Medicare’s clinic-visit cut priced hospital departments by address and history
CMS’s July 2018 outpatient proposal cut Medicare’s rate for clinic visits at grandfathered off-campus hospital departments. It keyed the cut to a site’s location and 2015 billing history, and built a method CMS later reused for other services.
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Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
CMS’s July 2018 outpatient proposal cut Medicare’s rate for clinic visits at grandfathered off-campus hospital departments. It keyed the cut to a site’s location and 2015 billing history, and built a method CMS later reused for other services.
- The week On Wednesday, July 25, 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services released its proposed rule for the 2019 Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System, numbered CMS-1695-P. The agency’s fact sheet said the proposals would encourage site-neutral payment between sites of service and make health care prices more transparent for patients.
- The address: location and history decided which visits were cut The proposal did not reach every hospital outpatient visit.
- The service: why the clinic visit came first, and what could follow CMS applied the method to a single service in 2018.
- The authority: a volume-control power that kept the savings The third part concerns the legal footing.
- The bill: who absorbed the difference The fourth part concerns the cost.
- Objections, and where the argument is weakest The argument here is that the clinic-visit cut priced departments by address and history and created a reusable method.
- With hindsight CMS finalized the clinic-visit policy on November 2, 2018, in the 2019 outpatient final rule, CMS-1695-FC.
The week
On Wednesday, July 25, 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services released its proposed rule for the 2019 Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System, numbered CMS-1695-P. The agency’s fact sheet said the proposals would encourage site-neutral payment between sites of service and make health care prices more transparent for patients. Comments were due by September 24, 2018.
One proposal concerned a single service. CMS proposed to use its authority under the Medicare statute to control unnecessary increases in the volume of covered hospital outpatient department services by paying a Physician Fee Schedule-equivalent rate for the clinic visit when it was provided at an off-campus provider-based department paid under the outpatient system. The fact sheet called the clinic visit the most common service billed under the outpatient system and said it was often furnished in the physician office setting.
The fact sheet put numbers on the change. Medicare then paid about $116 for a clinic visit at such a department, with an average beneficiary copayment of $23. Applying what CMS called the PFS relativity adjuster of 40 percent would cut the payment to $46 and the copayment to $9, a saving to beneficiaries of $14 a visit on average. CMS estimated savings for the program of $760 million for 2019. It also said the cut would largely offset the proposed 1.25 percent update to outpatient payment rates, because paying visits at the lower rate was projected to reduce outpatient payments by 1.2 percent.
CMS’s press release the same day framed the change as a matter of what patients pay. It said CMS was moving toward site-neutral payments for clinic visits, described them as essentially check-ups with a clinician, and said CMS often paid more for the same type of visit in the hospital outpatient setting than in a physician’s office. It projected that patients would save about $150 million in lower copayments for visits at off-campus hospital outpatient departments.
The release flagged a second, related proposal. CMS said it was proposing to close a potential loophole through which providers were billing patients more for visits in hospital outpatient departments when they created new service lines. That proposal concerned off-campus departments that Congress had grandfathered in 2015, and whether they could add new kinds of services and still be paid at full outpatient rates.
The rest of the rule pointed the same way. CMS proposed to add procedures to the list payable at ambulatory surgical centers and to extend its reduced payment for drugs bought under the 340B program to non-excepted off-campus departments. It proposed to lower the device-intensive threshold from 40 percent to 30 percent of a procedure’s cost, which it said would better recognize high-cost devices at surgical centers. It also proposed removing a number of quality measures from the outpatient and surgical center reporting programs. Taken together, the proposals were about which setting Medicare would pay more for, and why.
The fact sheet also covered narrower payment mechanics. CMS proposed that services assigned to New Technology ambulatory payment classifications with fewer than 100 claims a year be paid using up to four years of data, and asked for comment on whether to use the geometric mean, the median or the arithmetic mean. It proposed to keep its high-cost and low-cost grouping for skin substitutes, reported seven device pass-through applications without proposing to approve or deny any of them, and updated per diem rates for partial hospitalization programs.
The July 2018 proposal reads, at first, as a price cut on one code. A health system finance team could model it in an afternoon: count the clinic visits billed from off-campus departments, multiply by the difference in rate, and phase it in. That reading is correct as far as it goes, and it misses how the cut was built. CMS did not set one rate for one service. It set a test that decided which visits the lower rate reached, chose a service to apply it to, rested it on a statutory power that, as CMS read it, did not require offsetting money elsewhere, and left each hospital to absorb the result in its own cost structure.
This article argues that the clinic-visit cut priced hospital departments by their address and their history rather than by the care inside them, and that it created a method CMS could reuse one service at a time. The analysis falls into four parts. The first is the address: the location and grandfathering tests that decided which departments were affected. The second is the service: why the clinic visit came first and how the same method could be pointed at other services. The third is the authority: the volume-control power CMS relied on and why it mattered that the cut was not budget neutral. The fourth is the bill: who bore the cost and what a health system could and could not change in response. A final section takes the strongest objections.
The parts do not overlap. The address decides where the rate applies. The service decides what it applies to. The authority decides whether the rate can stand and whether the savings stay with Medicare. The bill decides who absorbs the difference. A health system can do well on one and badly on another, and its planning can fail at any of the four.
This is a Medicare payment rule. It governs what traditional Medicare pays hospitals under the outpatient prospective payment system. Commercial contracts, Medicare Advantage plans and Medicaid programs set their own rates, and some reference Medicare methods while others do not. The analysis below is about Medicare fee-for-service unless it says otherwise, and organizations should check with counsel and their contracting teams before assuming that any Medicare rule carries into another payer’s terms.
The address: location and history decided which visits were cut
The proposal did not reach every hospital outpatient visit. It reached clinic visits at off-campus provider-based departments that were still paid under the outpatient system. Understanding that phrase requires three distinctions that matter to finance and compliance teams more than to clinicians.
On campus and off campus
A provider-based department is a part of a hospital that bills as the hospital. It can sit inside the main building, elsewhere on the campus, or at a separate site. Medicare rules treat on-campus and off-campus departments differently, and the 2018 proposal applied only to departments off the campus. An identical visit, with the same clinician and the same patient, would be paid at the full outpatient rate in a clinic on the hospital campus and at the reduced rate in a clinic across town. The line was geographic, and it followed the hospital’s real estate rather than the clinical content of the visit.
Excepted and non-excepted
The second distinction came from Congress. According to the D.C. Circuit’s later account, section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 left rates for existing off-campus departments untouched, and provided that off-campus departments coming into existence after the statute’s enactment would no longer be paid under the outpatient system. HHS read the replacement as a rate equivalent to the Physician Fee Schedule, and the change applied to every service at those new departments. The statute exempted departments that had furnished covered outpatient services before November 2, 2015. Those grandfathered sites became known as excepted departments.
The 2018 proposal reached into that grandfathered group. Before it, an excepted off-campus department was paid full outpatient rates for everything. After it, the department would be paid the lower rate for one service, the clinic visit, while keeping full rates for the rest. The proposal, in effect, turned the 2015 grandfathering from a status into a list of exceptions that CMS could shorten.
History as an asset
Because excepted status turned on whether a department had billed before November 2, 2015, a department’s history became a financial asset. The record that proved a site was billing before that date, at that address, was worth money every year. Whether a relocation, an expansion or a change of ownership preserves that status is governed by CMS rules this article does not cover, and organizations should confirm them with counsel before making any move.
For a health system, this meant that the facilities register, the provider enrollment file and the billing configuration had to agree. A department’s address on the enrollment record, its place-of-service and modifier logic in the billing system, and its status as excepted or not had to line up. A mismatch could mean billing the full rate where the lower one applied, or the reverse. The rule therefore created work for revenue integrity and enrollment teams, as well as for finance.
The clinical families proposal
The second proposal in the July rule pushed the history test further, as CMS’s final rule fact sheet later described it. CMS proposed that an excepted off-campus department could keep full outpatient rates for services in each of 19 proposed clinical families of services only if it had furnished and billed for a service in that family before November 2, 2015. A department that had offered primary care visits and later added, for example, imaging or infusion would have been paid the lower rate for the new line. CMS’s press release called this closing a potential loophole.
CMS did not finalize that proposal in November 2018, according to its final rule fact sheet, and said it would continue to monitor the expansion of services in excepted off-campus departments. The proposal still matters as a reading of intent. It showed that CMS saw the grandfathered status as tied to the services offered in 2015 rather than to the site alone. A system planning service-line growth at a grandfathered site after July 2018 had reason to treat its full-rate status for new services as uncertain.
Status travels with transactions
Excepted status also changed the arithmetic of mergers and affiliations. When one system acquires another, the acquired off-campus departments arrive with whatever status their history gives them. A diligence team that valued a target on its outpatient revenue needed to know which of the target’s sites were excepted, which services each had billed before the cutoff, and how exposed each was to the new method. After July 2018, that was a question about future rules as well as current rates. A buyer that priced a target on full outpatient rates for every off-campus visit was buying a revenue stream CMS had just proposed to cut.
The same point applied to joint ventures and to sites a system might lease or share. The legal entity that billed for a department, the address on the enrollment, and the dates on which services began all fed the status question. Each is a fact that a transaction can change, and each should be checked with counsel before a deal closes.
The claim as evidence
CMS’s November 2018 final rule identified excepted off-campus departments as those that bill modifier PO on claim lines, and non-excepted ones as those that bill modifier PN. The claim itself carries the address test. That makes the billing configuration a compliance control. A claim that marks an excepted department wrongly can be paid at the wrong rate, and the error repeats on every claim until someone finds it. A system that wanted assurance would test a sample of claims each quarter against the facilities register and the enrollment file, and would treat any mismatch as a finding with an owner and a date.
What the address test asked of operations
The practical consequence was a mapping exercise. A system needed to know, for each off-campus department, whether it was excepted, which services it had billed before the cutoff, which services it billed now, and how the billing system marked each claim. That map was the foundation for every forecast that followed. Without it, a finance team could not say how much revenue each later rule would touch.
The map also set the boundaries of choice. A system could decide where to put new services, but it could not change a site’s history. An excepted department’s status was fixed by events in or before 2015, and new off-campus sites that began billing after that date were generally paid on the lower schedule. The address test therefore narrowed the strategic question from where care should be delivered to which of the system’s existing sites still carried the higher rate, and for how long that rate would hold.
The service: why the clinic visit came first, and what could follow
CMS applied the method to a single service in 2018. The choice of service and the design of the method together explain why the proposal was a beginning rather than an end.
Volume and comparability
CMS gave two reasons for starting with the clinic visit. The fact sheet called it the most common service billed under the outpatient system, which meant the cut would have a large effect on spending. And CMS said the visit was also furnished in physician offices, which meant a comparison rate existed. Those two features, high volume and an obvious office equivalent, made the clinic visit the natural first target for a policy built on comparing settings.
The comparability argument was the policy’s core. CMS’s claim was that a visit at a hospital-owned clinic and a visit at an independent practice were the same service, and that Medicare should not pay more for the first because of the billing status of the building. The D.C. Circuit later summarized the result of the old rates: for the same outpatient service, off-campus departments obtained up to twice as much per patient in Medicare payments as physician practices did.
A method that could be repeated
The design was general even though the first application was narrow. CMS described the change as a method to control unnecessary increases in the volume of a service. Nothing in that framing limited it to clinic visits. Any service with growing volume in excepted off-campus departments and a comparable office setting could, in principle, be the next one. CMS’s own fact sheet for 2026 later confirmed that reading by describing the drug administration change as an expansion of the method adopted in 2018.
That repeatability is the feature a health system should have planned around in 2018. A one-time cut can be absorbed and forgotten. A method that the agency can extend in any annual rule turns into a standing risk to every service line with an office comparator. The annual outpatient rule became, from that year on, a document to read for which service would be named next.
How a finance team could rank its exposure
A system could sort its off-campus services by the same features CMS used. The first is volume in excepted off-campus departments. The second is the existence of a comparable office service with a Physician Fee Schedule rate. The third is the size of the gap between the outpatient rate and the office-equivalent rate. Services high on all three carried the greater exposure to future rules. This is a planning heuristic, not a CMS rule, and it would not predict the agency’s choices with certainty. It would, however, give the board a ranked list rather than a surprise each July.
Services that resist the comparison
Some services are harder to move to an office rate because the office setting is not a true equivalent. Services that need hospital-level staffing, equipment or emergency backup, or that serve patients too complex for an office, carry costs an office does not bear. CMS’s method assumed comparability, and the strongest argument a hospital could make against extension to a given service was evidence that the service at its sites was not, in fact, comparable. That argument depends on data about acuity, staffing and outcomes collected at the department level, and it is weaker without such data.
Mix inside a department
Exposure also depends on what a department does. A primary care clinic whose revenue comes mainly from visits was exposed to the 2018 cut almost in full. A department that combines visits with procedures, infusions or imaging was exposed in part, and its exposure depended on which of those services CMS named next. The useful unit of analysis was therefore the department’s service mix, not the department as a whole. Two sites with the same total revenue could face very different risks.
That mix analysis also shows where a single policy change interacts with clinical planning. A system that wanted to add infusion capacity at an excepted site in 2018 had to ask whether that capacity would keep full rates. The unfinalized clinical families proposal and the later drug administration rule both bore on that answer. Clinical and finance leaders who planned service lines together were better placed than those who planned them apart.
The order of the list
The order in which services were named mattered to cash flow. A system that understood its exposure by service could stage its responses: renegotiating physician arrangements tied to visit volume, reviewing staffing in departments where one service dominated, or reconsidering expansion plans that relied on full-rate billing. The clinic visit was named in 2018. Drug administration and imaging without contrast followed in later rules. A system that had ranked its services in 2018 would have seen both on its list.
The authority: a volume-control power that kept the savings
The third part concerns the legal footing. CMS did not rely on section 603 to cut rates at excepted departments, because Congress had exempted them. It relied instead on a separate provision in the outpatient payment statute, section 1833(t)(2)(F) of the Social Security Act, which directs the Secretary to develop a method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered outpatient services.
Why the authority mattered to the money
The choice of authority had a consequence for where the savings went. The outpatient system generally requires annual rate adjustments to be budget neutral, so a cut in one place is offset by increases elsewhere. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion described HHS’s decision not to apply the clinic-visit cut in a budget-neutral manner. The money saved stayed with Medicare and beneficiaries rather than being spread across other outpatient services. For a hospital, that meant the 2019 cut was a net reduction in outpatient revenue rather than a reallocation within it.
The fact sheet for the proposed rule made the same point in its own terms. It said the proposed 1.25 percent update to outpatient rates would be largely offset by the visit change, which was projected to reduce outpatient payments by 1.2 percent. A system’s finance team reading the July 2018 fact sheet could see that the year’s update was largely being taken back through a single service.
The volume evidence
CMS supported the use of the volume authority with data on growth. As the D.C. Circuit later recounted from the proposed rule, HHS observed that for 2016 through 2018 the volume and intensity of outpatient services grew annually by 6.5 percent, 5.8 percent and 5.4 percent. HHS projected that without changes volume would increase by 5.3 percent in 2019, leading to $75.3 billion in outpatient spending. The court added that outlays had been nearly $20 billion lower only a few years earlier. HHS concluded that the higher outpatient payment was likely to be giving providers an incentive to furnish care in the hospital outpatient setting.
The argument linked a payment difference to a shift in where care was delivered. That linkage is what made the volume authority available. If the growth had been caused by changes in illness or population, a method aimed at volume would have been harder to justify. HHS’s position was that the payment gap itself drove some of the growth, so closing the gap was a way to control unnecessary volume.
Reading the update and the cut together
A hospital budget can start from the annual update. A finance team that saw a proposed 1.25 percent increase and stopped there would have overstated its 2019 outpatient revenue. The update applies across all outpatient services, while the visit cut applied to one service at a subset of sites. For a system with a large excepted off-campus network, the net effect could be close to zero or negative; for a system without one, it was close to the full update. The national offset in CMS’s fact sheet was an average of those very different positions.
The practical step was to model the rule at the level of each department and code, using the system’s own claims, rather than applying the national percentages. That model also served as the baseline for every later year. When the method was extended, the same model needed only a new list of codes.
Why the litigation risk was real
Hospitals argued that the volume authority did not allow a service-specific, non-budget-neutral rate cut, and that section 603’s exemption showed Congress had chosen to leave grandfathered departments alone. Those arguments were serious. The district court agreed with the hospitals and set aside the regulation, as the D.C. Circuit later recorded. In July 2018, before any of that litigation, a health system had to plan for a cut whose legal footing was contested and whose future was uncertain in both directions.
Planning under legal uncertainty
The sensible response to a contested rule is to plan for both outcomes and decide in advance what each would trigger. A system could book revenue at the lower rate, treating any later court win as a recovery rather than an assumption. It could keep claims and remittance data organized by department and code so that any repayment or remedy could be calculated quickly. And it could avoid making irreversible decisions, such as closing or relocating a site, solely on the strength of an expected court outcome. Each of these is a choice for the system’s finance and legal leaders, and none is required by the rule.
What the word unnecessary carried
The statute speaks of unnecessary increases in volume. HHS’s argument was that growth driven by a payment difference, rather than by patient need, was unnecessary in that sense. Hospitals could respond that some growth reflected patients moving to hospital-owned sites for reasons of access, integration or quality. The dispute turned on inference rather than on direct evidence about individual visits. For a health system, the lesson for its own records was practical: data showing why patients were seen at a given site, such as referral patterns, acuity and continuity with hospital services, was the evidence that could answer a claim that its volume was unnecessary.
The authority as a template
The volume-control authority had one more feature. Once upheld, it could support further service-by-service changes without new legislation. That made the legal question in 2018 larger than one service. If the authority covered clinic visits, it could cover others. The stakes of the litigation were therefore the stakes of the whole method, and a system that read the case as a dispute over one code underestimated what was at issue.
The bill: who absorbed the difference
The fourth part concerns the cost. A rate cut moves money. The question for a health system is where the lost revenue lands and what can be done about it.
Beneficiaries and the program
CMS presented the change as a saving to patients and to Medicare. The proposed rule’s fact sheet estimated an average copayment saving of $14 a visit, and the press release projected about $150 million in lower copayments. Those figures reflect real reductions in what beneficiaries paid at affected departments. They do not, by themselves, say anything about whether access to care at those departments changed, which depends on how hospitals responded.
Hospitals and the costs that did not move
A hospital’s off-campus department carries costs that an independent office may not: hospital licensure and accreditation requirements, compliance with hospital conditions of participation, hospital-level wage scales and allocated overhead from the parent system. The rate cut reduced the department’s revenue without changing those costs. A department that had covered its costs at the full outpatient rate might not cover them at the lower one. That gap is the core of the bill for a health system.
The response options were limited and each carried trade-offs. A system could reduce cost at affected departments, for example by reviewing staffing models, space and allocated overhead. It could change which services were offered where, consistent with patient need and the address rules above. It could negotiate harder with commercial payers, though commercial terms are a separate negotiation and Medicare changes do not carry over automatically. Or it could accept lower margins at those departments as the price of keeping access in a community. Each of these choices has a cost, and some would affect patients.
Physicians and employment arrangements
Hospital-employed physicians can practice in off-campus departments, and a compensation plan built on work relative value units, which the Physician Fee Schedule sets, does not depend on the facility payment. The facility cut did not change the physician’s professional fee. It did change the economics of the department in which the physician worked. A system reviewing physician arrangements in response had to keep compensation consistent with fair market value and the federal physician self-referral and anti-kickback rules, and should involve counsel in any change.
Commercial contracts
Medicare rules do not set commercial rates, but some commercial contracts are written as a percentage of Medicare or refer to Medicare payment methods. A system needed to read its contracts to see whether any of them would follow the Medicare change automatically, and whether any payer could argue that they should. Contracts that pay hospital-based clinic visits at a percentage of the Medicare outpatient rate could carry the cut into commercial revenue without any new negotiation. Contracts with fixed fee schedules would not. Knowing which was which was a contract-management task, and it belonged in the same analysis as the Medicare model.
Cost reports and allocation
The cut also exposed how a system allocated overhead. Off-campus departments carry a share of the parent hospital’s costs through the cost report and internal allocation. When revenue at those departments fell, the allocation decided whether they appeared to lose money. A system that wanted to understand which departments were truly at risk needed to separate direct costs from allocated ones, and to see which allocated costs would remain if a department closed. That analysis is internal management accounting rather than a Medicare requirement, and it changes the conversation from a department’s reported loss to the system’s actual savings from any change.
Data that a system needed
Every response depended on department-level data: claims by code, site, payer and excepted status; direct and allocated costs; staffing; and patient mix. A system might hold that data in pieces across billing, cost accounting and enrollment systems. The 2018 proposal made joining those pieces a financial necessity, because each later service-specific rule would require the same analysis for a different set of codes.
What patients see
The same rule proposed steps on price transparency, and the copayment difference gave patients a concrete reason to care about setting. A beneficiary who pays a higher coinsurance at a hospital-owned clinic than at an independent office has a reason to ask why. A health system that wanted to keep patients at its off-campus sites needed to be able to explain its bills, including the separate facility charge that a hospital-based visit can carry. Front-desk scripts, statements and estimate tools were part of the response, alongside the finance analysis.
Rural and safety-net sites
The cut fell on all affected departments in the same way in 2018, but its effect was not the same everywhere. A department that is the only source of outpatient care in a rural area, or that serves a high share of low-income patients, may have fewer ways to cut cost or shift services without reducing access. The later rules, discussed in the hindsight section, describe an exemption for rural sole community hospitals. In 2018, systems with such sites had to make the case for them in comments and plan as if no exemption existed.
The incentive the rule left in place
The cut did not remove every incentive it targeted. Excepted departments still received full outpatient rates for services other than the clinic visit, and on-campus departments were untouched. A system could, in principle, shift services toward on-campus sites or toward services still paid at full rates. CMS’s clinical families proposal was an attempt to limit one form of that response. Its decision not to finalize that proposal left the gap open until later rules extended the method service by service.
Objections, and where the argument is weakest
The argument here is that the clinic-visit cut priced departments by address and history and created a reusable method. There are reasonable objections.
The objection that hospital costs are higher for real reasons
A hospital can argue that its off-campus departments bear costs offices do not, from standby capacity to regulatory requirements, and that a rate built for offices underpays them. This is a strong objection on the economics. It does not defeat the argument about design. The rule chose comparability between settings as its test and did not measure the cost differences hospitals pointed to. That choice is exactly why the address and the service mattered more than the care, which is the article’s claim.
The objection that the policy was about patients, not hospitals
CMS framed the change as lowering what beneficiaries paid. That framing is accurate as to copayments at affected sites. It does not change the structure analyzed here: the beneficiary saving and the hospital’s revenue loss were two sides of the same rate change, and the hospital’s response determined whether the saving came with any change in access. Both effects are real.
The objection that the courts were the real decision point
One could argue that nothing in 2018 mattered until the litigation ended. In one sense that is right: the rule’s future was uncertain. But systems had to set budgets, rates and plans in 2018 and 2019 regardless. Waiting for the courts was itself a decision with consequences. A system that planned for both outcomes was better placed than one that assumed either.
The objection that the method would not be extended
In 2018 it was possible to argue that CMS would stop at clinic visits, especially after it declined to finalize the clinical families proposal. The later record answers this objection, as the hindsight section shows. The narrower point is that the design allowed extension from the start, and a planning process should account for what a rule permits as well as what it does in its first year.
The objection that the cut was too small to matter
CMS projected that the visit change would reduce outpatient payments by 1.2 percent, which looks modest for the system as a whole. The figure is an average. For a system whose off-campus network is weighted toward primary care visits at excepted sites, the effect was larger, and for one with few off-campus sites it was smaller. Averages also hide the effect on individual departments, where the decision to keep, move or close a site is made. The size of the national figure says little about the size of any one system’s exposure.
The objection that this was always a Congress question
Some argued that site-neutral payment for grandfathered departments should be decided by Congress, which had chosen to protect them in 2015. That is a policy view and a reasonable one. It does not change the planning consequence for a health system: whatever the right institutional answer, CMS had asserted an authority, and the system had to plan for its use.
What we would tell a health system finance leader today
Build and keep current a department-level map of excepted status, services and billing configuration. Rank off-campus services by volume, office comparability and rate gap, and treat the top of that list as exposed to future rules. Read each annual outpatient rule for the next named service and model it within days. Separate direct from allocated costs before deciding the future of any department. And keep the department’s history, the evidence of what it billed and where before November 2, 2015, as carefully as any other financial record, because it still carries value.
With hindsight
CMS finalized the clinic-visit policy on November 2, 2018, in the 2019 outpatient final rule, CMS-1695-FC. Its fact sheet said CMS was exercising its authority to apply a Physician Fee Schedule-equivalent rate to the clinic visit at off-campus departments paid under the outpatient system, phased in over two years. For 2019, the first year of the phase-in, the payment fell to $81 with a beneficiary copayment of $16, an average saving of $7 a visit, and CMS estimated savings of $380 million. CMS did not finalize the clinical families proposal and said it would continue to monitor the expansion of services in excepted off-campus departments.
The policy then went to court. According to the D.C. Circuit, the district court agreed with the hospitals that the rate reduction fell outside HHS’s statutory authority and set aside the regulation. On July 17, 2020, the D.C. Circuit reversed in American Hospital Association v. Azar, holding that the regulation rested on a reasonable interpretation of HHS’s authority to adopt volume-control methods. It rejected the hospitals’ argument that section 603 barred cuts to grandfathered departments, reasoning that the 2015 law exempted those departments from the change it mandated, not from all later adjustments. The Supreme Court’s docket shows that rehearing in the D.C. Circuit was denied on October 16, 2020, that the hospitals’ petition for certiorari was denied on June 28, 2021, and that a petition for rehearing was denied on August 23, 2021.
The method was then extended, as the design allowed. CMS’s fact sheet for the 2026 outpatient final rule, dated November 21, 2025, said CMS had expanded the policy to drug administration services furnished in excepted off-campus departments, using the same section 1833(t)(2)(F) authority. CMS estimated that the change would reduce outpatient spending by $290 million in 2026, of which $220 million would accrue to Medicare and $70 million to beneficiaries through lower coinsurance.
On November 4, 2026, CMS issued the 2027 outpatient final rule, CMS-1850-F. Its fact sheet said CMS was finalizing a policy to apply the volume control method to imaging without contrast, including certain bone density scans, x-rays, ultrasounds, CT scans and MRIs, at excepted off-campus departments. It said CMS was exempting rural sole community hospitals from that policy, as it did for the existing clinic-visit and drug administration policies.
What held up was the method. A single-service cut in 2018 became, through the courts and later rules, a tool CMS has applied to three service groups as of the November 2026 rule. The address test also held: the 2015 grandfathering date and off-campus status still decide which departments are affected. The 2027 fact sheet also describes an exemption for rural sole community hospitals across all three policies; the 2018 fact sheets did not mention one. What did not happen was the clinical families limit, which CMS did not finalize in 2018 and has not, as far as these fact sheets show, revived. In our reading, health systems that mapped their departments and ranked their services in 2018 had a starting point for modeling the 2026 and 2027 changes.
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