The 2016 AML proposal for state trust companies and uninsured credit unions kept the IRS as their examiner

On August 25, 2016, Treasury’s anti-money laundering bureau proposed written program rules for state trust companies, uninsured credit unions and other banks with no federal regulator. No federal bank examiner came with them, so the written program carried the proof.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

On August 25, 2016, Treasury’s anti-money laundering bureau proposed written program rules for state trust companies, uninsured credit unions and other banks with no federal regulator. No federal bank examiner came with them, so the written program carried the proof.

  1. The week The proposal explained the gap.
  2. The population: banks outside the federal agencies’ reach A bank lacking such a regulator has no federal agency writing and examining its AML program rules.
  3. The rule: what the program would have to contain FinCEN said it did not anticipate the requirement would mean obtaining information not already obtained in the ordinary course of business. [1] In our reading, that assumption holds better for a depository than for a small trust company that may never have had to document a risk assessment for an outside reviewer.
  4. The examiner: who checks a bank with no federal regulator On that description, a trust company or uninsured credit union would join the other FinCEN-regulated institutions the IRS examines.
  5. The evidence: what shows a program exists and works The rule requires a written program. [4] Writing is the minimum.
  6. How the proposal reached different institutions A non-depository trust company would face all three requirements: a written program, beneficial ownership procedures and, depending on its prior status, CIP. [1] Its customers include legal entities and trusts, so beneficial ownership would be central.
  7. Objections, in order That cuts both ways.
  8. Checks a compliance officer could run today Check that the AML program is written, approved by the board or equivalent body, and available for production on request. [4] Check the approval date against the last material change.
  9. With hindsight Commenters had asked for time.

The week

On August 25, 2016, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network published a proposed rule in the Federal Register. [1] Its title was Customer Identification Programs, Anti-Money Laundering Programs, and Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Banks Lacking a Federal Functional Regulator. [1] Written comments were due on or before October 24, 2016. [1]

The agency said the proposal would implement section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act. [1] It would remove the anti-money laundering program exemption for banks that lack a federal functional regulator, including private banks, non-federally insured credit unions and certain trust companies. [1]

The proposal had three parts. [1] It would prescribe minimum standards for AML programs at these banks. [1] It would extend customer identification program requirements to those not already covered. [1] And it would require them to identify the people who own or control their legal entity customers. [1]

The proposal explained the gap. It said the AML program requirement under the Bank Secrecy Act reached banks through an interim final rule issued April 29, 2002. [1] That rule deemed an institution with a federal functional regulator to comply if it kept a program meeting its regulator’s rules. [1]

The same interim rule deferred the requirement for certain institutions, including private bankers. [1] On November 6, 2002, the agency amended it to extend the deferral indefinitely and to include any bank not subject to regulation by a federal functional regulator. [1]

The proposal said those banks had remained exempt from the AML program requirement since then. [1] By contrast, it said, the agency had already ended the exemption and issued program rules for other institutions deferred in 2002, such as insurance companies, certain loan or finance companies, and dealers in precious metals, stones or jewels. [1]

The exempt banks were not outside the Bank Secrecy Act. The agency said they still had to file currency transaction reports and suspicious activity reports and to make and keep certain records. [1] They also had to comply with the rule barring correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks. [1]

Customer identification had its own history. The agency said a joint final rule of May 9, 2003 applied CIP requirements to private banks, non-federally insured credit unions and certain trust companies. [1] The same day, the agency proposed CIP requirements for other state-regulated banks without a federal functional regulator. [1] The agency said that rulemaking was never finalized. [1] The 2016 proposal would extend CIP requirements to the banks that the 2003 joint rule had left out. [1]

The proposal also pointed to the agency’s customer due diligence rule, published May 11, 2016. [1] That rule required federally regulated banks and certain other institutions to identify and verify the beneficial owners of legal entity customers. [2] It was effective July 11, 2016, and covered institutions had to comply by May 11, 2018. [2] For purposes of regulatory consistency, the agency said, the same owner-identification requirement should apply to non-federally regulated banks. [1]

The proposal listed categories of affected banks, while saying the list was not exhaustive. [1] It named state-chartered non-depository trust companies, non-federally insured credit unions, private banks, non-federally insured state banks and savings associations, and international banking entities in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. [1]

The proposal gave estimates for some categories. It said data from state banking regulator websites indicated upwards of 347 state-chartered non-depository trust companies. [1] It said there were approximately 265 state-chartered credit unions that were not federally insured, based on 2013 information from state credit union supervisors. [1]

It said the number of state banks and savings associations without FDIC insurance was not more than 12. [1] It said at least one private bank remained in the United States, and that Puerto Rico had licensed 33 international banking entities as of 2014. [1] Its paperwork estimate covered 1,151 affected institutions. [1]

The proposal also said who examines these banks. The agency said it had consulted federal regulators, state bank supervisors and the Internal Revenue Service. [1] The proposal described the IRS as the examining authority to date for all institutions regulated by FinCEN that do not have a federal functional regulator. [1]

The August 2016 proposal closed a gap in FinCEN’s rules. Banks without a federal functional regulator had been exempt from the AML program requirement since 2002, while they still filed currency and suspicious activity reports. [1] The proposal would require them to keep written programs meeting minimum standards, like their federally regulated peers. [1]

Our argument is that the proposal changed the rule and left the supervision structure as it was. These banks would still have no federal banking agency examining them. FinCEN described the IRS as the examining authority for institutions it regulates that lack a federal functional regulator. [1] So, in our reading, the burden of proof fell on documents: a written program, approved by the board, tested independently and available to FinCEN on request. [1] [4]

We take the proposal in four parts:

  1. The population: which banks lacked a federal functional regulator, and what FinCEN knew about them.
  2. The rule: what the program, customer identification and beneficial ownership requirements would demand.
  3. The examiner: who would check compliance, and with what authority and expertise.
  4. The evidence: what records would show a program existed and worked.

The parts do not overlap. The first is about scope, the second the obligations, the third oversight and the fourth proof. Together they cover what the proposal changed for these banks and what it left in place. After them we look at how it reached different kinds of institutions, take the objections in order, and end with checks a compliance officer could run.

The population: banks outside the federal agencies’ reach

What “lacking a federal functional regulator” means

Federal functional regulators, for these rules, are the federal banking agencies, the SEC and the CFTC. [1] FinCEN said its rules deem a bank with such a regulator to comply with the program requirement if it meets its regulator’s program rules. [1]

A bank lacking such a regulator has no federal agency writing and examining its AML program rules. It is still a bank under FinCEN’s definition. FinCEN said the proposal would apply to any entity meeting the definition of bank in 31 CFR 1010.100(d). [1]

Five categories

FinCEN named five categories while saying it wanted to identify more. [1]

  1. State-chartered non-depository trust companies. FinCEN said they are generally smaller than depository or federally regulated trust companies, and can provide services similar to investment advisers while being generally exempt from SEC adviser registration. [1]
  2. Non-federally insured credit unions. FinCEN said they are generally similar in structure to federally insured credit unions apart from the lack of a federal regulator. [1]
  3. Private banks, which FinCEN described as state-chartered banks owned by an individual or partnership that generally serve high-net-worth individuals. [1]
  4. Non-federally insured state banks and savings associations, which FinCEN said are privately insured. [1]
  5. International banking entities, authorized under Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands law to serve non-resident aliens. [1]

What FinCEN did not know

FinCEN said the number of state-chartered non-depository trust companies was difficult to determine. [1] It counted upwards of 347 from state regulator websites. [1] Its credit union figure relied on 2013 information from a state supervisors’ association. [1]

In our reading, those caveats say something about the gap itself. A population without a federal regulator is also a population without a federal call report or a federal register. FinCEN was estimating who it would regulate from state websites. [1]

A private bank is not a private banking account

FinCEN drew a distinction that matters for compliance staff. A private bank is a type of institution. [1] A private banking account, under the rules implementing section 312 of the PATRIOT Act, is a kind of account at any bank, held for certain non-U.S. persons with a minimum aggregate deposit of $1,000,000 and administered by a liaison officer. [1]

FinCEN said the section 312 rules do not apply to private banks as such. [1] The proposal would change that. Its program standard would require compliance with the due diligence rules for correspondent accounts and private banking accounts. [1]

Why the 2002 deferral lasted

FinCEN’s rules said the deferral would expire for an institution on the date it had to comply with a final rule requiring it to establish an AML program. [1] No such rule came for these banks between 2002 and 2016. [1]

Other deferred groups got rules. FinCEN listed insurance companies, certain loan or finance companies and dealers in precious metals, stones or jewels as institutions whose exemptions it had already ended. [1] Banks without a federal regulator remained on the deferred list. The proposal said the statutory mandate that all financial institutions establish AML programs is a key element of the national effort against money laundering and terrorist financing. [1]

Rules that already applied

The exemption covered the program requirement only. FinCEN listed what these banks already did: currency transaction reports, suspicious activity reports and record retention. [1] They also had to follow the rule against correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks and collect ownership information on foreign banks with correspondent accounts. [1]

So a trust company in 2016 could file SARs without having a required written program for deciding when to file. In our reading, that combination is the core of the gap. Reporting obligations existed. The framework that makes reporting consistent did not have to.

Why trust companies matter

Trust companies were the largest group by FinCEN’s count. [1] Their business includes estate planning, settlement and trust administration. [1] They can hold assets for families, foundations and businesses, and may act for legal entities with complex ownership.

That profile is where beneficial ownership information is especially useful. A trust company that does not know who stands behind a legal entity customer cannot assess its risk. FinCEN’s choice to extend the beneficial ownership requirement to these banks addressed that directly. [1]

International banking entities

International banking entities were a small and distinct group. FinCEN said they are not federally insured and are authorized by Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands law to provide banking and other services to non-resident aliens. [1] It said Puerto Rico had licensed 33 of them as of 2014. [1]

Their customers are non-resident by definition. Cross-border flows, foreign legal entities and correspondent relationships are central to their business. For them, the proposal’s CIP, beneficial ownership and section 312 elements would apply together. [1] In our reading, that combination made them the group whose obligations grew furthest under the proposal.

The rule: what the program would have to contain

Four pillars and a fifth

The PATRIOT Act’s section 352 requires AML programs that include, at a minimum, internal policies, procedures and controls; a compliance officer; ongoing employee training; and an independent audit function. [1] FinCEN’s proposed standard tracked those and added customer due diligence. [1]

The proposed rule would require a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. [1] It would require independent testing, a designated person or persons responsible for day-to-day compliance, and training for appropriate persons. [1]

The fifth element was risk-based procedures for ongoing customer due diligence. [1] They would include understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships to develop a customer risk profile, and ongoing monitoring to report suspicious transactions and maintain customer information on a risk basis. [1]

FinCEN said it viewed the due diligence element not as a new requirement but as an explicit statement of activities already required to detect and report suspicious transactions. [1]

Risk assessment

FinCEN said it would expect these banks to assess money laundering and terrorist financing risks tied to their products, customers, distribution channels and geographic locations. [1] It said banks had discretion over how to collect customer information for the assessment. [1]

FinCEN said it did not anticipate the requirement would mean obtaining information not already obtained in the ordinary course of business. [1] In our reading, that assumption holds better for a depository than for a small trust company that may never have had to document a risk assessment for an outside reviewer.

Third parties

FinCEN said banks may conduct some operations through agents and third-party service providers, and may contract with them for parts of the AML program. [1] It said a bank that does so remains fully responsible for the program’s effectiveness and for ensuring examiners can obtain the relevant records. [1]

For small institutions, that clause matters. A non-federally insured credit union or a small trust company may rely on a core processor or a compliance vendor for transaction monitoring. The rule would not let it hand off responsibility along with the work. [1]

Customer identification

For customer identification, the PATRIOT Act requires programs that verify the identity of anyone opening an account, to the extent reasonable and practicable, keep records of the verification, and check government lists of known or suspected terrorists. [1]

FinCEN noted that Treasury had not designated any such list for that last purpose. [1] Private banks, uninsured credit unions and certain trust companies were already under CIP rules from 2003. [1] The proposal would bring in the remaining state-regulated banks, such as uninsured state banks and international banking entities. [1]

A list check with no designated list

FinCEN’s footnote on the CIP rule is worth reading closely. The CIP rule requires procedures for checking customers against any list of known or suspected terrorists designated by Treasury for that purpose. [1] FinCEN said that, to date, Treasury had not designated any such list. [1]

Screening obligations under other authorities are outside this rule, and their reach for a given bank is a question for counsel. The footnote means the CIP list check, as written, pointed to a list that did not exist. A program document should say what screening the bank does and under which authority, so a reviewer does not read the CIP clause as the whole of it.

Beneficial ownership

The May 2016 customer due diligence rule required covered institutions to identify and verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers, with exclusions and exemptions. [2] FinCEN’s explanation of that rule said covered institutions were not then required to know who owned or controlled their legal entity customers. [2] It said that let criminals, kleptocrats and others hide proceeds and access the financial system anonymously. [2]

The August proposal would amend the definition of covered financial institution so non-federally regulated banks would face the same requirement. [1] FinCEN said this was for regulatory consistency. [1]

Section 312 due diligence

The proposed program standard would require compliance with FinCEN’s due diligence rules for correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions and for private banking accounts. [1] FinCEN summarized what section 312 requires. [1]

Institutions must have appropriate, specific and, where necessary, enhanced due diligence policies reasonably designed to detect and report money laundering through these accounts. [1] For private banking accounts for non-U.S. persons, they must take reasonable steps to identify the nominal and beneficial owners and the source of funds. [1] They must apply enhanced scrutiny to accounts for senior foreign political figures, including family members and close associates, designed to detect proceeds of foreign corruption. [1]

FinCEN said those due diligence rules had not applied to private banks, and applied only to federally insured credit unions and certain federally regulated trust companies. [1] The proposal would bring the remaining banks under them. [1]

What beneficial ownership collection involves

FinCEN’s analysis described the work at account opening. A covered bank would obtain the identity of each beneficial owner of a legal entity customer opening a new account, including name, address, date of birth and identification number. [1]

It would verify that identity by documentary or non-documentary methods. [1] It would keep for five years a description of the documents relied on, the non-documentary methods and their results, and how any substantive discrepancies were resolved. [1] FinCEN said the burden at account opening would depend on the number of beneficial owners of each legal entity customer. [1]

Board approval

The proposal would require a written AML program approved by the board of directors or an equivalent body. [1] It would also delete a CIP provision that had required these banks to have their CIPs approved by their boards until they became subject to an AML program requirement. [1] The board approval moved from the CIP to the whole program.

The examiner: who checks a bank with no federal regulator

The IRS as examining authority

FinCEN said it consulted the IRS in preparing the proposal. [1] It described the IRS as the examining authority to date for all institutions FinCEN regulates that lack a federal functional regulator. [1] The 2020 final rule used the same description. [3]

On that description, a trust company or uninsured credit union would join the other FinCEN-regulated institutions the IRS examines. The proposal did not create a new examiner. It extended rules into a supervisory structure that already existed. [1]

No federal agency with comparable authority

FinCEN gave a legal reason for issuing the CIP rule alone. The PATRIOT Act requires CIP rules for certain institutions to be issued jointly with the appropriate federal functional regulator. [1] FinCEN said it had maintained publicly since 2003 that no federal agency was appropriate to join a CIP rule for these banks. [1]

Its reason was that no federal agency has direct supervisory authority over them comparable in its pervasiveness to the authority federal functional regulators have over their institutions. [1] In our reading, that sentence is the clearest statement of the gap the proposal left in place. FinCEN could write the rule; no federal agency supervised these banks the way the banking agencies supervise theirs.

Self-regulatory organizations

FinCEN asked commenters whether any of these banks were in fact regulated by self-regulatory organizations. [1] FinCEN also said it was unaware of any instance in which a bank was subject to regulation by a self-regulatory organization, and proposed to strike the rule’s reference to such regulation. [1] The question was a check on that understanding, not evidence that such oversight existed.

State supervisors

FinCEN also consulted state bank supervisory authorities. [1] It said regulators from forty-seven states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico conduct AML compliance inspections in conjunction with the federal banking agencies. [1] It said credit unions are subject to joint supervision by the NCUA and state supervisors under a cooperation agreement. [1]

For a bank with no federal regulator, the state is the prudential supervisor. The 2020 final rule said these banks are generally required by state banking regulation and guidance to have policies, management oversight, personnel training and internal compliance review. [3] So the state examination and the federal rule would overlap in subject matter but come from different authorities.

The examination manual

FinCEN cited uniform examination procedures from the FFIEC Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, first published in 2005. [1] It said it understood that uniform audits or examinations had caused many banks lacking a federal regulator to adopt procedures similar to those the rule would require. [1]

That is FinCEN’s understanding, not a measured finding. It supported FinCEN’s view that the burden would be modest. [1] An examiner using the manual would find familiar structure at such banks if FinCEN’s understanding was right.

Availability on request

The final text, as it reads today, requires the bank to make a copy of its AML program available to FinCEN or its designee on request. [4] That is the hook for oversight. Without a routine federal examination cycle, a request for the written program is how a federal authority sees it.

In our reading, this is why the document carries so much weight. If the program is the main thing a reviewer will see, then its completeness, approval and testing record are the evidence of compliance.

What a request-based review looks like

A routine bank examination follows a cycle, with scoping, on-site work and a report. A request for a written program can come at any time and may be the first contact. The rule text says the bank shall make a copy of its program available to FinCEN or its designee upon request. [4]

That request tests whether the program exists as a document, whether it is current and whether the bank can produce it promptly. Follow-up questions would test whether practice matches the text. In our reading, a bank preparing for that kind of review should assume the document will be read on its own, without a meeting to explain it.

Why a document has to stand alone

A federally regulated bank’s examiners see its program in context over years: prior findings, management responses and on-site testing. A bank without that history in federal hands has less context around its document. In our reading, its program needs to explain its own reasoning, so a reviewer who has never visited can see why each control exists and who runs it.

Where the state examiner fits

For a state trust company, the state banking department is the routine supervisor. FinCEN said state regulators conduct AML compliance inspections in conjunction with federal agencies. [1] For banks with no federal agency, the state examination may be the only regular on-site review.

The 2016 proposal did not change state authority. It gave state examiners a federal standard to refer to. A state examiner reviewing a trust company’s AML controls after the rule could ask whether the program met 31 CFR 1020.210(b), a federal text, alongside state rules. [4]

The evidence: what shows a program exists and works

The written program

The rule requires a written program. [4] Writing is the minimum. A program that lists controls without saying who performs them, how and how often gives a reviewer little to test.

A useful written program for a small trust company might map each product, customer type and channel to a risk rating, and each rating to controls. It would name the compliance officer and describe reporting to the board.

The risk assessment document

FinCEN expected these banks to assess risks across products, customers, distribution channels and geographic locations. [1] The rule text does not use the words risk assessment. [4] But the program’s internal controls must assure ongoing compliance, and its due diligence must develop customer risk profiles. [4]

In our reading, a written risk assessment is the practical link between those requirements. It explains why controls are set as they are. Without it, a reviewer has no basis to judge whether monitoring thresholds or review frequencies fit the business.

Independent testing

FinCEN said an outside party need not perform the testing. [1] It could be done by an officer, employee or group, so long as they are independent of the people primarily responsible for implementing the program. [1] FinCEN said the frequency of testing would depend on the risks posed, citing the FFIEC manual’s description of testing generally every 12 to 18 months as a sound practice. [1]

For a small institution, independence is the hard part. If the compliance officer is also the operations manager and the only person who knows the systems, internal independent testing may not be possible. The rule’s text allows an outside party. [4] Small banks may find that route the only practical one.

Training records

FinCEN said training may be conducted by third parties or in-house, including by computer-based training, and that employees should receive periodic updates. [1] It said the nature, scope and frequency of training would depend on employees’ functions. [1]

Training is easy to claim and easy to evidence: attendance records, content and dates. For a reviewer arriving by request rather than routine exam, those records stand in for interviews.

Beneficial ownership files

The beneficial ownership requirement produces customer files. Each legal entity customer opened after the compliance date should have the beneficial ownership information and the verification record. [2]

For a trust company with legacy relationships, the question is how existing customers are treated. The 2016 CDD rule addressed new accounts and ongoing monitoring. [2] The program requirement to maintain and update customer information on a risk basis brought older relationships into view over time. [4]

The compliance officer

FinCEN said the designated person or persons should be competent and knowledgeable about Bank Secrecy Act requirements and money laundering risks. [1] It said they should be empowered with full responsibility and authority to develop and enforce policies and procedures. [1]

That is guidance in the proposal’s explanation, not rule text. The rule text requires designation of an individual or individuals responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance. [4] The evidence a reviewer would look for is the designation itself, a description of authority and a reporting line to the board.

Record retention

FinCEN said records required under the Bank Secrecy Act must be kept for five years. [1] It said the information collected under the proposal would be used by examining agencies to verify compliance. [1]

For a small institution, retention is a systems question. Files for beneficial ownership verification, CIP and training need to be retrievable when someone asks. A reviewer arriving with a request has no reason to wait for the bank to rebuild them.

Suspicious activity reports already filed

These banks already filed SARs. [1] Their SAR history is evidence too. A program with no SARs filed over several years may be a sign of low risk or of weak monitoring. A reviewer would ask which.

How the proposal reached different institutions

A state-chartered trust company

A non-depository trust company would face all three requirements: a written program, beneficial ownership procedures and, depending on its prior status, CIP. [1] Its customers include legal entities and trusts, so beneficial ownership would be central.

A non-federally insured credit union

An uninsured state credit union was already under CIP. [1] It would add the written program and beneficial ownership requirements. FinCEN said such credit unions were generally similar to federally insured ones in structure. [1] Their member base and products would shape the risk assessment.

A private bank

FinCEN said at least one private bank remained in the United States. [1] For that institution, the change included section 312 due diligence for correspondent and private banking accounts, which had not applied to private banks as such. [1]

An international banking entity

International banking entities serve non-resident aliens under Puerto Rico or U.S. Virgin Islands law. [1] They would add CIP as well as a written program and beneficial ownership requirements. [1] Their customer base is non-resident by definition, so cross-border risk would dominate their assessments.

A vendor serving these banks

Core processors, compliance software providers and outsourced testing firms serve small institutions. FinCEN said a bank may contract with third parties for parts of its program but remains fully responsible for its effectiveness and for examiners’ access to records. [1]

For a vendor, that means contracts should give the client the records it needs to show compliance and should allow reviewers access. A vendor that holds monitoring alerts in a system the client cannot export from leaves the client unable to meet a request.

A state banking department

A state supervisor of trust companies or uninsured credit unions gained a federal reference point. Its institutions became subject to a federal written program requirement, beneficial ownership rules and, for some, CIP. [3] State examination procedures could then test against those texts.

For the state, the change may have meant updating exam scopes and training examiners on the beneficial ownership rule. The proposal did not fund or direct that work. It assumed existing state supervision would continue. [1]

A federally regulated bank

A federally regulated bank was already covered. [1] For it, the proposal changed the field it competes on. FinCEN said uniform requirements would reduce opportunities for criminals to seek out banks with less rigorous AML requirements. [1]

Objections, in order

1. These banks already had programs, so the rule changed little

FinCEN said it understood that examinations had caused many of these banks to adopt similar procedures. [1] The 2020 final rule said state rules generally required policies, management oversight, personnel training and internal compliance review. [3]

That cuts both ways. If programs existed, the burden was small. If some did not, the rule filled a gap. A federal requirement also gives FinCEN a basis to act that a state guidance document does not. [4]

2. The IRS is not a bank examiner

FinCEN described the IRS as the examining authority for institutions lacking a federal functional regulator. [1]

The objection points at expertise. A trust company’s risks differ from a money transmitter’s. The rule did not answer that. FinCEN’s own CIP explanation conceded that no federal agency had supervisory authority over these banks comparable to the banking agencies’. [1] The proposal took that as a reason for FinCEN to act alone, not as a problem to solve. It placed weight on written programs, independent testing and state supervision. [1] [4]

3. Small institutions cannot afford independent testing

FinCEN’s text allows testing by internal staff independent of the program’s implementers, or by an outside party. [1] The frequency depends on risk. [1]

For the smallest institutions, cost is real. The rule did not exempt them. FinCEN’s 2016 paperwork estimate put the burden of developing a written program at 40 hours. [1] It did not estimate testing costs in that figure.

4. Beneficial ownership adds friction for legitimate clients

Collecting and verifying beneficial owners takes time from customers and staff. FinCEN’s CDD rule acknowledged exclusions and exemptions. [2]

FinCEN’s reason was that institutions not knowing their legal entity customers’ owners allowed criminals to hide behind them. [2] For trust companies that serve entities and trusts, the requirement goes to the core of the business.

5. The proposal took too long to finalize

FinCEN proposed the rule on August 25, 2016 and finalized it on September 15, 2020. [1] [3] The final rule adopted the proposal in its entirety. [3]

The delay is a fair criticism of process. It does not change the merits. FinCEN said all eight comments supported issuing the rule. [3] In our reading, the unchanged text shows FinCEN saw no need to revise the substance after comment.

6. One standard ignores differences in size and business

The PATRIOT Act requires FinCEN to consider whether program standards are commensurate with the size, location and activities of the institutions they cover. [1] The proposal applied one standard across trust companies, credit unions and international banking entities. [1]

The standard is risk-based by design. FinCEN said banks would assess risks tied to their products, customers, channels and locations. [1] The same four pillars and due diligence element produce different programs at different institutions. In our reading, the flexibility sits in the risk assessment, not in the list of elements.

Checks a compliance officer could run today

The written program

Check that the AML program is written, approved by the board or equivalent body, and available for production on request. [4] Check the approval date against the last material change.

Independent testing

Check who performed the last independent test, whether they are independent of the people running the program, and when the next is due. [4]

Beneficial ownership

Sample legal entity customers opened since March 15, 2021. Check that beneficial ownership information was collected and verified. [3]

CIP for newly covered banks

For uninsured state banks and international banking entities, check that CIP procedures exist and records show verification and list checks. [3]

Due diligence for correspondent and private banking accounts

Check whether the bank holds correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions or private banking accounts for non-U.S. persons, and that section 312 procedures cover them. [4]

Risk assessment

Check that a written risk assessment exists, covers products, customers, channels and locations, and has been updated since the last material change in business. [1] Check that controls in the program trace back to it.

SAR decision records

Check that alerts and referrals that did not lead to a SAR have a recorded reason. These banks filed SARs before the program rule. [1] A reviewer will want to see how filing decisions are made under the program.

Third-party contracts

Check that contracts with core processors, monitoring vendors and outside testers give the bank its records on demand and allow a reviewer access. FinCEN said a bank remains fully responsible for a program it partly outsources. [1] A contract that limits data export or audit access works against that responsibility.

These checks are good practice that follows from the rule’s text. Each institution’s obligations depend on its charter and status and should be confirmed with counsel.

With hindsight

The comment period on the proposal closed October 24, 2016. [3] FinCEN later reported that it received eight comments, from one anonymous source, three industry representatives and four trade associations. [3] It said all the comments supported issuing the rule. [3]

The final rule appeared in the Federal Register on September 15, 2020. [3] It was effective November 16, 2020, with a compliance date of March 15, 2021 for the program, CIP and beneficial ownership requirements. [3] FinCEN said the final rule adopted the proposal in its entirety but set a later compliance date. [3]

Commenters had asked for time. FinCEN said one asked for a two-year implementation period, one for a date in May 2018 to match the customer due diligence rule, one for six months to a year, and one for at least six months. [3]

FinCEN’s count of affected banks changed. Its 2016 paperwork estimate covered 1,151 institutions. [1] The 2020 estimate covered 567. [3] FinCEN broke that figure down as approximately 297 state-chartered non-depository trust companies, 228 non-federally insured credit unions and 12 non-federally insured state banks and savings associations. [3] The rest were one private bank and 29 international banking entities. [3]

The 2016 proposal gave its category figures as upwards of 347, approximately 265, not more than 12, at least one and 33, alongside a paperwork estimate covering 1,151 institutions; the 2020 rule gave 567. [1] [3] The two documents do not explain the difference in a way we can reconcile from the text. We note it as a reason to read any population estimate in this area as provisional.

The supervision structure did not change. The 2020 rule again described the IRS as the examining authority for all institutions FinCEN regulates that lack a federal functional regulator. [3] It said FinCEN consulted the federal functional regulators, the CFTC, the IRS and state bank supervisors. [3]

The 2020 rule also restated the state role. It said banks lacking a federal functional regulator are generally required by state banking regulation and guidance to have policies, management oversight, personnel training and internal compliance review. [3]

As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR text of 31 CFR 1020.210(b) sets the program requirements for banks lacking a federal functional regulator. [4] The program must be written, must comply with the correspondent and private banking due diligence rules, and must include internal controls, independent testing, a designated compliance person, training and risk-based customer due diligence. [4]

The current text requires board approval, or approval by an equivalent governing body if the bank has no board. [4] It requires the bank to make a copy of the program available to FinCEN or its designee on request. [4] The section cites the September 15, 2020 rule as its source. [4]

A broader change is now proposed. On April 10, 2026, FinCEN published a proposed rule to fundamentally reform AML/CFT program requirements, citing the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. [5] It said it was also proposing to modernize federal supervision of programs by enhancing its own role in AML/CFT supervision and enforcement, in coordination with federal banking regulators. [5] Comments were due June 9, 2026. [5]

The 2026 proposal refers to the 2020 rule directly. It notes that current 31 CFR 1020.210(b) requires banks lacking a federal functional regulator to establish, maintain and make available a written program. [5] It says such banks must have programs approved by the board or an equivalent governing body. [5]

As checked on November 16, 2026, the April proposal was the latest Federal Register document we found under its RIN, 1506-AB72. We make no claim about what a final rule will contain or when it will appear.

So the 2016 proposal’s two features held. The rule gap closed, on the text FinCEN proposed in August 2016. [3] The supervision gap stayed: these banks remain outside the federal banking agencies, with the IRS as examining authority and the written program as the document a federal reviewer asks to see. [3] [4] Whether FinCEN’s proposed supervisory role changes that will depend on the final form of the 2026 rule. [5]

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  • FinCEN
  • Bank Secrecy Act
  • AML program
  • trust companies
  • beneficial ownership
  • credit unions