The 2015 Yates memo made naming every individual involved the entry price for any cooperation credit
The Justice Department’s September 2015 memo required companies to give all relevant facts about the individuals involved before any cooperation credit. A 2021 memo reinstated that test, and the current manual adds data retention and messaging.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The Justice Department’s September 2015 memo required companies to give all relevant facts about the individuals involved before any cooperation credit. A 2021 memo reinstated that test, and the current manual adds data retention and messaging.
- The week The memo said the Department had convened a working group of senior attorneys from Department components and the United States Attorney community to examine how it approaches corporate investigations. [1] It described itself as a product of that group’s discussions.
- The test: all relevant facts, before any credit The memo separated two questions that a reader could easily merge.
- The evidence: where facts about people are kept The memo itself named the difficulty.
- The people: an investigation that must name its own staff An internal investigation that must identify every individual involved changes the position of each employee it touches.
- The clock: timeliness, limitation periods and duties after resolution The memo tied the corporate resolution to the individual cases.
- How the memo reached banks, health systems and agencies Financial firms keep extensive records for their own regulators.
- The strongest objections, and where they land The memo was addressed to Department officials and said it was intended solely to guide government attorneys.
- Checks a general counsel and a CIO could run together These checks are our suggestions.
- With hindsight The memo’s threshold did not stay fixed, but its core is in force.
The week
On September 9, 2015, the Deputy Attorney General, Sally Quillian Yates, signed a memorandum titled “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.” [1] It went to the Assistant Attorneys General for the Antitrust, Civil, Criminal, Environment and Natural Resources, National Security and Tax Divisions. [1] It also went to the Director of the FBI, the Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees and all United States Attorneys. [1]
The memo said the Department had convened a working group of senior attorneys from Department components and the United States Attorney community to examine how it approaches corporate investigations. [1] It described itself as a product of that group’s discussions. It said some of its measures were new and others reflected practices that federal prosecutors already used. [1]
It set out six steps. First, to qualify for any cooperation credit, a corporation must give the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct. [1] Second, criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the start. [1] Third, criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in routine communication with one another. [1]
Fourth, absent extraordinary circumstances or approved departmental policy, the Department would not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability when resolving a matter with a corporation. [1] Fifth, Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals. [1] Sixth, civil attorneys should evaluate whether to sue an individual on considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay. [1]
The first step carried the detail that mattered to companies. The memo said a company must completely disclose all relevant facts about individual misconduct and could not pick and choose what to disclose. [1] It said the company must identify all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct, regardless of their position, status or seniority. [1] If a company declined to learn such facts or to provide complete information about individual wrongdoers, its cooperation would not be considered a mitigating factor. [1]
Meeting that threshold made a company eligible for credit; it did not settle how much. The memo said the extent of credit would depend on the factors that had traditionally applied, and gave the timeliness of cooperation and the diligence, thoroughness and speed of the internal investigation as examples. [1]
The memo applied the same condition in civil matters. It said a company under civil investigation must provide all relevant facts about individual misconduct to receive any consideration in the negotiation. [1] It gave the False Claims Act as an example, saying the Department’s position on “full cooperation” under that law would be that, at a minimum, all relevant facts about responsible individuals must be provided. [1]
It also told Department attorneys not to wait for companies. They were to investigate individuals before, during and after any corporate cooperation, and to compare what companies gave them with the results of their own work. [1] Where a company’s cooperation on individuals would be needed after a resolution, the memo said the plea or settlement agreement should require it, with specific consequences such as stipulated penalties or a material breach. [1]
On releases, the memo said that any release of criminal or civil liability for individuals due to extraordinary circumstances must be personally approved in writing by the relevant Assistant Attorney General or United States Attorney. [1] It named the Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy as an example of approved departmental policy. [1]
On timing, the memo addressed corporate cases that were ready to resolve before the individual cases were. [1] In that situation, the authorization memorandum should discuss the potentially liable individuals and include a plan to resolve their cases before any statute of limitations expired. [1] It said tolling agreements should be the rare exception. [1]
The memo directed revisions to the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations in the United States Attorneys’ Manual, at section 9-28.000, and to the commercial litigation provisions in Title 4. [1] It said its guidance would apply to all future investigations and to matters pending on its date, to the extent practicable. [1] A footnote said its measures were not intended to create any right or benefit enforceable by a party to litigation with the United States. [1]
The memo closed by noting that the Department would host a training conference on the subject in Washington on September 16, 2015. [1] That was the week’s development: a policy document, addressed to prosecutors and civil attorneys, that changed what a company had to bring to the table before cooperation would count at all.
The Yates memo is remembered as a statement about prosecuting executives. For the people who run a company’s systems and its compliance program, its more useful feature is narrower. It set a threshold. Before a company’s cooperation would count for anything, the company had to deliver the facts about the people involved. [1]
Our argument is that this threshold turned a company’s ability to find, keep and produce evidence about individuals into a condition of credit. Producing documents was part of cooperation before the memo, which said some of its measures reflected existing practice. [1] After September 2015, a company that could not reconstruct who did what had a harder path to any credit at all. [1] In our reading, that moved part of the work from the lawyers’ negotiation to the systems that hold a company’s records.
The point is a practical one. A memo cannot make a company’s email archive complete, its chat history retained or its approval logs reliable. It can make the consequences of gaps more severe. In our reading, the threshold did exactly that, and later revisions kept it. [2] [3]
We take the memo in four parts, each a different element of the threshold:
- The test: what “all relevant facts” about individuals meant, and how eligibility differed from the amount of credit.
- The evidence: where those facts live in a company, and what retrieving them asks of its systems.
- The people: how an investigation that must name individuals changes the company’s relationship with its own staff.
- The clock: how timing, limitation periods and continuing duties after a resolution shaped the work.
The parts do not overlap. The first is the standard, the second the records, the third the workforce and the fourth time. After them we look at how the memo reached banks, health systems and agencies, set out the strongest objections and end with checks a general counsel and a CIO could run together.
The test: all relevant facts, before any credit
Eligibility, then extent
The memo separated two questions that a reader could easily merge. The first was whether a company was eligible for cooperation credit at all. The second was how much credit it would receive. [1]
The threshold answered only the first. A company that provided all relevant facts about individuals became eligible for consideration. The amount then turned on the factors that had traditionally applied, such as timeliness and the diligence and speed of the internal investigation. [1] In our reading, the threshold was a gate, and the traditional factors were the scale behind it.
That structure matters for planning. A company could do excellent work on most of an investigation and still fail the gate if it held back facts about a person. The memo said companies could not pick and choose what facts to disclose. [1] It also said a company that declined to learn such facts would not have its cooperation counted as a mitigating factor. [1]
What “involved in or responsible for” reached
The memo’s wording was broad. It required the company to identify all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their position, status or seniority. [1] It did not limit the duty to those the company considered most culpable.
Two consequences follow, in our reading. The first is that the company’s own judgment about who mattered did not define the scope. The second is that seniority offered no shelter. A junior analyst who executed a transaction and the executive who approved it fell within the same sentence. [1]
The current Justice Manual keeps this wording. Section 9-28.700 says a corporation must identify all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct, regardless of their position, status or seniority, and timely provide all relevant facts relating to that misconduct. [2] The word “timely” is in the current text; it is not in the sentence of the 2015 memo that set the threshold. [1] [2]
The good-faith qualifier
The threshold was never absolute. The memo’s second footnote cited the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, which treats identification of responsible individuals as a prime test of full disclosure. [1] The current manual goes further and quotes a second part of that commentary. [2]
That passage covers a case where particular individuals do not cooperate, and neither the organization nor law enforcement can identify the culpable people. [2] If the organization tried to cooperate fully, the commentary says it may still be given credit for full cooperation. [2] The manual states that a company unable to identify all relevant individuals despite good faith efforts may still be eligible. [2]
The qualifier changes what a company needs to show. Where it cannot name everyone, it needs to show that it tried, and how. In our reading, that turns the record of the investigation itself into evidence. What was searched, which custodians were interviewed and what could not be recovered all become part of the case for credit. [2]
Facts, not privileged material
The threshold did not require a company to waive privilege. The memo said companies must cooperate completely as to individuals within the bounds of the law and legal privileges. [1] Section 9-28.720 of the current manual says eligibility for cooperation credit is not predicated upon the waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection. [2]
What the manual asks for instead is facts. It says the corporation, like any person, must timely disclose the relevant facts of which it has knowledge. [2] It says the corporation should receive the same credit for facts in protected materials as for identical facts in unprotected ones. [2] The distinction pushes the work toward fact-gathering that can be expressed without the privileged material that recorded it.
For a technology leader, the practical meaning, in our reading, is that the facts must exist in a form that can be found and described. The manual’s own examples of the facts sought are how and when the misconduct occurred, who promoted or approved it and who was responsible for committing it. [2] In our reading, those events, who sent what, who approved what and who accessed what, must be reconstructable from records.
The same test in civil matters
The threshold was not limited to criminal cases. The memo said the condition applied equally to corporations seeking to cooperate in civil matters. [1] It said a company under civil investigation must provide all relevant facts about individual misconduct to receive any consideration in the negotiation. [1]
That reached matters where no prosecutor was involved. Civil fraud cases, including those under the False Claims Act, are handled by the Department’s civil attorneys. The memo told those attorneys to keep a focus on individuals and to weigh suing them on grounds beyond their ability to pay. [1]
In our reading, the civil reach widened the population of companies affected. A firm that would never face a criminal charge could still face a civil investigation in which credit depended on facts about its people. The systems question was the same in both settings.
The evidence: where facts about people are kept
Facts about individuals are scattered
The memo itself named the difficulty. It said that in large corporations it can be hard to establish an individual’s knowledge and criminal intent, particularly for high-level executives, who may be insulated from the day-to-day activity where misconduct occurs. [1] As a result, it said, investigators often must reconstruct what happened from a painstaking review of corporate documents, which can number in the millions and may be difficult to collect because of legal restrictions. [1]
Facts about individuals are spread across systems built for other purposes. Email and chat record who said what. Workflow tools record who approved what. Identity and access logs record who opened which record or ran which job. Trading, payments and claims systems record who entered which transaction. None of those systems was designed to answer the memo’s question.
In our reading, the threshold made the joins between those systems as important as the systems themselves. A message that says a step was approved is only useful if it can be tied to a named person, a role at the time and an action in a business system. Without that chain, the company has documents but not facts about individuals.
What the current manual says about data
The 2015 memo did not address messaging platforms or personal devices. The current manual does. In its list of cooperation factors, it says prosecutors should consider the extent to which a corporation enforced effective document and data retention policies to preserve, collect and disclose relevant evidence. [2]
It adds, in a parenthesis, that this includes third-party messaging data, regardless of whether the data is kept on corporate or personal devices that are used for work purposes. [2] A separate passage in section 9-28.800 addresses personal devices and communication platforms, including third-party applications. [2] It says prosecutors should consider whether the corporation’s policies on them ensure that business data and communications are preserved. [2]
The Criminal Division’s guide to evaluating compliance programs, updated in September 2024, asks related questions. It says prosecutors should consider a corporation’s policies on personal devices, communications platforms and messaging applications, including ephemeral messaging applications. [4] It says such policies should be tailored to the company’s risk profile and specific business needs, and should ensure, as appropriate and to the greatest extent possible, that business-related electronic data and communications are accessible and amenable to preservation by the company. [4]
Access for the compliance function
The same guide asks whether compliance and control personnel have sufficient direct or indirect access to relevant sources of data to allow timely and effective monitoring or testing of policies, controls and transactions. [4] It asks whether any impediments limit or delay that access, and what the company is doing about them. [4]
It also asks how the company manages the quality of its data sources and how it measures the accuracy, precision or recall of any data analytics models it uses. [4] Those questions are framed as prosecutors’ evaluation tools, not as rules. They show where the Department’s attention went after 2015, and in our reading they extend the memo’s logic from investigations to monitoring.
The connection is direct. A company that can monitor its own transactions by person and role can also reconstruct them when something goes wrong. A company whose compliance team cannot reach the data in time will find the same gap when prosecutors ask for facts about individuals. [4]
Preservation as the first deliverable
Before facts can be produced, they must survive. The manual lists, among cooperation factors, timely voluntary preservation, collection and disclosure of relevant documents and information relating to their provenance. [2] A retention schedule that deletes chat after a short period, or a device policy that leaves work messages on personal phones, can remove the facts the threshold requires.
There is a trade-off here that security and privacy teams will recognize. Keeping more data enlarges what a breach can expose and what privacy law may restrict. The manual itself addresses claims that data privacy laws, blocking statutes or other foreign law prohibit disclosure of overseas documents, and puts the burden on the corporation to establish any prohibition and identify reasonable alternatives. [2]
In our reading, the answer the documents point to is deliberate retention: keep business communications in systems the company controls, on schedules it can defend, with the ability to place a hold quickly. The memo did not say this. It made the cost of not doing it higher. [1] [2]
Identity records as the join
Every fact about an individual passes through identity. A log line names an account, not a person. A chat message names a display name. A trade ticket names a user ID. Turning those into facts about people needs a record of who held which account, and when.
That record can be lost. Accounts can be renamed, shared mailboxes created, service accounts set to run jobs on behalf of teams, and contractors brought in through third parties with their own directories. Each step weakens the link from an action to a named individual.
The memo did not mention identity systems. Its threshold depends on them all the same, because a company cannot identify all individuals involved if it cannot say who used an account at the relevant time. [1] In our reading, the identity governance record is the index to every other system a company might search.
The people: an investigation that must name its own staff
Interests that diverge
An internal investigation that must identify every individual involved changes the position of each employee it touches. The company’s interest in credit depends on naming people. Each person’s interest may be different. [1]
The memo recognized one side of this. It said a focus on individuals from the start increases the likelihood that people with knowledge will cooperate and provide information against individuals higher up the corporate hierarchy. [1] The sentence states a prosecutor’s purpose. Inside a company, it describes a workforce in which colleagues may become witnesses about one another.
For a CIO or CISO, this has concrete effects. The people who administer systems hold access to the evidence about others, including their managers. Investigations need a way to collect from systems without relying on administrators who may themselves be involved. [1]
Interviews and availability
The current manual lists, among cooperation factors, making corporate officers and employees who possess relevant information available for interviews by the Department, where appropriate and possible. [2] It also lists de-confliction of the company’s own investigative steps, so that they do not interfere with the Department’s investigation. [2]
Both points reach operations. An employee on leave, a contractor whose engagement ended or a staff member in another country can each be hard to make available. A company that has let a key administrator go without an exit process that preserves their accounts and devices may lose both the person and the record. [2]
In our reading, offboarding becomes part of investigation readiness. The checks are ordinary: preserve the departing person’s mailbox, chat and files under the retention policy, record what devices they held and when access ended, and keep that record findable.
Incentives in pay
The 2015 memo did not address compensation. The current manual does, in section 9-28.800. It says prosecutors should consider whether compensation arrangements include elements, such as clawback provisions, that allow financial recoveries from current or former employees, executives or directors whose actions or omissions contributed to criminal conduct. [2]
It also says that where a corporation has clawback provisions, prosecutors should consider whether it has taken steps to execute on them after discovering misconduct, to the extent possible. [2] That moves accountability for individuals from the prosecutor’s case into the company’s own payroll and HR systems.
Executing a clawback depends on records that tie pay to conduct: who was responsible for what, when, and which compensation was paid on which basis. Those records live in HR, finance and governance systems. The memo’s focus on individuals, carried into this later text, makes them part of the evidence base. [1] [2]
Culture as a measured factor
Section 9-28.800 also says prosecutors should evaluate the corporation’s commitment to a culture of compliance at all levels, including how it treats internal complaints and disciplines employees. [2] It says the program should be assessed at the time of the offense and at the time of a charging decision, using the same criteria. [2]
Two points in time means two sets of evidence. A company must be able to show what its controls, training and escalation paths looked like when the conduct happened, as well as what they look like now. [2] In our reading, a compliance system that keeps only its current configuration cannot answer the first question.
Counsel, HR and IT in one process
An investigation organized around individuals needs three functions to work as one. Counsel decides scope and privilege. HR holds employment records, discipline and departures. IT holds the systems and the means to collect from them.
Where those functions run separate processes, gaps appear at the handoffs. A collection request arrives without the list of accounts. A departure is processed before the hold is placed. A system owner learns of an investigation from a colleague under review.
The memo’s demand that criminal and civil attorneys communicate routinely was addressed to the Department, not to companies. [1] In our reading, the internal equivalent is a written process that names who in counsel, HR and IT acts on an investigation, and in what order.
The clock: timeliness, limitation periods and duties after resolution
Limitation periods and tolling
The memo tied the corporate resolution to the individual cases. If the investigation of individuals had not concluded when authorization was sought to resolve the corporate case, the authorization memorandum had to discuss the potentially liable individuals and the work remaining. [1] It called for an investigative plan to resolve their cases before any statute of limitations expired. [1]
It said tolling agreements should be the rare exception, but that where one was unavoidable, efforts should be made to resolve individual cases or preserve the ability to charge individuals by tolling the limitations period. [1] The current manual carries the same instruction in section 9-28.210. [2]
For the company, this links its pace to the Department’s. A slow collection of evidence about individuals delays the company’s own resolution. It also presses against limitation periods that apply to people, which in our reading gives prosecutors a reason to ask for facts about individuals early.
Limitation periods also set how far back evidence must reach. A company cannot know in advance which period will matter, so retention decisions are made without knowing the case they will serve. In our reading, that argues for retention schedules set by legal and business analysis together, written down with their reasons, so the company can explain later why a record does or does not exist.
“Timely” as a standard
The current manual says that companies that identify significant facts but delay their disclosure will place in jeopardy their eligibility for cooperation credit. [2] It says corporations seeking credit bear the burden of ensuring that documents and information are provided in a timely manner. [2]
It also says that production of evidence most relevant to assessing individual culpability should be prioritized. [2] That is a sequencing instruction. In our reading, a company that produces large volumes of general material while the facts about people wait has the order wrong under the current text.
Prioritizing evidence about individuals requires knowing early which records concern which people. That again depends on identity: mapping accounts, devices and system roles to named individuals quickly, including for people who have left. [2]
Obligations that outlast the resolution
The memo anticipated that a company’s help on individuals might be needed after its own case was resolved. It said the plea or settlement agreement should then require the company to provide information about all culpable individuals, with specific consequences for failure. [1]
The current manual keeps that structure. It says such an agreement should require the corporation to provide information about all individuals substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct. [2] The provision should carry consequences for failure, such as stipulated penalties or a material breach. [2]
For operations, this means the evidence infrastructure built for the investigation cannot be dismantled at resolution. Holds, collections and the people who know them must survive the settlement for as long as the obligation lasts. [1] [2] In our reading, a company that treats the resolution date as the end of the matter risks breaching an agreement it has just signed.
Self-disclosure and its own clock
Cooperation is distinct from voluntary self-disclosure. The current manual says a voluntary self-disclosure occurs only when a company discloses misconduct promptly and voluntarily, without a preexisting obligation, and before an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation. [2]
The manual recognizes that early disclosures are unlikely to be complete. It says the Department encourages timely self-disclosure even before all facts are known to the corporation. [2] In our reading, that creates two clocks: one for deciding to disclose, and one for completing the facts about individuals afterwards.
The second clock runs on the same systems as the first. A company that discloses early commits itself to producing facts about people later, and needs the evidence base to make good on that. [2]
How the memo reached banks, health systems and agencies
Banks, credit unions and broker-dealers
The memo opened by saying that the economy depends on enforcing the laws that protect the financial system, and referred to corporate investigations in the aftermath of the financial crisis. [1] It applied to the Department’s criminal and civil corporate work, so it reached financial firms whenever the Department was the investigating or resolving authority. [1]
Financial firms keep extensive records for their own regulators. The memo did not change any regulator’s recordkeeping rules. In our reading, it gave the same records a second use: proving facts about individuals to the Department. [1]
Credit unions and smaller banks may have fewer specialized tools, but the threshold applied to any company seeking credit. The size of the institution did not change what “all relevant facts” meant. [1]
Health systems and the False Claims Act
The memo’s civil provisions mattered for health care because of the False Claims Act. It said the Department’s position on “full cooperation” under that Act would require, at a minimum, all relevant facts about responsible individuals. [1]
For a health system, the relevant facts about a billing matter can sit in clinical documentation, coding records, charge capture, claims history and the audit trails of the electronic health record. Facts about who changed a code, who signed a note or who approved a policy are system facts.
In our reading, the threshold made those audit trails part of the cooperation file. A system whose audit logs are incomplete, short-lived or hard to query leaves the health system less able to meet the threshold in a civil matter.
Public agencies
Agencies were not the memo’s targets, but they appear in it. The memo said consultation between the Department’s civil and criminal attorneys, together with agency attorneys, allows consideration of the full range of the government’s remedies. [1] It listed exclusion, suspension and debarment among those remedies. [1]
For agency program and acquisition staff, that places them in the chain. [1] In our reading, referrals, contractor records and suspension and debarment decisions all draw on facts that agencies hold. An agency that wants corporate cases involving its programs to reach individuals needs its own records of contractor personnel, approvals and communications to be complete.
Agencies also act as employers and as data holders in investigations of their contractors. In our reading, the memo’s emphasis on early coordination, which it said should include agency attorneys, suggests that agencies benefit from knowing what they hold before a matter begins. [1]
Vendors that hold a client’s records
Across all three sectors, some of the evidence can sit with vendors. Hosted email, collaboration suites, core banking platforms, revenue-cycle services and case-management systems keep records on the customer’s behalf.
The threshold applied to the company seeking credit, not to its vendors. But the company can only produce what its contracts let it obtain. A contract that limits log retention, export formats or support for legal holds limits the facts the company can deliver.
In our reading, the contract terms that govern retention and export are part of a company’s investigation capability. They are easier to negotiate at renewal than in the week a subpoena arrives.
The strongest objections, and where they land
“This was about prosecutors, not systems”
The memo was addressed to Department officials and said it was intended solely to guide government attorneys. It said it created no enforceable rights. [1] A reader could fairly say it imposed no duty on any company’s technology function.
The objection is correct as far as it goes. The memo imposed no record-keeping rule. Its effect on systems was indirect, through the condition it set for credit. In our reading, an indirect effect can still be decisive. A company that cannot meet the threshold loses eligibility, whatever its other merits. [1]
“Cooperation was already about documents”
A second objection is that cooperating companies produced documents before 2015 too. The memo itself said some of its measures reflected practices prosecutors already used. [1]
The change was in the focus and the consequence. Producing documents is not the same as identifying every individual involved and the facts relating to each. The memo made the second a precondition. [1] That required a company to organize what it produced around people, which is a different task from producing what was asked for.
“The standard moved, so the memo did not last”
A third objection is that policy changed after 2015. The 2021 memo described its own step as reinstating the 2015 guidance. [3] That wording shows the standard had changed in between, and a reader could argue the Yates threshold was a passing policy.
The 2021 memo answers part of that. It said companies cannot limit disclosure to those individuals believed to be only substantially involved, and that the requirement includes individuals inside and outside the company. [3] In our reading, the version in force when that memo issued had allowed a narrower disclosure, and the 2021 memo restored the broader one. The current manual uses the broad wording. [2]
The variation strengthens the argument for building the capability rather than weakening it. A company whose systems can produce facts about everyone involved meets either version. One that can identify only the people it judges central meets the narrower one only. [2] [3]
“The good-faith qualifier makes the threshold soft”
A fourth objection is that the qualifier for good-faith efforts lets a company short of the threshold receive credit anyway. [2] That is true, but the qualifier rewards effort that the company can show. It does not reward a company that never had the records to search. [2]
In our reading, the qualifier raises the value of a documented process. Search terms, custodians, systems examined and gaps found all become part of the showing. That again is work for the systems that hold the records, and for whoever can describe them accurately.
“Smaller companies cannot build this”
A fifth objection is cost. A small adviser, a community bank or an ambulatory practice may lack the tools to map identities, retain messaging and query audit logs across systems.
The memo drew no line by size. Its threshold applied to any corporation seeking credit. [1] The current manual says a failure does not necessarily mean a program lacked adequate resources, and asks whether a corporation has sufficient resources to monitor, audit and document its compliance efforts. [2] The 2024 guide asks how the resources and technology available to compliance compare with those used elsewhere in the company. [4]
In our reading, the capability scales down. A small firm with one email system, one core platform and a short list of staff can keep a person-to-account map in a spreadsheet and a retention setting it has checked. The threshold asks for facts, not for any particular tool.
Checks a general counsel and a CIO could run together
These checks are our suggestions. They are not requirements of the 2015 memo, the Justice Manual or the Criminal Division’s guide, which are policy documents for Department attorneys. Organizations should confirm how any of them applies with counsel. [1] [2] [4]
- Person-to-account map: for every employee and contractor, the company can list the accounts, devices and system roles they held, with start and end dates.
- Messaging inventory: the company knows which messaging tools staff use for business, including on personal devices, and which of them it can preserve.
- Hold speed: legal holds can be placed on mail, chat, files and key business-system logs for a named person on the day they are requested.
- Audit trail retention: approval and access logs in payment, trading, claims and clinical systems are kept long enough to reach back to the start of a plausible investigation.
- Compliance data access: the compliance team can reach the data it needs to test controls without waiting on a project queue.
- Offboarding record: departures preserve the person’s data under the retention policy and record when each access ended.
- Investigation log: internal investigations record what was searched, which custodians were covered and what could not be recovered.
- Post-resolution duties: obligations in any agreement are tracked with an owner, and the holds they depend on are not released at signature.
The 2015 memo put a precondition on cooperation: facts about people first. [1] The checks above test whether a company could meet that precondition from its own records, quickly and completely. In our reading, that ability is what the memo priced, and what the current manual still prices. [2]
With hindsight
The memo’s threshold did not stay fixed, but its core is in force. The October 28, 2021 memorandum on corporate crime cited the 2015 memo and said it reinstated that prior guidance. [3] The reinstated rule was that corporations must provide all relevant facts relating to the responsible individuals to qualify for any cooperation credit. [3]
The 2021 memo said this meant all nonprivileged information relevant to all individuals involved in the misconduct. It said companies cannot limit disclosure to those believed to be only substantially involved, and that the requirement includes individuals inside and outside the company. [3] It said Department attorneys are best placed to assess relative culpability, and that prior inconsistent statements should be considered rescinded. [3]
The same memo made two other changes. It directed prosecutors to consider all prior misconduct by a corporation, including actions against its parent, affiliates and subsidiaries. It also revised the standards for deciding whether a monitor is needed. [3] It announced a Corporate Crime Advisory Group and said the group would consider how the Department could invest in new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to process large amounts of data. [3]
The Justice Manual, as checked on 2026-11-16, carries the broad version of the threshold in section 9-28.700. It says a corporation must identify all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct, regardless of position, status or seniority, and timely provide the relevant facts. [2] It adds that companies that delay disclosure of significant facts place their eligibility in jeopardy. [2]
The manual now addresses the systems the 2015 memo left unmentioned. Its cooperation factors include the enforcement of document and data retention policies, including for third-party messaging data on corporate or personal devices used for work. [2] Its section on compliance programs addresses personal devices, communication platforms and compensation clawbacks. [2]
The Criminal Division’s guide to evaluating compliance programs, updated in September 2024, asks about compliance staff’s access to data, the quality of data sources and the performance of analytics models. It also asks how a company assesses the potential impact of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, on its ability to comply with criminal laws. [4]
What held up from 2015 is the structure: a threshold of facts about individuals before any credit, with the amount of credit set by traditional factors. What changed is the detail around it. The current text adds timeliness, prioritization of evidence on individuals and explicit attention to messaging data and pay. [1] [2]
What did not hold up is the idea that the threshold could be met from documents assembled after the fact. The later texts ask about retention, preservation and access as features of the company’s program, assessed both at the time of the conduct and at the time of decision. [2] [4]
In our view, the memo is best read today as the start of a line that runs from investigation into everyday data management. It asked companies to name people. The texts that followed asked whether the company kept the records that would let it.
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