The OCC’s fintech charter wrote an uninsured bank’s duties into its approval letter

In July 2018 the OCC opened national bank charters to fintechs that lend or pay without taking deposits. Because such banks fall outside insured-bank statutes, their duties on inclusion, safety, records and wind-down would live in bank-by-bank charter conditions.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

In July 2018 the OCC opened national bank charters to fintechs that lend or pay without taking deposits. Because such banks fall outside insured-bank statutes, their duties on inclusion, safety, records and wind-down would live in bank-by-bank charter conditions.

  1. The week On Tuesday, July 31, 2018, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency announced that it would begin accepting applications for national bank charters from nondepository financial technology companies engaged in the business of banking.
  2. Eligibility: banking without deposits The first part concerns who could apply.
  3. Funding: what replaced insured deposits The second part concerns the balance sheet.
  4. Obligations: conditions in place of statutes The third part is the center of the argument.
  5. Durability: what could change or undo the arrangement The fourth part concerns whether the charter would last.
  6. Objections, and where the argument is weakest The argument here is that the fintech charter replaced statutes with conditions, and that this made each chartered fintech’s obligations bespoke.
  7. With hindsight The challenge the July 2018 decision invited came quickly.

The week

On Tuesday, July 31, 2018, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency announced that it would begin accepting applications for national bank charters from nondepository financial technology companies engaged in the business of banking. The decision was set out in two documents published the same day: a signed policy statement on fintech companies’ eligibility to apply for national bank charters, and a supplement to the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual titled “Considering Charter Applications From Financial Technology Companies.”

The OCC’s release said the decision followed outreach over a two-year period and public comment on its December 2016 paper exploring special purpose national bank charters for fintech companies and on a draft licensing supplement published in March 2017. It said every application would be evaluated on its own facts, that chartered fintech companies would be supervised like similarly situated national banks, including capital, liquidity and financial inclusion commitments as appropriate, and that new fintech banks would be subject to heightened supervision at first, similar to other new banks.

The legal basis was an existing regulation. The policy statement said that, as defined in the OCC’s rules, the business of banking includes any of three core functions: receiving deposits, paying checks or lending money. Section 5.20 of the OCC’s regulations provides that a special purpose national bank must conduct at least one of them. The release said this authority, described at 12 CFR 5.20(e)(1), did not require the bank to take deposits within the meaning of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and therefore would not require insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

The supplement defined its scope narrowly. It applied to fintech companies seeking a special purpose national bank charter to pay checks or lend money without taking deposits and without FDIC insurance, which it called SPNBs. A company that planned to take insured deposits would need FDIC insurance and should apply for a full-service charter, and the supplement did not apply to a fintech company that intended to engage in fiduciary activities and otherwise met the requirements of a trust bank. A footnote said that facilitating payments electronically may be considered the modern equivalent of paying checks.

The documents set out what an uninsured bank would owe in place of the duties that come with deposit insurance. Applicants would have to make a commitment to financial inclusion, with goals, milestones and metrics suited to their business model. They would have to develop a contingency plan to address significant financial stress, setting out strategies for restoring the bank’s financial strength and options for selling, merging or liquidating it if recovery failed. The supplement said capital would be set by a minimum level stated in the approval, based on the bank’s own capital adequacy assessment, and that the OCC could require a liquidity maintenance agreement with a parent company or a set amount of high-quality liquid assets.

The policy statement closed with limits. It said the OCC would not approve proposals contrary to law, regulation, policy or safety and soundness, that the decision did not alter existing barriers separating banking and commerce, and that proposals with predatory, unfair or deceptive features would not be approved.

The July 2018 decision is remembered as a fight between federal and state regulators about who could charter a fintech lender. That fight was real, and the hindsight section follows it to its end. It also obscured what the OCC had actually designed. A national bank without insured deposits falls outside a set of statutes that apply by their terms to insured institutions. The OCC’s answer was to write the missing duties into each bank’s charter approval as conditions. The rulebook for an uninsured fintech bank would be, in large part, its own approval letter.

This article argues that the fintech charter replaced statutes with conditions, and that conditions are a different kind of obligation for the bank, its partners, its competitors and its supervisor. The analysis falls into four parts. The first is eligibility: what activities qualified a company for the charter. The second is funding: what took the place of insured deposits in the bank’s capital and liquidity. The third is obligations: the conditions that stood in for statutes written for insured banks, including the contingency plan. The fourth is durability: the legal and supervisory risks that could change or undo the arrangement. A final section takes the objections.

The parts do not overlap. Eligibility decides who can apply. Funding decides how the bank stays solvent and liquid. Obligations decide what the bank owes beyond the general law for national banks. Durability decides whether any of it lasts. A company could clear one and fail another, and a bank partnering with a chartered fintech would need to understand all four.

The audience is wider than fintech founders. Banks that partner with fintech lenders or payment companies, credit unions and community banks that compete with them, and broker-dealers and wealth managers considering their own technology charters all had reason to read the July 2018 documents. Each should take the analysis below as a description of the OCC’s published framework, not as advice on any particular application, and should check with counsel before relying on it.

Eligibility: banking without deposits

The first part concerns who could apply. The OCC’s position was that the business of banking includes paying checks or lending money, so a company doing either could be a bank without taking deposits.

The three core functions

The policy statement rested on the OCC’s regulation at 12 CFR 5.20. That rule says a special purpose national bank that conducts activities other than fiduciary activities must conduct at least one of three core banking activities: taking deposits, paying checks or lending money. The fintech charter used the second and third. A lender that made loans but funded itself from investors or the capital markets, or a payments company that moved money for customers, could argue that it met the test.

The supplement’s footnote on payments widened the door. It said facilitating payments electronically may be considered the modern equivalent of paying checks. That sentence brought payment companies, which do not lend and do not take deposits in the insured sense, within reach of the charter. It also raised the question of which payment activities counted, which the OCC left to individual applications.

What a charter would offer

The documents did not dwell on why a company would want the charter, but the attraction was clear from the structure. A national bank operates under one federal regime across the country. A fintech company operating under state licenses deals with each state’s licensing, examination and rules. The Comptroller, quoted in the OCC’s release, said companies that provide banking services in innovative ways deserve the opportunity to pursue that business on a national scale as a federally chartered, regulated bank. For a lender or payments company licensed state by state, that was the core of the offer.

Two years of drafts

The July 2018 documents were the end of a long public process. The OCC’s release cited its December 2016 paper exploring special purpose charters for fintech companies and its March 2017 draft licensing supplement. The Second Circuit later recorded that the New York Department of Financial Services sent an opposition letter on the draft supplement, contending that the plan exceeded the OCC’s authority. By July 2018, the main objections were on the record, and the final documents answered some of them through conditions rather than through any change in the core legal position. An applicant could read the drafts and the comments to see which questions the OCC expected to be asked.

What the charter could not do

The charter had limits that mattered as much as its reach. It did not allow the bank to take deposits in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act sense. A company that wanted to fund itself with insured deposits had to apply for a full-service charter and obtain FDIC insurance. The SPNB’s activities beyond the core functions were limited to what national banks may do under statute, regulation, court precedent or OCC determination. And the policy statement said the decision did not alter the barriers between banking and commerce, which bore on technology companies with large nonfinancial businesses.

The fiduciary carve-out

One more boundary deserves attention. The supplement said it did not apply to a fintech company that intended to engage in fiduciary activities and otherwise met the requirements of a trust bank. Trust banks were already a recognized form of special purpose national bank, with their own path. That carve-out looked like a technical note in 2018. It became significant later, as the hindsight section shows.

How an application would proceed

The supplement described the same four phases the OCC uses for any national bank. In the prefiling phase, a company would meet the OCC, starting with its Office of Innovation, to discuss its proposal. In the filing phase it would submit a complete application. In the review phase the OCC would assess whether the bank had a reasonable chance of success, would operate safely and soundly, would provide fair access and fair treatment, would comply with law and would foster healthy competition. The decision phase had three stages: preliminary conditional approval, an organization stage in which the bank raises capital and prepares to open, and final approval. The OCC could also ask for a draft application before a formal one, a step the supplement said it uses for unusual or complex filings.

That sequence matters to anyone planning around a fintech’s charter. A preliminary conditional approval is permission to organize, not a bank. The supplement said it is not an assurance of final approval. A partner bank or competitor reading an announcement of preliminary approval should treat it as the start of the organization stage, with conditions still to meet.

What the business plan had to show

The supplement asked for more than financial projections. The business plan was to describe internal controls for customer transaction and data integrity, security and auditability, with overviews of the operational architecture, security framework and resiliency structures. It was to address functions outsourced to third parties and the risk management for those relationships. The accompanying risk assessment was to cover third-party, cybersecurity, Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering, and sanctions risks among others. For a technology company, those sections would be read as closely as the credit model.

The supplement also said that, because fintech companies are technology-driven, sufficient technical knowledge, skills and experience among organizers, directors and managers would be as necessary as banking and financial experience. That emphasis cut both ways. A founding team strong in engineering and light in banking would need to recruit banking experience, and a team of former bankers would need to show it understood the technology it proposed to run.

What eligibility asked of a bank partner

The eligibility test also bore on the bank’s own risk file. A bank whose partner might become a national bank needed to know where the partnership’s customer data, loan files and servicing records would go if the partner left. Partnership agreements written before July 2018 might not address a partner’s charter at all. A review of termination, data return and transition clauses was a sensible response, and one that would serve the bank whether or not any partner applied.

For a bank that partners with a fintech lender, the eligibility test raised a strategic question. A partner that obtained its own charter would no longer need a bank to originate loans or move payments. The partnership’s value to the bank could fall, and the partner could become a competitor. A bank that depended on partnership revenue in 2018 had reason to ask each partner whether it planned to apply, and to plan for the answer.

Funding: what replaced insured deposits

The second part concerns the balance sheet. An insured bank has access to a stable, insured deposit base and to the protections that come with it. An SPNB would not. The supplement addressed that gap through capital and liquidity expectations set bank by bank.

Capital set by the business plan

The supplement said an SPNB would be subject to the minimum capital requirements in 12 CFR 3 that apply to all national banks, but that those requirements set a floor and might not be sufficient. Organizers would determine a minimum capital level through a capital adequacy assessment of the risks in the business plan, the OCC would evaluate that assessment, and the preliminary approval would include a condition specifying a minimum capital level the bank must maintain at all times. The OCC expected capital to rise beyond the initial minimum as the bank’s size, complexity and risks grew.

That approach makes the business plan the measure of capital. A lender whose plan assumed one loss rate would hold capital for that rate. If the business changed, the capital assumption could become stale. The supplement anticipated this by expecting capital to rise with risk, and by conditioning approvals on not deviating significantly from the business plan without the OCC’s prior non-objection.

Liquidity without a deposit base

The supplement was direct about funding risk. Because SPNBs are uninsured and likely to rely on funding that is potentially more volatile in certain environments, it said, organizers should describe how the bank can be funded and maintain sufficient liquidity under stress. The OCC could impose requirements tailored to the funding model, such as a liquidity maintenance agreement with a parent company or a set amount of high-quality liquid assets.

A liquidity maintenance agreement with a parent ties the bank’s liquidity to the parent’s. That can be a strength when the parent is well funded and a channel of contagion when it is not. A bank or investor assessing a chartered fintech would need to look at the parent’s funding as closely as the bank’s, because the agreement makes them one funding question.

Funding and the business model

The funding question differed by business. A lender that sells its loans to investors needs funding for the period between origination and sale, and its liquidity depends on the market for those loans. A payments company holds customer funds in transit, and its liquidity depends on the timing of settlement. A charter that applied one framework to both would need very different conditions for each. The supplement’s choice to set conditions bank by bank reflects that difference. It also means there was no single funding standard a competitor could look up.

Assessments

The supplement said the OCC would impose assessments on an SPNB as a condition of approval, as it does on other national banks, and that it would set them based on factors tailored to the bank’s business model. It noted that the OCC had modified assessments for other special purpose banks to account for their activities and assets. For an applicant, the assessment was a recurring cost of the charter that could not be known precisely until the OCC set it. For a business plan, that was one more line to stress.

Testing the plan against bad years

A capital level built on a business plan is only as good as the plan’s worst case. A lender’s plan that assumes steady access to loan buyers needs a scenario in which that access stops. A payments company’s plan needs a scenario in which a major partner or settlement bank fails. The supplement asked organizers to consider factors that could deplete capital, such as broad market volatility or volatility specific to a business line. A board that wanted to rely on its capital condition would test the plan against those scenarios each year and raise capital before the condition was at risk, not after.

Parent support beyond liquidity

A liquidity maintenance agreement is one form of parent support. A parent could also be asked to support capital, to provide services under contracts that survive the bank’s distress, or to stand behind the contingency plan. Each of those commitments ties the bank to the parent’s health. From the parent’s side, they are obligations that rating agencies, lenders and investors may want to see. A fintech group weighing a charter needed to price those commitments at the group level, because the charter’s cost was not confined to the bank’s own balance sheet.

What funding asked of a board

For the board of a chartered fintech, the funding conditions would be among the heaviest obligations it carried. A breach of a minimum capital condition or a liquidity requirement would be a breach of a written condition, enforceable as such. The board would need reporting against each condition, with early warning before any breach. That is a governance task as much as a treasury one.

Obligations: conditions in place of statutes

The third part is the center of the argument. Several federal statutes apply to banks because they are insured. An uninsured bank falls outside them. The OCC’s answer was to impose comparable duties as conditions of the charter.

Financial inclusion as a condition

The Community Reinvestment Act applies to insured depository institutions. An SPNB would not be one. The policy statement said the OCC expected a chartered fintech to demonstrate a commitment to financial inclusion, and that by providing a high standard similar to the Community Reinvestment Act’s expectations for insured national banks, the commitment would help ensure fair access and fair treatment. The supplement asked applicants to describe proposed goals, approaches, activities, milestones, commitment measures and metrics for serving the anticipated market and community.

The difference from a statute is in the source and the measure. Under the Community Reinvestment Act, the obligation and the evaluation framework come from law and regulation that apply to all covered banks. Under the fintech charter, the commitment would be drafted by the applicant, accepted by the OCC and enforced as a condition. Two chartered fintechs could carry very different commitments. A community group, a competitor or a partner bank wanting to know what a fintech bank owed its communities would have to read that bank’s approval letter.

Safety and soundness and recordkeeping

The supplement named two more statutes by section. It said certain provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, such as section 1831p-1 on safety and soundness standards and section 1829b on retention of records, only apply to insured depository institutions. When a law does not apply directly, it said, the OCC may, through a charter condition, work with the bank to achieve the goals of that statute, taking into account differences between a full-service bank and a special purpose bank.

That sentence describes the whole design. The OCC would decide, statute by statute and bank by bank, which goals of insured-bank law to carry over and how. The resulting obligations would be real and enforceable. They would also be bespoke. A compliance officer at a chartered fintech would need to map each condition to a control, and could not rely on the body of interpretation that surrounds a statute applied to every bank.

The contingency plan

The condition that set the charter apart was the contingency plan. Before final approval, an SPNB would have to develop a plan to address significant financial stress, with strategies for restoring the bank’s financial strength and options for selling, merging or liquidating it if recovery failed. The plan would be developed during the organization phase as a condition of preliminary approval, final approval would require the bank to implement and adhere to it, and the bank would review it annually. Significant changes would need the supervisory office’s non-objection. The OCC pointed applicants to its recovery planning guidelines for large insured banks as a useful resource.

The reason is the absence of deposit insurance. When an insured bank fails, the FDIC resolves it. An uninsured national bank does not fit that process in the same way. The release said the OCC had the authority and resources to unwind a fintech that became a national bank in the event that it failed. The contingency plan was the bank’s own part of that unwinding, written in advance.

What a contingency plan asks of operations

A plan to sell, merge or liquidate a bank is an operational document as much as a financial one. It needs to show which systems, contracts, data and staff a buyer or a liquidator would need, and whether they can be separated from the parent. For a fintech whose bank shares technology, staff and vendors with a parent, that separation can be hard. A credible plan would identify shared services, describe how each would continue during a sale or wind-down, and show that customer records could be produced quickly. Those are the same questions resolution planning asks of large banks, applied to a much smaller firm.

Conditions as enforceable obligations

The supplement said charter conditions are considered conditions imposed in writing and are enforceable under 12 U.S.C. 1818, the statute that gives bank regulators their enforcement powers. It also said the OCC publishes conditional approval letters monthly, does not generally publish operating agreements, and discloses when an operating agreement exists. A party trying to understand a chartered fintech’s obligations could read the conditional approval letters but might not see every term.

The law that applied anyway

Conditions filled gaps; they did not replace the general law for national banks. The supplement said an SPNB would be subject to the laws, rules, regulations and federal supervision that apply to all national banks. The risk assessment it asked for named Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering requirements, sanctions and cybersecurity among the risks to address. A chartered fintech would therefore carry two layers: the body of national bank law that applied by its terms, and the conditions written for its uninsured status. The compliance map had to show both, and had to mark which obligations came from which layer, because only the second could be changed by the OCC in a letter.

Staying inside the business plan

The supplement said the OCC imposes a condition on new charters requiring the bank not to deviate significantly from the business model in its application without the OCC’s prior non-objection. For a technology company used to changing products quickly, that condition could weigh heavily on daily operations. A new product line, a new customer segment or a new funding source could each be a significant deviation. The compliance function would need a process to test proposed changes against the approved plan and to seek non-objection in time. Product teams would need to know that the approved plan, not the market, set the pace of change.

Carrying forward other regulators’ remedies

One more condition addressed a fintech’s past. The supplement said the OCC would not let a company use a charter to escape a corrective program or enforcement action by another regulator. A pending enforcement action on a significant matter could be grounds for denial. Otherwise, after consulting the other regulator, the OCC would carry the company’s obligations forward through conditions on the approval. A fintech with open state findings could not leave them behind by converting.

Durability: what could change or undo the arrangement

The fourth part concerns whether the charter would last. Three risks stood out in July 2018: litigation over the OCC’s authority, the supervisory weight of conditions over time, and the possibility that companies would not apply at all.

Litigation over the meaning of banking

The central legal question was whether the National Bank Act’s business of banking requires taking deposits. State regulators argued that it does. The New York Department of Financial Services had already sued over the idea before the July 2018 decision, and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors had done the same, according to the Second Circuit’s later account. Both had been dismissed, on standing grounds and, in New York’s case, ripeness too, because the OCC had not yet decided whether to issue such charters. The July 2018 decision removed that obstacle. A company planning to apply had to expect a legal challenge and plan for the possibility that its charter could be contested.

Preemption as the stake

The states’ interest turned on preemption. A national bank can rely on federal law that displaces some state laws, including, in the states’ view, state interest rate caps and licensing. The Second Circuit later noted that New York had pointed to harms such as lenders obtaining a charter and locating in other states that authorize interest rates considered usurious in New York. A fintech that saw the charter as a route to a single national rulebook was, from the states’ perspective, seeking to escape their consumer protections. That tension did not depend on the outcome of any one case. It would follow any chartered fintech into every state where it lent.

Conditions that tighten over time

Conditions can be modified. The supplement said they generally remain in place until removed or modified by the OCC. A chartered fintech would face heightened supervision at first, as new banks do, and its conditions could be adjusted as the OCC learned about its business. That flexibility cuts both ways. It allows conditions to be relaxed as a bank matures, and it allows them to be tightened if the OCC sees new risks. A business plan built on today’s conditions is built on terms the supervisor can revisit.

State licenses on the way in

A fintech operating under state licenses that obtained a national charter would not shed its state relationships in a day. Its existing loans, contracts and customer disclosures were written under state law. It might be under a corrective program or enforcement action by a state regulator, which the supplement said the OCC would carry forward through conditions after consulting that regulator. And any business it kept outside the bank, in the parent or an affiliate, could remain under state licensing. The move from state to federal regulation would be a transition with overlapping obligations, and a fintech that planned it as a clean switch would underestimate the work. The same was true for its partner banks, whose contracts with the fintech would need review as its regulatory status changed.

Supervision in the early years

The supplement’s appendix said newly chartered SPNBs would be subject to more frequent and intensive supervision in their early years, consistent with the OCC’s policy for new banks, with frequent contact with the board and management. Each would have an assigned portfolio manager serving as examiner-in-charge, with expertise suited to its business model, and the same CAMELS rating framework as other national banks. It also said OCC executives would assess the agency’s ability and willingness to supervise a given SPNB based on the OCC’s risk appetite, resources and skill sets. That sentence is a reminder that the supervisor’s capacity was itself a condition of entry.

The risk that no one applies

The last durability risk was demand. A charter is useful only if companies want it. The costs were visible in the July 2018 documents: capital set by the OCC, liquidity conditions, a financial inclusion commitment, a contingency plan, heightened supervision, assessments, and the expectation of litigation. The benefits depended on what each company valued in a single national regime. For some, partnering with an existing bank or holding state licenses would remain cheaper.

What durability asked of competitors and partners

For incumbents, the durability question was a planning one. A credit union or community bank competing with fintech lenders, or a bank partnering with them, could not know in 2018 whether any would obtain a charter or how long it would last. The prudent response was to monitor the OCC’s monthly publication of conditional approvals and the litigation, and to treat a partner’s charter application as a material change in the relationship.

Objections, and where the argument is weakest

The argument here is that the fintech charter replaced statutes with conditions, and that this made each chartered fintech’s obligations bespoke. There are fair objections.

The objection that conditions are routine

The supplement said the OCC imposes certain conditions on all new national bank charters, special purpose banks included. On this view nothing in the fintech charter was new. That is fair as to the tool. What was new was the scope: the documents named whole statutes, including the Community Reinvestment Act’s expectations and Federal Deposit Insurance Act provisions on safety and soundness and recordkeeping, whose goals would be pursued through conditions. The tool was familiar. Its use as a substitute for statutory regimes was broader.

The objection that the OCC applies the same standards anyway

The policy statement said a chartered fintech would be subject to the same high standards of safety and soundness and fairness as all federally chartered banks. If the standards are the same, does the source matter? It matters for transparency and predictability. A statute applies the same text to every covered bank and builds up interpretation over time. Conditions vary by bank, may sit in unpublished operating agreements, and can be modified. The standards may be comparable, but the ability of outsiders to see and rely on them is not.

The objection that the states were simply protecting turf

Federal and state regulators have institutional interests, and one can read the litigation as a turf fight. That reading does not change the analysis. Whoever was right about the National Bank Act, the states’ concern about preemption of consumer protections was a real policy question, and a chartered fintech would face it in every state. The argument here does not depend on who should have won.

The objection that the charter favored large technology firms

A related concern is that a fintech charter could open banking to large technology companies with consumer reach and data that banks lack. The policy statement answered part of that fear by saying the decision did not alter existing barriers separating banking and commerce. Those barriers depend on the structure of the parent and on law outside the OCC’s charter decision. The objection is therefore about the boundaries of bank holding company law as much as about the charter. Within the charter itself, the bank-by-bank conditions described above would apply to any applicant, large or small.

The objection that the charter never mattered because it went unused

As the hindsight section shows, the path the July 2018 decision opened was not used in the way it was announced. One could argue the framework therefore did not matter. The design still matters, for two reasons. The questions it answered, what an uninsured bank owes and how it is wound down, recur whenever regulators consider new kinds of banks. And the framework remains on the books as a statement of how the OCC would approach such a bank.

What we would tell a bank’s chief risk officer today

Read the conditional approval letter of any chartered partner or competitor as you would read a statute, because for that bank it largely is one. Ask fintech partners directly about their charter plans and treat an application as a material change. Look at a chartered partner’s parent funding and any liquidity maintenance agreement, since the bank’s liquidity may depend on it. And for your own institution, keep a map from each regulatory obligation to its source, statute, rule or condition, so that a change in any of them can be traced to the controls it affects.

With hindsight

The challenge the July 2018 decision invited came quickly. According to the Second Circuit, the New York Department of Financial Services sued the OCC in the Southern District of New York on September 14, 2018, arguing that the business of banking under the National Bank Act requires taking deposits and that the OCC’s regulation was void as applied to nondepository fintechs. The district court agreed on the merits and entered an amended judgment setting aside the regulation as applied to nondepository fintech applicants. The OCC appealed.

On June 3, 2021, the Second Circuit reversed in Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. It held that the Department lacked Article III standing and that its claims were constitutionally unripe, because no nondepository fintech had filed a formal application for a special purpose charter and it was not known whether such an application would be granted. It remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, and said it expressed no view on the district court’s holding that the business of banking requires deposits. The court’s opinion also noted that the Conference of State Bank Supervisors had sued again on December 22, 2020, adding that Figure Technologies had applied for a special purpose charter; the court described that company as a fintech that the OCC allegedly had determined does accept deposits but would not be required to obtain deposit insurance.

The legal question the states raised was therefore never decided on appeal. The decision that ended New York’s case turned on the absence of any formal application from a nondepository fintech. In our reading, that absence also says something about demand for the charter as designed.

When the OCC later approved charters for digital asset firms, they came through a different route. On December 12, 2025, the OCC announced conditional approval of five national trust bank charter applications: de novo charters for First National Digital Currency Bank and Ripple National Trust Bank, and conversions from state trust companies for BitGo Bank & Trust, Fidelity Digital Assets and Paxos Trust Company. The OCC said that, subject to its conditions, these institutions would join approximately 60 other national trust banks it supervised. Those were trust charters, the category the 2018 supplement had expressly left outside its scope.

The December 2025 release described the approvals in terms that echo the 2018 design. It said the OCC had applied the same rigorous review and standards it applies to all charter applications and had reviewed each application on its individual merits, and that the institutions would join the federal system subject to meeting the OCC’s conditions. The approvals were conditional, as the 2018 supplement said every new charter’s would be. The release does not list the conditions, which sit in the individual decision letters it links. In our reading, bank-by-bank conditions were again where each new institution’s obligations were written.

What held up was the method. Conditional approval remained the OCC’s tool for admitting new kinds of banks, as the December 2025 release shows. What did not hold up was the expectation that nondepository lenders and payment companies would use the special purpose path announced in July 2018, at least on the record in these sources. The Second Circuit expressly left the core legal question, whether a national bank must take deposits, undecided.

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  • OCC
  • fintech charter
  • special purpose national bank
  • charter conditions
  • preemption