The FCC’s CIO rule named money and hiring and left contracts out
In February 2019 the FCC wrote its CIO’s statutory role into its rules. The text covered budgets, governance and hiring but not technology contracts. A technology leader’s mandate is four separate levers, and the missing one decides where spending goes.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
In February 2019 the FCC wrote its CIO’s statutory role into its rules. The text covered budgets, governance and hiring but not technology contracts. A technology leader’s mandate is four separate levers, and the missing one decides where spending goes.
- The week On February 26, 2019, the Federal Register published a final rule from the Federal Communications Commission titled “Memorializing the Significance of the FCC’s Chief Information Officer’s Role.”
- Two texts set side by side The easiest way to see the levers is to put the two federal texts next to each other.
- Money: the allocation clause and the budget request Money comes first because every other lever depends on it.
- Governance: a significant role with no seat named The second lever is the forum where decisions are made.
- People: a say in hiring and the component CIO question The third lever is people.
- Contracts: the lever the FCC text does not mention The fourth lever is the one the FCC text leaves out.
- How the levers depend on one another Treating the four levers separately makes the comparison clear, but they do not operate separately.
- What a rule of organization adds when the statute already binds The FCC said its rule was not required by law.
- The four levers outside the two statutes The comparison is a federal one, but it carries to the readers of this series in two ways.
- Testing a mandate before an examiner or auditor does A comparison of two statutes is useful only if it changes what an organization checks.
- With hindsight GAO’s own record shows how slowly the covered agencies’ side of the question moved.
The week
On February 26, 2019, the Federal Register published a final rule from the Federal Communications Commission titled “Memorializing the Significance of the FCC’s Chief Information Officer’s Role.” It took effect the same day. The rule added a new paragraph (c) to 47 CFR 0.11, the section of the FCC’s organizational rules that sets out the functions of the Office of the Managing Director. According to the Federal Register summary, the Commission adopted the underlying Order, FCC 19-4, on January 29, 2019 and released it on January 30.
The words themselves came from Congress. Section 502 of the RAY BAUM’S Act of 2018, Division P of Public Law 115-141, gave the FCC’s chief information officer what the rule calls enhanced responsibilities. Section 502 is codified at 47 U.S.C. 155a, and the rule says the language added to 0.11 is the same as the language in section 502. Under that text, the CIO shall have a significant role in three things. The first is the decision-making process for annual and multi-year planning, programming, budgeting and execution decisions, related reporting requirements, and reports related to information technology. The second is the management, governance and oversight processes related to information technology. The third is the hiring of personnel with information technology responsibilities. A second sentence goes further on money: the CIO, in consultation with the Chief Financial Officer and budget officials, “shall specify and approve the allocation of amounts appropriated to the Commission for information technology,” consistent with appropriations Acts, budget guidelines and recommendations from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
The FCC was plain about the legal weight of its own step. The rule states: “This update to the Commission’s organizational rules is not required by law.” It said the update demonstrates the Commission’s commitment to ensuring that the CIO has a significant role in advancing its overall information technology capabilities. Because the change concerned agency organization, procedure or practice, the Commission said it would not send the Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office under the Congressional Review Act, and it found no new information collection under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
Why the FCC had a statute of its own becomes clear from the government-wide law. The CIO authorities in 40 U.S.C. 11319, a section whose statutory credits begin with Public Law 113-291 of December 19, 2014, apply to a “covered agency,” defined as each agency listed in 31 U.S.C. 901(b)(1) or 901(b)(2). Those lists name the executive departments, the Environmental Protection Agency, NASA and seven other agencies, among them the General Services Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Social Security Administration. The FCC is not on them.
An executive order had also left the FCC out. Executive Order 13833 of May 15, 2018, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers,” directed covered agencies to have their CIOs report directly to the agency head, to make the CIO a member of IT investment boards and, as appropriate, their chair, and to have the CIO approve the appointment of component CIOs. The order defined a covered agency as one listed in 31 U.S.C. 901(b), other than the Department of Defense or any “independent regulatory agency” as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5). That definition names the FCC, along with, among others, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the SEC, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Office of Financial Research.
In August 2018, GAO had reported on the covered agencies’ side of the question. Its report GAO-18-93, published August 2, 2018, found that none of the 24 agencies it reviewed had policies that fully addressed the role of their CIOs consistent with federal laws and guidance. GAO also found that OMB guidance did not ensure that CIOs had a significant role in IT planning, programming and budgeting decisions, or in execution decisions and the management, governance and oversight processes related to IT.
The FCC’s February 2019 rule was a short amendment by an agency that said it did not need to make it. It would be reasonable to file it as housekeeping. We read it differently. Set beside the government-wide statute it echoes, the FCC text is a clean specimen of something every chief information officer’s mandate is built from: a set of separate powers, each of which can be granted, withheld or left vague on its own. The FCC’s text granted some of them and did not mention one. The same reading can be applied to any organization that writes a charter for its technology leader, in government or out of it.
Our argument is that authority over technology is four distinct levers, and that a mandate is only as strong as the lever it leaves out. The four are:
- Money: who shapes the technology budget before it is requested, and who decides how appropriated funds are split once they arrive.
- Governance: who sits in the room, and with what standing, when investments are reviewed, approved, paused or stopped.
- People: who has a say in hiring technology staff, and who approves the technology leaders in each part of the organization.
- Contracts: who must approve an agreement to buy technology or technology services before it is signed, and who must approve moving money between technology programs.
These parts do not overlap. Budget formulation and allocation are about the size and split of funds. Governance is about decision forums and their membership. Personnel covers hiring and appointment. Contract review covers the point at which the organization commits to a supplier. Between them they cover the ways an organization can spend on technology: through its budget, through its project decisions, through its own staff, or through a purchase. The sections that follow set the FCC text beside 40 U.S.C. 11319, take each lever in turn, look at how the levers depend on one another, and then ask what a rule that restates a statute adds, what the comparison offers regulators and regulated institutions outside the two statutes, and how an organization can test its own mandate.
Two texts set side by side
The easiest way to see the levers is to put the two federal texts next to each other. Both use the phrase “significant role.” Both attach it to planning, programming, budgeting and execution decisions, and to the management, governance and oversight processes related to information technology. The FCC’s statute is close to a copy of the government-wide one on those points, down to the order of the clauses.
Then the texts diverge. Section 11319 asks OMB to require, in its annual capital planning guidance, that the CIO of each covered agency other than Defense approve the agency’s information technology budget request. It bars a covered agency other than Defense from entering into a contract or other agreement for information technology or information technology services unless the CIO has reviewed and approved it. It bars the agency from requesting the reprogramming of funds made available for information technology programs without the same review and approval. It makes those contract and reprogramming duties non-delegable, except that approval of a contract for a non-major investment may be delegated to someone who reports directly to the CIO. And it requires the CIO to approve the appointment of any other employee who has the title of CIO, or functions as one, for a component of the agency.
The FCC text has a different shape. It adds a significant role in the hiring of personnel with information technology responsibilities, which the government-wide section does not frame that way. It gives the CIO, in consultation with the Chief Financial Officer and budget officials, the duty to specify and approve the allocation of amounts appropriated to the Commission for information technology. It says nothing about approving contracts, nothing about approving reprogramming, and nothing about component CIOs.
Laid out as levers, the comparison reads as follows. On money, both texts give a significant role in budget decisions; the government-wide text adds approval of the budget request, and the FCC text adds approval of the allocation of appropriated funds. On governance, both give a significant role and neither names a seat. On people, the government-wide text controls the appointment of component CIOs, and the FCC text gives a significant role in hiring. On contracts, the government-wide text requires CIO approval, and the FCC text is silent.
Two cautions apply to this reading. First, a text that is silent on a power does not forbid an agency from granting it. An agency head can delegate contract review to a CIO by internal order whether or not a statute requires it, and nothing in the FCC’s rule tells us how the Commission actually ran its acquisitions. Second, the right shape of a mandate depends on how an organization is structured and how it buys and builds, and a single commission is a different organization from a department with several bureaus. Our claim is narrower: the two texts show which levers a legislature chose to write down in each case, and the gap is visible in the text.
Money: the allocation clause and the budget request
Money comes first because every other lever depends on it. A CIO who has no influence over how much is spent on technology, or where, can review and advise but cannot change the outcome.
Two different moments in the budget cycle
The government-wide section and the FCC section reach the budget at different moments. Section 11319 works through OMB’s capital planning guidance, which is to require the CIO to approve the information technology budget request. This approval comes at the front of the cycle: the point at which the agency decides what to ask for. The FCC text reaches the other end. Its CIO is to specify and approve the allocation of amounts already appropriated to the Commission for information technology.
Both moments matter, and they test different things. Approval of a request tests whether the CIO can shape the portfolio before it is fixed: which systems are retired, which are modernized, how much goes to security. Approval of an allocation tests whether the CIO can direct the funds once they exist, when the pressure is to spread them across every program that asked. An organization that gives its technology leader only the first can see a careful request diluted in execution. One that gives only the second can see the leader handed a total that was set without them.
What consultation with the finance function means
The FCC text ties the CIO’s allocation power to consultation with the Chief Financial Officer and budget officials, and to appropriations Acts, budget guidelines and OMB recommendations. The constraint is sensible. Appropriations law, not the CIO, decides what money may be spent on. The structure does raise a question every organization has to answer in its own documents: when the CIO and the finance function disagree about an allocation, whose view prevails, and where is that written down. The statute says the CIO approves after consulting. It does not describe a dispute process, and a rule that copies the statute does not add one.
Defining what counts as information technology
The money lever also depends on a definition. Section 11319 says “information technology” has the meaning given under OMB’s capital planning guidance. GAO’s 2018 report found a related gap in how agencies reported CIO authority over spending: OMB had recently required agencies to provide data on that authority, but its guidance did not provide a complete definition of it, and agencies had created varying definitions. An allocation power is only as wide as the line drawn around technology spending. If program offices can classify a system build as program spending, or buy technology services through a budget line that is not labeled as IT, the CIO’s approval over the IT allocation does not reach it.
For any organization, the practical consequence is a scoping exercise. Before a technology leader can be said to approve the allocation, someone has to define, in writing, what falls inside the allocation: hardware, software, cloud services, technology staff, contractor labor for technology projects, and technology embedded in other programs. That definition is the real boundary of the money lever.
Governance: a significant role with no seat named
The second lever is the forum where decisions are made. Here the two federal texts are the same. Each gives the CIO a significant role in the management, governance and oversight processes related to information technology. Neither defines the role.
What the executive order added for covered agencies
For the agencies it covered, Executive Order 13833 filled part of the gap. It directed agency heads, wherever appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to ensure the CIO is a member of any investment or related board with purview over IT, or any board responsible for setting agency-wide IT standards, and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to direct the CIO to chair such boards. Where such a board operates through member votes, agency heads were, as appropriate, to direct the CIO to serve as a voting member. The order also directed that the CIO report directly to the agency head, consistent with 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(2), and serve as the primary strategic advisor to the agency head on the use of IT.
Those are concrete governance terms: membership, chairing, voting, and a reporting line. They turn “significant role” into something an inspector general or an auditor can test. They did not apply to the FCC, because the order excluded independent regulatory agencies. The FCC’s rule reproduced the statutory phrase and stopped there.
Why the phrase alone is hard to test
“Significant role” is a standard, not a mechanism. An organization can meet it on paper with a CIO who attends investment reviews as an observer, or with a CIO who chairs them and can stop a project. Both are participation; only one is authority. GAO’s 2018 finding about OMB guidance shows the phrase troubled the covered agencies too. GAO recommended that OMB update its guidance to explain clearly how agencies are to address the role of CIOs in complying with the statutory requirements for a significant role in budgeting decisions and in management, governance and oversight processes.
For an organization writing its own mandate, the governance lever comes down to a short list of facts that should appear in its documents: which boards make technology investment decisions, whether the CIO is a member, whether the CIO chairs, whether the CIO votes, and whether any decision can proceed over the CIO’s documented objection. If those facts are written down, the governance lever can be inspected. If they are not, the lever exists only in the goodwill of whoever runs the meeting.
The reporting line as part of governance
The reporting line belongs here as well, because it decides whose agenda the CIO’s concerns reach. The executive order tied it to the agency head. The FCC rule placed its new paragraph in the section on the functions of the Office of the Managing Director, and its text does not state to whom the CIO reports. We draw no conclusion from that placement about how the FCC organized its reporting. What others can take from it is that a mandate that grants powers without stating to whom the holder reports leaves a central governance fact to custom.
People: a say in hiring and the component CIO question
The third lever is people. Technology work is done by staff and contractors, and a technology leader who cannot influence who is hired, or who leads technology in each part of the organization, can set direction without the means to carry it out.
Two different personnel powers
The two federal texts handle personnel differently. Section 11319(b)(2) gives the CIO of a covered agency approval over the appointment of any other employee with the title of CIO, or who functions as a CIO, for a component organization. This power works on the leadership layer: it addresses the case of a large department whose bureaus each have their own technology chief. The FCC text instead gives the CIO a significant role in the hiring of personnel with information technology responsibilities. The FCC version reaches the workforce as a whole, framed as influence rather than approval.
The two framings suit different structures. A department whose bureaus each have a technology chief needs a way to keep those leaders aligned with the department’s CIO. An organization with a single technology office has less use for that power and more use for a say over who joins the technology staff. The FCC’s statute does not explain its choice, and we do not supply a reason for Congress. The executive order took a further step for covered agencies, directing that knowledge and skill standards for IT personnel be included in the performance standards and evaluations of component CIOs, with the CIO responsible for that portion of the evaluation, and directing OPM to propose a rule on direct hiring authority for IT positions.
Influence over hiring is a process question
A significant role in hiring is, again, a standard that needs mechanics. The questions that give it substance are specific. Does the CIO approve the position descriptions for technology roles, or only review them. Does the CIO sit on interview panels for senior technology hires. Does the CIO have a say when a program office hires staff who will administer systems, even if the job title is not in the technology series. GAO’s 2018 report shows that the covered agencies had trouble here too: its first recommendation to OMB was to issue guidance on the CIO responsibilities not included in existing guidance, in particular those relating to IT workforce matters.
Staff outside the technology office
The hardest part of the people lever concerns staff who do technology work outside the CIO’s office. The FCC text speaks of “personnel with information technology responsibilities,” which is broader than staff in the technology office. Read literally, that reaches system administrators, data analysts and developers wherever they sit in the organization. An organization that adopts similar language has to decide whether it means it. If it does, the hiring process for every such role has to route through the CIO in some form. If it does not, the mandate should say which roles are in scope, so that the lever is not claimed in the charter and absent in the hiring workflow.
Contracts: the lever the FCC text does not mention
The fourth lever is the one the FCC text leaves out. In the government-wide statute it is the sharpest of the four, because it operates at the point where an organization commits money to a supplier.
What the government-wide text requires
Under section 11319(b)(1)(C), a covered agency other than Defense may not enter into a contract or other agreement for information technology or information technology services unless the CIO has reviewed and approved it. It may not request reprogramming of funds made available for IT programs without the same review and approval. The agency may use its governance processes to approve such a contract if the CIO is a full participant in them. The duties are not delegable, except that approval of a contract for a non-major investment, as OMB’s capital planning guidance defines it, may be delegated to someone who reports directly to the CIO.
That clause turns the other three levers into something enforceable. A budget approval can be worked around by spending through a different line. A governance role can be worked around by deciding outside the forum. A hiring role can be worked around by buying services instead of hiring staff. A contract approval closes those routes, because the agreement to buy cannot be signed without it.
What the silence means and does not mean
The FCC’s statute and its rule say nothing about contract approval. We want to be careful about what follows from that. The silence does not mean the FCC’s CIO had no role in contracts; an agency can give its CIO contract review by internal policy, and the public text tells us nothing either way. What it does mean is that the role, if it existed, rested on internal policy rather than on the statute the FCC chose to write into its rules. Internal policy can be changed by the agency at any time. A statute cannot.
Reprogramming as a second route
Reprogramming deserves separate attention. The FCC text gives its CIO approval over the allocation of appropriated IT funds. It does not address what happens when funds are later moved between programs. An allocation power without a matching reprogramming power is exposed at mid-year, when the pressure to move unspent technology funds to other priorities, or to move program funds into technology projects that bypassed review, is highest. The government-wide statute requires CIO review and approval before a covered agency requests reprogramming of funds made available for IT programs, which covers moves out of the technology budget; moves into technology from other lines depend on the contract clause and on how the organization defines its IT spending.
For organizations outside government, the contract lever has a direct analogue in procurement policy: whether a purchase order for software, cloud services or technology consulting can be issued without sign-off from the technology function. The same three routes around a mandate exist in any organization, and the same clause closes them.
How the levers depend on one another
Treating the four levers separately makes the comparison clear, but they do not operate separately. Each one covers a route that the others leave open, and a mandate with one lever missing behaves differently from a mandate with every lever present but weakly defined.
Money without contracts
An allocation power decides how much of the technology budget goes to each program. It does not decide what each program buys with it. Without approval over contracts, a technology leader who has approved an allocation for a modernization project has no formal point at which to confirm that the contract signed for that project matches what was approved. The allocation and the purchase are separate events, and only one of them carries the leader’s signature.
The government-wide statute links the two through its contract and reprogramming clauses. A covered agency’s CIO approves the budget request at the front of the cycle and the contract at the point of commitment, and must approve any request to reprogram IT funds in between. The chain has no unsigned link. In the FCC text, the chain runs from the budget process to the allocation and stops.
Governance without money
The reverse case is a technology leader who chairs the investment board but has no say over the budget behind it. Such a board can approve or reject proposals, but if programs can fund technology from their own lines, the proposals that reach the board are only the ones programs choose to bring. A governance role is strongest when the money lever makes the board the only route to funds.
People without contracts
The personnel lever has its own bypass. If a technology leader shapes hiring for technology roles but has no approval over services contracts, a program that wants a system built outside the leader’s view can buy the labor instead of hiring it. The work gets done by contractor staff whose selection the technology leader never saw. That is why a hiring lever on its own covers less ground than its wording suggests, and why the contract lever closes the gap.
The lever that sets the floor
The interactions also explain why adding detail to one lever does not compensate for leaving another out. A mandate can define its allocation process with care, name every board the technology leader chairs and list every role whose hiring the leader shapes, and still leave purchases outside review. The detail on the first three levers is real, but it describes the routes spending is least likely to take when it wants to avoid scrutiny. A reviewer who reads the mandate for its strongest clauses will come away reassured; one who reads it for its weakest will see where the exposure is.
Taken together, these cases point to a practical rule for anyone drafting or reviewing a mandate. The protection a mandate gives is set by its weakest lever, because spending that wants to avoid review will move to the route with the least oversight. In our reading of the two federal texts, the contract clause is the one that closes the other routes, and it is the one the FCC’s statute did not include. Whether that mattered at the FCC depends on internal policies the public record we reviewed does not show. Whether it matters in any other organization is a question that organization can answer from its own documents.
What a rule of organization adds when the statute already binds
The FCC said its rule was not required by law. That raises a fair question about what such a step adds, and the answer helps any organization deciding whether to restate an external requirement in its own documents.
Visibility to the people who run the processes
A statute in the United States Code is read by lawyers. A section of an agency’s organizational rules is read by the managers who run budgets, hiring and governance. Putting the CIO’s statutory role into the same section that describes the Managing Director’s functions puts it in front of the people whose processes the role has to change. In our view, that is the main value of the FCC’s step, and it is a value that any regulated organization can get by writing an external requirement into its own charter, policies or delegations of authority.
The limit of copying text
By its own account, the FCC’s rule uses the same language as the statute. That choice keeps the rule faithful to the statute, but it also carries over every ambiguity the statute contains. “Significant role” remains undefined. The allocation process and its dispute path remain unstated. The scope of “personnel with information technology responsibilities” remains open. A restatement that adds no mechanics can make a mandate more visible without making it more testable.
What a stronger internal document would add
The useful step after restating a requirement is to translate each clause into the process where it operates. For the money lever, that means naming the budget documents the CIO signs and the definition of technology spending. For governance, it means naming the boards and the CIO’s standing on each. For people, it means naming the roles whose hiring the CIO influences and how. For contracts, it means naming the purchases that need CIO sign-off and the delegation limits. None of those details needs a statute; each needs an owner and a document.
The four levers outside the two statutes
The comparison is a federal one, but it carries to the readers of this series in two ways.
The independent regulators
The definition of independent regulatory agency in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5), which kept the FCC outside Executive Order 13833, also names the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the SEC, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Office of Financial Research. The Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC and the SEC are not listed in 31 U.S.C. 901(b), so section 11319 did not cover them either; the OCC and the Office of Financial Research are not listed by name, and we have not examined how the section applies to them. Whatever authority their CIOs held in 2019 rested on their own statutes, delegations and internal policies, which we have not reviewed here. Banks and other supervised firms have an interest in that question, because several of these bodies examine how firms govern their own technology.
Banks, health systems and agencies writing their own mandates
Neither federal text applies to banks, health systems or state agencies. The four levers still apply. A bank, a health system or a state agency that writes a charter for its technology leader is deciding, whether it says so or not, how much say that leader has over the budget request and the allocation, which governance forums the leader sits on and with what standing, how far the leader’s influence reaches into hiring, and whether a technology purchase can be signed without the leader’s approval.
The FCC example suggests a simple test for any such charter. Lay its clauses beside the four levers. For each lever, ask whether the charter grants approval, grants influence, or says nothing. A charter that grants approval on three levers and is silent on the fourth has a gap at the fourth, and the gap is where spending will route if it needs to avoid review. That says nothing about the people in the role. It is a property of the text.
We would add one more test. For each lever where the charter grants approval, find the record that shows the approval was given: a signed budget document, board minutes, a hiring file, a contract approval in the procurement system. A lever without a record is hard to prove to an auditor, an examiner or a board, and harder still to defend when the holder of the role changes.
Testing a mandate before an examiner or auditor does
A comparison of two statutes is useful only if it changes what an organization checks. The four levers translate into a short review that a chief information officer, a chief audit executive or an agency program director can run against their own documents. Nothing in what follows is a legal requirement for a bank, a health system or a state or local agency; it is a method we would apply, and organizations should check with counsel on any requirement that applies to them.
Step one: collect the texts
Gather every document that grants or limits the technology leader’s authority: the charter or position description, board and committee charters, delegations of authority, the procurement policy, the budget procedures and the hiring procedures. The FCC example shows why the last three belong on the list. A mandate written in an organizational rule is only one of the places where a lever is granted or withheld; the procurement policy may grant a lever the charter omits, or withhold one the charter appears to grant.
Step two: map each clause to a lever
For each document, mark which clauses touch money, governance, people or contracts, and whether each clause grants approval, grants influence, or requires consultation. Keep the exact wording. The difference between “approve” and “have a significant role in” is the difference the two federal texts turn on, and it is easy to lose in a summary.
Step three: find the silent lever
Look for the lever with no clause, or with only consultation where the others have approval. That is the gap. In the FCC comparison it was contracts. Elsewhere it may be reprogramming, or hiring outside the technology office, or the definition of technology spending. The aim is to find it from the text rather than from an incident.
Step four: trace one decision through each lever
Pick a recent technology project and trace it. Find the budget document that funded it, the board minutes that approved it, the hiring or staffing decisions that resourced it and the contract that bought it. At each step, check whether the technology leader’s approval or input is recorded. A lever that is granted in the charter but leaves no trace in the record of a real project is weaker than the charter suggests.
Step five: decide and write it down
Not every gap needs closing. An organization may decide that its technology leader should advise on hiring rather than approve it, or that small purchases need no technology sign-off. The FCC’s own text shows a legislature making deliberate choices among levers. What matters is that the choice is made on purpose and recorded, with a named owner for each lever and a document that shows how it works, so that the next leader, the next auditor and the next examiner can read the mandate as it was meant.
With hindsight
GAO’s own record shows how slowly the covered agencies’ side of the question moved. The GAO-18-93 product page, as shown in an Internet Archive copy captured October 13, 2026, lists 27 recommendations. On that page, 16 are marked closed and implemented and 11 remain open, one of them as partially addressed. GAO records its second recommendation to OMB, on explaining how agencies should give CIOs a significant role in budgeting and in management, governance and oversight, as closed and implemented, citing the executive order that requires CIOs to be members of IT investment boards and, as appropriate, to chair them.
The two other recommendations to OMB were still open. On the first, guidance covering the 12 CIO responsibilities missing from OMB guidance, in particular those relating to IT workforce matters, GAO wrote that as of January 2025 OMB stated it had actions planned but not yet underway. On the third, defining the authority CIOs are to have when agencies report on CIO authority over IT spending, GAO wrote that in a January 2025 update OMB stated it had action planned but not yet underway. The two levers those recommendations concern, people and the definition behind the money lever, are two that the FCC’s text also left without mechanics.
Agency progress was uneven. For the Department of Health and Human Services, GAO wrote that as of January 2026, of 23 responsibility gaps, the department had addressed 10 and partially addressed three; two were no longer applicable because of a sunset provision in the law, and eight had not been established through agency policy. For the Treasury, GAO wrote that as of May 2025, of 28 gaps, two were fully addressed, five partially addressed and 19 not yet addressed, with two no longer applicable, and that as of February 2026 the department had not provided an update. For Veterans Affairs, as of December 2024, three of 21 gaps were fully addressed, three partially addressed and 13 not yet addressed, with two no longer applicable; as of February 2026 the department had not provided an update. Other agencies closed their recommendations: GAO records the Department of Agriculture as having revised its policies in May 2019 and May 2021 to address the 22 responsibility gaps GAO identified.
The independent regulators’ position changed in a different direction. On February 18, 2025, the President signed Executive Order 14215, “Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies.” It uses the same 44 U.S.C. 3502(5) definition of independent regulatory agency that had kept the FCC outside Executive Order 13833. It requires those agencies to submit significant regulatory actions to OIRA, directs the OMB Director to establish performance standards and management objectives for independent agency heads, and directs OMB to review their obligations and adjust their apportionments by activity, function, project or object where necessary. It applies to the Federal Reserve Board only for its supervision and regulation of financial institutions, not for monetary policy. Its text does not mention chief information officers or information technology, and we do not read a CIO mandate into it. What it shows is that the boundary between covered and independent agencies, which decided whether the 2018 CIO order applied, is a boundary the executive branch has since redrawn for budget execution and regulatory review. As checked on November 15, 2026, we have not traced how OMB has used the apportionment power for any agency’s technology spending, and we make no claim about it.
What held up is the shape of the problem the FCC rule exposed. A mandate can be written in the right words and still leave its levers undefined. As of the archived copy GAO was still recording open recommendations at large departments, including HHS, the Treasury and Veterans Affairs, on exactly that point.
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