s information access management standard requires policies and procedures for authorizing access to electronic protected health information. [4] Its implementation specification on access establishment and modification is labeled addressable. [4] According to the agreement, HHS’s investigation indicated that MHS had not implemented policies and procedures to establish, document, review and modify users’ access. [2]

Why affiliates break the usual identity model

A hospital’s identity system can learn about its own employees from human resources. A hire creates an account. A transfer changes it. A departure ends it. That chain depends on a feed the hospital controls.

Affiliate staff are outside that chain. They are hired and released by a physician practice. The hospital learns about them only if the practice tells it. When the practice forgets, or when no one asked it to report, the hospital’s records describe a workforce that no longer exists.

The MHS documents show what that gap can produce. Credentials of a former affiliate employee were used daily, without detection, from April 2011 to April 2012. [1] The person had left the practice. The hospital’s systems still treated the credentials as valid.

What a granting decision should record

A grant to an affiliate user is a decision with several parts. Someone at the hospital approves it. Someone at the practice sponsors the person. The access is scoped to a purpose, such as treating the practice’s own patients.

Each part can be recorded. The record names the sponsor at the practice, the approver at the hospital, the scope, and an end date or review date. Without a sponsor, no one is responsible for telling the hospital when the person leaves. Without a review date, the grant lasts until someone notices.

Scope as a control

The release listed names, dates of birth and Social Security numbers among the information exposed. [1] Those fields support identity theft, and the agreement mentioned federal charges relating to fraudulent tax returns. [2] Whether affiliate staff needed full Social Security numbers for their work is a scoping question.

Scope limits reduce what a misused account can reach. An affiliate user who sees only the practice’s own patients, and only the fields needed for care and billing, exposes less when the credentials outlive the job. Scope is a granting decision, and it is cheaper to set at the start than to retrofit.

The affiliate agreement

The hospital and the practice have some agreement that lets the practice’s staff into the hospital’s systems. That agreement is where the reporting duty belongs. It can require the practice to report departures and role changes, name who reports, and set a deadline.

The MHS corrective action plan pointed in this direction. It required MHS to revise its access policies to include protocols for access to its electronic protected health information by affiliated physicians, their practices and their employees. [2]

Granting at different kinds of organizations

The granting problem looks different by size. A large system with dozens of affiliated practices needs a sponsor model and a portal for practices to manage their own users. A smaller hospital with a handful of affiliates may manage grants by hand, but still needs the sponsor and the end date.

Ambulatory networks face the mirror image. Their staff receive access to hospital systems they do not control. The practice manager is the person who knows when someone leaves. The MHS case shows what follows when that knowledge stays inside the practice.

Shared logins at the practice

A practice under time pressure may let staff share one login to the hospital’s system. The documents we cite do not say this happened at MHS. The risk is general. A shared login has no single person to remove when someone leaves, so departures never end it.

The granting rule that prevents it is simple. Every outside user gets a personal account, and the affiliate agreement forbids sharing. The activity review can then look for signs of sharing, such as the same account active from two places at once.

When the affiliate changes hands or closes

Practices merge, change owners and close. Each event changes who employs the people holding hospital access. If no one tells the hospital, every grant to that practice becomes a grant to people with no current sponsor.

The hospital can treat such events as triggers. A change of ownership or a closure suspends the practice’s grants until a new sponsor confirms each user. That rule costs a few days of disruption. It removes a class of accounts that no one would otherwise review.

Watching: a known risk with no review

The Security Rule requires information system activity review. The implementation specification says to implement procedures to regularly review records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports and security incident tracking reports, and it is labeled required. [4] According to the agreement, HHS’s investigation indicated that MHS had not implemented such procedures from January 1, 2011, to June 1, 2012. [2]

The release added that MHS had identified this risk in several risk analyses from 2007 to 2012. [1] The risk analysis did its job. The response to it did not follow.

Why review would have mattered

Access controls decide who can enter. Review decides whether anyone notices what they do once inside. A former employee using valid credentials looks legitimate to an access control. A review of activity can show patterns that do not fit the person’s role or employer.

The release said the credentials were used daily, without detection, across the period it described. [1] A regular review is the control designed to make that phrase impossible. Even a modest review, focused on affiliate accounts, had a chance to see sustained activity from a user whose practice no longer employed them.

What the rule leaves to the organization

OCR’s January 2017 newsletter was candid about the rule’s limits. It said the Security Rule does not identify what information to collect from an audit log or how often to review audit reports. [3] Those choices rest on the organization’s risk analysis and its environment. [3]

That flexibility is real, and it cuts both ways. It lets a small practice choose a light review and a large system choose a heavy one. It also means an organization must decide, record its decision, and then do what it decided. MHS’s risk analyses identified the gap; the review procedures were not implemented. [1] [2]

Three kinds of audit trail

The newsletter described three kinds of audit trail. [3] Application audit trails log user activity in an application, such as records opened, edited and deleted. System-level audit trails capture log-on attempts, user IDs, times and devices. User audit trails log the commands and access a user initiates. [3]

Each kind answers a different question about an affiliate account. System-level trails show when and from where the account logged in. Application trails show which patients’ records it opened. User trails show what it did with them. A review program that uses only one kind sees part of the picture.

Designing a review that runs

A review that exists only in policy did not help MHS. The design question is what makes a review happen every period. One answer is to make it small, specific and owned.

A hospital can define a short list of review rules for affiliate accounts. Examples are logins from an account with no activity by its sponsor, access to patients outside the practice’s panel, and bulk lookups of identity fields. Each rule has an owner, a frequency and a log showing it was run.

The review also needs a path for findings. A flagged account goes to someone who can suspend it and contact the practice. Without that path, a review produces reports that no one acts on.

Protecting the logs themselves

The newsletter said access to audit trails should be strictly restricted to authorized personnel. [3] It said unprotected logs let hackers or malevolent insiders cover their tracks. [3] A review depends on logs that the people being reviewed cannot alter.

For affiliate users without administrative rights, that concern is smaller. It becomes larger when the people with administrative rights are themselves outside the hospital, such as a vendor’s support staff. The same principle applies: the reviewed should not control the record of review.

What to look for in identity fields

The release said the exposed information included names, dates of birth and Social Security numbers. [1] Those fields support fraud, and the agreement mentioned federal charges relating to fraudulent tax returns. [2] A review can give identity fields special attention.

Patterns worth flagging include an account that views identity fields for a large number of patients without clinical documentation, lookups outside the practice’s patients, and access at hours when the practice is closed. Each pattern can be written as a rule and run on a schedule. None of the rules proves misuse. Each one tells a reviewer where to look.

Who does the review

Activity review sits between the privacy office and the security team. Privacy staff know which access is appropriate for a role. Security staff know how to collect and query logs. If each assumes the other is reviewing, no one is.

The MHS plan required revised policies on information system activity review, approved by OCR. [2] A policy of that kind can name the reviewing role, the frequency and the escalation path. The name matters more than the org chart. It tells an assessor whom to ask for the evidence.

Review frequency as a recorded decision

Because the rule leaves frequency to the organization, the frequency is itself a compliance decision. [3] It should appear in writing, with the reason. A monthly review of affiliate accounts, chosen because of the number of outside users and the sensitivity of the fields they can see, is a defensible decision. An unstated frequency is not a decision at all.

The record also lets the organization change its mind deliberately. If incidents rise or the number of affiliates grows, the frequency can rise, and the record shows when and why. That trail is the difference between a flexible rule applied and a flexible rule ignored.

Ending: access that outlived the job

The Security Rule includes termination procedures under the workforce security standard. The implementation specification says to implement procedures for terminating access when the employment of, or other arrangement with, a workforce member ends, and it is labeled addressable. [4]

The release said MHS failed to implement procedures for reviewing, modifying or terminating users’ right of access. [1] The resolution agreement’s covered conduct used the access establishment and modification specification. [2] The corrective action plan then required revised policies under both the access modification and the termination specifications. [2]

What addressable meant and did not mean

The rule’s text explains addressable specifications. An organization must assess whether the specification is reasonable and appropriate, and implement it if so. [4] If not, it must document why and implement an equivalent alternative measure if reasonable and appropriate. [4]

Read with its text, addressable did not mean optional. It meant decide, document and act. A hospital that grants affiliate access and has no way to end it when the person leaves has not shown that termination procedures are unreasonable for it. On our reading of the text, it has simply not addressed them. [4]

The signal problem

Termination procedures need a trigger. For employees, the trigger is a human resources event. For affiliate staff, the hospital needs a signal from the practice, or a substitute that does not depend on the practice remembering.

There are several substitutes. Grants can expire unless renewed by the sponsor. Accounts with no use for a set period can be suspended. Sponsors can be asked to confirm their user lists on a schedule. Each substitute catches some of the people a missing signal would miss.

Shared and inherited credentials

The release described the credentials of a former employee being used. [1] The documents we cite do not say who used them. The design point holds either way. When credentials outlive a job, anyone who obtains them gains the access the job once justified.

Multi-factor authentication tied to a device or a person reduces that risk, because a password alone no longer opens the account. It does not replace termination. An account that should not exist is still a liability if its second factor is on a phone the former employee kept.

Ending access across organizations

The hardest version of the problem involves two regulated organizations. The practice may itself be a covered entity. Its former employee had access to the hospital’s systems because of the practice’s relationship with the hospital. [1]

Neither organization’s internal process covers the other’s systems. The practice ends the person’s access to its own systems. The hospital never hears. Closing that gap requires a duty that crosses the boundary between them, written into their agreement.

Measuring termination lag

Termination works when the gap between a departure and the end of access is short. That gap can be measured. For each departure, the organization records the date the person left and the date access ended.

For employees, both dates come from internal systems. For affiliate staff, the departure date comes from the practice, if at all. The measurement itself exposes the problem: if the hospital cannot fill in the first date, it cannot know its lag. The 2025 proposal discussed in the hindsight section would turn this measurement into fixed deadlines. [5]

Movers as well as leavers

The agreement’s covered conduct included failure to establish, document, review and modify a user’s right of access. [2] Modification covers people who change roles as well as people who leave. A practice employee who moves from billing to the front desk may need different access, or none.

Role changes at affiliates are even less visible to the hospital than departures. A periodic confirmation by the sponsor, listing each user and role, catches both kinds of change. Without it, access accumulates as people move.

Dormant accounts

An account that stops being used is a signal. The person may have left, changed roles or stopped needing the system. In each case, the account’s continued existence adds risk without adding value.

A dormancy rule suspends accounts after a set period without use, and requires the sponsor to reactivate them. The rule does not depend on anyone reporting a departure. It would not have caught the MHS pattern, where the account was used daily. [1] It does catch the larger set of forgotten accounts that never show up in a review because they are never used, until someone finds the password.

Proving: what the corrective action plan asked MHS to show

The corrective action plan ran for a compliance term of three years from its effective date, unless OCR found a breach of the plan. [2] Its obligations show what OCR considered sufficient evidence that the life cycle of access now worked.

Risk analysis, then policies

MHS had to complete a risk analysis and risk management plan covering all identified risks related to enterprise-wide protected health information security. [2] The plan had to include evidence of implementation, or of efforts toward implementation, of the safeguards it identified. [2]

Within 90 days of completing that analysis, MHS had to revise its policies on information system activity review and on access establishment, modification and termination. [2] The revised access policies had to include protocols for affiliated physicians, their practices and their employees. OCR had to approve the revisions. [2]

Distribution to people outside the payroll

The plan required MHS to distribute the approved policies to all its workforce members. [2] It also required distribution to business associates, vendors and workforce members of affiliated physician practices. [2] New workforce members of MHS or an affiliated practice were to receive them within 15 days of joining. [2]

That distribution term is the plan’s answer to the affiliate gap. It treats the practice’s staff as people the hospital’s policies must reach. A hospital that cannot list the affiliate staff who hold its access cannot meet a term like this one.

An outside assessor

MHS had to engage a qualified, objective, independent third-party assessor, approved by OCR. [2] The assessor was to make unannounced site visits, hold quarterly progress meetings with key management, and interview workforce members, employees of affiliated physician practices and business associates as needed. [2]

The assessor reported to OCR as well as to MHS. MHS could not terminate the assessor except for cause and with OCR’s consent. [2] OCR could also conduct a validation review if it doubted an assessor report. [2]

Reportable events and attestations

MHS had to require workforce members with access to report violations of its HIPAA policies. When MHS found a violation, it had to notify the assessor and OCR within 30 days as a reportable event. [2]

Annual reports had to include signed attestations that the policies were adopted, implemented and distributed, including to affiliated practices, business associates and vendors. [2] MHS had to keep compliance documents for six years from the effective date. [2]

What the evidence regime implies for others

The plan shows what OCR asked for when it wanted proof. It asked for analysis, approved policies, distribution beyond the payroll, outside assessment, internal reporting and signed attestations. [2] Each item is a record someone could inspect.

An organization without a plan can build the same records voluntarily. The benefit is practical. If an incident comes, the organization can show its own life cycle of access working, with dates, rather than describe it from memory.

The approval loops

The plan required OCR approval of several items: the internal monitoring plan, the revised policies, the assessor and the assessor’s plan. [2] If OCR disapproved, MHS had to revise and resubmit, and the process continued until OCR approved. [2]

Those loops take time and staff. They also mean the evidence is reviewed by the regulator before the organization relies on it. An organization not under a plan can borrow the idea internally. It can have its own audit or compliance function approve access policies and review plans before they take effect.

What an assessor would test

The plan described the assessor’s work: unannounced site visits, quarterly meetings with key management, interviews with workforce members, affiliate practice employees and business associates, and follow-up on reportable events. [2]

Translated into tests, an assessor could pick affiliate users at random and ask the practice whether each still works there. It could pick departures and check when access ended. It could ask for the last three activity reviews and the actions taken on their findings. Each test has a clear answer, and each answer is evidence.

How the case reaches different organizations

The Security Rule applies to covered entities and business associates. [4] The affiliate problem appears wherever one organization’s systems are opened to another organization’s staff. We take the main types in turn.

Hospitals and health systems

Systems that extend their electronic records to community physicians face the MHS pattern directly. The control set is the one the corrective action plan described: sponsor-based grants, scoped access, activity review focused on affiliate accounts, and policies that reach affiliate staff. [2]

Public hospital districts

MHS is a special tax district under Florida law, according to the agreement. [2] Public hospital systems answer to HIPAA like private ones. They may also answer to public records and procurement rules that shape how they contract with affiliates. Counsel should check how those rules interact with access terms in affiliate agreements.

Physician practices and ambulatory networks

Practices are on the other side of the arrangement. Their staff hold access to systems the practice does not run. A practice can protect its patients and its relationship by reporting departures promptly and by keeping its own list of who holds hospital access.

Health plans

Health plans may open provider portals to staff at physician offices for eligibility checks, claims and authorizations. The same pattern applies. The plan learns about departures only if the practice tells it, unless the plan builds expiry and review into the portal.

Business associates and technology vendors

Vendors that host clinical systems, or provide support with privileged access, are another group outside the payroll. Their staff come and go on the vendor’s schedule. Business associate agreements can require notice of departures for anyone with access, and the covered entity can review those accounts like affiliate accounts.

State Medicaid agencies and public health programs

Public agencies that operate health programs may also open systems to outside staff, such as enrollment brokers and provider office staff. Whether HIPAA applies depends on the agency’s role. The identity pattern applies regardless, and so does the need for a departure signal from each outside organization.

Academic medical centers

Teaching hospitals host residents, students and visiting clinicians whose affiliations change on academic calendars. Their access is granted by the hospital but sponsored by a school or program. The same life cycle applies, with rotation end dates as natural expiry points.

A rotation that ends on a known date is the easiest case for automatic expiry. The harder case is the trainee who leaves a program early. The program, not the hospital, knows first, and the reporting duty belongs in the affiliation agreement.

Health information exchanges

Exchanges connect the users of several organizations to shared data. Where each participant vouches for its own users and the exchange relies on that vouching, the MHS pattern scales up: one participant’s missed departure becomes a valid account on a network that reaches other organizations’ patients.

Exchange participation agreements can carry the same duties as affiliate agreements: prompt notice of departures, periodic user confirmation and cooperation with activity review. The exchange can also run its own review across participants, since it sees activity no single participant sees.

Objections, in order

1. The breach was a crime by individuals, not a compliance failure

The agreement said some instances led to federal charges. [2] The settlement still addressed MHS’s own controls: activity review and access modification. [2] Criminal acts by individuals do not remove the organization’s duty to notice misuse of its systems.

2. Termination procedures are addressable, so MHS had discretion

Addressable specifications require an assessment and, if the specification is not adopted, a documented reason and an equivalent alternative if reasonable. [4] The covered conduct in the agreement included MHS not implementing policies and procedures on access modification. [2] On our reading, discretion requires a decision, and the documents describe none that worked.

3. The hospital cannot know when an affiliate’s employee leaves

That is the problem, not a defense. The corrective action plan required protocols for affiliate access and distribution of policies to affiliate staff. [2] The hospital can require the practice to report, set grants to expire, and review dormant or unusual accounts.

4. Reviewing every log is impossible

OCR’s newsletter said the rule does not set what to collect or how often to review. [3] A focused review of affiliate accounts is far smaller than a review of everything. The covered conduct in the agreement was that MHS did not implement procedures for regular review in the period described. [2]

5. The amount was a one-off, not a signal

A settlement binds its parties. Its value to others is in what it shows about how OCR reads the rule. On our reading, it showed OCR treating activity review and access modification as the controls that mattered when insiders and affiliates misused access. [1] [2]

6. Multi-factor authentication would have solved it

A second factor raises the bar for credential misuse. It does not end access that should have ended, and it does not review what a valid user does. The covered conduct in the agreement concerned review and access management, which a second factor does not replace. [2]

7. Smaller hospitals cannot afford this

The checks scale down. A small hospital with a few affiliated practices can keep its sponsor list in a spreadsheet, set grants to expire, and review outside accounts on a fixed schedule. The rule itself requires an organization to take into account its size, complexity and capabilities, and the costs of security measures, when choosing them. [4] The size of the organization changes the tooling, not the need to decide and record.

8. Activity review creates privacy risk of its own

Reviewing logs means people reading records of other people’s work and of patient lookups. That is a real concern. OCR’s newsletter addressed it by saying access to audit trails should be strictly restricted to authorized personnel. [3] A narrow review, run by named people under a written procedure, limits that risk while still catching misuse.

What privacy and security leaders could check

The four parts give a short list of checks for any organization that opens its systems to outside staff:

  • List every account held by someone who is not on the payroll. Record the sponsoring organization and a named sponsor for each.
  • Set an end date or review date on every outside grant, and suspend accounts that pass it without renewal.
  • Write a duty to report departures into each affiliate, vendor and partner agreement, with a deadline.
  • Run a focused activity review of outside accounts on a fixed schedule, and keep a log that it ran.
  • Restrict outside users to the patients and fields their role needs, starting with identity fields.
  • Keep the risk analysis and the response to it together, so a known risk carries an owner and a date.
  • Suspend accounts that go unused for a set period, and require the sponsor to reactivate them.
  • Measure the gap between each departure and the end of access, including for outside staff.

Leaders can also ask for two numbers at each review: how many outside accounts exist, and how many have a named sponsor and a current review date. The gap between them is the size of the MHS problem inside their own organization. It shrinks only when someone owns it.

A third number completes the picture: the share of scheduled activity reviews that actually ran, with findings closed. The MHS release described a risk identified repeatedly and a review never put in place. [1] That share measures whether an organization has the same gap.

The list requires no new platform. Each requires a decision about who owns the people at the edge of the workforce, and a record that the decision is carried out. [1] [2]

With hindsight

On January 6, 2025, HHS published a proposed rule to strengthen the HIPAA Security Rule. [5] Several proposals address the failures described in the MHS agreement directly. [2] [5]

The proposal would remove the distinction between addressable and required implementation specifications and make all of them required, with specific, limited exceptions. [5] HHS said this would make clear what had always been a requirement, citing an apparent misunderstanding of “addressable” by regulated entities. [5]

On termination, the proposal would require that a workforce member’s access be terminated as soon as possible, but no later than one hour after the employment or other arrangement ends. [5] It would also require written procedures to notify another regulated entity of a change in or termination of a workforce member’s access to that entity’s systems. [5]

That notice would be due as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours after the authorization is changed or terminated. [5] HHS asked for comment on whether a shorter period would be appropriate. [5] On our reading, this is the cross-boundary duty the MHS case lacked: the practice telling the hospital that someone has left.

The proposal would also rename the audit controls standard as audit trail and system log controls and expand what it requires. [5] Comments were due on or before March 7, 2025. [5]

The proposal’s status is uncertain. In the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda, HHS listed the rule at the final rule stage, with a final action projected for May 2026. [8] In the 2026 Unified Agenda, HHS listed it among long-term actions instead, with a final action projected for July 2027. [6] As checked on November 15, 2026, we found no final rule. The Security Rule text in force still labels termination procedures and access modification as addressable. [4]

A second development came from Congress. On January 5, 2021, Public Law 116-321 amended the HITECH Act to require HHS to consider recognized security practices when making certain enforcement decisions. [7] HHS must consider whether a covered entity or business associate adequately demonstrated that it had recognized security practices in place for not less than the previous 12 months. [7]

The law says those practices may mitigate fines, lead to early and favorable termination of an audit, and mitigate remedies in agreements resolving potential Security Rule violations. [7] It also says HHS may not increase fines because an entity lacks those practices. [7] Agreements like the MHS plan are among the remedies the statute names.

For the MHS pattern, the law gives a reason to keep evidence. Demonstrating practices for 12 months requires records covering those months. [7] The records that would help are the ones the MHS plan required: approved policies, distribution to outside staff, activity reviews performed, and access ended on time. [2]

What held up from 2017 was the diagnosis. Access granted to people outside the payroll, without regular review of its use and without a way to end it, was the failure OCR named. [1] [2] The 2025 proposal addressed the same failure and proposed fixed deadlines for both termination and cross-entity notice. [5]

What did not settle was the rule. As checked on November 15, 2026, the proposal had not become final, and the agency’s latest projection we found pointed to July 2027. [6] Organizations that wait for the deadline to become law are relying on a projected date. The cross-boundary notice duty can be written into affiliate agreements now, without waiting for the rule.

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  • HIPAA
  • access management
  • audit logs
  • affiliated practices
  • insider threat
  • OCR enforcement