The 2015 investment adviser AML proposal let firms contract out the work but kept them fully responsible
Treasury’s anti-money laundering proposal for registered asset managers, published September 1, 2015, let firms hand program work and suspicious activity reporting to custodians and administrators by contract. It kept each firm fully responsible, making compliance a sourcing and oversight question.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
Treasury’s anti-money laundering proposal for registered asset managers, published September 1, 2015, let firms hand program work and suspicious activity reporting to custodians and administrators by contract. It kept each firm fully responsible, making compliance a sourcing and oversight question.
- The week The proposal had three parts.
- The obligation: what an adviser would have had to produce The program was risk-based.
- The supply chain: who already did the work The proposal described how advisory services involve other institutions.
- The contract: what could be delegated, and what could not Those are two separate conditions.
- The price: cost, burden and timing The proposal’s burden estimates did not price delegation separately.
- How the proposal reached different firms An adviser owned by a bank or bank holding company could rely on the group’s existing AML infrastructure, and the proposal allowed one comprehensive program across affiliates. [2] FinCEN said it would not expect the bank to extend its own requirements to the adviser beyond the proposed rule. [2] For these firms, in our reading, the main work was mapping the adviser’s activities into the group program.
- The objections, and what the record shows Commenters pressed this point, asking in the final rulemaking to rely on custodians or on service providers’ certifications. [4] FinCEN kept the adviser fully responsible. [4] The objection is real: an adviser pays for a service it cannot fully control.
- Checks an operations or procurement leader could run These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of the 2015 proposal or the current rule.
- With hindsight The 2015 proposal did not become a final rule.
The week
On September 1, 2015, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network published in the Federal Register a proposed rule on anti-money laundering programs and suspicious activity reports for registered investment advisers. [2] It appeared at 80 FR 52680, and comments were due on or before November 2, 2015. [2] The Treasury bureau had announced the proposal in a news release dated August 25, 2015. [1]
The proposal had three parts. It would require certain asset managers to establish AML programs and report suspicious activity under the Bank Secrecy Act. [2] It would add them to the general definition of “financial institution” in the bureau’s rules, bringing requirements such as Currency Transaction Reports and records on transmittals of funds. [2] And it would delegate examination for compliance to the Securities and Exchange Commission. [2]
Coverage was set by SEC registration: firms registered or required to be registered with the SEC. [2] The release said that included managers of certain hedge funds, private equity funds and other private funds. [1] The proposal said that as of June 2, 2014, there were 11,235 such registered firms, reporting approximately $61.9 trillion in assets for their clients. [2]
The proposal set out its reasoning. It said illicit actors might seek access to the financial system through a type of institution not required to maintain AML programs or file reports of suspicious activity. [2] The release said the rule would bring these firms under regulations similar to those for mutual funds, broker-dealers, banks and insurance companies. [1]
It was not the bureau’s first attempt. The proposal recounted a May 5, 2003 proposal covering certain asset managers and a September 26, 2002 proposal for unregistered investment companies. [2] Both were withdrawn on November 4, 2008. [2] It said the 2003 proposal drew 26 comment letters, with particular focus on definitions, the program’s scope and “the ability of an adviser to outsource compliance to a third party.” [2]
The program requirements were the familiar four: policies, procedures and internal controls; independent testing; a designated person responsible for the program; and ongoing training. [2] The program would need written approval by the firm’s board or equivalent and would be available to regulators on request. [2] Reporting would apply to transactions involving at least $5,000 in funds or other assets. [2]
The proposal also said what it left out. It did not propose a customer identification program requirement. [2] It anticipated addressing that later, in a rulemaking expected to be joint with the SEC. [2]
The provision with the clearest effect on operations and procurement came in the program discussion. It said a firm could delegate contractually the implementation and operation of aspects of its program to other entities, such as broker-dealers, custodians and transfer agents. [2] A firm that did so would “remain fully responsible for the effectiveness of the program.” [2]
That sentence put a question on every operations desk in the sector: which parts of the work could be bought, from whom, and on what terms, when the buyer kept all of the responsibility. The rest of this piece is about that question.
FinCEN’s 2015 investment adviser proposal is remembered for extending anti-money laundering rules to a large part of asset management. For a chief operating officer, a chief compliance officer or a procurement lead at an adviser, its more practical feature was a sentence about contracts. The proposal let an adviser hand the operation of its AML program to service providers it already used, while keeping it “fully responsible for the effectiveness of the program.” [2]
Our argument is that the proposal made AML compliance for advisers a question of buying and overseeing work done by others. Much of the activity a program would monitor already passed through custodians, broker-dealers, administrators and transfer agents that had their own obligations or capabilities. [2] The proposal allowed advisers to rely on them by contract. [2] In our reading, that turned the rule’s cost into a sourcing decision, and its risk into a vendor oversight problem.
That framing places the work with people who negotiate and manage service agreements as well as with compliance staff. It also explains why the rule’s later history matters to operations budgets. The final rule, issued in 2024, kept the same approach. [4] Its effective date has since moved to January 1, 2028. [5]
We take the proposal in four parts:
- The obligation: what an adviser would have had to produce.
- The supply chain: who already performed parts of that work.
- The contract: what the proposal allowed an adviser to delegate, and what it could not.
- The price: how FinCEN assessed the cost, and how the cost question shaped the rule’s timing.
The parts do not overlap. The first is the requirement, the second the existing providers, the third the terms of reliance and the fourth the economics. After them we look at how the proposal reached different kinds of firms, take the objections in order and end with checks an operations or procurement leader could run.
The obligation: what an adviser would have had to produce
Four program elements
The proposal required a program with four minimum elements. [2] The first was policies, procedures and internal controls reasonably designed to prevent the adviser from being used for money laundering or terrorist financing, and to achieve compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. [2] The others were independent testing, a designated person responsible for the program and ongoing training for appropriate persons. [2]
The program was risk-based. FinCEN said it was “not a one-size-fits-all requirement.” [2] It said large firms should adopt policies addressing the responsibilities of the people and departments carrying out each part of the program. [2] It said smaller firms would likely adopt procedures consistent with simpler, more centralized structures. [2]
Approval and access
The program had to be approved in writing by the adviser’s board of directors or trustees, or by a sole proprietor, general partner or similar person if there was no board. [2] The adviser had to make the program available to FinCEN or the SEC on request. [2] The proposed text set the deadline for a program at six months from the final rule’s effective date, left as a bracketed placeholder. [2]
Reports and records
Beyond the program, the proposal would require suspicious activity reports for transactions of at least $5,000 that the adviser knew, suspected or had reason to suspect met the reporting criteria. [2] Where an adviser and another financial institution were involved in the same transaction, one joint report could be filed, provided each institution kept a copy and supporting documents. [2] Adding advisers to the definition of financial institution would bring Currency Transaction Reports and the recordkeeping rules for transmittals of funds. [2] The proposal also brought advisers into FinCEN’s information-sharing procedures under sections 314(a) and 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act. [2]
Independent testing
The proposal let independent testing be done by the adviser’s own employees, its affiliates’ employees or unaffiliated service providers, provided the testers were not involved in operating or overseeing the program. [2] It said the frequency would depend on the adviser’s risk assessment, and that recommendations should be promptly implemented or submitted to senior management. [2]
That provision was itself a sourcing choice. An adviser without an internal audit function could buy testing from an outside firm. One with an affiliated bank or broker-dealer could use the group’s audit staff. [2]
Training reaches the provider’s staff
The proposal required ongoing training for appropriate persons. [2] The 2024 final rule spelled out who that includes in a delegated model. It said employees of an adviser, and of any agent or third-party service provider administering part of the program, must be trained in the requirements relevant to their functions. [4] In our reading, that makes the provider’s training records part of the adviser’s evidence, and a term worth writing into the agreement.
The designated officer as a buyer
The proposal required a person or persons responsible for implementing and monitoring the program’s operations and internal controls. [2] In a firm that delegates much of the work, that person spends less time doing the work and more time specifying it, receiving it and judging it. In our reading, the role becomes partly a contract manager’s role.
That has hiring and budget consequences. A firm choosing its officer would look for someone who understands both AML requirements and service agreements, and give that person authority over the provider relationships the program depends on. Without that authority, the officer is accountable for work he or she cannot direct.
What the obligation part asked of an adviser
In our reading, the obligation was a set of outputs: a written program, a named officer, training records, test reports, suspicious activity reports and records of certain transfers. [2] None required the adviser to perform every step itself. The question was which outputs it would produce internally and which it would buy.
The supply chain: who already did the work
Assets held elsewhere
The proposal described how advisory services involve other institutions. It said advisers may direct the purchase or sale of client securities held at bank or broker-dealer custodians. [2] It said advisers are “often dually registered as a broker-dealer in securities or affiliated with each other.” [2] FinCEN used that interrelationship as part of its reason to bring advisers under the Bank Secrecy Act. [2]
That interrelationship also defines the supply chain. Banks and broker-dealers that custody client assets had their own AML programs, customer identification programs and suspicious activity reporting duties. [2] An adviser directing trades in those accounts would see activity those institutions also see.
Clients that were already covered
The proposal treated different clients differently. It said advisory services to registered open-end funds may present lower risk to the adviser, because those funds were already subject to FinCEN’s rules, including AML and customer identification programs. [2] It said advice to closed-end funds may also present lower risk, because their shares trade through broker-dealers or banks already subject to the rules. [2]
Private funds and other unregistered pooled vehicles were different. FinCEN contrasted them with registered funds as presenting more risk to the adviser. [2] In our reading, for private funds the parties with investor-level information may be administrators and transfer agents, some located offshore. That is where an adviser’s AML program would depend heavily on contracted providers.
Wrap fee programs
The proposal addressed wrap fee programs, in which a broker-dealer sponsors a program and advisers provide services to it. [2] Where the sponsoring broker-dealer was also a registered adviser, FinCEN said it would expect that firm to address the risks of the underlying clients. [2] Where an adviser served a program sponsored by an unaffiliated broker-dealer, FinCEN said it might have more limited access to investor information, but may still have information that would let it identify illicit activity. [2]
That passage describes a common shape of the supply chain: the adviser sees part of the picture, and another institution sees the rest. In our reading, the proposal asked the adviser to use what it could see, not to rebuild what the sponsor already held.
Offshore providers and records
Private funds can be administered outside the United States. [4] A provider abroad may hold investor records under another country’s law. The proposal required an adviser that delegates to ensure FinCEN and the SEC can obtain information and records relating to the program. [2] In our reading, that condition is hardest to meet where records sit in another jurisdiction, and it is the condition an adviser should test before relying on an offshore provider.
Primary advisers and subadvisers
The proposal noted that an adviser may act as the primary adviser or as a subadviser, and that both are investment advisers. [2] It asked how a subadviser’s program would overlap with the primary adviser’s and how duplication could be avoided. [2] It asked whether an adviser should be allowed to delegate elements of its program to an entity with which the client, and not the adviser, has the contractual relationship. [2]
Those questions show the supply chain problem from FinCEN’s side. Two advisers serving one client may each have a duty. Neither may hold the account. The party holding the account may contract with the client rather than with either adviser.
Affiliates and dual registrants
The proposal did not require an adviser that was dually registered as a broker-dealer to keep separate programs, as long as one comprehensive program covered all of the entity’s advisory and broker-dealer business. [2] The same applied to an adviser affiliated with or owned by an entity required to have an AML program in another capacity. [2] FinCEN said one comprehensive program would be beneficial and cost-effective, but was not required. [2]
It drew a line in each direction. It would not expect an insurance company that owned an adviser to subject itself, through an enterprise-wide program, to requirements FinCEN did not impose on insurers. [2] Nor would it expect a bank that owned an adviser to subject the adviser to requirements beyond the proposed rule. [2]
What only the adviser sees
Delegation has a limit that no contract removes. Some information exists only at the adviser: what a client said about the source of funds, why a client asked for an unusual transfer, or how a client’s instructions changed. The proposal noted that even an adviser with limited access to investor information may still have information that would enable it to identify illicit activity. [2] In our reading, a program built entirely on providers’ monitoring would miss what the adviser’s own staff hear and decide. That part of the work stays in-house.
What the supply chain part shows
For a large part of the adviser population, in our reading, the infrastructure for AML already existed in custodians, brokers, administrators and affiliates. [2] The proposal’s design choice was whether advisers would build parallel capabilities or rely on that infrastructure. It chose reliance, with conditions. [2]
The contract: what could be delegated, and what could not
Delegating the program
The proposal said some elements of the program may best be performed by personnel of other entities. [2] It said it was permissible for an adviser to delegate contractually the implementation and operation of those aspects to another financial institution, agent, third-party service provider or other entity. [2] The adviser, it said, would remain fully responsible for the program’s effectiveness and for ensuring that FinCEN and the SEC could obtain information and records relating to it. [2]
Those are two separate conditions. The first is accountability: the adviser answers for the work, whoever does it. The second is access: the regulator must be able to reach the records, wherever they are kept. [2] In our reading, the second is a contract term an adviser has to negotiate, because a provider has no automatic duty to produce its records to the adviser’s regulator.
Delegating suspicious activity reporting
The proposal applied the same logic to reports. It said an adviser was permitted to delegate its suspicious activity reporting to agents or third-party service providers, such as broker-dealers, custodians, administrators or transfer agents. [2] If it did, the adviser remained responsible for compliance with the reporting requirement, including the requirement to keep reports confidential. [2]
Confidentiality is a sharp edge in a delegated arrangement. A provider that drafts or files reports for several advisers holds sensitive information about each. In our reading, the adviser’s contract would need to cover who may see that information, how it is stored and how disclosure would be prevented, since the adviser carries the obligation.
What the contract would need to say
The proposal did not prescribe contract terms. [2] From its conditions, in our reading, a delegation agreement would need to cover at least five things. It would define which program elements the provider performs. It would give the adviser and its regulators access to records. It would set reporting from the provider to the adviser’s designated officer. It would address confidentiality of suspicious activity information. And it would allow the adviser to test or review the provider’s work.
Oversight as the adviser’s retained work
If the adviser stays fully responsible, oversight is the work it cannot delegate. [2] That means a person who reads the provider’s reports, follows up on exceptions and decides whether the arrangement still meets the adviser’s risk assessment. The designated officer the proposal required would naturally hold that role. [2]
Oversight also needs evidence. An adviser relying on a custodian’s monitoring would want periodic confirmation of what was monitored, what was escalated and what was filed on its behalf. Without that evidence, the adviser’s independent testing would have little to test. [2]
Exit and transition terms
Service relationships end. A provider may be replaced, merged or withdraw a service. If part of an adviser’s AML program runs inside that provider, the program has a gap until the replacement is in place. The proposal did not address transitions. [2] In our reading, a delegation agreement benefits from terms that require the provider to hand over records, continue monitoring for a notice period and cooperate with any regulator inquiry about work done before the end.
Concentration across clients
Administrators and custodians can serve several advisers at once. A failure in one provider’s monitoring would therefore affect each of its clients’ programs simultaneously. The proposal placed responsibility on each adviser separately. [2] In our reading, that makes provider concentration a risk each adviser should know about, even if it cannot easily diversify. Knowing it at least shapes how closely the adviser watches the provider’s results.
The comment question that stayed open
The proposal asked whether an adviser should be able to delegate elements of its program to an entity with which the client, not the adviser, had the contract. [2] That question goes to the heart of the procurement problem. A custodian chosen by the client is not the adviser’s vendor. The adviser may have little bargaining power to impose terms on it.
The 2024 final rule addressed a version of this. It said an adviser may delegate contractually to an offshore fund administrator to monitor for suspicious activity, provide details to the adviser and file reports on its behalf. [4] It said the adviser “remains fully responsible and legally liable for compliance with AML/CFT requirements.” [4] It also recorded commenters’ requests to rely on custodians or on service providers’ certifications, which illustrates how far the reliance question had been pressed. [4]
Fees and incentives
A provider paid a flat fee for monitoring has no direct reason to escalate more alerts, and one paid per alert has a reason to escalate more. Neither model is wrong, but each shapes what reaches the adviser. The proposal left pricing to the market. [2] In our reading, an adviser negotiating AML services would ask how the provider’s fee responds to volume, and would test whether the alerts it receives reflect risk rather than billing.
Service levels belong in the same discussion. How quickly does the provider escalate a potential reportable matter? Who at the adviser receives it? The proposal’s confidentiality and responsibility conditions make those terms more than administrative detail. [2]
What the contract part shows
The proposal made delegation lawful and kept liability where it was. [2] In our reading, that combination puts the economic weight on contract quality and oversight capacity. An adviser with strong terms and an attentive officer can rely heavily on providers. One with weak terms carries the provider’s failures as its own.
The price: cost, burden and timing
How FinCEN classified the proposal
FinCEN said the proposal was a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, although not economically significant, and would be reviewed by OMB. [2] For small entities, it adopted the SEC’s definition of a small adviser. [2] It said the SEC estimated about 464 registered advisers would be small entities, and concluded the rule would not affect a substantial number of small entities. [2]
Burden reduced by risk
FinCEN said it recognized that different types of advisers within the proposed definition may present varying degrees of risk. [2] It anticipated that the burden of establishing a program would be correspondingly reduced, given the risk-based nature of the program and the services some advisers provide. [2] Its examples of such advisers included advisers to registered investment companies, financial planners, pension consultants and firms providing only newsletters or research. [2]
Cost as a function of sourcing
The proposal’s burden estimates did not price delegation separately. In our reading, the actual cost to a given adviser would depend on what it could buy from existing providers and at what price. An adviser whose clients’ assets sat at a large custodian with existing monitoring could buy coverage. An adviser to private funds with offshore administrators would need to confirm what those administrators could do and on what terms.
That makes the cost question partly a market question. The supply of AML services from administrators and custodians, and their willingness to accept access and confidentiality terms, would set the price for advisers. FinCEN’s design relied on that market existing. [2]
Why the timing matters to cost
The rule’s history shows how cost and timing interact. The 2015 proposal was not finalized. FinCEN released a new proposal on February 15, 2024, and issued a final rule on September 4, 2024, effective January 1, 2026. [4] In January 2026, FinCEN delayed that date to January 1, 2028. [5] The delay rule said the 2024 rule had projected aggregate expenses of $800 million in 2026 and $780 million in 2027, in 2022 dollars. [5]
For an adviser’s budget, each delay is a choice about when to buy. Contracts signed early lock in terms before demand rises. Contracts signed late may meet a rule changed in scope. The delay rule referred to potential changes to the rule’s scope, which it said were outside that rule. [5] In our reading, that uncertainty favors contracts that can expand or narrow with the final scope.
Build, buy or share
An adviser facing the rule had three broad paths. It could build its program internally, with its own staff and systems. It could buy elements from providers, under the proposal’s delegation provision. [2] Or, if it belonged to a group with an existing program, it could share one comprehensive program with affiliates. [2]
Each path has a different cost profile. Building carries fixed staff and system costs and gives more control. Buying converts some fixed costs into fees, at the price of oversight effort and dependence on providers. Sharing spreads costs across the group, with the work of mapping adviser activities into a program designed for other businesses. In our reading, the right answer depends less on the rule than on the firm’s structure and existing relationships.
A hypothetical mid-sized adviser
A hypothetical adviser managing separate accounts for individuals and two private funds shows the choice. Its separate accounts sit at a large broker-dealer custodian with its own AML program. Its funds use an offshore administrator that handles investor onboarding. [2]
Under the proposal, it could rely on the administrator for investor-level monitoring of the funds, by contract, and ask the custodian what information it could share about the separate accounts. [2] It would still need its own program document, a designated officer, training, independent testing and a way to report what it saw in its own trading decisions. [2] Its budget would be the sum of the administrator’s fee for AML services, the officer’s time, the testing and the cost of negotiating access and confidentiality terms.
Budgeting across delays
The cost projections the delay rule cited fell in calendar years that the delay moved. [5] For an adviser, that changes budgets rather than removing them. Work done early, such as provider mapping and contract review, keeps its value. Work tied to scope, such as systems for a client category later excluded, may not. In our reading, a firm budgeting across delays would separate the two and fund the first while waiting on the second.
What the price part shows
The proposal’s cost depended on a supply chain that was already in place and on terms the adviser could obtain. [2] The later delays added a timing cost of their own. [5] In our reading, the economically sound course was to know which providers could carry which parts of a program. An adviser would want to know the price and terms too, before the rule made the choice urgent.
How the proposal reached different firms
Advisers inside banking groups
An adviser owned by a bank or bank holding company could rely on the group’s existing AML infrastructure, and the proposal allowed one comprehensive program across affiliates. [2] FinCEN said it would not expect the bank to extend its own requirements to the adviser beyond the proposed rule. [2] For these firms, in our reading, the main work was mapping the adviser’s activities into the group program.
Dually registered broker-dealers
A firm registered as both adviser and broker-dealer already had an AML program for its broker-dealer business. [2] The proposal allowed one program covering both, designed to address the different risks of each. [2] Its work was extending monitoring to advisory accounts and confirming that the program met both sets of requirements.
For such a firm, the delegation question was mostly internal. The broker-dealer side already ran surveillance, filed reports and trained staff. [2] In our reading, the adviser side could rely on those functions through the comprehensive program, provided the program addressed advisory risks the brokerage surveillance was not built for, such as discretionary decisions made by portfolio managers rather than client-directed trades.
Private fund advisers
Advisers to hedge funds, private equity funds and other private funds were named in FinCEN’s release. [1] They faced the supply chain question directly, because investor information may sit with administrators and transfer agents rather than with the adviser. The 2024 final rule’s statement about offshore fund administrators addressed exactly that arrangement. [4]
Smaller standalone advisers
A small adviser without affiliates might buy much of its program, from testing to training, or build it with a small staff. The proposal’s risk-based approach let it scale the program to its services and structure. [2] Its exposure was concentration: one or two providers might carry much of its program, and their failures would be its own.
The proposal’s small-entity analysis estimated about 464 registered firms were small entities by the SEC’s definition. [2] Even so, a firm small in staff can be large in assets, and in our reading the delegation model weighs heavily on firms whose staff is small relative to their client base.
Public pension and health system clients
The proposal listed pension plans, foundations and corporations among advisers’ clients. [2] Public pension funds and hospital endowments hire advisers and, in our reading, would see the rule through their managers’ questionnaires and contracts. A public fund’s due diligence on a manager could ask how the manager’s program is structured, which providers carry it and how the manager oversees them. Those answers describe a risk the fund carries indirectly.
Fund administrators and custodians
Service providers were not regulated by the proposal as advisers. [2] Their business, in our reading, would be shaped by it: advisers would ask them to perform monitoring, file or support reports, open their records to regulators and accept confidentiality obligations. Providers able to offer those services on standard terms would lower costs for their adviser clients.
The objections, and what the record shows
“Delegation without relief from liability is unfair”
Commenters pressed this point, asking in the final rulemaking to rely on custodians or on service providers’ certifications. [4] FinCEN kept the adviser fully responsible. [4] The objection is real: an adviser pays for a service it cannot fully control. But the alternative, shifting liability to providers without a direct duty, would leave regulators with no single accountable party. The rule’s answer was contract and oversight.
“The work is duplicated across institutions”
The proposal acknowledged overlap. It allowed joint suspicious activity reports, one comprehensive program for affiliates and reduced burden for lower-risk clients such as mutual funds. [2] It asked how subadvisers’ programs could avoid duplicating primary advisers’. [2] Duplication was not eliminated. It was reduced by design and left to contracts and program structure to manage further.
“Advisers do not hold the money, so the risk is low”
FinCEN’s own text conceded that some advisory services present lower risk. [2] Its reasoning for coverage was that advisers engage in activities similar to, related to or a substitute for those of covered institutions, and that illicit actors might seek access through uncovered ones. [2] In our reading, the objection supports a lighter program for some advisers. It does not support exempting all.
“Custodians already watch the accounts”
Banks and broker-dealers holding client assets had their own AML programs and reporting duties, as the proposal noted. [2] Commenters on the final rule asked to rely on a single qualified custodian performing AML obligations for assets it held. [4] The final rule kept the adviser responsible while permitting delegation. [4] The objection supports using the custodian’s work. It does not cover what the adviser alone knows, or accounts held at custodians the adviser has no contract with.
“The rule keeps changing, so preparation is wasted”
The history supports caution. A proposal in 2015, a re-proposal and final rule in 2024, and a delay to 2028 with possible changes to scope. [2] [4] [5] Even so, the core design, a risk-based program with contractual delegation and retained responsibility, appears in both the 2015 proposal and the 2024 final rule. [2] [4] Work that maps providers and contract terms is useful under either.
“Outsourcing rules will settle the vendor questions”
Commenters on the 2024 rule asked FinCEN to wait for the SEC’s proposed outsourcing rule for advisers before setting requirements for delegation. [4] FinCEN noted that proposal had not been finalized and would apply only to registered advisers, and declined to wait. [4] In our reading, the vendor questions this proposal raised in 2015 remained live. Two regulators approached the same contracts from different directions, and advisers could not assume one framework would answer both.
Checks an operations or procurement leader could run
These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of the 2015 proposal or the current rule. Advisers should confirm their obligations with counsel, especially while the rule’s scope is under review.
- Provider map: list every custodian, broker-dealer, administrator and transfer agent that touches client assets or investor information, and what each already monitors.
- Delegation inventory: for each program element and reporting duty, record whether it is done in-house, by an affiliate or by a provider.
- Access terms: confirm that each provider agreement lets the adviser and its regulators obtain the records the program relies on.
- Confidentiality terms: make sure agreements with any provider involved in suspicious activity reporting protect that information.
- Oversight evidence: set the reports a provider must send the designated officer, and how often, so testing has something to test.
- Client-chosen providers: identify custodians the client chose, where the adviser has no contract, and decide how the program covers those accounts.
- Testing source: decide who performs independent testing and confirm they do not operate or oversee the program.
- Flexible terms: prefer agreements that can expand or narrow with the final rule’s scope.
The 2015 proposal let advisers buy the work and kept the responsibility with them. [2] The checks above follow that line: know who does each piece, make sure the records can be reached, and keep the evidence that the adviser was watching.
With hindsight
The 2015 proposal did not become a final rule. FinCEN returned to the subject with a new proposal released on February 15, 2024, which the 2024 final rule calls the IA AML NPRM. [4] On May 21, 2024, FinCEN and the SEC jointly proposed customer identification program requirements for registered and exempt reporting advisers, the joint rulemaking the 2015 proposal had anticipated. [3] [2]
FinCEN issued the final rule on September 4, 2024, at 89 FR 72156, with an effective date of January 1, 2026. [4] It added investment advisers to the definition of financial institution and defined them as SEC-registered advisers and exempt reporting advisers. [4] It narrowed the proposed definition to exclude advisers registered with the SEC solely as mid-sized advisers, multi-state advisers or pension consultants, and those reporting no assets under management. [4]
The final rule kept the 2015 approach to delegation. It said an adviser may delegate contractually to an offshore fund administrator to monitor for suspicious activity, provide details to the adviser and file reports on its behalf. [4] It said the adviser “remains fully responsible and legally liable” for compliance. [4] It also said employees of any agent or third-party service provider administering part of the program must be trained in the requirements relevant to their functions. [4] It delegated examination authority to the SEC, as the 2015 proposal had suggested. [4]
The effective date then moved. On September 22, 2025, FinCEN proposed a two-year delay. [5] On January 2, 2026, it published a final rule delaying the effective date from January 1, 2026, to January 1, 2028. [5] The delay rule recounted FinCEN’s view that a delay would give it an opportunity to review the rule and, as applicable, ensure it is effectively tailored. [5] It said FinCEN received 22 comments on the delay proposal. [5]
The delay rule also recorded commenters’ concern about the timing of possible revisions to the rule’s scope and of the customer identification rulemaking. [5] Some asked FinCEN to reissue the two proposals together. [5] FinCEN said it intends to consider those timing issues during the rulemaking processes for any future adviser-related rules. [5] As checked on November 16, 2026, the effective date stated in that rule is January 1, 2028. [5]
What held up from 2015 is the structure. A risk-based program with four elements, contractual delegation and retained responsibility appears in the 2024 final rule as it did in the proposal. [2] [4] Examination by the SEC carried through as well. [4]
What did not hold up is the timetable. A proposal published in September 2015 was followed by a final rule in September 2024 and a new effective date in 2028. [2] [4] [5] The scope narrowed in 2024, and commenters on the delay raised the timing of potential further changes. [4] [5]
In our view, the lasting point for an adviser’s operations leaders is the contract sentence that survived every version. Work can be bought from custodians and administrators, and responsibility cannot. The value of an adviser’s preparation lies in knowing its providers, its terms and its evidence of oversight.
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