GAO’s 2019 high-risk list tied 16 other risks to missing skills
GAO’s March 2019 update found skills gaps played a significant role in 16 of the 34 other areas on its High-Risk List. Its three kinds of gap, staffing, planning and training, belong in every corrective action plan.
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GAO’s March 2019 update found skills gaps played a significant role in 16 of the 34 other areas on its High-Risk List. Its three kinds of gap, staffing, planning and training, belong in every corrective action plan.
- The week On March 6, 2019, the Government Accountability Office publicly released its biennial update of the federal High-Risk List, GAO-19-157SP, titled High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas.
- Staffing: too few people to oversee the work Several staffing examples in GAO’s table share a pattern.
- Workforce planning: not knowing which skills the work needs The second heading is harder to see, because the gap is an absence of information.
- Training: people in the role without the skills The third heading covers people who hold the right job title but lack a skill the job now requires.
- Capacity: the criterion that scores the people GAO’s five criteria give the workforce finding its weight.
- Measures: the evidence that each gap is closing GAO’s fifth criterion, demonstrated progress, asks for results.
- Where the argument is weakest Five objections deserve an answer.
- A skills register for a program on the list Pulling the parts together, we think a program on the high-risk list, or close to it, would benefit from a simple register kept by the program office and reviewed alongside cost and schedule.
- With hindsight On May 2, 2019, the President signed Executive Order 13870, “America’s Cybersecurity Workforce,” published in the Federal Register on May 9 at 84 FR 20523.
The week
On March 6, 2019, the Government Accountability Office publicly released its biennial update of the federal High-Risk List, GAO-19-157SP, titled High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas. The list names government operations that GAO judges vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement, or in need of transformation. The report put the scale in context: about $4.1 trillion in federal outlays in fiscal year 2018.
The headline finding was slow movement. GAO said the ratings for more than half of the 35 areas on the 2019 list remained largely unchanged. Since its 2017 update, seven areas had improved, three had regressed, and two showed mixed progress, improving on some criteria and declining on others. GAO removed two areas, Department of Defense Supply Chain Management and Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data, because each met all five of its criteria for removal. Two areas were new since 2017: the Government-Wide Personnel Security Clearance Process, added in 2018 outside the usual cycle, and Department of Veterans Affairs Acquisition Management, added in 2019. For the VA area, GAO identified seven contracting challenges, among them outdated acquisition regulations and policies, the lack of an effective medical supplies procurement strategy, and inadequate acquisition training.
GAO scores every area against five criteria it issued in November 2000: leadership commitment, capacity, an action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress. Since its 2015 update it has rated each criterion as met, partially met or not met. In 2019, 24 areas had met or partially met all five criteria, and 20 of those had fully met at least one. Ten areas had neither met nor partially met one or more criteria.
GAO singled out nine areas needing especially focused executive and congressional attention, including Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation, Managing Risks and Improving VA Health Care, and the 2020 Decennial Census. Beyond those, it said focused attention was needed to address mission-critical skills gaps in 16 high-risk areas. In the body of the report it put the finding precisely: of the 34 other high-risk areas covered, skills gaps played a significant role in 16. It listed them in a table, labeling each example as staffing, workforce planning or training, with a few entries combining two labels. In the text it named the same three causes: an insufficient number of staff, inadequate workforce planning and a lack of training in critical skills.
The report also assessed Strategic Human Capital Management, the area GAO added to the list in 2001. As of December 2018, GAO said, the Office of Personnel Management had not fully implemented 29 of its recommendations made since 2012 in that area. GAO rated the area as meeting the leadership commitment criterion, partially meeting capacity, action plan and monitoring, and not meeting demonstrated progress, with all five ratings unchanged since 2017. It noted that 31.6 percent of permanent federal employees on board as of September 30, 2017, would be eligible to retire within the next five years.
On cybersecurity, GAO said it had made more than 3,000 recommendations to agencies since 2010, of which about 700 had not yet been implemented. It named four major cybersecurity challenges facing the nation and ten critical actions to address them, one of which was addressing cybersecurity workforce management challenges.
A high-risk list invites a reader to look for the biggest problem on it. The 2019 update had obvious candidates: the census, veterans’ health care, the cybersecurity of the nation. But the more useful finding for an agency program director was buried in the middle of the report, in a table on pages 60 and 61. GAO looked across the other 34 areas on the list and found that a shortage of people or skills had played a significant role in 16 of them. Missing skills were not a separate risk sitting beside the others. They were, in GAO’s words, “a root cause of many high-risk areas.”
Our argument is that this finding changes how an agency should read its own entry on the list. If a program is high risk partly because the agency lacks the people to run it, then a corrective action plan that lists systems, policies and milestones without a workforce line is missing a cause. GAO’s table gives a usable way to break the problem down, because it labeled its examples with three headings (a few entries combine two). We use those headings, add the scoring rule that turns them into a rating, and close with the objections:
- Staffing: too few people, or slow hiring, for work the agency already knows it must do.
- Workforce planning: not knowing, or not recording, which skills the work requires.
- Training: people in the role who have not been given the skills it needs.
- Capacity: the criterion through which GAO scores all three, and why it decides whether an area can leave the list.
- Measures: the evidence that would show each kind of gap closing.
- Objections: where the argument is weakest, and what it does not claim.
The three headings are GAO’s, not ours, and they separate cleanly. A gap is either a shortage of bodies in roles that are defined, a failure to define the roles, or a failure to equip the people already in them. Each calls for a different fix, owned by a different office, and measured in a different way. Treating them as one undifferentiated “workforce problem” may be why progress is hard to show.
Staffing: too few people to oversee the work
Several staffing examples in GAO’s table share a pattern. The agency had decided what it wanted to do, and in some cases had bought the work from a contractor, but lacked enough of its own people to carry it out or oversee it.
The census contract
The clearest case was the 2020 Decennial Census. GAO’s table cited a lack of staff to oversee the $886 million contract for integrating the information technology systems needed to conduct the census. The census was one of the nine areas GAO said needed especially focused attention. The Census Bureau planned several innovations for 2020, including new IT systems, and GAO said those innovations, along with other challenges, put a cost-effective census at risk.
The point for other agencies is the shape of the gap, not the census itself. An integration contract moves the engineering work to a vendor. It does not move the accountability. Someone in the agency still has to read the vendor’s schedule, test its claims, accept or reject deliverables and decide when to escalate. If those people are too few, the contract runs on the vendor’s account of its own progress. GAO’s description fits that risk: the shortfall was in staff to oversee the contract, not in staff to write code.
Hiring speed as a staffing gap
The Department of Defense business systems entry made a related point from the hiring side. GAO cited slow and inefficient hiring processes that had led to challenges in recruiting and retaining qualified chief information officers and IT personnel. The Department of Energy’s contract management entry, covering the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of Environmental Management, said competing agency priorities and limited hiring had contributed to critical staff shortages to manage and oversee strategic materials programs. DOD contract management cited challenges in recruiting talent for acquisition management.
Read together, these entries suggest that a staffing gap is a matter of time as well as money. An agency may have the authority and money to fill a role and still be unable to fill it in time, because the hiring process takes longer than the program can wait. We think a program director should treat time-to-hire for mission-critical roles as a program risk with an owner, measured in the same review as schedule and cost, rather than as a human resources statistic reported somewhere else.
Staffing in service delivery
Not every staffing gap was about technology. GAO cited insufficient numbers of community care staff and medical support assistants in VA health care, and said the difficulty of recruiting and retaining skilled health care providers and human resources staff at the Veterans Health Administration’s medical centers made it hard to meet the needs of more than 9 million veterans. For federal disability programs, it noted that the Social Security Administration’s disability appeals plan called for increased hiring to reduce backlogs and improve timeliness. Under the area on programs that serve tribes and their members, it cited shortages of expert staff to review energy proposals and shortages of health care providers.
These are reminders that the people an IT program depends on include the people who use what it builds. A new scheduling or case management system in an understaffed clinic or claims office may not produce the expected gains, because the bottleneck may sit with the staff, not the software. Program directors may want to state that dependency in the business case before the system is bought, so that the staffing plan for the users is part of the decision.
Retirement eligibility as a staffing forecast
GAO added a forward-looking warning in its human capital appendix. It said the changing nature of federal work and the high percentage of employees eligible for retirement could produce gaps in leadership and institutional knowledge, and could aggravate the problems created by existing skills gaps. Its figure was that 31.6 percent of permanent federal employees on board as of September 30, 2017, would be eligible to retire within the next five years, with some agencies having particularly high levels.
Eligibility is not departure, and GAO did not say how many would leave. But eligibility data turns a future staffing gap into something a program can see in advance. A program office can ask, for each mission-critical role, whether the person holding it is eligible to retire within the program’s planning horizon, and whether anyone else on staff could do the work. Where the answer to both is yes and no, the program has a staffing risk with a date range attached. We think that is more useful to a program director than an agency-wide percentage, because it names the roles and the knowledge at stake.
Knowledge transfer is the hard part. A system’s design history, a contract’s negotiating record and the reasons behind an exception are not always written down in full; they may live with the people who handled them. A program that waits for a retirement notice to start transferring that knowledge may find there is not enough time left to do it well.
Workforce planning: not knowing which skills the work needs
The second heading is harder to see, because the gap is an absence of information. An agency can be short of skills it has never listed. GAO’s workforce planning examples were mostly of this kind.
The CIO’s role in workforce planning
Under Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations, GAO reported that none of the 24 major federal agencies had IT management policies that fully addressed the role of their chief information officers. The majority, it said, minimally addressed or did not address the CIO’s role in assessing agency IT workforce needs and developing strategies and plans to meet them.
That finding matters because the CIO is an official well placed to know which technical skills an agency will need as it modernizes. If agency policy does not give the CIO a role in workforce planning, the people who decide what to build and the people who decide whom to hire may be working from different lists. A new cloud platform, a data analytics program or a zero trust architecture each implies skills the agency may not have. The decision to adopt them and the decision to hire for them can be separated by a reporting line.
New delivery models without a skills map
The Department of Homeland Security entry put the same gap in operational terms. GAO cited a lack of guidance on how to identify the critical cybersecurity and acquisition skills needed to support the department’s new IT delivery model. At DOD, it cited an incomplete assessment of the extent to which personnel met IT management knowledge and skill requirements. At VA health care, it cited no annual tracking and reviewing of data related to the IT skills needed in the future. Under Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources, it said the agency lacked a plan for identifying key positions and their technical competencies.
In each case, the agency had changed or planned to change how it worked, and had not written down what that change required of its people. We think this kind of gap can stay invisible from the top. A staffing shortage shows up as vacancies. A training shortfall shows up in error rates or audit findings. A planning gap shows up as nothing at all, until a project stalls because nobody on staff can do a task that no one listed.
A planning tool already existed
The government was not without tools. GAO noted that OPM’s regulation on strategic human capital management, which took effect in April 2017, required executive branch agencies to issue human capital operating plans that must, in part, describe the agencies’ skills gaps and the strategies to be used for closing them. OPM had built a multi-factor model for identifying skills gaps and planned to launch an automated version in mid-2019. It supported Federal Agency Skills Teams, which set goals for closing gaps across occupations, and gave agencies a quarterly dashboard of 12 metrics on their progress.
So the requirement to plan existed in regulation. What GAO’s table showed was that, across a large part of the list, the plans had not reached the specific programs at risk. A department-level human capital plan can describe gaps in occupations, such as IT specialists or contracting officers, without describing the gap in a particular program, such as the people needed to oversee one integration contract. Program directors are well placed to close that distance, because they know the program’s tasks in detail.
Planning for the oversight role itself
One planning gap deserves separate mention because it links back to the census example. When an agency decides to buy a capability rather than build it, the skills it needs change. It needs fewer people who can do the engineering and more who can specify it, evaluate proposals, test deliverables, read a vendor’s schedule and manage changes. Those are distinct skills, and an agency’s workforce plan may not list them if it was written for in-house delivery.
We think the decision to contract out a major system should prompt a short planning step: list the oversight tasks the contract will create, estimate how many people they need at each stage, and name who will do them. GAO’s DHS example, a lack of guidance on identifying the critical cybersecurity and acquisition skills needed for a new IT delivery model, describes what can happen when that step is skipped. The delivery model changed; the skills map did not.
Training: people in the role without the skills
The third heading covers people who hold the right job title but lack a skill the job now requires. GAO’s training examples were fewer than its staffing ones, but they were specific.
Acquisition training
The new VA Acquisition Management area cited a lack of training for contracting officers, and the report’s summary listed inadequate acquisition training among the seven contracting challenges GAO identified at VA. GAO described VA as having one of the most significant acquisition functions in the federal government, both in obligations and number of contract actions. A training gap in a function of that size can reach every program that buys through it.
The link to technology programs is direct. A contracting officer who has not been trained to buy cloud services, software subscriptions or agile development work may default to contract structures built for hardware or fixed deliverables. The program then inherits terms that fit poorly. In our view, a program director who depends on a contracting office should know whether the officers assigned have been trained for the kind of purchase being made, and should raise the question early when they have not.
Technical skills for a specific system
At DHS, GAO cited insufficient technical skills to support its biometric identification services program. Under the oil and gas area, it said there had been no evaluation of training needs or training effectiveness. Under the programs serving tribes, it said limited funding and the lack of a safety training plan had contributed to incomplete training to protect Bureau of Indian Education schools. Under VA health care, it cited no assessment of the training needs, or monitoring of completed training, for patient advocate positions.
Two of these examples are about measurement rather than delivery: no evaluation of training needs, no monitoring of completed training. We think that distinction is useful. An agency may run training and still not know whether it closed the gap it was meant to close. A training record shows attendance. It does not show that the person can now do the task. For roles tied to a high-risk program, an agency may want evidence of the skill itself, such as a supervised task, a certification tied to the role or a review of work produced, alongside the attendance record.
Cybersecurity as a training and staffing problem
For Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation, GAO’s table listed staffing and training together, and pointed to the administration’s June 2018 government reform plan, which included recommendations for solving the federal cybersecurity workforce shortage. Those included prioritizing and accelerating efforts to reform how the government recruits, evaluates, selects, pays and places cyber talent. GAO had first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997, expanded it to protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015, and updated it in 2018 to reflect the lack of a comprehensive federal cybersecurity strategy.
Cybersecurity is where all three headings meet. Agencies may lack enough people, may not have mapped the specific skills each security role requires, and may not have trained existing IT staff for security duties. One reason the area has proved hard to close, as we read the report, is that a fix for one heading does not close the other two. Hiring more analysts does not help if their roles are not defined. Defining roles does not help if nobody can be hired into them. Training helps people already on staff but does not create new positions.
Capacity: the criterion that scores the people
GAO’s five criteria give the workforce finding its weight. The second criterion, capacity, is defined as the agency having “the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to resolve the risk(s).” An area cannot leave the list on GAO’s criteria without meeting it.
Why capacity is the hinge
The other criteria can be met largely on paper. Leadership commitment can be shown through statements, governance and attention from senior officials. An action plan is a document. Monitoring is a process. Capacity is different, because it asks whether the agency has the people and resources to carry out the plan. A strong plan that depends on staff the agency does not have may score well on one criterion and poorly on another.
The Strategic Human Capital Management area illustrated the pattern. GAO rated OPM as meeting the leadership commitment criterion, and noted OPM’s regulation, guidance, training and quarterly review of agency data. Capacity, action plan and monitoring were rated partially met, and demonstrated progress was rated not met. On GAO’s account, the government had committed leaders and tools for the workforce problem, but had not yet shown results.
Reading your own rating
For a program director whose area is on the list, the ratings table may be read as a diagnosis. An area rated as meeting leadership commitment but only partially meeting capacity is telling the agency that its senior officials have said the right things and its people and resources have not caught up. An area that partially meets capacity and fails demonstrated progress may be failing on the second because of the first.
We would add one practical step. When an agency writes or updates its corrective action plan for a high-risk area, it can include a workforce section organized by GAO’s three headings: the roles that are unfilled and how long they have been open; the skills the plan needs that have not been mapped to any role; and the training required for staff already in place, with the evidence that will show it worked. That gives GAO, the agency’s inspector general and the agency’s own leaders a way to see progress on capacity, rather than inferring it from progress elsewhere.
Capacity includes contractors
GAO’s definition of capacity says people and resources, not employees. For an agency that relies on contractors, that raises a question about how contractor staff count. If the work is done by a vendor and overseen by federal staff, the capacity question has two parts: whether the vendor has qualified people, and whether the agency has enough qualified people to oversee them. The census example sat in the second part.
Contract terms can help with the first part. An agency may ask, in solicitations for IT and cybersecurity work, for a statement of the knowledge and skills each labor category requires and for reporting that shows the people assigned meet them. That gives the agency evidence of vendor capacity it can check, rather than a résumé reviewed once at award. It does not solve the oversight gap, which needs the agency’s own people.
Measures: the evidence that each gap is closing
GAO’s fifth criterion, demonstrated progress, asks for results. For workforce gaps, results need measures that an outside reviewer can check. Each of the three headings suggests its own.
Staffing measures
For staffing, the useful measures are about roles and time: the number of mission-critical roles the program needs, how many are filled, how long each vacancy has been open, and how long recent hires took from request to start. A falling count of vacancies with a rising average age can hide a problem, so we would report both. For roles filled by contractors, the measure is whether a named federal official oversees the work and how many such officials there are relative to the contract’s size and complexity.
Planning measures
For planning, the measure is coverage: of the tasks in the program’s current plan that need specialized skills, how many are mapped to a role, and how many of those roles are filled. A program that adopts a new technology should see coverage drop and then recover as roles are defined and filled. A program whose coverage never changes may not be updating its map when its plan changes.
Training measures
For training, the measure should be ability, not attendance. GAO’s examples of no evaluation of training needs or effectiveness, and no monitoring of completed training, point to the gap. A program can define, for each role, one or two tasks that show the skill, and record when each person last demonstrated them. That record is harder to build than a list of completed courses. It is also the evidence that would persuade a reviewer that a training gap has closed.
Putting the measures in front of the right people
Measures help only if someone with authority looks at them. We would put the staffing, coverage and ability measures in the same program review that covers cost, schedule and risk, so that a slipping hiring timeline is discussed alongside the schedule slip it may cause. When the measures are reported to a separate human capital forum, the program’s leaders may not see them until the consequences arrive.
Where the argument is weakest
Five objections deserve an answer.
Skills gaps may be a symptom, not a cause
One objection is that skills gaps follow from deeper problems: budgets, pay rules, procurement law, political priorities. If an agency cannot pay market rates for cybersecurity specialists, calling the result a skills gap names the symptom. The point is fair as far as it goes, and GAO’s own reporting supports it. Its table cited slow hiring processes and limited funding as causes, and the cybersecurity entry pointed to reforms in how the government pays and places cyber talent. But a cause outside the agency’s control does not remove the need to plan around it. An agency that cannot hire at market pay can still map the skills it needs, train its existing staff, and design contracts and programs that ask less of scarce roles. The three headings still apply. They just shift weight toward planning and training when staffing is constrained.
Sixteen of 34 is GAO’s judgment
A second objection is that the count of 16 is a qualitative judgment. GAO said skills gaps “played a significant role” in those areas, and the table gave examples rather than a score. Another reviewer might count differently. We accept that, and we do not rest the argument on the number. The argument rests on the pattern: across defense, health care, census, security, acquisition and benefits programs, GAO found the same three kinds of gap. A different count would not change the structure.
Some areas on the list are not about people
A third objection is that several high-risk areas are about program design, legal authority or financial exposure, not the workforce. Resolving the federal role in housing finance and the insurance programs of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, both among GAO’s nine areas for focused attention, are, as we read them, largely questions of policy and finance. We agree, and it is why GAO’s count was 16 of 34 rather than all of them. The argument is limited to the areas where people were part of the cause. For those, a plan without a workforce section is incomplete.
Workforce plans can become paperwork
The fourth objection is the strongest. A requirement to describe skills gaps in a plan can produce plans that describe gaps without closing them. OPM’s regulation already required human capital operating plans to describe gaps and strategies. GAO still rated demonstrated progress as not met. Adding a workforce section to a high-risk action plan could produce one more document.
Our answer is that the section should be built around evidence, not description. A vacancy has a date it opened. A skill has a role it is mapped to. A training program has a measure of whether people can now do the task. Those are facts an inspector general or GAO can check. A narrative about workforce challenges is not. The risk of paperwork is real, and the defense against it is to report counts, dates and tests rather than intentions.
The big levers are outside the agency
The fifth objection is that pay scales, hiring authorities, position classification and appropriations are set by Congress, OPM and OMB, not by a program office. A register kept by a program director cannot change them. That is true, and GAO’s own framing recognized it: it said congressional actions had been critical in spurring progress where areas improved. Our response is that the register is how a program makes the case for those levers. An agency asking for a special hiring authority or additional positions is in a stronger position when it can show which roles are vacant, for how long, and what the vacancies have cost the program in delay. Without that evidence, a request for help looks like every other request.
A skills register for a program on the list
Pulling the parts together, we think a program on the high-risk list, or close to it, would benefit from a simple register kept by the program office and reviewed alongside cost and schedule. It would hold three lists that match GAO’s three headings.
The first list would hold the program’s mission-critical roles, each with its status: filled, vacant with the date it opened, or filled by a contractor with the name of the federal official who oversees the work. The second would hold the skills the program’s current plan requires that are not yet assigned to any role, with an owner for deciding where each will sit. The third would hold the training required for staff already in place, with the evidence that will show it has worked and the date that evidence is due.
None of the three lists requires a new system or a new office. Each can be built from information a program office may already hold in hiring requests, project plans and training records. The work is in putting them side by side, so that a decision to adopt a new technology or contract structure prompts an immediate question about the people it needs. GAO’s 2019 table suggests that question was not being asked, or not being answered, in a large share of the programs on the list.
Who keeps it and who reads it
We would make the program manager the owner of the register, with the agency’s chief human capital officer and chief information officer as its regular readers. The program manager knows the tasks. The human capital office controls hiring actions, position descriptions and training budgets. The CIO sees the technology plans that will change which skills are needed next. GAO’s finding that agency policies minimally addressed, or did not address, the CIO’s role in assessing IT workforce needs suggests that this three-way reading may not happen by default. A standing quarterly review, with the register as the single document on the table, is one way to make it happen.
The register should also travel with the program. When a program changes managers, the incoming manager inherits a record of which roles are open, which skills are unmapped and which training is unproven. When an inspector general or GAO team arrives, the register is the document to hand over at the start, because it answers the capacity question in the program’s own terms. And when the agency updates its human capital operating plan under OPM’s regulation, the registers from its high-risk programs give the department-level plan the program-level detail that GAO’s table suggests was missing.
Starting small
A program office does not need to build the whole register at once. It can start with the five or ten roles without which the program would stop, record their status and the knowledge each holder carries, and add the planning and training lists as the next plan update approaches. A partial register that is kept current is worth more than a complete one that is written once for an audit and then left alone.
The list of roles without which the program would stop is itself a useful exercise. Writing it down forces the program to say which people it depends on, and may show that some of them are contractors whose departure the agency would learn of from the vendor. That is a staffing and oversight risk the agency can manage once it can see it, for example by requiring notice of key personnel changes in the contract and by pairing each such role with a federal counterpart who understands the work.
The register also gives an agency something to show GAO when the capacity criterion is assessed. An area that can show its vacancies closing, its unmapped skills shrinking and its training evidence improving has a factual case for moving from partially met to met. An area that can show none of this may stay where it is, whatever its leadership says and however good its plan reads.
With hindsight
On May 2, 2019, the President signed Executive Order 13870, “America’s Cybersecurity Workforce,” published in the Federal Register on May 9 at 84 FR 20523. Its provisions read like answers to GAO’s three headings. For knowledge transfer, it directed the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with OMB and OPM, to establish a cybersecurity rotational assignment program and to report on the proposed program within 90 days. For planning, it asked that report to evaluate using the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, the NICE Framework, as the basis for cybersecurity skill requirements for program participants. It also told the Administrator of General Services, in consultation with OMB and Commerce and to the maximum extent practicable, to incorporate the NICE Framework lexicon and taxonomy into the knowledge and skill requirements used in contracts for IT and cybersecurity services, and to ensure those contracts include reporting that lets agencies evaluate whether contractor personnel have the knowledge and skills for the tasks specified. For training, it directed OPM, within 180 days, to identify cybersecurity aptitude assessments agencies could use to find current employees with the potential to acquire cybersecurity skills for reskilling. It also called for a plan for an annual President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition for federal civilian and military employees.
The contract provision deserves attention because it reached the capacity question from the vendor side. It asked for evidence, through contract reporting, that the people doing the work had the skills, measured against a common framework. That is the kind of check we argue an agency needs for contractor capacity. The order did not, and could not, address the other side of the census example: whether an agency has enough of its own people to oversee the vendor.
GAO’s later updates show the problem still on the list. In its 2023 update, published April 20, 2023, GAO added the federal prison system to the list, partly because of the Bureau of Prisons’ longstanding challenges managing staff and resources. In its 2025 update, published February 25, 2025, the list held 38 areas after GAO added one on federal disaster assistance. GAO said ten areas had improved and three had regressed since 2023. It also said that twenty areas were on the list in part due to skills gaps or an inadequate number of staff. That figure was framed differently from the 2019 count of 16 of 34 other areas, so the two numbers are not a like-for-like trend, and we do not treat them as one. But both describe a large share of the list. In the 2025 table, Strategic Human Capital Management showed no change since 2023, and Improving IT Acquisitions and Management was marked as declining. Of the 1,881 recommendations GAO had made in the IT acquisitions area since 2010, it said 463 remained open as of January 2025.
What held up is the structure. Staffing, planning and training remain distinct problems with distinct fixes, and GAO still ties a large part of its list to skills gaps and staff shortages. What we would add from today is that the contract lever, which the 2019 executive order pointed to, is a part an agency controls directly. An agency cannot change federal pay rules on its own. It can write skill requirements and reporting into the contracts it signs this year, and it can staff the oversight of those contracts as a named, tracked part of the program.
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