Why the TRACED Act gave hospitals a two-way phone problem

The robocall law signed on December 30, 2019 had a section to protect hospital lines. The larger change ran the other way: call authentication, analytics-based blocking and tighter healthcare call exemptions put every reminder and result call a hospital places under new tests.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

The robocall law signed on December 30, 2019 had a section to protect hospital lines. The larger change ran the other way: call authentication, analytics-based blocking and tighter healthcare call exemptions put every reminder and result call a hospital places under new tests.

  1. The week On December 30, 2019, the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act became law as Public Law 116-105.
  2. How calls are signed, judged and blocked Under STIR/SHAKEN, the provider that originates a call attaches a digital signature to it.
  3. Inbound: defending the hospital’s own lines The Hospital Robocall Protection Group’s December 2020 report set out the kinds of unlawful calls hospitals receive.
  4. Outbound identity: are the hospital’s calls trusted A health system may place calls through many paths.
  5. Outbound permission: staying within the exemptions The Telephone Consumer Protection Act restricts calls using an automatic dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, unless the called party has given the required consent or an exemption applies.
  6. The strongest objections One objection is that call authentication and blocking are matters between carriers.
  7. How it differs across health organizations Large systems have the most outbound paths, the most vendors and the most numbers.
  8. With hindsight The FCC moved on the Act’s timetable.

The week

On December 30, 2019, the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act became law as Public Law 116-105. It is known as the TRACED Act. The bill, S. 151, amended the Communications Act and directed the Federal Communications Commission to act on illegal robocalls and caller ID spoofing on a series of deadlines.

Its centerpiece was call authentication. The Act required the FCC, within 18 months, to make voice service providers implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework in the internet protocol parts of their networks. STIR/SHAKEN is an industry standard that lets the provider originating a call digitally sign the caller ID, so the provider at the other end can check it. For older, non-IP networks, providers had to take reasonable measures toward an effective authentication framework. Providers that had already adopted STIR/SHAKEN voluntarily, and would complete it within 18 months, could be spared the mandate. The FCC had already proposed requiring the framework if major providers did not adopt it voluntarily by the end of 2019.

The Act also dealt with what happens to calls once authentication exists. Within a year, the FCC had to write rules on when a provider may block calls based on authentication information, with no line-item charge to consumers. It had to create a safe harbor protecting providers from liability for unintended or inadvertent blocking, and for misidentifying the level of trust in a call. It had to set up a process for a calling party harmed by the authentication information to verify that its calls were authentic. In shaping the safe harbor, the FCC was to consider whether a provider had used reasonable care, including all reasonable efforts to avoid blocking emergency public safety calls.

A separate section addressed the call-blocking services that carriers were already offering. The FCC had ruled in June 2019 that providers could offer such blocking on an opt-out or opt-in basis. The Act required the FCC to ensure those services gave consumers and callers transparency and effective redress, with no charge to callers for resolving complaints about erroneously blocked calls.

Section 8 tightened the exemptions in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. That law generally restricts automated and prerecorded calls without consent, and the FCC had exempted some categories, including certain healthcare calls. Every exemption now had to state which callers could rely on it, which people could be called, and how many calls could be made to a person. The FCC had one year to bring existing exemptions into line.

Section 14 was specific to hospitals. Within 180 days, the FCC had to establish a Hospital Robocall Protection Group, an advisory committee. Its members were to come in equal numbers from voice providers serving hospitals, companies that mitigate robocalls, consumer advocacy groups, one-way internet calling providers, hospitals and state officials. The FCC and the Federal Trade Commission would each have one representative. The group was to issue best practices on how providers could better combat robocalls to hospitals, how hospitals could protect themselves, and how governments could help.

The Act also raised penalties. It added civil forfeiture for violations of the robocall rules, with an additional penalty of up to $10,000 for violations committed with intent.

The hospital section of the TRACED Act framed the health sector’s problem as inbound: robocalls flooding hospital lines, spoofed calls tricking staff, and scams using a hospital’s name. That problem was real. But the rest of the Act changed something that touched more of a health system’s operations, every day. It made the calls a hospital places, to patients, subject to new tests on the way out.

Our argument is that the TRACED Act gave hospitals a two-way phone problem, and that the outbound half was the larger operational change. The same machinery built to stop illegal calls, authentication, analytics-based blocking and labeling, and tighter exemptions, applied to appointment reminders, lab result calls and discharge follow-ups. A health system that treated the Act as protection for its switchboard missed the part that affected patient contact.

The exposure divides into three parts, which do not overlap and together cover the phone channel. The first is inbound: defending the hospital’s own lines against floods, spoofing and social engineering. The second is outbound identity: whether the hospital’s calls carry an authenticated caller ID that terminating carriers trust. The third is outbound permission: whether automated and prerecorded calls stay within the limits of the exemptions they rely on.

A first section explains how authentication and blocking work, because both halves of the problem depend on them. The three parts follow. A fifth section tests the argument against the strongest objections. The last considers how the problem differs across kinds of health organization. Specific obligations under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act depend on facts, and organizations should check them with counsel.

How calls are signed, judged and blocked

Signing the caller ID

Under STIR/SHAKEN, the provider that originates a call attaches a digital signature to it. The signature carries the calling number and an attestation level. The FCC’s April 2020 order described three levels. Full, or A, attestation means the provider can confirm both who the customer is and that the customer is entitled to use the calling number. Partial, or B, attestation means it knows the customer but cannot confirm the number. Gateway, or C, attestation means it is only the point where the call entered its network from somewhere else.

The terminating provider checks the signature. A call with full attestation from a known provider is more likely to be treated as legitimate. A call with partial or gateway attestation, or none, carries less trust. Authentication alone does not block anything. It produces information that other systems use.

Judging the call

Those other systems are analytics. Carriers and third-party analytics firms assess calls using authentication results and traffic patterns. The protection group’s report described providers monitoring traffic for patterns consistent with unlawful robocalls. A busy clinic’s reminder system, placing many automated calls from one number, can resemble such a pattern. The analytics then decide whether to let the call through, label it as unwanted, or block it.

The FCC’s September 2020 rules gave terminating providers a safe harbor for opt-out blocking based on reasonable analytics, provided the analytics took account of authentication information where it was available. They also allowed blocking of traffic from upstream providers that kept carrying bad calls. In return, providers that block had to offer a single point of contact to resolve unintended or inadvertent blocking. They were to make all reasonable efforts not to block critical calls, such as those from public safety answering points, and the FCC said they should never block calls to 911.

What authentication does not prove

Full attestation says that the originating provider knows its customer and that the customer may use the number. It says nothing about whether the call is wanted, lawful or honest. A legitimate hospital call can carry weak attestation because of how it was routed. A dishonest call can carry strong attestation if the caller has a real account and real numbers. That is why analytics weigh attestation alongside other signals, and why attestation alone neither guarantees delivery nor proves good faith.

For a hospital, the practical meaning is that strong attestation is necessary but not sufficient. It removes one reason for distrust. Calling patterns, number reputation and complaints from recipients can still lead to a label or a block. Each of those is also, in part, within the hospital’s control.

Redress when a call goes wrong

The Act built in remedies for callers. The FCC had to create a process for a calling party harmed by authentication information to verify the authenticity of its calls. Blocking services had to offer callers effective redress, with no charge for resolving complaints about erroneous blocking. The September 2020 rules added a single point of contact at each blocking provider.

A remedy only helps a caller that uses it. A hospital needs a workflow to detect that its calls are being blocked or labeled, to collect evidence, to contact the right provider and to follow up. Detection is the hard part, because the hospital may not see what happens on the patient’s phone. Patient reports, staff test calls to phones on major carriers and sudden drops in answer rates are practical signals. The workflow should have an owner and a record, so repeated problems with one number or vendor become visible.

Why this matters for both directions

This system protects a hospital’s inbound lines by filtering illegal calls before they arrive. It also judges every call the hospital places. The same analytics that block a scam call to the emergency department may label a pharmacy refill reminder as spam on a patient’s phone. A hospital is both a beneficiary and a subject of the regime. A response organized around the first role misses the second.

Inbound: defending the hospital’s own lines

What the attacks look like

The Hospital Robocall Protection Group’s December 2020 report set out the kinds of unlawful calls hospitals receive. Telephone denial-of-service attacks flood key numbers, such as the emergency department or intensive care unit, with simultaneous calls. The HRPG report says such an attack may involve caller ID spoofing, and that while the attacker’s goal may simply be disruption, it is more common that it is an extortion attempt in which the attacker demands a ransom to stop the attack. Targeted social engineering calls gather information about staff, systems and contacts. Vishing calls try to steal credentials from staff, for example to obtain prescription drugs. Impersonation scams spoof a hospital’s number to defraud patients, who then call the hospital about calls it never made. General robocall campaigns and nuisance calls tie up lines and staff.

For these examples the report cited, in one footnote, a 2019 House subcommittee hearing, a newspaper article and an FCC consumer guide, without saying which source supplied which figure. One hospital received more than 4,500 robocalls in two hours in 2018. Another had 6,500 calls spoofed to look like internal calls, consuming about 65 hours of staff response time over 90 days. These are reported cases, not industry statistics. They show the shape of the risk: disruption of clinical communications and diversion of staff time.

The report’s recommendations for hospitals fell into prevention and response. On prevention, hospitals should train staff and prepare robocall incident response plans. They should explore the blocking and labeling capabilities their voice providers offer. And they should manage their number resources, including reporting spoofing of the hospital’s numbers and isolating critical phone lines.

On response, hospitals should evaluate each event and capture information about the calling activity. They should have engineers ready to make immediate configuration changes to premises equipment, and coordinate with federal and state agencies where appropriate. For providers serving hospitals, the report recommended prioritizing hospitals in response efforts, giving hospitals a fast way to report robocalls that interfere with patient care, and starting tracebacks.

Impersonation is a patient trust problem

Of the call types the group described, impersonation reaches furthest beyond the hospital’s walls. When scammers spoof a hospital’s number to ask patients for payment or personal details, the victim is the patient. The hospital still bears the consequences: confused calls to its lines, complaints, and reduced trust in its genuine calls. The report noted that such campaigns can expose a hospital to negative publicity, regulatory scrutiny and reputational harm.

Two controls help. The first is a published statement of what the hospital will and will not ask for by phone, repeated in patient communications. The second is a call-back rule: a patient unsure about a call can hang up and call the hospital’s published number. Both work only if the hospital’s own legitimate calls follow the same rules. A hospital that sometimes asks for card numbers on outbound calls teaches patients to give them.

Turning that into controls

For a health system, these recommendations translate into a small set of concrete controls:

  • A list of critical inbound numbers, such as emergency department, intensive care, poison control lines and nurse triage, with a plan to protect each one.
  • Separation of critical lines from published general numbers, so a flood on one does not take down the others.
  • A written telephone denial-of-service playbook, agreed in advance with each carrier, including who to call and what the carrier will do.
  • Staff training that treats phone requests for credentials, patient data or prescriptions as social engineering until verified.
  • A process to log and report spoofing of the hospital’s own numbers, and a script for staff answering confused patients.

Most of these are security controls, and they sit naturally with the information security team. They also depend on the telecommunications team, which may report elsewhere. The incident plan should name both.

Testing the playbook

A telephone denial-of-service playbook that has never been exercised can fail at the first step, because nobody knows the carrier’s escalation number or who may authorize a change. A short annual exercise fixes that. The telecommunications team, the security operations team and a clinical lead walk through a flood on a critical line. They confirm the carrier contacts, the authority to reroute calls and the fallback numbers for clinical staff. The exercise should end with updated contacts and a list of gaps, owned and dated.

The exercise also tests whether the hospital can capture the evidence the group recommended: times, numbers, volumes and the effect on operations. That evidence is what a carrier needs to start a traceback and what law enforcement needs to act.

A trade-off on inbound blocking

Inbound blocking has its own risk. A hospital that turns on aggressive blocking for its main lines may block calls it needs: from other hospitals, from emergency medical services, from patients calling from unfamiliar numbers. The Act required the FCC to ensure that blocking services make all reasonable efforts to avoid blocking emergency public safety calls, and the FCC said providers should never block calls to 911. Calls from a clinic arranging a patient transfer are not named in those protections. Blocking settings for clinical lines should be chosen by clinical and telecommunications leaders together, and reviewed after any incident.

Outbound identity: are the hospital’s calls trusted

The many ways a hospital calls patients

A health system may place calls through many paths. Staff dial from desk phones on the hospital’s own system. Contact centers run scheduling and nurse lines on separate platforms. Vendors send appointment reminders, prescription notifications and lab result alerts. Telehealth platforms place calls. Billing and collections may run through yet another vendor. Each path may display a different number, and each may originate through a different carrier.

That variety matters because attestation depends on the originating provider knowing the customer and the number. The FCC’s April 2020 order recorded commenters’ concern about exactly this case. An enterprise may place outbound calls through a provider other than the one that assigned its telephone numbers. In that situation, they said, a call would have difficulty receiving full attestation, because it would not pass through the authentication service of the provider that controls the number.

What can go wrong

When a reminder vendor places calls showing the hospital’s main number through its own carrier, that carrier may not be able to confirm the hospital’s right to the number. The call may then receive partial or gateway attestation. Combined with a high-volume calling pattern, that raises the chance that analytics will label or block it. The patient sees a spam warning, or nothing at all, and misses the reminder.

The consequences are clinical and financial. A missed appointment reminder becomes a no-show. A missed lab result call becomes a delay in treatment. A missed post-discharge call becomes a gap in follow-up that the hospital meant to close. These failures do not show up in the vendor’s delivery report, which records that the call was placed.

Taking control of outbound identity

The fix starts with an inventory. For every outbound path, the health system should know:

  • Which numbers are displayed, and who holds the rights to them.
  • Which provider originates and signs the calls, and what attestation level they receive.
  • How many calls each number places per day, and to whom.
  • What the vendor does when calls are labeled or blocked, and how quickly it reports this.
  • Who in the health system owns the relationship and the remedy.

With that inventory, the health system can make choices. It can assign dedicated numbers to each vendor path, so one vendor’s volume does not taint the main number. It can require vendors to originate calls through providers able to give full attestation for the numbers they use. It can monitor labeling of its numbers and use carriers’ points of contact to correct errors. These requirements belong in vendor contracts and business associate agreements, alongside the privacy terms.

What vendor contracts should say

Vendors that call patients on a health system’s behalf should accept a short set of telephony terms:

  • Disclosure of the originating provider for each calling path and the attestation level calls receive.
  • Use only of numbers assigned by the health system for that purpose, with the health system’s written approval.
  • Prompt notice when calls are labeled or blocked, with the evidence the vendor holds.
  • Per-patient call counts available to the health system, in a format it can combine with other vendors’ data.
  • Acceptance of the health system’s central opt-out list, applied within a stated time.
  • Message templates approved by the health system before use, with no added financial or marketing content.

We would expect most of these terms to cost a competent vendor little. A vendor that cannot meet them is telling the health system something about its operations. The terms should sit in the main contract or a telephony schedule, alongside the business associate agreement that governs patient information.

Measuring whether calls arrive

Delivery reports say a call was placed. They do not say a patient saw it as trustworthy. A health system can build better measures from data it already holds. Answer rates by displayed number and vendor, tracked weekly, show when a number has started to be labeled or blocked. A sudden fall can be the first sign. No-show rates for patients who received a reminder, compared with those who did not, show whether reminders are working at all.

These measures should be reviewed by the owner of outbound identity, with the vendors present. When a number’s answer rate falls, the response is to check its attestation, review its calling pattern and use the providers’ redress contacts. Rotating to a fresh number without fixing the cause risks repeating the problem.

Who owns it

Ownership can be split four ways. Telecommunications may own the trunks, patient access the scheduling, pharmacy the refill calls and the revenue cycle the billing, each under its own vendor contract. A health system needs one owner for outbound caller identity, with authority over number assignment and the telephony terms in vendor contracts. Patient experience leaders are natural candidates, because they bear the cost of calls that do not arrive.

Outbound permission: staying within the exemptions

Why exemptions matter

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act restricts calls using an automatic dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, unless the called party has given the required consent or an exemption applies. Health systems that place automated calls without the required consent depend on the exemptions for healthcare messages. Section 8 of the TRACED Act required every exemption to say who could call, who could be called and how many calls were allowed.

The FCC implemented that section in an order published in February 2021. For prerecorded or artificial voice calls to residential lines that deliver a healthcare message, the exemption covers calls made by, or on behalf of, a HIPAA covered entity or business associate. Such calls are limited to one per day to each patient’s residential line, up to a maximum of three calls combined per week. Callers must honor requests to opt out. The FCC noted that the same numerical limit already applied to exempted healthcare calls to wireless numbers.

The conditions on wireless calls

The order also codified the existing exemption for healthcare calls and texts to wireless numbers. Its conditions are specific. The messages must be limited to listed purposes. These include appointment and exam confirmations and reminders, wellness checkups, hospital pre-registration instructions and pre-operative instructions. They also include lab results, post-discharge follow-up intended to prevent readmission, prescription notifications and home healthcare instructions. They must not include telemarketing, solicitation or advertising. They may not include accounting, billing, debt-collection or other financial content. They must comply with HIPAA privacy rules. And they must be concise: generally one minute or less for voice calls, or 160 characters or less for texts.

The word that matters: combined

The residential limit applies to calls combined, per patient. That word turns a simple rule into a data problem. A patient might receive a reminder from the scheduling vendor, a refill call from the pharmacy vendor and a lab result call from the hospital’s own system in the same week. Each vendor may be within its own limit. Together they may exceed three.

No single vendor can see the whole picture. Only the health system can, if it keeps a central record of automated calls by patient and number. Where each department bought its calling tool separately, no such record exists. Meeting the combined limit means building that record, or routing all automated patient calls through one platform that enforces it.

Building the central record

A central record of automated calls needs four things. It needs a feed of call logs from every system and vendor that places automated or prerecorded calls. It needs a reliable link between each call and a patient, for example through the medical record number rather than the phone number alone. It needs to know whether each number called is a residential line or a wireless one, because the limits and conditions differ. And it needs a rule engine, or at least a daily report, that flags patients approaching the weekly limit.

Line type is an easy detail to miss. A registration system may record a phone number without recording whether it is a landline or a mobile. Without that, a health system cannot tell which exemption applies to a call. It can record line type at registration or look it up. Either way, the record should note how line type was determined and when, since patients change numbers.

Opt-outs that travel

The same logic applies to opt-outs. A patient who opts out of prerecorded calls from one vendor has told the health system something. If the opt-out stays in that vendor’s system, other departments keep calling. A central opt-out list, shared with every vendor that calls on the health system’s behalf, is the practical answer. It should be a contract requirement, with a stated time for vendors to apply updates.

The exemptions are a fallback for calls made without the required consent. A health system can reduce its reliance on them by obtaining consent at registration, with clear scope, and recording it where every calling system can see it. Calls made with the required consent do not depend on the exemption, so its numerical limits and content conditions stop being the binding constraint. Counsel should confirm what form of consent each kind of call needs and what the recorded consent covers.

Consent has its own costs. It must be captured reliably, recorded in a form that can be produced later, and honored when withdrawn. A consent record kept in one system while calls go out from five others creates the same coordination problem as the combined limit. The central record of automated calls and the central consent record are best designed together.

Texts follow the same logic

Some health systems send reminders by text instead of voice. The wireless healthcare exemption covers texts as well as calls, with the same purpose list, the same exclusion of financial and marketing content and a 160-character guide for length. A text program therefore needs the same disciplines as a calling program: approved templates, per-patient counts, a shared opt-out list and one owner.

Texts add their own failure mode. A reminder that runs past 160 characters because it includes directions, parking details and a portal link may fall outside the exemption’s length condition. Template design is a compliance task as much as a communications one. The clinical and patient access teams that write the messages should know the conditions, and the templates should be checked before each change goes live.

Content discipline

The content conditions affect how departments design messages. A reminder that adds a balance due falls outside the wireless healthcare exemption, because financial content is excluded. A post-discharge call that promotes a new service line risks being treated as marketing. Each message template should be reviewed against the exemption it relies on, or the health system should obtain the consent that makes the exemption unnecessary. Counsel should review the templates and the consent records, because the details matter.

The strongest objections

Outbound delivery is the carrier’s problem

One objection is that call authentication and blocking are matters between carriers. A hospital pays for service and should expect its calls to arrive.

The FCC’s own record shows why that does not hold. Attestation depends on the originating provider knowing the customer and the number, and the enterprise calling arrangements hospitals choose determine whether that is possible. Carriers cannot fix an arrangement in which a vendor displays the hospital’s number through a provider with no relationship to it. Only the hospital can, by changing its contracts and number assignments.

The limits are generous enough

A second objection is that one call a day and three a week are generous. Few patients receive more than three automated calls a week from their hospital.

For a single department, that may be true. The difficulty lies in counting across departments and vendors, and in proving compliance if challenged. A patient preparing for surgery may receive pre-registration, pre-operative and appointment calls in the same week, plus pharmacy and lab calls. Without central records, a health system cannot show that it stayed within the limit. The burden is evidence, not volume.

Patients are moving to portals and texts

A third objection is that phone calls are fading as a channel, replaced by patient portals and apps. Investing in phone controls is investing in the past.

Channels change, but the rules cover texts too. The wireless healthcare exemption covers texts as well as calls, and its content and length conditions apply to both. And for patients without portal access or smartphones, a call may be the only channel that works. Those patients may be the ones for whom a missed reminder matters most. A health system can shift volume to digital channels and still need the phone channel to work for the patients who remain on it.

The cost is out of proportion

A further objection is cost. Central call records, contract changes with every vendor, number reassignments and monitoring take staff time and money, for a channel leaders may regard as routine.

The cost is real, and it should be compared with what the channel carries. Appointment reminders, pre-operative instructions and post-discharge follow-up are tied to clinical outcomes and to revenue. A health system that loses a share of those calls to labeling, or faces a consumer protection claim over excess automated calls, pays in no-shows, readmissions and legal costs. The controls also overlap with work a health system should already be doing on vendor management and patient preferences.

Inbound attacks are rare

A fourth objection is that telephone attacks on hospitals are rare, so the inbound controls are a low priority. The examples the protection group cited were individual incidents, not evidence of frequency.

Frequency is uncertain. Impact is not. A flood on the emergency department line during an incident is a patient safety event. The inbound controls are also cheap: a list of critical numbers, line separation, a playbook agreed with the carrier and staff training. Their cost is low enough that uncertainty about frequency is no reason to skip them.

How it differs across health organizations

Large health systems

Large systems have the most outbound paths, the most vendors and the most numbers. They also have the resources to centralize. For them, the priority is ownership. That means one leader for outbound caller identity and automated call permission, and a central record of automated patient calls. It also means a standard telephony and consent schedule attached to every vendor contract that calls patients. Their inbound priority is the number and size of critical lines across many sites.

Sequencing matters for them. The inventory of outbound paths comes first, because every later step depends on it. Ownership and contract terms come next, applied at each vendor renewal rather than all at once. The central call record can start as a weekly report built from vendor exports and mature into a single platform over time. A system that waits for the platform before counting calls has no evidence in the meantime.

Ambulatory networks and physician groups

Ambulatory networks and physician groups may rely on the reminder features of their practice management or electronic health record vendor, with less bargaining power and fewer staff than a large system. Their best lever is the vendor relationship. They should ask the vendor which numbers it displays, how calls are signed, how it counts calls per patient and how it handles opt-outs. Practices that share a vendor can ask together. A practice should also know its own critical inbound numbers and have its carrier’s contact for a flood.

Public hospitals and health departments

Public hospitals face the same issues as other hospitals. Health departments call the public for outreach, such as vaccination reminders and case follow-up. The exemption that applies to their calls depends on who is calling and why, which counsel should confirm. Their inbound exposure includes impersonation: scammers using a health department’s name or number to reach residents. A clear public statement of what the department will and will not ask for by phone is a cheap and useful control.

Rural and critical access hospitals

A small rural hospital may have few telecommunications staff, one carrier and a handful of critical lines. A flood on the main number can cut off a community’s access to its only hospital. Its priorities are simple and cheap: know the critical numbers, keep a fallback line unpublished, and have the carrier’s escalation contact on paper. The protection group’s membership included voice providers that serve hospitals, and its recommendations asked providers to prioritize hospitals in response. A small hospital should ask its carrier, in writing, how that priority works in practice.

Vendors and business associates

Companies that call patients on behalf of providers sit in the middle. The healthcare exemptions cover calls made on behalf of covered entities by business associates, so these companies carry much of the operational burden. They are the ones that must count calls, honor opt-outs and secure good attestation. A vendor that can show its clients per-patient call counts, opt-out propagation and attestation levels by number offers something its competitors may not. Health systems should ask for it.

Across all of these, the test is whether the organization can answer three things about its phone channel. Which critical lines it protects and how. Which numbers call patients, through which providers, at what attestation. And how many automated calls each patient received last week, and whether any opted out. A health system that can answer all three has addressed both directions.

With hindsight

The FCC moved on the Act’s timetable. In an order published in April 2020, it required all originating and terminating voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks by June 30, 2021. The order acknowledged the enterprise problem. It recorded commenters’ concern that calls placed through a provider other than the one that assigned the number would struggle to receive full attestation, and the Commission’s expectation that standards bodies, which remained engaged on such cases, would resolve them.

Blocking rules followed. An order published in September 2020, effective October 14, gave terminating providers safe harbors for analytics-based opt-out blocking and for blocking bad-actor upstream providers. It required blocking providers to give callers a single point of contact to resolve erroneous blocking, and said calls to 911 should never be blocked.

The hospital group came next. The FCC established the Hospital Robocall Protection Group on June 25, 2020, and it first met on July 27, 2020. It adopted its best practices report on December 14, 2020. The FCC began its assessment proceeding on January 11, 2021, and concluded it on June 11, 2021, with a public notice assessing how to encourage voluntary adoption of the practices. The FCC’s page for the group, in an Internet Archive copy captured in September 2026, says it is archived and no longer maintained.

The exemption limits took longer to bite. The FCC’s order implementing Section 8 was published in February 2021. It set the limit of one call per day and three per week for exempted healthcare calls to residential lines, with opt-out requirements. The numerical limits and opt-out requirements were delayed at first, because they involved information collection under the Paperwork Reduction Act. An announcement published in January 2023 made them effective on July 20, 2023. Health systems that had not built the counting and opt-out machinery by then were out of time. Those that had used the delay to centralize their automated calling were ready.

Outbound identity stayed on the agenda. In August 2025, the FCC published rules, effective September 18, 2025, on providers that rely on third parties to sign calls. The provider with the obligation must make the attestation-level decisions, and calls must be signed with that provider’s own certificate. Providers had to obtain their own service provider code token, and the rules added recordkeeping for third-party arrangements. The rules also confirmed that the originating provider remains responsible for vetting customers and for its criteria for full attestation. The same document recalled an earlier Commission observation that hospitals and 911 centers had reported robocall surges disabling or disrupting their networks.

What held up was the two-way structure. Regulators kept tightening who may sign a call and on what basis, which kept the enterprise calling arrangements of hospitals and their vendors in scope. The 2025 rules put the attestation decision firmly with the originating provider, which is the party a hospital’s vendor contracts need to reach. What no rule could supply was the hospital side. Ownership of outbound identity and combined call counting depended on each health system’s own organization.

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  • TRACED Act
  • robocalls
  • STIR/SHAKEN
  • TCPA
  • patient communication