The 2015 Wyndham ruling let the FTC’s security case proceed; the settlement covered franchised hotel links
The Third Circuit’s August 24, 2015 Wyndham ruling let the FTC pursue cybersecurity as unfairness, judged by cost and benefit. The FTC’s allegations faulted links to franchised hotels; the settlement required yearly certification of how each hotel network was treated.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The Third Circuit’s August 24, 2015 Wyndham ruling let the FTC pursue cybersecurity as unfairness, judged by cost and benefit. The FTC’s allegations faulted links to franchised hotels; the settlement required yearly certification of how each hotel network was treated.
- The week The opinion described how the company’s network was arranged.
- The authority: unfairness as a cost-benefit test The opinion traced the unfairness standard to its source.
- The notice: knowing the standard without a rule The court stressed the nature of the allegations.
- The perimeter: franchisees, vendors and the links between them The allegations treated those links as the brand’s responsibility.
- The proof: an annual assessment in place of a general standard The order set qualifications.
- How the case reached different sectors For financial companies under the FTC’s jurisdiction, data security already had a specific rule: the Safeguards Rule under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. [7] Wyndham argued that the statute behind that rule showed Congress had kept general cybersecurity outside unfairness; the court disagreed. [1] In our reading, a nonbank lender, servicer or payment company therefore faced both: the Safeguards Rule’s requirements and the general unfairness standard.
- The objections, and what the record shows That is correct.
- Checks a security or third-party risk leader could run These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of the FTC Act or the Wyndham order.
- With hindsight The case settled.
The week
On August 24, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, No. 14-3514, in a precedential opinion. [1] It affirmed the District of New Jersey’s denial of Wyndham’s motion to dismiss. [1] The appeal was interlocutory: the court had agreed to hear two questions before any trial. [1]
Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” [1] The first question was whether the FTC has authority to regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness prong of that provision. [1] The second was whether Wyndham had fair notice that its specific cybersecurity practices could fall short of that provision. [1] The court answered both against Wyndham. [1]
The case rested on the FTC’s allegations, which the court accepted as true at that stage. [1] The FTC alleged that hackers accessed Wyndham’s systems on three occasions in 2008 and 2009. [1] The opinion said that in total they stole personal and financial information for hundreds of thousands of consumers, leading to over $10.6 million in fraudulent charges. [1] It recounted the FTC’s allegation that payment card information from over 619,000 consumers was obtained. [1]
The opinion described how the company’s network was arranged. Wyndham Worldwide franchises and manages hotels through subsidiaries, and licensed its brand to approximately 90 independently owned hotels. [1] Each Wyndham-branded hotel had a property management system that processed guest data, including payment card numbers, expiration dates and security codes. [1] According to the complaint, Wyndham managed those systems and required hotels to buy and configure them to its specifications. [1] A Wyndham network in Phoenix connected its data center to each hotel’s system. [1]
The FTC listed seven alleged failings, as the opinion summarized them. They included letting hotels store card data in clear readable text and allowing easily guessed passwords. [1] They included failing to use firewalls between hotel systems, the corporate network and the internet, and letting hotel systems connect without adequate precautions. [1] They also included failing to restrict third-party vendors’ access, failing to detect unauthorized access and failing to follow proper incident response procedures. [1]
The opinion described the attacks as alleged. In April 2008, hackers broke into one hotel’s local network, which was connected to Wyndham’s network, and used brute force to reach an administrator account. [1] The FTC alleged that in a 2009 attack Wyndham did not notice the intrusion for two months and found malware used in the earlier attack on more than thirty hotels’ systems. [1] A third intrusion came to light in January 2010, when a credit card company received cardholder complaints. [1]
Wyndham’s arguments were recorded in the opinion. It argued that a business does not treat its customers unfairly when it is itself victimized by criminals. [1] It argued that later statutes giving the FTC specific data security powers, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, showed Congress had excluded cybersecurity from general unfairness authority. [1] It argued it lacked notice of which specific practices the law required. [1] The court rejected each of these at the pleading stage. [1]
The court was careful about what it did not decide. It said it left “for another day” whether Wyndham’s alleged practices in fact fail the cost-benefit analysis of the statute. [1] It noted that the FTC had begun bringing cybersecurity actions in 2005. [1] It said “the vast majority of these cases have ended in settlement.” [1] Wyndham’s own case would end the same way that December, as the hindsight below records.
FTC v. Wyndham is remembered for confirming that the FTC can treat poor cybersecurity as an unfair practice. For a security, compliance or third-party risk leader in any sector, its more specific contribution concerns systems a company connects to but does not own. The FTC’s complaint, as the opinion summarized it, was about how a brand linked the systems of about 90 independently owned hotels to its network. [1] The settlement that followed was about how it would treat those links from then on. [3]
Our argument is that the ruling and the settlement together made a company’s connections to franchisees and vendors part of its own security case. The court accepted, at the pleading stage, a complaint that faulted Wyndham for letting hotel systems connect without precautions and for failing to restrict vendors’ access. [1] The order then required an assessor to certify, hotel by hotel, whether the company treated each franchisee network as untrusted and, if not, that the network was assessed or separately validated. [3] In our reading, the case moved the security perimeter from the systems an organization owns to the systems it chooses to connect.
That framing reaches well past hotels. A bank connects to agents, processors and fintech partners. A health system connects to affiliated practices and billing vendors. A public agency connects to contractors and grantees. The legal authority differs by sector, but the question Wyndham raised, who answers for the link, does not.
We take the case in four parts:
- The authority: what the court said the FTC Act’s unfairness standard requires.
- The notice: how a company is expected to know what reasonable security means without a rule.
- The perimeter: how the allegations and the order dealt with franchisees and vendors.
- The proof: how the settlement turned a general standard into annual, assessor-certified evidence.
The parts do not overlap. The first is the legal test, the second the sources of guidance, the third the scope of responsibility and the fourth the form of evidence. After them we look at how the case reached different sectors, take the objections in order and end with checks a security or third-party risk leader could run.
The authority: unfairness as a cost-benefit test
The statutory test
The opinion traced the unfairness standard to its source. In 1994, Congress codified the FTC’s 1980 policy statement at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). [1] That provision bars an unfairness finding unless the practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers. [1] The injury must also be one consumers cannot reasonably avoid, and must not be outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition. [1]
The court described that standard as “far from precise.” [1] It said it informs parties that the relevant inquiry is a cost-benefit analysis. [1] That analysis considers the probability and expected size of reasonably unavoidable harms to consumers given a level of cybersecurity, against the costs to consumers of investing in stronger security. [1]
Criminals and causation
Wyndham argued that a company victimized by criminals has not treated its customers unfairly. [1] The court said Wyndham offered no authority for that principle and it could think of none. [1] It said a company’s conduct not being the most proximate cause of an injury generally does not immunize it from liability for foreseeable harms. [1] It noted Wyndham did not argue the intrusions were unforeseeable, which it said would be particularly implausible for the second and third attacks. [1]
For any organization, that reasoning shifts the question after a breach. The attacker’s crime does not end the inquiry. The inquiry turns to whether the harm was foreseeable and whether the organization’s practices were reasonable given that risk. [1]
Likely harm as well as actual harm
The court also addressed timing. It said unfairness claims “usually involve actual and completed harms,” but may also be brought on the basis of likely injury, citing the FTC’s own precedent. [1] It noted that the statute expressly covers a practice that “causes or is likely to cause” substantial injury. [1]
For organizations, that reading means the exposure does not wait for a breach. In our reading, a practice that makes consumer harm likely can be challenged before anyone is hurt, though the Wyndham case itself followed three intrusions. The cost-benefit test then weighs the probability and size of the harm, which is easier to argue about before it happens than after.
Later statutes did not narrow the authority
Wyndham pointed to the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s disposal provision, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act as tailored grants of data security authority. [1] It argued those grants would be inexplicable if the FTC already had general authority. [1] The court was not persuaded. It distinguished the Supreme Court’s tobacco case, in which the agency had long disclaimed authority before reversing itself. [1]
The banana peel
Wyndham warned that FTC authority over its conduct would extend to hotel door locks. [1] It also invoked supermarkets “sloppy about sweeping up banana peels.” [1] The court called the argument “alarmist to say the least.” [1] It said that a supermarket leaving so many banana peels that 619,000 customers fall “hardly suggests it should be immune from liability.” [1]
What the authority part means for organizations
In our reading, the authority part did two things. It confirmed that the FTC could bring cybersecurity cases as unfairness claims, alongside deception claims about broken promises. [1] And it located the standard in a cost-benefit judgment, not in a list of controls. [1] An organization within the FTC’s reach therefore had to be able to show its judgment: that it had weighed the likely harm against the cost of protection, and chosen accordingly.
The court also left the deception claim standing in the background. The FTC alleged Wyndham’s privacy policy overstated its security, and the court found it plausible that the policy bore on whether consumers could reasonably avoid injury. [1] In our reading, that links the two prongs: a published security claim can make an unfairness case stronger by explaining why customers could not protect themselves.
The notice: knowing the standard without a rule
Notice of the statute, not of the agency’s view
Wyndham argued it lacked fair notice of the specific practices the law required. [1] The court held that Wyndham was entitled to notice of the meaning of the statute, not to know “with ascertainable certainty” the FTC’s interpretation of it. [1] The court explained that it was interpreting the FTC Act itself, as the District Court had, so Wyndham was entitled only to notice of the statute’s meaning. [1]
The court said fair notice was satisfied if the company could reasonably foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the statute. [1] It said a company is not entitled to such precision as would eliminate all close calls. [1]
Why the as-applied challenge failed
The court stressed the nature of the allegations. The complaint did not allege weak firewalls, encryption or passwords, it said, but no firewall at critical points, no IP address restrictions, no encryption for certain files and no change to some default passwords. [1] It said the challenge was weaker still because Wyndham was hacked three times. [1] At least after the second attack, it said, it should have been “painfully clear” that a court could find its conduct failed the cost-benefit analysis. [1]
That reasoning matters for any organization that has had an incident. In our reading, a prior breach raises the bar for what counts as reasonable afterward, because the risk is no longer hypothetical. The record of what was done after an incident becomes part of the notice argument in any later case.
The privacy policy as a measure
The FTC’s deception claim was not before the court, but the opinion described it. The FTC alleged that since 2008 Wyndham had published a privacy policy overstating its cybersecurity. [1] As the opinion quoted it, the policy described industry standard practices, commercially reasonable efforts, encryption and firewalls. [1] The FTC alleged that, contrary to the policy, Wyndham did not use encryption, firewalls and other commercially reasonable methods. [1]
That allegation turned the company’s own words into a benchmark. In our reading, a published security statement sets a standard the organization will be measured against, whatever the law requires on its own. Security and legal teams that review such statements together can keep them accurate as practices change.
Guidance as evidence of what was foreseeable
The court pointed to the FTC’s 2007 guidebook, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business. [1] It said the guidebook did not state that any practice was required, but counseled against many of the practices alleged. [1] Its recommendations included encrypting stored sensitive information, patching, using firewalls, setting access controls, requiring strong passwords and having a breach response plan. [1]
The court agreed with Wyndham that the guidebook could not, on its own, give ascertainable certainty of the FTC’s interpretation. [1] But it said the agency’s expert views about a sound data security plan could have helped Wyndham see that its conduct might not survive the cost-benefit analysis. [1]
Complaints and consent orders
The court also considered the FTC’s earlier complaints and consent orders in cybersecurity cases, which the agency had published. [1] It agreed with Wyndham that the consent orders, which “admit no liability” and focus on prospective requirements, were of little use in understanding what Section 5 requires. [1] It found the complaints more useful. Its table compared the 2006 CardSystems Solutions complaint with the Wyndham complaint and found close parallels. [1]
The court was candid about the limits. It said it may be unfair to expect private parties in 2008 to have examined FTC complaints. [1] It said that at oral argument the FTC could offer no example of telling the public to look to them for guidance. [1] It noted Wyndham did not claim to have been unaware of them. [1]
A record of reasonableness
If the standard is a cost-benefit judgment, the evidence of compliance is the record of that judgment. [1] In our reading, that record has four pieces. A risk assessment names the data and the threats. A decision log shows which controls were chosen and which were deferred, with the reason. An exceptions register shows where systems fall short and when that will change. And test results show the chosen controls work.
The opinion requires no such record. They are what an organization would want to hand a regulator or a court asked to decide whether its choices were reasonable. The Wyndham allegations, by contrast, described the absence of basic controls rather than a contested trade-off. [1] An organization whose record shows real weighing is in a different position from one with no record at all.
What the notice part means for organizations
In our reading, the notice part told organizations where to look for the standard: the statute’s cost-benefit test, the FTC’s published guidance and the allegations in its complaints. [1] A compliance program that tracks those sources, and records how the organization’s practices compare, builds evidence that it understood what reasonable meant at the time. That record is useful whether or not an enforcement case ever comes.
The perimeter: franchisees, vendors and the links between them
The franchise structure in the allegations
The opinion described a brand that licensed its name to independently owned hotels while managing their property management systems and requiring them to be bought and configured to its specifications. [1] The hotels’ systems were connected to the brand’s network, and through it to its data center. [1] The first attack, as alleged, began in one hotel’s local network and moved into the brand’s network. [1]
The allegations treated those links as the brand’s responsibility. The FTC alleged that Wyndham let hotel systems connect to its network without appropriate precautions and did not ensure hotels implemented adequate security policies. [1] It alleged Wyndham knowingly let at least one hotel connect with an operating system that had not received a security update in over three years. [1] It alleged Wyndham allowed hotel servers to connect with default user IDs and passwords enabled. [1]
Vendors with access
A separate allegation concerned third-party vendors. The FTC alleged Wyndham failed to adequately restrict vendors’ access to its network and to hotel servers, for example by not limiting connections to specified IP addresses or granting temporary, limited access. [1] The example the opinion gave for weak passwords involved remote access to one hotel’s system, where the user ID and password were both “micros,” the name of the system’s developer. [1]
Detection across connected sites
The allegations also described a detection failure that crossed site boundaries. The FTC asserted that, because Wyndham did not monitor its network for the malware used in the first attack, hackers had access for approximately two months during the second. [1] The third intrusion, the opinion said, was learned of only when a credit card company received complaints from cardholders. [1]
In a connected network, an indicator found at one site is evidence for every other site. In our reading, a central operator that finds malware on one partner’s system and does not search the rest has learned less than it could. The allegation tied the perimeter to monitoring as well as to firewalls.
A hypothetical bank network
A hypothetical regional bank shows how the question translates. It connects a third-party loan origination platform, a check processing vendor and several independent insurance agencies to parts of its network. Each connection is a business decision. Each also brings another organization’s security practices into contact with the bank’s systems.
The Wyndham order’s approach suggests two paths for each link. [3] The bank can bring the partner’s environment inside its own assessed controls, with the right to test it. Or it can treat the partner’s network as untrusted, limiting what traffic crosses and from where. The bank’s own regulators set its obligations; the design choice is the same.
Inventory as a perimeter control
The FTC also alleged that Wyndham did not maintain an adequate inventory of computers connected to its network. [1] As a result, it alleged, Wyndham could not identify the source of at least one attack. [1] In our reading, that allegation ties the perimeter to knowledge: an organization cannot defend or even investigate links it does not know exist.
How the order drew the perimeter
The December 2015 order addressed the hotels directly. It defined a Wyndham-branded hotel as an independently owned hotel operated in the United States under a management or franchise agreement. [3] It required the information security program’s risk assessment to consider “risks emanating from the Wyndham-branded Hotels.” [3] It required safeguards to control those risks. [3]
The order’s assessment section went further. The assessor had to certify, individually for each Wyndham-branded hotel, whether the company treated as untrusted any hotel network with a cardholder data environment. [3] If a hotel network was not treated as untrusted, the assessor had to certify that it was included in the assessment or had been separately validated as fully compliant within the preceding 12 months. [3]
The FTC’s release explained the purpose. The certification of franchisee networks’ “untrusted” status was meant to prevent future hackers from using the same method used in the prior breaches. [2]
Service providers in the program
The order also required reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of safeguarding cardholder data, and to require safeguards by contract. [3] In our reading, that clause put vendor oversight inside the program the company had to maintain for 20 years. [3]
Specifications as responsibility
One detail in the allegations deserves attention from any central operator. According to the complaint, Wyndham required the hotels to purchase and configure their property management systems to its own specifications, and managed those systems. [1] In our reading, a party that sets the specification and manages the system is hard-pressed to argue that the system’s security belongs to someone else.
That has a practical edge. A franchisor, a bank sponsoring a payments program or a health system standardizing affiliates’ technology can write security settings into the specifications it already issues. If it sets the configuration, it can set secure defaults, require patching and forbid default passwords. The specification becomes the first control rather than an afterthought.
What the perimeter part means for organizations
The case’s lesson on perimeter is concrete. A connected partner’s network can be the attacker’s way in. The order’s answer was certification that such networks were treated as untrusted, unless they were brought inside the assessed environment or separately validated. [3] For any organization with franchisees, agents, affiliates or vendors on its network, that is a design choice with two options. Either the partner’s environment meets the organization’s standard and is assessed as part of it, or the connection is treated as hostile and controlled at the boundary.
The proof: an annual assessment in place of a general standard
The program requirement
The order required Wyndham Hotels and Resorts to establish and maintain, for 20 years, a comprehensive information security program reasonably designed to protect cardholder data it collects or receives in the United States. [3] The program had to be documented in writing and include a designated accountable employee, a risk assessment, safeguards with regular testing, service provider oversight and periodic adjustment. [3]
The assessment requirement
The order required an annual written assessment of the company’s compliance with an “Approved Standard,” defined as PCI DSS or a standard of comparable scope approved by the FTC’s Associate Director for Enforcement. [3] Each assessment was due by December 31. [3] The assessor also had to certify compliance with a risk management protocol at least as thorough as a named version of the PCI DSS risk assessment guidelines. [3]
The order set qualifications. Assessors had to be independent, objective and free of conflicts. [3] They had to hold one of several named credentials, such as Qualified Security Assessor status under PCI DSS, CISSP or CISA, or be otherwise approved by the FTC. [3] Assessments had to be sent to the FTC within ten days of delivery. [3]
The safe harbor
The order’s distinctive term linked assessment to compliance. Suppose the company obtained an assessment certifying full compliance with the Approved Standard, with the required certifications. It would then be deemed in compliance with the program requirement for one year or until the next assessment deadline. [3] The FTC’s release described the same effect. [2]
The safe harbor had limits. It did not apply to a practice where the company misrepresented or omitted a material fact likely to affect the assessor’s decision. [3] If the misrepresentation was meant to deceive the assessor, the company would not be deemed compliant with any part of the program or assessment requirements based on that assessment. [3] It did not apply to significant changes in practice unless an assessor certified that the change did not cause noncompliance. [3]
Independence of the assessor
The order’s reliance on assessors made their independence central. It required assessors free of conflicts that might compromise their judgment, using procedures and standards generally accepted in the profession. [3] The misrepresentation carve-out put the burden of candor on the company. [3]
In our reading, an organization relying on third-party assessments for its own evidence faces the same questions. Who chooses the assessor, who defines the scope and who decides what the assessor is shown all affect what the certificate means. A board or audit committee that receives assessment results can ask those questions directly.
After a breach
The order also set a breach rule. After discovering a breach involving more than 10,000 unique payment card numbers, the company had 180 days to obtain a forensic assessment. [3] It had to meet the requirements for a PCI Forensic Investigator final incident report, or an approved equivalent. [3] The FTC’s release said the assessment was to be provided to the agency within 10 days. [2]
Choosing a yardstick
The order borrowed an industry standard, PCI DSS, as its measure. [3] It also limited the program’s scope to cardholder data collected or received in the United States. [3] That fit the case: the alleged harm concerned payment card information. [1] It also meant the order did not reach other personal data the company held, which the order’s definitions left outside.
In our reading, the choice of yardstick decides what an assessment can prove. An organization that adopts a standard for evidence should check that the standard covers the data and systems that create its real exposure. A card-data standard says little about a breach of medical records or employee files.
What the proof part means for organizations
The settlement converted a cost-benefit standard into a measurable obligation. [3] It did so by borrowing an industry standard as the yardstick and an independent assessor as the measurer. [3] In our reading, that design offered both sides certainty. The company knew what evidence would satisfy the order. The FTC received annual evidence without having to define reasonable security in its own words.
The design also had a cost. An assessment measures compliance with the chosen standard on the assessment date. It does not prove that the program will stop the next attack. The order’s exceptions for misrepresentation and significant changes acknowledged that gap. [3]
How the case reached different sectors
Nonbank financial companies
For financial companies under the FTC’s jurisdiction, data security already had a specific rule: the Safeguards Rule under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. [7] Wyndham argued that the statute behind that rule showed Congress had kept general cybersecurity outside unfairness; the court disagreed. [1] In our reading, a nonbank lender, servicer or payment company therefore faced both: the Safeguards Rule’s requirements and the general unfairness standard.
Anyone that takes card payments
The order’s focus on cardholder data has a reach of its own. [3] A hospital gift shop, a university bursar, a county permit office and a bank all accept payment cards. The FTC’s authority in the case rested on the FTC Act. [1] The practical lesson, protect card data where it is processed and control connections to the systems that hold it, applies to any organization that accepts cards.
Banks and credit unions
Banks and federally insured credit unions answer for data security to their own regulators. The Safeguards Rule covers financial institutions not subject to another regulator’s enforcement under section 505 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and its list of examples includes non-federally insured credit unions. [7] The Wyndham perimeter question still applies to them through their own supervisors’ expectations: a bank that connects agents, processors or fintech partners to its network has to decide how much to trust those links.
Health systems
The Wyndham analysis concerned the FTC Act alone. [1] Health systems answer to other regimes for patient data, which the case did not address. The perimeter lesson transfers directly, though. Affiliated practices, billing companies and device vendors with remote access are the health system’s equivalent of franchisees and vendors. In our reading, the order’s choice, assess them or treat them as untrusted, is one a health system can make for each connection.
Public agencies
Public agencies were not parties to this case, which concerned practices in commerce. [1] They are buyers of services from companies that are, and they connect contractors and grantees to their networks. In our reading, the order’s contract clause for service providers and its per-connection certification offer a template for agency contracts: name the standard, name the assessor and say how the connection will be treated.
Vendors to regulated organizations
Banks, health systems and agencies buy from technology companies that are themselves businesses in commerce. In our reading, those vendors sit within the reach of the unfairness standard the court described, whatever rules bind their customers. [1] A regulated organization choosing a vendor can therefore ask how the vendor would answer the Wyndham questions: how it connects to client networks, how it restricts its own staff’s remote access and what independent evidence it can show.
Franchisors and platform operators
The closest analogues are any businesses that set technology requirements for independently owned partners and connect them to a central network. The allegations faulted the brand for managing and connecting hotel systems without adequate controls. [1] In our reading, the more a central operator specifies and connects, the more of the partners’ risk it takes on.
The objections, and what the record shows
“The court never found Wyndham’s security unreasonable”
That is correct. The court left for another day whether the alleged practices failed the cost-benefit analysis. [1] The settlement order stated that it was not an admission that the law had been violated or that the alleged facts, other than jurisdictional facts, were true. [3] Our argument does not depend on a finding of liability. It depends on what the court accepted as a valid claim and what the order required.
“A cost-benefit standard gives no real guidance”
The court acknowledged the standard was far from precise and that borderline cases would arise. [1] Its answer was that due process does not require eliminating close calls in an economic regulation. [1] The settlement’s answer was more practical: a named standard and an assessor. [3] The objection has force for organizations near the line. It has less force for practices like those alleged here, such as no firewall at critical points. [1]
“Franchisees are independent businesses”
They were, and the order defined them that way. [3] The allegations did not rest on the hotels’ independence; they rested on the brand’s management of their systems and its decision to connect them. [1] The order did not require the brand to secure the hotels’ own operations. It required certification that their networks were treated as untrusted, or else included in the assessment or separately validated. [3]
The objection also cuts the other way. A franchisee’s independence is a reason the central operator cannot vouch for the franchisee’s security, and therefore a reason to control the connection rather than assume trust. In our reading, independence argues for the untrusted-network approach the order adopted, not against it.
“Assessment-based compliance becomes box-checking”
This is the strongest objection to the settlement’s design. An assessor certifying compliance with a standard is not the same as security. The order’s carve-outs for misrepresentation and significant changes, and its separate breach assessment, show it anticipated the risk. [3] In our reading, the objection argues for using assessments as one input to a program, not for abandoning them.
“The FTC regulates by settlement rather than rule”
The court’s own description supports the premise: “the vast majority” of the FTC’s cybersecurity cases had ended in settlement, and consent orders admit no liability and give little guidance on what the law requires. [1] The objection is that organizations learn the standard from complaints and orders they may not read. The court acknowledged that concern in a footnote. [1] For financial companies under its jurisdiction, the FTC later answered with a rule. [6] For others, the record still consists of guidance, complaints and orders, which is why we suggest tracking them.
Checks a security or third-party risk leader could run
These checks are our suggestions, not requirements of the FTC Act or the Wyndham order. Organizations should confirm which laws and regulators apply to them with counsel.
- Connection inventory: list every external network connected to yours, including franchisees, affiliates, agents and vendors, with an owner for each.
- Trust decision: for each connection, record whether the partner is assessed as part of your environment or treated as untrusted at the boundary.
- Vendor access: restrict vendor remote access to named sources and time-limited sessions, and review it on a schedule.
- Specifications you set: where you require partners to buy or configure systems, include security settings in the specification and check them.
- Default credentials: test connected systems for default or factory passwords before they join the network.
- Post-incident record: after any intrusion, document the specific changes made, since a repeat attack raises the bar for what is reasonable.
- Guidance tracking: keep a record of regulators’ published guidance and complaint allegations that bear on your practices, and how you compare.
- Assessment scope: confirm that your independent assessments cover the connections that matter, and update the scope when connections change.
The Wyndham case made the link to a partner’s network part of the security question. [1] [3] The checks above follow that line: know every link, decide how much to trust it and keep evidence of the decision.
With hindsight
The case settled. On December 9, 2015, the FTC announced that Wyndham Hotels and Resorts had agreed to settle charges that its security practices unfairly exposed the payment card information of hundreds of thousands of consumers. [2] The FTC said the Commission vote approving the proposed stipulated order was 4-0. [2]
The stipulated order was filed in the District of New Jersey on December 11, 2015. [3] It required a comprehensive information security program for cardholder data, annual assessments against PCI DSS or an approved standard, certification of the untrusted status of franchisee networks and a forensic assessment after any large breach. [3] Its obligations ran for 20 years. [2] [3] The order stated that it was not an admission of the alleged violations or facts. [3]
Later rulings set limits on how the FTC could enforce data security. On June 6, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the FTC’s order against LabMD. [4] The court assumed, without deciding, that LabMD’s alleged negligent failure to maintain reasonable security was an unfair practice. [4] It held the order unenforceable because it did not enjoin a specific act or practice and instead mandated an overhaul of the company’s security program to meet “an indeterminable standard of reasonableness.” [4]
The Wyndham order had avoided that problem by naming a standard and an assessor. [3] In our reading, the LabMD ruling made specificity of that kind a practical requirement for FTC data security orders.
The FTC’s remedies narrowed too. On April 22, 2021, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management v. FTC that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. [5] The FTC had brought the Wyndham case under Section 13(b), and the settlement was an order for injunction. [3]
For financial companies under its jurisdiction, the FTC moved from a general standard toward named controls. Its amended Safeguards Rule, published December 9, 2021, added provisions on access controls, authentication and encryption and required periodic reports to boards. [6] It took effect January 10, 2022, with some provisions applicable from December 9, 2022. [6]
As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR text of 16 CFR Part 314 is up to date as of November 12, 2026. [7] It requires covered institutions to oversee service providers by selecting capable ones, requiring safeguards by contract and periodically assessing them. [7] It requires multi-factor authentication for anyone accessing an information system, unless the qualified individual approves an equivalent control in writing. [7] It requires notice to the FTC of a notification event involving the information of at least 500 consumers. [7]
What held up from August 2015 is the authority. The Eleventh Circuit in LabMD assumed, without deciding, that negligent security could be unfair, and vacated the order as unenforceable rather than on the FTC’s authority. [4] The service provider duties in the Wyndham order are close to those in the current Safeguards Rule. [3] [7] What changed is the form. Orders became more specific after LabMD, and for nonbank financial companies the standard became a rule with named controls. [4] [6]
In our view, the lasting point for any organization is the one the Wyndham order wrote into its assessment terms. A connected partner’s network is either inside the assessed environment or treated as untrusted, and that choice should be recorded for every link.
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